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ABSTRACT
Terminal illness and the prospect of a painful and protracted dying process created new 
medical realities for Western culture in recent decades. Patients challenged traditional medical 
canons against medical killing by requesting changes in laws to allow physician assistance with 
suicide (PAS). This challenge occurred within a broader cultural context where core principles 
of medical common morality (beneficence, patient autonomy, and justice) were questioned.
A new study of medical killing is warranted because ethical changes are occurring in 
current issues surrounding doctors and patients (for example, humanism and autonomy, rights, 
justice, and the morality of medical killing). Furthermore PAS proponents argue that sometimes 
there is a moral obligation for beneficent medicine to allay suffering; that is, a doctor must kill 
or assist his patient’s suicide. This thesis explores the possible influence that John Stuart Mill’s 
hedonistic-utilitarianism (HU) exerts on one aspect of medical killing, the philosophy and 
practice of PAS.
This study clarifies certain features of the PAS debate and demonstrates weaknesses 
inherent in HU that impact adversely on medical canons and doctor-patient relationships 
(DPR). Six features within the PAS debate are examined for HU influence. Chapter 1 
delineates how Mill’s key utilitarian pleasure-is-happiness (PH) theme interacts with the topic 
of PAS in contemporary medico-cultural discussions. Chapter 2 surveys some epochal events in 
the development of rights, justice, and medical killing, while chapter 3 surveys similarly 
autonomy, physician paternalism, and sanctity of life (SL)~all in relationship to PAS. The final 
chapter isolates key HU weaknesses found in PAS arguments and offers moral concerns 
regarding the utilisation of HU claims to justify changing traditional medical canons to endorse 
PAS. The thesis contributes to the ongoing medical-ethical dialogue about medical killing by 
exploring the historical and ethical points crucial to future discussions of medical killing.
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INTRODUCTION
The advent of new medical technologies in the 1960s enabled physicians to extend life 
well beyond its natural limits. The dying process oftentimes became a painful and protracted 
event for terminally ill patients with few people in Western culture having been left untouched 
in some way by this healthcare scenario. As this sort of medical occurrence continued, by the 
1990s a new medical reality emerged. Some patients, in an attempt to escape the harsh 
possibility of this sort of dying process, began to request a change in laws to allow medical 
assistance with suicide.1 The request for physician-assisted suicide (PAS) itself, along with 
other forms of physician-aid-in-dying, presented a challenge to traditional medical canons 
against medical killing.2 The challenge of PAS occurred within a much broader cultural context 
where traditional core principles of medical common morality (like beneficence, patient 
autonomy, and justice) began to be questioned.3 Overall, the medical community faced 
questions on several fronts that challenged the foundation of established medical practice. Even 
as cultural and ethical concerns with medicine were growing, fresh philosophical concerns 
surfaced in other quarters.
Philosophers began to examine all facets of the current state of medicine. Indeed, the 
same decade of the 1960s gave rise to numerous articles, books, and studies on the implications 
of ethical concerns upon medical practice. Despite this voluminous corpus of material, a new 
study of medical killing is warranted for two reasons. First, this thesis will present an
Daniel Callahan, “Foreword,” in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical, and Legal 
Perspectives, ed. John Keown, reprint edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
xiii-xiv.
2Ibid.
3Discussions of beneficence usually include the topic of nonmaleficence; likewise, 
patient autonomy gives rise to a discussion of physician paternalism. Please see ch. 3 for a 
discussion of these themes as they relate to PAS.
1
examination of the ethical changes in current issues surrounding doctors and patients (for 
example, humanism and autonomy, rights, justice, and the morality of medical killing) from the 
perspective of selected historical periods where changes related to these basic issues also 
occurred. The author believes that these previous periods offer excellent background material 
that can illuminate selected aspects of proposed cultural and philosophical changes in medical 
canons regarding medical killing. Such an examination of historical links can broaden and 
inform the current debate that surrounds proposed changes within medicine.
A further reason for a new study includes a current ethical claim that sometimes there is 
a moral obligation for beneficent medicine to allay suffering. This can result in a doctor killing 
or assisting a patient’s suicide. While much has been written for and against medical killing 
and physician-assistance-with-suicide, this thesis will examine the subject from a fresh 
perspective. It explores the possible influence that John Stuart Mill’s philosophical approach 
(hedonistic-utilitarianism [HU]) exerts on one aspect of medical killing. The topic at hand is 
the philosophy and practice of PAS.
Mill’s form of utilitarianism has long been recognised as a useful philosophical 
framework for social policy aimed toward improving the conditions of human life by the 
exercise of rational principles.4 John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) championed this notion as a 
catalyst for social change, and his writings, while gaining wide acclaim in his era, have 
continued to exert broad influence in the more than one hundred years since he penned them.
An example of Mill’s current influence includes contemporary philosophers and 
medical-ethicists who cite portions of his arguments to support claims within the medical- 
ethical arena.5 Mill centred his philosophy on several core issues which figure prominently in
4William L. Davidson, Political Thought in England: The Utilitarians from Bentham to 
J. S. Mill (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1916), 8-9.
5Margaret Pabst Battin, The Least Worst Death: Essays in Bioethics on the End o f Life 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 278; 286, footnote 9; Margaret Pabst Battin, The 
Death Debate: Ethical Issues in Suicide (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 169; 
Sheila McLean and Alison Britton, The Case for Physician Assisted Suicide (London: Pandora,
the current medical-ethical climate: PAS, autonomy, rights, and justice. An examination of his 
philosophy is important in this instance because it leads to a significant research question- 
whether HU provides sufficient moral ground to warrant a change in medical canons regarding 
medical killing.
The research question is unique in that no other study to date deals specifically with 
Mill’s philosophy in relation to PAS. Van Zyl’s work approaches the subject of medical killing 
(euthanasia) from a virtues-orientation.6 Battin does write on PAS and makes isolated 
references to Mill, but she does not address PAS from Mill’s hedonistic-utilitarian perspective.7 
Singer addresses the subject of medical killing in his writings from a preference utilitarian 
perspective which differs somewhat from Mill’s approach.8 None of the above discussions 
includes the pleasure-is-happiness (PH) theme, which is central to Mill’s theory and which 
could influence patient decisions regarding PAS.
Influence of John Stuart Mill
As far back as ancient Greece, moral theories about what an individual ought to do 
usually contained at legist two basic components: a view about what is “good” (a theory of 
value) and some theory of what constitutes the “right” (a theory of action).9 The latter 
component, a theory of what constitutes “rightness,” dictated how individuals ought to act in
1997), 29; and Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles o f Biomedical Ethics,
4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 125, 276-77,285, 334.
6Liezl Van Zyl, Death and Compassion: A Virtue-Based Approach to Euthanasia 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2000), 7.
7Battin, Least Worst Death, 26. Battin explores a range of views on suicide, voluntary 
euthanasia, and suicide, and states that she is “ambivalent” about the issues surrounding these 
avenues of death. See also Battin, Death Debate, 199. Battin writes that views about PAS are 
in an “extreme state of flux.” She does not settle on any one philosophical view related to PAS.
8Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 94.
9Philip Pettit, “Consequentialism,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: 
Blackwell, reprint ed., 1994), 230.
response to what was valued.10 Like the ancient Greeks, John Stuart Mill’s HU contains these 
two structural components as well. However, Mill further clarified how action should follow 
value when he added that “all action is for the sake of some end,” and that rules of action must 
take their “whole character” from the end to which they are “subservient.”11 In other words, 
one’s actions, according to HU, must have in end view the maximisation of that which is 
valued; namely, in Mill’s theory, pleasure-happiness (PH) for the many. For Mill and the 
hedonistic-utilitarian, actions are right when actions maximise pleasure-happiness, or, 
conversely, minimise pain-unhappiness.12 Mill’s theory, as has been stated previously, contains 
a pervasive moral outlook that has been applied to a broad range of spheres, one of which is the 
medical-ethical arena.13
Conceptually, classical HU draws support from Mill’s early reliance upon Ancient 
Greek philosophy.14 Mill believed he was providing correction to the ages’-long speculation 
regarding the summum bonum and the controversy surrounding the nature, or the essence, of 
what constitutes the concept.15 Mill’s venture into the conflict to isolate and define both the 
supreme good (theory of value) and rules of action to attain that supreme good (theory of 
action) resulted in the fresh theory of social reform known as Hedonistic-Utilitarianism.16 In
10Ibid.
11 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1987), 10. This 
approach to ethics reflected Mill’s attempt to correct the social ills of his generation (e.g. 
women’s suffrage). Mill’s philosophy, with its antipathy toward deontological ethics, 
represented something of a watershed for teleological (consequential) theories in moral 
philosophy.
12Ibid., 16-17. It is well-recognised that Mill forwarded the theory that actions are 
“right” in proportion to the degree that they tend to promote happiness (pleasure) for the many.
13 See thesis, 2.
14See thesis, 10, for a description of the proposed philosophical roots of Mill’s 
philosophy.
15Mill, Utilitarianism, 9.
16See David Cook, The Moral Maze: A Way o f Exploring Christian Ethics (London: 
S.P.C.K., reprint edition, 2001), 32. Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions
5postulating such a theory, however, Mill moved conceptually beyond ancient Greek 
philosophy. Mill set himself against the notion of an a priori awareness of moral principles. He 
set the philosophical boundaries clearly in a realm that was outside of intuitionism when he 
delimited “moral instinct” as a sufficient guide for moral decision-making by subordinating it 
to the principle o f utility (author’s italics).17
Moral decision-making was important to Mill’s enterprise as a means of requiring a 
person’s decision-making and the subsequent action to derive from the principle of utility.18 
Mill’s bold solution to the ongoing debate about moral decision-making was his claim that his 
theory (HU) provided a suitable “ultimate moral standard” by which to settle differences of 
opinion about the best way to make moral decisions.19 Mill went so far as to state that the 
greatest happiness theory formed an “indispensable” basis for moral decision-making even for 
those who “scorned” its principles.20 His boldness extended to the level of claiming that 
pleasure-happiness was the supreme good and that right actions either maximised pleasure- 
happiness, or the converse, that right actions minimised pain-unhappiness.21 Mill believed that
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 41. Anthony Quinton, “Utilitarian Ethics,” in 
New Studies in Ethics: Modern Theories, vol. 2, ed. W. D. Hudson (New York; Saint Martin’s 
Press, 1970), 1. Mill’s theory is widely recognised as a treatise on social and political reform.
17Mill, Utilitarianism, 11,13. Mill believed that a moral instinct, itself, was one of the 
matters in dispute when determining theories of right action. He believed that a person’s moral 
faculty provided only a general principle of moral judgment. See thesis, 10-11.
18Mill, Utilitarianism, 39-48. Mill names two sanctions that oblige individuals to 
promote the general happiness: external and internal. External sanctions are the hope of favour 
and the fear of displeasure from a person’s fellow creatures or from the “Ruler of the 
Universe” (40). The internal sanction is a sense of conscience or individual duty (41-42). 
Bentham names four sanctions: physical, political, moral, and religious. See also Jeremy 
Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles o f Morals and Legislation, with an introduction by 
Laurence J. Lafleur (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948), 24.
19Mill, Utilitarianism, 12.
20Ibid., 12-13. This claim concerning the “indispensable” basis of Mill’s GHP was 
questioned as much then as it is now.
21Ibid., 16-17.
6individuals always seek their own pleasure or, at least, to minimise their own pain.22 His hybrid 
philosophy made normative this pleasure concept when he claimed further that individuals 
should act so as to maximise pleasure-happiness for the many, or at least minimise pain- 
unhappiness for the many.23 Such actions, for Mill, were adjudged as right or wrong based 
upon the “goodness” (non-moral) or “badness” of the results. “Goodness” or rightness of an 
action meant that pleasure-happiness for the many was maximised, or that pain-unhappiness 
was minimised for the many. The “badness” or wrongness of an action would mean that 
pleasure-happiness for the many was somehow restricted, or that pain-unhappiness for the 
many was increased. Mill’s theory did not appear suddenly, however, devoid of context.
Indeed, his moral conceptualising emerged from within a specific era, characterised in part by a 
rise in philosophical and scientific empiricism and an exploration of the causes of, and 
solutions for, the complex social problems of the age. Mill’s writing was an attempt to bring 
about reform within that specific setting.
Historical Background
Prior to the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) had originated an 
instrument of social reform, utilitarianism, that he and others (including Mill) would use in an 
attempt to counter the weight of English tradition.24 Excesses connected with the French 
Revolution had produced a strong political and social reaction in England, which led to an
22Ibid., 54. This was an empirical fact to Mill and constituted the basis of his shift from 
psychological hedonism to ethical hedonism.
23Piers Benn, Ethics (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 61. John 
Finnis, Fundamentals o f Ethics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 983), 83. 
Consequentialism is inherent in Mill’s theory and forms the larger umbrella under which HU 
stands.
24Frederick Copleston, A History o f Philosophy: Modern Philosophy, vol. 8 (New York: 
Image Books, 1994), 3. Benthamism, specifically, and utilitarianism, generally, “expressed the 
attitude of liberal and radical elements in the middle class to the weight of tradition and to the 
vested interests of what is now often called the Establishment.” Utilitarianism was an 
instrument used to facilitate social and political reforms.----
emphasis upon, and return to, social stability and tradition.25 Bentham and others provided 
philosophical challenges to this perceived restrictive status quo. These reformers proved to be 
influential as British social philosophy in the nineteenth century passed through three 
successive phases with utilitarianism occupying the first two: Philosophical Radicalism 
(associated with Bentham); Benthamism modified and developed by John Stuart Mill; and 
Idealism.26 Jeremy Bentham, one of John Stuart Mill’s mentors, is recognised as a bridge 
between late 18th and 19th century empiricism, but his brand of empiricism varied from the 
previous classical British empiricism 27 Bentham, like Hume (“Treatise of Human Nature”) 
sought to apply the method of experimental reasoning to moral subjects.
Like Bentham, John Stuart Mill’s approach adhered to empiricism, which means Mill 
believed that knowledge is based upon experience through the senses.28 He also held fast to 
associationism, in that he believed that the mind’s workings depend on law-governed 
associations of ideas with one-another.29 Jeremy Bentham and James Mill (1773-1836, John 
Stuart Mill’s father), provided the influence for John Stuart Mill to adopt, as well as to adapt,
25Ibid., 8:3.
26Ibid. The third, Idealism, was quite different from utilitarianism.
27Ibid., 8:2. The former had been concerned with the “nature, scope and limits of human 
knowledge,” while the utilitarian movement was essentially practical in focus, “oriented 
towards legal, penal and political reform.” The continuity between both was evident in the 
method of reductive analysis or the reduction of the whole to its simple elements or parts. 
Bentham carried forward this element of empiricism.
28John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, edited by Roger Crisp, 8. See also Elizabeth S. 
Anderson, “John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living,” in Mill’s Utilitarianism: Critical 
Essays (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 123. Conceptions of the good 
according to Mill, then, must be tested by “the experiences we have in living them out, not 
merely by comparing them with ethical intuitions.” Mill rejected the view that a person could 
know about the good singularly through a priori intuitions.
29Mill, Utilitarianism, edited by Roger Crisp, 8. See also Copleston, 8:29. 
Associationism figured prominently in Mill’s method of linking goods, like virtue or money or 
fame, to the good, happiness. The former goods, in Mill’s estimation, cannot properly be 
described as happiness, but a person can explain them as being sought for their own sake 
through an association o f ideas. Ultimately, a good, like virtue for example, comes to be 
associated with happiness and is seen as a constituent part of it.
these ideas for his own use.30 John Stuart Mill also was influenced by Auguste Comte, who 
stressed the acquisition of knowledge through accepted methods of science.31 Mill, as a result, 
came to believe that it was possible for a person to apply the methods of physical science to 
moral and social phenomena. Through the impact of all of these influences, Mill’s 
amalgamated approach, which attempted to blend science with morality, embraced 
Utilitarianism, a construct which, in turn, supplied him with a critical framework for the 
conveyance of his ideas. While Mill amplified Bentham’s utilitarian framework he never 
deserted entirely Bentham’s utilitarianism.32 In fact, Mill states that it became his “creed,” 
“doctrine,” and “philosophy.”33
Basis of Mill’s Utilitarianism 
The purpose of Mill’s philosophical thinking was to answer the question “How should 
one live?” To answer such a question would involve answering three further questions: “What 
is happiness?” “What is the relation between happiness and morality?” and “What is the
30Copleston, 8:29. See also John Stuart Mill, Autobiography o f John Stuart Mill, with a 
preface by John Jacob Coss (New York: Columbia University Press, Kessinger’s Rare Mystical 
Reprint edition,1924), 36-39,45, and 47. James Mill was a strict Benthamite and the younger 
Mill was educated in Benthamism. James Mill also held to associationist psychology which he 
passed on to John Stuart Mill. However, John Stuart Mill, in his work and writings, effectively 
undermined Bentham’s framework with his qualitative move into a “valued pleasure.”
31Mill, Autobiography, 146-47. He was indebted to Comte’s “Inverse Deductive 
Method,” whereby a person obtains “generalizations by a collation of specific experience, and 
verifies them by ascertaining whether they are such as would follow from known general 
principles.” Mill stressed further that Comte had influenced his thinking at the point of the 
“moral and intellectual ascendancy,” an influence formerly exercised by priests, and which 
Comte envisioned now passing from priests to philosophers. At the same time, Mill did not 
agree with Comte’s practical system that a hierarchy of philosophers would possess the same 
spiritual supremacy that priests in the Catholic Church had once possessed. Mill’s emphasis 
upon elevating and protecting individuality and personal liberties precluded Mill’s adoption of 
Comte’s assumptions at this point (149). See also Copleston, 8:16. Mill sought to employ a 
scientific method in morals and politics. Of course, the feasibility of such a moral approach has 
been the subject of much debate.
32Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. by Roger Crisp, 8.
33Mill, Autobiography, 47. ----
morally right way to live or act? Mill sought to address these three central questions in 
Utilitarianism.34 His overall aim was not to write about how the world is, but to explore how it 
should be. In order to establish a basis for this ethical approach, Mill chose, as his foundational 
principle, the same principle as Bentham did, the Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP).
Hedonism, or the view that happiness consists in pleasure, had been given, up to that 
time, its most sophisticated development by Bentham,35 who reasoned that the happiest life was 
the one that, simply, consisted in the greatest amount of pleasure over pain.36 Bentham had 
claimed that pleasure was a “kind of sensation, common to all those experiences described as 
enjoyable or as contributing to the value of a life to the person living it.”37 For Bentham, “pain” 
referred to all experiences, both physical pain and mental suffering, which people found to be 
objectionable.38 Bentham’s empirical and quantitative method had led him to postulate that all 
pleasures and pains are structurally similar sensations, so it would be possible to construct a 
felicific calculus in order to measure the various courses of action one might employ in order 
to derive the expected utility of any given action.39 This Benthamic approach helped to form 
the basis for John Stuart Mill’s philosophy.40
34Mill, Utilitarianism, edited by Roger Crisp, 5.
35Crisp, 10. See also Copleston, 8:8. Hedonism was not a novel doctrine, but Bentham, 
according to Copleston, gave a “memorable” statement of it.
36Crisp, 10.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Ibid. Mill’s background in empiricism and associationism coloured his understanding 
of pleasurable physical and mental states. Mill integrated his philosophical and psychological 
frameworks into a revised utilitarian philosophy. An awareness of Mill’s attempt at a tri-partite 
blending is important to understand how he aimed to craft a practical, working moral 
philosophy. See also Henry R. West, An Introduction to Mill’s Utilitarian Ethics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10. West states, “There can be little question that John 
Stuart Mill’s moral philosophy cannot be rightly understood without reference to the 
psychological framework within which he developed it, and from within which he attempted to 
explain it.”
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Following after Bentham, Mill further defined Utilitarianism: “The creed which accepts 
as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that right 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; 
by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”41 Mill assumed that there must be either a 
single principle at the root of all morality, or, if there are several, there is to be a determinate 
order of preference to them 42 The GHP answered the need for a unifying principle in Mill’s 
mind. He also recognised there would be challenges to his claim and he sought to answer them. 
Mill’s hedonistic-utilitarian theory, together with challenges leveled against it, invites 
thoughtful exposition and critique.
Exposition and Critique of Mill’s HU
Mill’s HU: Theory of Value
Mill supported the utilitarian view by his defence of the same in his 1863 treatise, 
Utilitarianism.43 In the first chapter he provided a brief critique of alternative a priori 
(intuitive) ethical theories. In so doing, he sought to demonstrate the superior strength of a 
utilitarian (inductive/empirical) approach. In contrast to an intuitive moral approach, Mill did 
not believe that there was a “moral sense” that enabled a person to discern what was right and 
wrong in each particular case,44 instead, he believed that a person’s “moral sense” was but an 
outgrowth of his reason. Observation and experience was sufficient, in his scheme, to supply a
41Mill, Utilitarianism, 16-17; see also Bentham, Principles, 2.
42West, 31-32; and Mill, Utilitarianism, 1,3.
43Mill, Utilitarianism, 13; and West, 28. The thesis author has chosen to critique Mill’s 
approach by examining the two basic components of the theory: value and action.
44Crisp, 22. Mill was willing, however, to admit a moral sense by which a person can 
grasp general moral principles. See also West, 170.
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person with what was a right action in any particular circumstance.45 Mill believed that the 
GHP played a significant role in shaping moral doctrines—even of those who rejected its 
authority—because he believed that a person’s feelings could not help but be shaped by what 
he or she supposed to be the effect of experiences upon his or her happiness.46 Mill’s chief 
claims concerning utility is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end.47
Critical Assumptions
Even in Mill’s polite opening “defence” of utilitarianism he assumed several things.
One of his assumptions was that morals and legislation are practical arts—meaning that they 
are derived scientifically, thereby discounting (rejecting) an a priori intuitive approach to 
morals. He also assumed a teleological view of morality,48 with pleasure-happiness serving as 
the summum bonum as defined by the GHP. His utilitarian theory of morality meant that 
actions were considered to be right or wrong as they tended to produce happiness or 
unhappiness.
Rather than offering a careful critique of the a priori approach, Mill actually offered 
specific alternatives in order to establish the moral theory he then developed in his remaining 
chapters of Utilitarianism. Mill intended to respond to objections by clarifying his adaptation 
of the primary tenets of utilitarianism—both within the framework of its theory of value and its 
theory of action.49
Mill’s defence of utilitarianism in chapter one is based on assumptions that presuppose 
a structure to a moral theory. Mill sought to base his argument on hedonistic principles that he
45West, 170.
46Ibid., 171.
47Mill, Utilitarianism, 49.
48Ibid., 10; and West, 31.
49The utilitarian theory as conceived by Bentham had received challenges, the force of 
which Mill sought to blunt or refute entirely. See Mill, Utilitarinianism, 14, 15-38.
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claims originated in Ancient Greece. He believed that the two schools of thought, inductive and 
intuitive, were rooted there by reference to Socrates’ argument for hedonism in the 
Protagoras.50 Essentially, Socrates was believed by Mill to hold to the idea that pleasure and 
pain were intrinsically good and bad, respectively, and that this principle formed the ultimate 
standard for moral reasoning.
Mill followed the same approach when seeking to respond to critics of utilitarianism.
He believed that his opponents unconsciously used the principle of utility and that without it 
they had no ultimate standard.51 Therefore, Mill’s assumptions concerning the a priori school 
actually imposed a structural condition upon ethics that makes it difficult to consider eligible 
alternatives.52 While this approach worked for Mill, it actually begged the question against “the 
most fundamental characteristics of intuitive ethics.”53 In Mill’s mind, overall “moral 
obligation depended entirely upon the intrinsic worth of the intended or expected results.”54
50West, 29.
51Mill, Utilitarianism, 11; and West, 30.
52 West, 31.
53Ibid., 32. While elements of both the deontological and the teleological can be found 
in any particular ethical theory, intuitionism was ruled out by Mill when he assumed a 
teleological classification and a single principle at the root of all morality. Mill’s teleological 
approach did not adhere to the deontological requirement that there were certain duties 
inherently incumbent upon a person. The concept of intuitionism also allows for a number of 
possible first principles, a notion that Mill disallowed. See John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, rev. ed., 1999), 34.
54In Mill’s view, “All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, its seems 
natural to suppose, must take their whole character and color from the end to which they are 
subservient.” Mill, Utilitarianism, 10; and West, 32. West states that such a view falls within 
the realm of “result” theory. Mill, by assuming that rules take their character from the end they 
serve is to presuppose that a consequentialist theory is the proper one. This thesis, for example, 
examines the implications of Mill’s consequentialist view relative to medical concerns 
surrounding challenges to proscriptions against medical killing and the determination if, 
indeed, Mill’s presupposition may be supported as a proper foundation for future legal action.
Mill never addressed the fact that the very nature of an act sometimes was a 
determining factor in a person’s moral duty to act in a specific way. Mill stood against the 
“formalist theory” school that held that the “nature” of the act is “sometimes an important fact 
bearing on whether there is a moral obligation to perform or avoid it”; for example, whether.it 
is a lie or a breach of promise—something about it differs from the inherent worth of actual or
13
Mill assumed that HU was the best alternative among the many moral theories where moral 
obligation was based upon the intrinsic worth of the actual or expected results.55
Mill claims that the only proof that PH is the summum bonum is that people actually 
desire PH.56 This raises a question concerning the elusive quality of actual ordinary individual 
preferences and presents a difficulty when a person might prefer something different if he or 
she were more fully informed and what he or she might prefer if such a preference actually 
were to occur.57 An uninformed preference may fail to coincide with “what. . .  an individual 
would prefer if he became informed.”58 Furthermore, numerous social forces contribute to what 
a person wants, or is capable of wanting, so it is not just a simple matter of a person’s desire.59
Mill’s assumption was that there must be a single principle at the root of all morality, or 
that such a principle would be placed first in order of preference among multiple principles. He 
dismissed intuitive theories because a prominent general feature of these types of theories is the 
plurality of principles with no set procedure for settling decision-making conflicts between 
them.60
expected consequences. West, 32; see also Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problems o f  
Normative and Critical Ethics, Prentice-Hall Philosophy Series, ed. Arthur E. Murphy 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959), 354-55.
55West, 33. See G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 135-36, and 145. It is also possible for a consequentialist theory to 
“give preference to the agent or those who are in special relations to the agent in counting the 
significance of the results.” Mill’s approach differed from Benthamism’s analysis of the 
dimensions of pleasures and pains.
56Mill, Utilitarianism, 50.
57 J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, repr. ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 147. This sort of difficulty with hedonism 
holds implications for end-of-life decision-making. A criticism of PAS and VAE is that 
patients have had limited awareness of end-of-life alternatives to a stated desired preference for 
medical killing.
58Ibid.
59Ibid.
60West, 34. For Mill to assert that there must be a first principle or an order of 
preference among principles, assumes that any theory that lacks such features is insufficient as
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Another reason for Mill’s dismissal of a priori moral theories was his belief that they 
“prevented rational criticism and reform of existing moral and social practices.”61 Mill adhered 
to the belief that the question of a person’s duty was open to discussion like any other question. 
He believed that changes could be expected not only in a person’s opinions on such a subject 
but also in “progress of intelligence,” from “more authentic and enlarged experience,” and 
from “changes in the condition of the human race.” Such changes would require “altered rules 
of conduct.”62 While Mill defended his theory and further clarified his foundational 
assumptions, questions also arose that challenged hedonism itself.
Challenges to Mill’s Hedonism as a Theory of Value ,
By 1870, opponents of hedonism were challenging Mill’s theory in broad general 
terms.63 Specifically, however, Mill sought to defend Utilitarianism against the more narrow 
objection that life had no higher end than pleasure and that utilitarianism was a “pig” 
philosophy64—a specific objection directed toward Bentham’s quantitative hedonism. In 
response to objections that hedonism was a doctrine only worthy of swine, Mill introduced the 
notion of qualitative differences between pleasures. His reply was that if humans were capable 
of only those pleasures suitable for swine, then the same rule of life could govern both humans 
and swine. Instead, Mill states that human beings have more elevated faculties than animal 
appetites, and once individuals are made aware of their higher faculties, they do not regard
a moral theory. See also Rawls, Theory o f Justice, 34. Rawls’s definition of intuitive theories 
includes this feature.
61West, 43.
62Ibid. See also Mill, Autobiography, 158-59. Mill held to a progressively developing 
morality.
63John Grote challenged Mill on the grounds of ambiguity, and Joseph Mayor 
challenged him on the grounds of false analogies. G. E. Moore questioned Mill’s “naturalistic 
fallacy,” and Gorge Sabine exposed what he considered to be Mill’s fallacious argumentation. 
See discussion of these early challenges in West, 119-20.
64Mill, Utilitarianism, 17.
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anything as happiness that does not include the satisfaction of them.65 He reasons that it is quite 
compatible with utility to recognise the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and 
valuable than others.66 However, in seeking to allay the chief objection that HU was little more 
than a swine theory, Mill’s response only introduced a fresh difficulty to his theory.
The Challenge Related to Quantitative and Qualitative Pleasure
Bentham had proposed specific criteria for measuring the value of any pleasurable 
experience.67 He believed that all pleasures were measurable on a single scale and that the best 
life for a person would consist in the greatest balance of pleasurable experiences over painful 
ones. For example, it could be worth undergoing a painful medical operation in the short term 
in order to produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain in the long run. According to 
Bentham, all pleasures and pains were structurally similar sensations and it would be possible 
to construct a feliciflc calculus in order to measure the value of various courses of action.68
In response to people who thought Bentham’s calculus could itself lead to 
unhappiness,69 John Stuart Mill explored further the idea that the very nature o f the pleasure in 
question was important.70 Mill argued that greater quantity alone could not make one pleasure
65West, 48-49. Mill includes among the higher faculties the intellect, the feelings and 
imagination, and the moral sentiments. See also Mill, Utilitarianism, 17-18.
66Mill, Utilitarianism, 18. The more desirable pleasure was the one that, in Mill’s 
scheme, once two pleasures were experienced, was given a decided preference.
67Bentham, Principles, 29-30. Bentham names seven overall circumstances for a 
person, or a number of persons, to evaluate pleasures and pains: intensity, duration, certainty or 
uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent.
68Ibid., 29-32.
69The prospect of living a life of lower pleasures, because it consists of greater duration 
when compared to a shorter life of higher pleasures, was distasteful and raised objections to 
HU. Mill sought to allay the objections by introducing a qualitative dimension to PH.
According to Mill, some kinds of pleasure were both more desirable and more valuable. Mill 
names the intellect, the feelings and imagination, and the moral sentiments, as examples of the 
higher faculties. See West 69-73.
70Mill, Utilitarianism, 17-18.
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higher than another.71 This claim led people to charge Mill with deserting hedonism. They 
reasoned that to remain a hedonist Mill must accept that pleasure was the only value.
Such a claim against Mill assumed that there was only one variety of hedonism, an 
assumption Mill would himself deny. Like Bentham, Mill believed that pleasure was the only 
good-making property but, unlike Bentham, he believed that the value of pleasure was 
determined also by its nature?2 Mill’s distinction, indeed, had stretched his hedonism to its 
known limits, for now Mill’s hedonism would require a more complex calculus in order to 
evaluate both quantity and quality of pleasure. Notwithstanding the stresses that Mill’s 
qualitative dimension added to hedonism, there were also significant problems raised by his 
qualitative method and application of his argument for hedonism.
The Challenge Related to the Structure and Application 
of Key Argument
Chapter four of Utilitarianism contains Mill’s key argument, for it is here that he seeks 
to lay the groundwork for hedonism as the “valuational foundation for all of life and for 
morality as a part of that.”73 The core structure of Mill’s system is that happiness is desirable 
and the only thing that is desirable.74 To the claim that happiness is desirable, Mill presents his 
method in three statements: 1) “ . . .  The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is 
desirable is that people do actually desire it;” 2) “. . .  each person, so far as he believes it to be
71West, 48-49; and Mill, Utilitarianism, 18.
72Mill, Utilitarianism, 18.
73West, 119. Even though the chapter in Utilitarianism is only twelve paragraphs long, 
West states that considerable disagreement exists concerning how to interpret Mill’s argument.
74Mill, Utilitarianism, 50.
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attainable, desires his own happiness;” and 3) “ . . .  each person’s happiness is a good 
(desirable75) to that person. . .  .”76
The first challenge to Mill’s method derives from his first statement. Mill argues for 
what is desirable based upon what is desired. Such a claim is common to psychological 
hedonism, whether it is of a quantitative or qualitative variety. Mill’s premise denied that a 
person intuits what is intrinsically good in some “directly cognitive way.”77 Pleasure is the 
good because it is what all people—ultimately—desire or aim toward.78 Mill believed it to be a 
true theory of human nature that pleasure is desired as the end.79 Mill seeks to deny an 
intellectual intuition of the normative ends of conduct. His claim rules out the possibility that a 
person intuits what is intrinsically good in a directly cognitive way and he also denies that there 
is an “overarching physical or metaphysical structure on the basis of which normative ends of 
conduct can be determined.”80 A critique of Mill’s claim is the counter argument that a person 
does not desire certain things (knowledge or virtue, for example) because such things give him 
or her pleasure. People choose certain things, for example knowledge or virtue, even if they 
bring no pleasure at all.81 Mill would argue that for such a rebuttal to be valid, it must be shown
75West, 122. West believes that Mill substitutes “good” in the place of “desirable” 
simply for stylistic reasons.
76Ibid. William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2d ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1973), 85-87. Frankena states the same argument in similar language.
77West, 126.
78Frankena, 85. See also Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in The Essential Epicurus: 
Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments, trans. and with an introduction 
by Eugene O’Connor (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1993), 64-65.
79There is no logical necessity, however, to accept desire as the sole evidence for 
desirability. See West, 126.
80Ibid.
81 Aristotle, The Ethics o f Aristotle: The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson, 
revised with notes and appendices by Hugh Tredennick, and with an introduction and 
bibliography by Jonathan Barnes (New York: Penguin Books, rev. ed., 1976), 317-18.
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that knowledge, or virtue, can be intuited to be good as an end.82 Mill was attempting to 
demonstrate that a desire for virtue, for example, was due to a psychological association of 
virtue with pleasure, thereby accounting for any claim that virtue was intuited to be good as an 
end. In order to challenge Mill’s theory, a person must demonstrate that Mill’s claim—that 
pleasure is what a person desires—cannot be the normative case because people often desire 
things other than pleasure and desire such things without having pleasure as an ultimate goal.83
The second challenge to Mill’s method derives from his second statement and assumes 
a universalisation of psychological hedonism. Utilitarian doctrine reflects upon the basis and 
nature of a foundational principle of morality—the maximisation of the happiness of the 
many.84 Yet, a challenge to such a view is that there is no clear reason why morality is to be 
judged solely in terms of the good to be promoted.85 It may be reasoned that morality consists 
in “certain categorical requirements” that “apply regardless of the good.”86
The third challenge to Mill’s method is an enduring problem concerning the move from 
individual happiness to aggregate happiness. Mill assumed that the value of “different instances 
of happiness” can be “summed up to generate a larger good.”87 A problem within Mill’s theory 
surfaces when he assumes that happiness can be summed up to find a general or aggregate total 
of happiness. Mill’s assertion was offered simply without explanation or argument. He 
believed that the “general happiness” was a “mere sum of instances of individual happiness.”88
82West, 126-27.
83Aristotle, 318. Aristotle denied that pleasure was the Good.
84West, 123; and see Mill, Utilitarianism, 50.
85Crisp, 25.
86Ibid.
87West, 141. Mill reasoned that since “A’s” happiness is a good, and “B’s” happiness is
a good, and “C’s” happiness is a good, then the sum of all these goods, even if they are 
different, must be a good. West cites Mill’s letter to Heniy Jones from The Later Letters o f 
John Stuart Mill 1849-1873. ^
88West, 140.
19
Mill believed that happiness was the “kind” of thing that constituted intrinsic welfare. He also 
assumed that the value of different instances of happiness could be thought of “as summed up 
to generate a larger good.”89 By these steps Mill believed it to be empirically obvious that 
happiness may be measured and summed.90 For Mill, the promotion of happiness is the test by 
which to judge all conduct, and from which it follows that happiness must be the criterion of 
morality. Mill does not make it clear who would be an unbiased judge, or how one would be 
able to judge, “felt experiences” because such experiences are seldom, if ever, simultaneous.91
The various difficulties with Mill’s method were not restricted to his theory of value 
alone, but also included his theory of action. Mill had sought to establish the two—the theory 
of value and the theory of action—as a working ethical theory, so the following section will 
now focus attention on the latter, and the challenges to his method.
Mill’s HU: Theory of Action 
Development of the Theory of Action
Jeremy Bentham and James Mill influenced J. S. Mill’s position on right and wrong 
action. Jeremy Bentham is well known for his detailed instructions for determining the 
“general tendency” of any act “by which the interests of a community are affected.”92 He 
accomplished this by means of his hedonic calculus, which was intended to provide a guide for 
measuring pleasures and pains produced by “acts.”93 Bentham assessed acts strictly by
89Ibid., 141.
90Mill, Utilitarianism, 81.
91West, 144.
92Bentham, Principles, 30.
93Fred R. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political 
Philosophy o f John Stuart Mill (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 74. Where 
numbers of persons are affected by acts, the calculus calls on one to judge pleasures and pains 
by a specific criteria: the intensity, duration, certainty and uncertainty, propinquity or 
remoteness, fecundity, purity, and extent. See also Bentham, Principles, 30.
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their consequences, even though he allowed for the necessity of useful social rules upon 
occasion.94
Like Bentham, James Mill (John Stuart Mill’s father) held that the morality of an 
act is dependent upon the consequences that the act will produce. The question of the rightness 
or wrongness of an act is dependent upon its consequences just as judging the morality of an
94Berger, 76. See Bentham’s discussion of the case of nonpayment of taxes; see also 
Bentham, Principles, 160-63.
In late twentieth-century terminology, it has become common to distinguish between 
two versions of utilitarianism—act utilitarianism (AU) and rule utilitarianism (RU). Act 
Utilitarians believe that an act is right only if it produces the best consequences among all 
possible acts an agent may perform. Rule Utilitarians hold that acts are only right if they are 
prescribed by rules which are, in turn, justified by the consequences that to which has been 
adopted or conformed. See Berger, 64. Objections were raised against AU, because it was 
believed that it would be too difficult to make decisions this way due, for example, to 
ignorance, bias, or a lack of time. Frankena, 40. RU was offered as a simpler alternative to AU; 
however, RU has been shown to dissolve into AU in certain circumstances and, therefore, is 
thought by some to be untenable. See Smart and Williams, 10-11.
Some utilitarians of late, based upon the difficulty with determining objectively “what 
is intrinsically good in any circumstance,” offer a variation on Mill’s classical HU by naming 
the good as “that which is subjectively desired or wanted.” The goal of such moral actions 
becomes the satisfaction of desires or wants. This approach is based upon individual 
preferences, and utility is measured in terms of an individual’s actual preferences rather than in 
terms of “intrinsically valuable experiences.” Preference utilitarianism (PU), as this approach 
is termed, is based upon what an individual prefers to obtain. Utility is translated into the 
satisfaction of individual needs and desires. Tom L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics: An 
Introduction to Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982), 115. To 
maximise individual utility, for a preference utilitarian, would be to maximise the satisfaction 
derived from what has been chosen or what a person would choose from available alternatives. 
To maximise the preference utility for all persons, who would be affected by a specific action 
or policy, would be to maximise the preference utility of an aggregate group. Even though 
these types of individual (or aggregate) preferences are permitted, this does not imply that the 
pleasure/pain characteristics are totally absent from consideration. Singer, 14. Singer 
acknowledges the suggestion, for example, that classical utilitarians like Bentham and Mill 
used “pleasure” and “pain” in a broad sense that allowed them to include achieving what one 
desired as a “pleasure” and the reverse as a “pain.” If this is the case, according to Singer, then 
the differences between classical utilitarianism and utilitarianism, based on interests, will 
disappear.
Neither Bentham, James Mill, nor J. S. Mill can rightly be classified under any o f the 
rubrics above, because these writers pre-date the classifications and held ideas that may have 
conformed to both AU and RU. This thesis applies Mill’s usage of the terms and word ideas of 
“act” and “rule” within Mill’s historical context. Current interpretations of Mill often assign 
expanded meanings, such as those defined above, to these terms, which Mill himself perhaps 
had not conceived or applied. Settling the ongoing discussion as to whether Mill was an act 
utilitarian, a rule utilitarian, or a combination of both, as defined by current theoretical 
definitions, need not be the chief focus in examining his moral approach.
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act is conducted by calculating the consequences.95 James Mill felt that most cases fell under 
general rules that were universally accepted, “so that a man can act upon them, as pre- 
established decisions, which he may trust.”96 The younger John Stuart Mill learned from both 
Bentham and his own father, but enlarged upon Bentham’s theory of action.
John Stuart Mill’s HU and Action
John Stuart Mill thought that the views of both Bentham and his father were too 
narrow, and that their conceptions of human happiness were inadequate.97 Mill’s own 
psychology made it possible for him to believe that people can desire things for their own 
sakes, and that these things can contribute to a person’s happiness though that person does not 
explicitly aim at happiness in a direct way. Mill also recognised the need for “internal culture” 
and happiness that would require the balancing of a person’s faculties, including the 
“emotional sensibilities.”98
As discussed earlier, Mill’s psychology was associationistic. He believed that 
psychology sought to establish general laws of the mind—meaning those laws “according to 
which one mental state succeeds another.”99 Essentially, these laws of association were 
ascertained by observation and experience. Mill believed that social science could supply a 
person with information that could form a basis from which he or she could frame moral
95Berger, 80. Berger cites James Mill, A Fragment on Macintosh (London: Longmans, 
Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1870), 162-63.
96Berger, 80; and Mill, Fragment, 163. While James Mill was writing to refute 
Macintosh’s claim that utilitarianism required too many calculations, it does show that he 
accepted the view that general rules of thumb were an accepted consideration for daily 
conduct.
97Berger, 82; and see Mill, Autobiography, 141-43, and 152-53. Mill believed some of 
the doctrines of his father and Jeremy Bentham were untenable.
98Berger, 83. Mill saw as important the various “instruments of human culture,” like 
music and poetry, to balance a person’s “faculties,” which is a notion other utilitarians had 
dismissed. See also Mill, Autobiography, 78,101.
"Berger, 87.
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guidelines for maximising, in his or her action, the achievement of the ultimate end.100 Yet, he 
also believed that rules of conduct were to be considered only as provisional. They were not to 
supersede, when time permitted, the scientific process for framing a rule from the data of 
particular cases. Noting the complexity of his views, it may be observed that Mill, like 
Bentham before him, sought to provide practical instruction in how to apply social science to 
morality.101
Mill’s HU: Action Based upon Consequences
The practical content of Mill’s utilitarianism states that the “right action in any 
circumstance” is the one “which produces the greatest overall balance of pleasure over pain.”102 
Mill’s utilitarian theory concerns what makes actions right.103
Criticism of Odd Consequences
Mill’s view is one that potentially produces odd consequences.104 Mill considered what 
effect his committing an act in a particular situation would have on the overall balance of good 
over evil. For example, in the case of truth-telling as a moral rule, an utilitarian might 
determine that truth-telling is for the greatest general good or that telling the truth is not for the 
greatest general good. A utilitarian would consider breaking a moral rule against lying if that
100Ibid., 89. “Rules of thumb” are guidelines which may be trusted for daily living, 
based upon positive consequences of past experience, and which are reliable for everyday rules 
of conduct. These rules, however, are guides only and may be dropped in favour of calculation 
whenever time and circumstances permit, or under unusual situations (ibid., 64).
101Ibid., 89. See also Mill, Utilitarianism, 35-36. Mills says that “. . .  mankind must by 
this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the effects of some action on their happiness; and 
the beliefs which have come down are the rules of morality for the multitude, and for the 
philosopher until he has succeeded in finding better.”
102Crisp, 14.
103Ibid., 18; see also Mill, Utilitarianism, 9.
104Ibid, 14-15.
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violation would lead to a greater amount of pleasure-happiness.105 While Mill attempts to 
produce right action, his calculus sometimes yields the odd consequence of undoing the 
benevolence HU aims toward. Telling a lie to a friend may increase the general happiness but it 
may also undermine a valuable friendship.106 In the case of telling a lie, it is impossible to 
assess the bad consequences of shaking human confidence in a person’s statements. It is also 
very difficult to know the effect of a solitary act (e.g., a lie), upon the larger scheme of human 
action and habit, when compared to the immediate pleasure it would bring.107 Mill’s 
counterargument was that the bad effect would be small in relation to the happiness of mankind 
and the pleasure to be gained,108 but this is not at all a certainty.109 Actions that maximise utility 
increase the likelihood of adverse individual effects.
Criticism of Extensive Calculations
Mill’s theory of action also produces unusual requirements. If Mill expected a person to 
calculate the full consequences of every act he or she would voluntarily perform, then these 
calculations could potentially be endless. Mill agreed that rules can guide daily conduct, based 
upon past experience and the sufficient reliability of such rules for ordinary matters.110
105Compare Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 118. See Crisp, 15. Yet, in order to 
produce a workable morality, most utilitarians currently do not express their view in terms of 
actual but expected outcomes of actions. An expected outcome of an action would be 
“calculated by multiplying the value of an outcome by the probability of its occurring.”
106Crisp, 21.
107Berger, 92.
108Ibid. Mill reasoned that the bad effect, the telling of a lie in this case, would be small 
in relation to the happiness of all mankind. An individual’s rights, however, may be adversely 
affected by such action to maximize the happiness of mankind (ibid., 124).
109Ibid, 124. This concern raises questions concerning duties of justice. These duties,
however, appear to have “bases in considerations other than consequences.” Furthermore, 
duties of justice may have bases in considerations (moral) other than whether, or not, a 
maximisation of good consequences has occurred. In this case a lie, even when localized 
among a few people, may be harmful to an individual or to a group of people.
110Berger, 64.
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One of the criticisms levelled against Mill is that an individual should not rely upon 
rules or generalizations from past experience. While rules and principles may be useful as 
guides, HU requires one to calculate anew the effects o f  all possible actions open to a decision­
maker every time a decision is to be made.111 This has been criticised as being simply 
impractical, if not impossible, to implement.
A counter response, of course, would be that such a course of action would generate
still another difficulty, because it is conceivable that in a certain situation, two acts, once all
calculations of good and evil are tallied, may result in the same hedonic score. However, it
might be that the first of the two acts involves breaking a promise or telling a lie or being
unjust, for example, while the second act includes none of these things. In this case, the
consistent utilitarian must say that both acts are equally right, because the consequence is the 
112same.
Even when employing general rules of thumb, utilitarians face challenges. A challenge 
is that applying moral rules themselves often produces conflict in moral life. There are 
circumstances, for example, that call for telling a lie to protect a confidence, or stealing in 
order to protect a life. In such cases, utilitarians must decide which kind of action, or rule, is to 
have priority; however the most relevant consideration for the utilitarian method is what kind 
of action will lead to the maximisation of pleasure, not necessarily the observance of a moral 
rule.
Summary
John Stuart Mill, indeed, followed his own father and Jeremy Bentham in further 
crafting and refining a theory introduced to bring about social and political reform. While not
11 frankena, 35-36; cf. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 117. Similarly, Beauchamp 
believes that past experience can provide general guidelines or “summary rules of thumb,” but 
these past experiences are not to be considered “unmodifiable prescriptions.”
112Compare Frankena, 36.
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specifically tailored, originally, to be a personal moral theory, it was only a matter of time until 
HU’s social and political constructs were applied to the individual realm and even to areas well 
beyond Mill’s initial focus. One of those areas, as already noted, is that of medicine and 
medical ethics.
The challenges to Mill’s brand of Hedonistic Utilitarianism, its assumptions, its theory 
of value, and resulting action, remained problematic not only during Mill’s lifetime, but across 
the next century, even to the present. The unresolved challenges continued to seek reasoned 
cohesion and integrity of method, if not solutions.
The specific challenge to hedonism itself as a “pig” philosophy, and the burden 
imposed upon Mill’s theory of HU to quantify and qualify the nature of PH, remained 
unresolved. Another unsettled challenge for Mill concerned what he considered to be an 
empirical fact— that pleasure is the good because it is what all people ultimately desire, or aim 
toward.
These tensions, compounded by the constructs of those who would further modify 
Mill’s concepts, accompanied Mill’s HU as it moved through the Enlightenment and modem 
eras. Notwithstanding the core unresolved tensions in Mill’s theory, HU has been applied 
throughout medical ethics in a number of key areas, not the least of which are circumstances 
related to medical end-of-life decision-making, which sometimes include PAS.
This study will answer the research question by clarifying certain features of the PAS 
debate and demonstrating weaknesses inherent in HU that impact adversely on medical canons 
and the doctor-patient relationship (DPR). Six features of the PAS debate, each used by PAS 
proponents, will be isolated and evaluated for HU influence. First, however, chapter 1 will 
address the research question by defining the terms of the current medical-ethical dialogue, 
delineating the philosophical background to Mill’s key utilitarian PH theme,113 including his
113The thesis covers other supporting themes in greater detail in chs. 2 and 3.
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links with ancient Greek philosophy and introducing how Mill’s HU theme interacts with the 
occurrence of PAS in contemporary medico-cultural debate.
The following chapter will examine three core features in the PAS debate by defining 
each one and by conducting an historical examination of the growth and development of each. 
The three features to be examined include rights, justice, and medical killing. These three 
features will be linked together because Mill believed rights and justice were intimately 
associated with one another and with the principle of utility. PAS advocates, as well, link the 
notions of rights and justice together as support for their claims to medical killing.
The historical development of autonomy, physician paternalism, and sanctity of life 
(SL), and examining the relationship of each of these areas to the debate within PAS, are the 
subjects of chapter 3. The final chapter will isolate key HU weaknesses found in claims or 
arguments in each of the six PAS debate features, will offer several moral concerns regarding 
the use of employing HU claims to justify changing medical canons to endorse PAS, will 
evaluate the impact HU exerts on the philosophy and practice of PAS, and will draw 
conclusions based on the research conducted in the first three chapters. The thesis, upon 
completion, will contribute to the wider ongoing medical-ethical dialogue about medical killing 
by exploring the broader historical and ethical views and providing points crucial to ethical 
considerations that will supplement future discussions of medical killing.
CHAPTER 1
HEDONISTIC-UTILITARIANISM
Before one can enter into the PAS ethical debate, one must understand the backdrop 
and evolution of the terms involved, the influence of Mill upon the topic, and the impact of his 
work upon the current medical-ethical ethos. The following definitions and core concepts 
comprise a foundational understanding of utilitarianism, particularly Mill’s HU, and provide a 
framework for the PAS discussion.
Utilitarianism: Definitions and Terms 
Dictionary Terminology
Utilitarianism, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), means “the 
doctrine that the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the guiding principle of 
conduct.”1 It also means “Utilitarian doctrine, principles, theories or practices...  .”2 The root 
concept is utility which the OED defines as “the ability, capacity, or power of a person, action, 
or thing to satisfy the needs or gratify the desires of the majority, or of the human race as a 
whole.”3 In philosophical usage there are four general categories of utilitarianism.
Distinguishing Utilitarianism in Its Varied Forms
Each of the four general divisions of utilitarianism may be distinguished by its political 
or moral approach.4 Economic utilitarianism is usually applied to the governmental realm
1Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed., s.v. “utilitarianism.” Henceforth, the Oxford 
English Dictionary will be referred to as the OED.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., s.v. “utility.”
4Robin Barrow, Utilitarianism'. A Contemporary Statement (Brookfield, VT: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Co., 1991), 40. See also Anthony Quinton, “Utilitarian Ethics,” in New 
Studies in Ethics: Modern Theories, vol. 2, ed. W. D. Hudson (New York: Saint Martin’s
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wherein any given policy might be evaluated by its usefulness.5 In ideal utilitarianism actions 
are right insofar as they serve various moral ends.6 This form of utilitarianism allows moral 
ends other than pleasure to be valued intrinsically.7 Another more recent variety of 
utilitarianism is the preference type. This approach differs from other forms, as Singer states, 
in that “best consequences” are understood as meaning essentially that which furthers the 
interest of those affected rather than merely what increases pleasure and reduces pain.8 Human 
good, in this case, would be viewed as constituting whatever satisfies a person’s preferences or 
desires. A fourth variety, and the subject of this thesis, is hedonistic utilitarianism, which 
claims that happiness or pleasure is the only ultimate end and that the rightness of any given 
action is to be determined by its tendency to produce or contribute to that end.9
Press, 1970), 3. Quinton also states that utilitarianism can be understood in three ways. It can 
be viewed as (1) a legal, political, and social reform movement of the early nineteenth century, 
(2) as the ideology of that reform movement, or (3) as an ethical theory. It is the ethical theory 
that is in view in this thesis.
5Barrow, 39-40. Barrow describes economic utilitarianism as being derived from 
government policies. The utility of a product or an activity is based upon its usefulness. This 
approach is not intended to be a moral one because its focus is an effective means to an end 
rather than a moral means to an end (ibid., 39).
6G. E. Moore was a leading proponent of this approach. Moore included beauty and 
friendship in the list of moral ends. Cf. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, revised edition, 1993); Barrow, 40; and Quinton, 4. Basically this variant of 
utilitarianism holds that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, but it is only one thing among others 
that are intrinsically valuable. Beauty and friendship are examples of other such moral ends. 
Beauchamp terms this as “pluralistic” utilitarianism. See Tom Beauchamp, Philosophical 
Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982), 83.
7Barrow, 40. See also Quinton, 6. Examples of other possible intrinsically valued ends 
would be: virtue, knowledge, and beauty. See also Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 81. An 
intrinsic value is one that a person wishes to own and enjoy for its own sake and not for 
“something to which it leads.”
8Singer, 14. See also Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 84.
9Barrow, 40. See also JanNarveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1967), 51. Narveson states that utilitarianism is usually described as a “species” 
of hedonism.
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The OED does not list the compound term “Hedonistic-Utilitarianism.” It does contain 
listings of various individual parts of the compound term, however. Hedonistic means 
“pertaining to hedonists, or of the nature of hedonism.”10 Hedonism, in turn, means “the 
doctrine or theory of ethics in which pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of 
action.”11 The resulting compound word, hedonistic-utilitarianism, denotes an idea of pleasure 
and happiness for the greatest number of persons, but there is more to the meaning of the term.
Ethical Implications of Hedonistic-Utilitarianism 
The ethical theory classified as Hedonistic-Utilitarianism rests upon two core 
principles: consequentialism and hedonism.12 The consequentialist principle determines the 
rightness or wrongness of an action by the goodness or badness of the results that follow from 
the action.13 Measuring the worth of actions by their ends14 is not new or unique to 
utilitarianism, but the theory is the most influential of several ethical theories that gauge the 
value of actions in this way.15 A consequentialist approach to utilitarian ethical decision­
making would require that a right action be distinguished from a wrong action solely on the
l0OED, 2d ed., s.v. “hedonistic.”
nIbid., s.v. “hedonism.”
12Quinton, 3.
13Ibid. See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1987), 
16-17. See also Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles o f Morals and Legislation, 
with an introduction by Laurence J. Lafluer (New York: Hafher Press, Macmillan Publishing 
Co., 1948), 2.
14Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 73. The Greek is telos, meaning “end,” and such a 
theoretical approach is termed teleological or “consequentialist.”
15Ibid. See also Alan Donagan, The Theory o f Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1st paperback ed., 1979), 52. In contrast, an anticonsequentialist affirmation would be 
that principles of morality are to be observed whatever the consequences. See also Joseph J. 
Fins and Matthew D. Bacchetta, “Framing the Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary 
Active Euthanasia Debate: The Role Of Deontology, Consequentialism, and Clinical 
Pragmatism,” Journal o f American Geriatrics Society 43, no. 5 (May 1995): 564-65. 
“Proponents of this view judge the moral acceptability of an action or rule based upon its net 
balance of good and bad consequences.”
30
ground that its consequences are better than any other consequences produced for the general 
well-being of all who are affected by the action of the agent.16 The second element, hedonism, 
states that the only thing that is good in itself is pleasure and the only thing bad in itself is 
pain.17 While classical HU theory regards pleasure as the good, later species of utilitarianism 
broaden the scope of what was considered to be good.18 Hedonistic-utilitarianism, however, 
claims specifically that an action is right based upon its ability to contribute to happiness 
(pleasure).19
Some authors designate the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as 
“hedonistic-utilitarianism,” even though neither Bentham nor Mill used the term as a rubric for 
their ethical theories.20 Even though John Stuart Mill did not use the term “hedonistic- 
utilitarianism” specifically, he alluded to the ideas contained within the compound concept 
when writing to rebut criticisms of his philosophy.21 His philosophical statement,
Utilitarianism, is an elaboration of HU. His definition and subsequent exegesis of the concept 
“utilitarianism” indicates his belief that the philosophy rested upon consequential and 
hedonistic principles.22 Henry Sidgwick added later insight into the composition of HU with his
16Donagan, 189. Donagan notes that any acceptable moral system “exalts” benevolence. 
See also Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 73.
17Quinton, 3.
18See ch. 1, fns. 5-8.
19Barrow, 40. Hedonistic utilitarians may accept that beauty, for example, is good but 
not that it is a moral good (ibid., 41). See also Bentham, 70. Bentham equates happiness with 
pleasure and absence of pain. See also Mill, 16-17. Mill states that by happiness he intends to 
mean pleasure and absence of pain.
20E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
Publishers, 1973), 59. See also Barrow, 40; and Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 81.
21Mill, 15, called attention to critics of “utility” who denounced the theory of utility as 
being “impracticably dry” when the word utility preceded the word pleasure, and “too 
practicably voluptuous” when the word pleasure preceded the word utility.
22Ibid. Mill’s words include the core statement that “. . .  actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness” 
(ibid., 16). He also writes that by happiness he intends pleasure and the absence of pain (ibid.,
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clarifying remarks on utilitarianism. He equated the meaning of utilitarianism with 
“Benthamite hedonism” or “universalistic hedonism.”23 Sidgwick employed the term 
“universalistic-hedonism” to distinguish between egoistic hedonism (Epicurean) and the more 
universal variety of hedonism as postulated by Jeremy Bentham.24 A precise clarification of 
HU is difficult to isolate. Arriving at a clear evaluation of Mill’s usage is equally difficult. Mill 
has been characterised as a hedonistic-utilitarian25 and a quasi-ideal utilitarian,26 but Mill 
thought himself to be a utilitarian in the Epicurean tradition.27
Mill’s Self-Definition of Hedonistic-Utilitarianism
Mill’s own statements about his theory help to establish his working definition out of 
which considerations of the ethical implications may be broached. Hedonistic-Utilitarianism 
(HU) was termed “utility” by Mill, and he equated it with the “greatest happiness principle” 
(GHP).28 The GHP (utility) meant simply that actions are right in proportion to which they tend 
to promote happiness—that is pleasure and the absence of pain for the many. By the same 
token, actions are wrong in proportion to which they tend to produce the opposite of happiness-
16-17).
23Henry Sidgwick, The Methods o f Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1981), 84.
24Ibid., also ibid., 87-88, footnote. He gives Jeremy Bentham the credit for this form of 
hedonism because Bentham was the one who chiefly taught it. See discussion of the 
background and development of Epicurean hedonism in the following section of this chapter, 
14-25.
25Carritt, 59.
26J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, reprint edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 13. Smart states that Mill’s position was 
somewhere between hedonistic and ideal utilitarianism. Sidgwick, 85, states that Mill’s 
utilitarianism was an attempt to establish a logical connection between the psychological and 
ethical varieties of hedonism.
27W. D. Hudson,^ Century o f Moral Philosophy (Guildford: Lutterworth Press, 1980),
10. Mill claimed that there had been utilitarians down through the ages.
28Mill, 16.
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-that is pain or the privation of pleasure for the many.29 Whether the term used is “utility” or 
“hedonistic-utilitarianism” or “greatest happiness principle,” the ethical theory derived from 
the use of the term is the same.30 Mill claimed that utilitarian theory was rooted in Ancient 
Greece.31 Since his model is the one used in this study, it is important to examine those 
proposed roots in order to trace his development of HU and its meaning.
Proposed Philosophical Roots of Hedonistic-Utilitarianism 
Copleston writes of the splendid achievement of Greek thought that was “cradled” in 
Ionia, the home of the early Greek philosophers who were exploring the meaning of life events: 
the “fact of change, of birth and growth, decay and death.”32 These early thinkers believed that 
life events were evidence of the “inescapable facts of the universe.”33 While it is true that the 
early Ionians held to a belief in the divine governance of the world, the difference between 
them and the older civilisations of Homer and Hesiod was that the Ionians began to examine 
the world through the lense of independent thought without relying on the perceived whims of 
the gods.34 Rational reflection and argument had surely been used before, but the difference at
29Ibid., 16-17, 22. See also Sidgwick, 414-16.
30The term hedonistic-utilitarianism (HU) will be used throughout the thesis. This is not 
to imply, however, that the use of the term means that Bentham’s and Mill’s approach 
(combining hedonism and utilitarianism) is free from philosophical difficulty and debate.
31Mill, 15-16.
32Richard D. McKirahan Jr., Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts 
and Commentary (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994), 20. The timeframe was the 
sixth century B.C. Philosophers and representatives of this era and area included Thales of 
Miletus, Anaximander, and Anaximenes. Others who had Ionian roots, though not from 
Miletus, included Democritus and Anaxagoras, and other philosophers. Frederick Copleston, A 
History o f Philosophy: Greece and Rome, vol. 1 (New York: Image Books, 1993), 13,17.
33Copleston, 1:17. Examples might include the changing seasons or a person’s lifespan 
from birth to death.
34McKirahan, 73. See also G. E. R. Lloyd, Science and Morality in Greco-Roman 
Antiquity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 11; and G. E. R. Lloyd, Magic, 
Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin and Development o f  Greek Science (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 32. See also Anthony Harrison-Barbet, Mastering 
Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1990), 9. The early Greek philosophers (Milesians) “were the
33
this time was that the Ionian philosophers turned their rational minds toward finding meaning 
in cosmology and theology with the confidence that the rational mind was sufficient for the 
task.35
The Ionians were also conscious of the dark side of existence on earth, noting well the 
certainty of death and the darkness of the future.36 Their perception of the cycles from life to 
death to life again led to a beginning of philosophy as these thinkers grappled also with the 
“why” of life and death. Even though change and uncertainty were an obvious part of life, the 
Ionians believed in, and sought after, something permanent.37 They believed that in order for 
change to occur there must be something primary “which persists” that was not simply the 
result of cyclical events. These early philosophers desired to discover the essential element of 
this “Unity.”38 The Ionians held this essential element of the universe to be material in nature 
and matter as the principle of unity. Soon Greek philosophers turned their foci to the manner in 
which they lived.39
first thinkers to begin to disengage themselves from a mythological framework and to show a 
determination to enquire into the nature of things, freely and without regard for religious 
dogma or prejudiced opinion.”
35McKirahan, 73.
36Copleston, 1:17.
37Ibid, 19-20.
38Ibid., 20. The German word Urstoff was used by Copleston to describe the primitive 
unifying element. It helped to explain the notion of “primitive element or substrate or ‘stuff” 
of the universe. See also S. E. Frost Jr., Basic Teachings o f the Great Philosophers: A Survey 
o f Their Basic Ideas, revised edition (New York: Anchor Books, 1989), 6-10. Frost writes that 
the earliest philosophers were greatly interested in the nature of the universe and desired to 
break it open in their minds in order to discover the “stuff’ from which all things come. See 
also Harrison-Barbet, 9, who writes that the earliest Greek philosophers were concerned with 
finding a unifying principle for the world. They sought to look beyond the appearances of the 
sensory world to penetrate and postulate “unchanging and underlying reality.” See also R. D. 
Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 204. The early Greeks were 
in search of some “permanent and primary element which by its transformations would account 
for the variety of nature.”
39Copleston, 1:78.
34
At first the focus was placed on the object, the external world, but eventually it was 
shifted to man in the world and his interaction with man as a moral, willing, and acting 
subject.40 Man was believed to be an inseparable part of the world and society and had a moral 
relationship with other members of the world. Ethics, being concerned primarily about 
goodness, was employed to guide man in living a good life. Man’s every activity whether 
artistic or scientific, for example, was believed to have for its object the attainment of some 
good. The Ancient Greeks held to this view of life and they sought to discover the end which 
moral agents sought for its own sake, terming this end “the absolute good.”41 This good, it was 
generally agreed, was identified with “happiness” or well-being (<eudaimonia).42 Even though 
the end or absolute good to which all men aimed might be equated generally with happiness, it 
was not easily determined of what that happiness consisted.43
A happy person, therefore, was believed to possess that which he or she thought to be 
desirable, which might be believed to include, for example, wealth, a fine family, or power.44 
From its inception individual happiness was linked to the fulfilment of that person’s desire or 
need. Eudaimonia remained a woolly term, yet it encompassed a significant portion of Ancient
40Ibid.
41Harrison-Barbet, 60; and Christopher Rowe, An Introduction to Greek Ethics 
(London: Hutchison & Co., 1976), 9.
42Harrison-Barbet, 60; and Rowe, 9. It is fair to state that the Ancients were not at all 
certain about the composition of eudaimonia.
43There were a variety of responses to the question of what happiness consisted. See 
Aristotle, 66. Aristotle, for example, wrote that eudaimonia meant “living well” or “doing 
well” but this is ambiguous. Aristotle stated that the word had been variously defined as 
consisting of pleasure or money or eminence and that often the person giving his view changed 
his opinion. Plato, as another example, believed the highest good to be “reason.” See Frost, 84. 
Epicurus, it is well known, believed the supreme good to reside in pleasure. See Frost, 86. See 
also The Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, s.v. “eudaimonism.” The word is translated 
“happiness” or “flourishing” and refers to the ethical doctrine that happiness is “the ultimate 
justification for morality.”
44Christopher Rowe, “Ethics in Ancient Greece,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter 
Singer, reprint edition (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1994), 122.
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Greek philosophical discussion and speculation. It does seem clear from the discussion of what 
constituted personal happiness that the philosophical roots of hedonism were planted within a 
milieu of philosophical exploration and speculation.
Indeed, in the age before scientific examination, individual philosophers offered their 
varying appraisals of happiness. One such philosopher, Epicurus (341-271 B.C.),45 was unique 
in that he advanced the notion that pleasure was the supreme good and that pleasure alone 
constituted happiness.46 His bold assertion drew attention because his theory that an 
individual’s desire determined personal happiness held ethical implications. Although Epicurus 
developed a different approach to happiness, his ideas were not formed in a moral vacuum. He 
incorporated earlier ethical systems into his own, drawing from several preceding centuries 
before his own time. Several early Greek philosophers who shared similar cosmological views 
as Epicurus had focussed previously on pleasure.
Hedonism in Early Greek Thought
Life’s Aim is Pleasure
Aristippus of Cyrene (435-350 B.C.)47 was noted early on for his interest in developing 
an ethical theory which was based on the underlying assumption that things are ultimately to be . 
evaluated by a supreme goal or good of life. To him the “supreme goal” or “good”48 was
45Eugene O’Connor, trans., The Essential Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines,
Vatican Sayings, and Fragments (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 9,11.
46Rowe, “Ancient Greece,” 123. See also The Cambridge Dictionary o f Philosophy, s.v. 
“eudaimonism.” Epicureans, unlike others that made virtue or virtuous activity a “constituent” 
of the happy life, “. . .  construe happiness in terms of pleasure, and treat virtue as a means to 
the end of pleasant living.”
47Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, trans. R. D. Hicks 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 195.
48J. C. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure, reprint edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 35.
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pleasure, and he and his adherents49 advocated a lifestyle which pursued that pleasure. 
Aristippus’ notion of pleasure was different from that of Epicurus in that he did not focus on 
the removal of pain or freedom from discomfort.50 Cyrenaics pursued pleasure as the “end,” 
and happiness was viewed as the sum total of the particular pleasures: the more sensual 
pleasure the better, which contained a quantitative element.51
Another significant element to Aristippus’ ethical system was the view that, since the 
past no longer existed and the future was uncertain, the present was the only thing with which 
the wise man was to be concerned.52 Unrestrained pursuit of immediate sensual pleasure was 
the path the Cyrenaics chose. This basic position was radical hedonism wherein the specific 
goal was to maximise the pleasure of the moment, especially bodily pleasure.53 This view of 
pleasure demonstrated a quantitative measurement and the consequential result could lead to 
sensual excesses.54
49Laertius, 1:195,215, 217. Laertius writes that Aristippus was from Cyrene and refers 
to him and his school as “Cyrenaic.”
50Ibid., 217.
51Ibid. Aristippus believed pleasure as the end was proved by the fact that from youth 
onward people were instinctively attracted to it and once it was obtained they sought nothing 
more and shunned nothing more than its opposite, pain. Gosling and Taylor, 41. The view that 
pleasure was the supreme good was based upon an observation that all living things pursue 
pleasure and avoid pain, but it must be stated that not everyone held the same view. There were 
then, as now, differing views of the supreme good and Aristippus’ view can be contrasted with 
Aristotle who argued that there were some pleasures that were not good with some even being 
open to censure. Aristotle, 250. Aristotle also argued against the view that pleasure is an end. 
See also Plato, The Republic o f Plato, trans. with introduction and notes by Francis MacDonald 
Comford (England, 1941; reprint New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 215. Plato states 
that most people viewed the good as pleasure, but that the enlightened thought it was 
knowledge. Plato, as well, did not view pleasure as the supreme good, Viewing instead 
knowledge as being in that position.
52Gosling and Taylor, 41.
53Ibid., 41. Cf. Copleston, 1:122.
54See Copleston, 1:122.
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Aristippus’ PH view engendered ethical implications. Since he had advanced the idea 
that the future was inconsequential, he purported that pleasure was to be the supreme goal and, 
therefore, made the individual the deciding influence in the pleasure equation. It followed that 
one need not fear the moral retribution of the gods.55 Even though his concept of pleasure was 
somewhat nondiscriminatory and perhaps unsophisticated, his view on individual pleasure 
served as a precursor to future development of the “PH” theme. Another philosopher, 
Democritus, built upon his ideas.
Democritus (460-357 B. C.?)56 carried forward a variation of the PH theme with the 
development of his ethical system. He laid down a test to be applied in deciding questions of 
conduct. His criterion was the consideration of the ultimate aim or purpose in human life.57 He 
moved beyond the sensual bodily pleasures of Aristippus’ views and advanced the notion that 
what made life worthwhile was neither possessions nor any other external thing, but one’s state 
of mind.58 In Democritus’ belief “tranquility” was the ultimate aim, and achievement of that 
aim was the supreme good.59 He differed from Aristippus in that his notion of pleasure rested 
upon mental states of mind. Further, Democritus did not advocate pursuit of the pleasure of the 
moment as did Aristippus. Instead, he advanced the notion that the individual, by calculation, 
measured pleasure against the aim of his life’s span.60 He had unintentionally introduced an
55Later Cyrenaics did not believe in the godsrSee also ibid; and Laertius, 1:227.
56Diogenes Laertius, Lives O f Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, trans. R. D. Hicks, reprint 
edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 443.
57Gosling and Taylor, 29.
58Ibid., 30.
59Ibid., 29. Laertius, however, distinguishes Democritus’ euthumia from pleasure and 
does not equate the two. Democritus’ “tranquility” meant a state where the soul was 
continually calm and strong, “undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion.” 
Laertius states that Democritus called this state “well-being” among many other names. 
Laertius, 2:455.
60Gosling and Taylor, 32.
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individual qualitative characteristic to the pursuit of PH.61 Democritus’ views set the stage for 
Epicurus who followed and carried forward the idea of pleasure as the supreme good.
Epicurus developed not only a moral viewpoint but a comprehensive worldview that 
provided a philosophical justification for human decisions.62 Epicurus equated pleasure with 
tranquility (ataraxia),63 and the highest pleasure or the “supreme good” he attributed to living 
without pain or disturbance. Epicurus believed this to be the condition to which all living 
things should aim.64 His ethical system had its roots in the systems of his predecessors. 
Pragmatically, he followed Democritus in the sense that Epicurus did not advocate a life of the 
pursuit of dissipation65 because it did not produce a pleasant life. Further, like Democritus, he 
advocated mental pleasure throughout the span of one’s life 66 Finally, in an era which had yet 
to realise a full awareness of the individual, the philosophical systems of all three, Aristippus, 
Democritus, and Epicurus, were moving unknowingly toward positioning the individual as the 
moral decision-maker in the pursuit of what would later constitute PH.
61Laertius, 2:455. This idea will be developed further within the framework of the 
section on atomism. Unknowingly, his belief that all things happen by necessity actually 
undermined rather than strengthened his notion of individual choice.
62 John Newport, Life’s Ultimate Questions: A Contemporary Philosophy o f Religion 
(Dallas, TX: Word Publishing, 1989), 461.
63Peter Preuss, Epicurean Ethics: Katastematic Hedonism, vol. 35, Studies in the 
History of Philosophy (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1994), 169-70.
64Gosling and Taylor, 365. Epicurus believed pleasure was the good and this meant 
ataraxia!aponia.
65Preuss, 99. Epicurus, “Letter to Menoeceus,” in The Essential Epicurus: Letters, 
Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragments, trans. and with an intro, by Eugene 
O’Connor (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1993), 66.
66Newport, 461. See also Laertius, 10:136. Laertius states that Epicureans advocate the 
katastematic type of pleasure, not the kinetic.
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Epicurean Pleasure
For Epicurus there were two types of pleasure: the kinetic and the katastematic. Either 
of these could take place in the mind or in the body.67 Kinetic pleasure was defined as 
satisfying bodily desires,68 the experience of active stimulation of enjoyable bodily feelings, 
such as the alleviation of hunger or thirst,69 or states of mind. A characteristic of this type of 
pleasure was that it lasted only as long as the activity that gave rise to it.70 Kinetic pleasures 
included all the things that ordinary people would call pleasures.71 Epicurus defined 
katastematic pleasure as the lack of disturbance of mind (ataraxia) and of pain (aponia). This 
aspect of pleasure defended against the charge that he was advocating a life of debauchery.72 
The essence of katastematic pleasure was “the organism itself, without any additional external
67Philip Merlan, Studies in Epicurus and Aristotle (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz,
1960), 6.
68Preuss, 162-63. Kinetic pleasures come and go and in this way are discontinuous.
They are dependent upon their object. It is a matter of individual choice whether or not to 
continue a life of kinetic pleasure. Gosling and Taylor, 365. The authors add also the 
possibility of some mental pleasures such as learning. See also A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 
The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Translations o f the Principal Sources with Philosophical 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 123. Kinetic pleasure included 
all experience that “consists in active stimulation of enjoyable bodily feelings or states of 
mind.” Gisela Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 196.
69Preuss, 123. Compare also Phillip Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures o f 
Invulnerability, vol. 48, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), 45. He states that kinetic pleasure is equivalent to motion, meaning the 
satisfying of a desire. Katastematic pleasure is equivalent to being stable or having satisfied a 
desire.
70Long and Sedley, 123. See also Preuss, 90. Preuss states that kinetic pleasure is 
essentially discontinuous, meaning it comes and goes.
71Striker, 196.
72Epicurus, 66. Gosling and Taylor, 366. See also Joseph M. Bryant, Moral Codes and 
Social Structure in Ancient Greece: A Sociology o f Greek Ethics from Homer to the Epicureans 
and Stoics (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 412. See also Cyril 
Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 524.
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stimulus.. .”73 His theories of pleasure furthered the qualitative/quantitative dimension of 
pleasure. The potential for individual rationality in decision-making was inherent in Epicurus’ 
system where a person determined what would sustain personal katastematic pleasure.
The ethical significance of kinetic and katastematic pleasure rested in this context of 
individual choice; that is, with the morally discerning individual who made a choice. Epicurus 
argued that a person’s “final good,” or pleasure, must lie completely within that person’s 
control.74 Although not universally accepted, Epicurus’ view was uniquely empowering for the 
individual.75 A difficulty with empowering the individual with the capacity for moral choice, 
and the responsibility to determine his own pleasure or “supreme good” by those choices, was 
the question of how specific moral action could originate from atomistic (exclusively material), 
or nonmoral origins. As unique as the Ionian departure was from mythological constructs to the 
advent of unhampered individual choice, a parallel advance was embodied in the development 
of atomistic thought.
73Merlan, 7. The author believes that this type of pleasure was “static,” meaning the 
person reached some state of equilibrium. The pleasure is not caused by an external stimulus. 
Preuss, 121. While katastematic pleasure could be of both body and mind, Epicurus believed 
that the pleasure of the mind was the more important (ibid., 123). The Epicurean would learn to 
sustain the katastematic pleasure during bouts of kinetic pain.
74Mitsis, 49.
75This viewpoint was not without its detractors. See Mitsis, 49, and Preuss, 97-98. 
Among the critics were Clement of Alexandria, Cicero, and Plutarch. See also Roger J. 
Sullivan, An Introduction to Kant’s Ethics, reprint edition (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), 124. Learning what people do does not necessarily give instruction into what they 
ought to do. Even though Kant advanced later another form of individual moral autonomy, he 
would express also that such a moral view (hedonism) was false because a person based his or 
her analysis of morality on experience. Carritt, 91. Another significant aspect was the 
individual determination of whether or not the life being lived was filled with a greater balance 
of pleasure over pain. A problem with this approach was that not all pleasures could be stated 
as being of supreme importance and not all pain as being something to be avoided.
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Early Greek Atomism
Atomism is the path along which certain philosophers carried the notion that the 
material worldview gave rise to moral responsibility.76 Atomism77 emerged from within this 
same early cultural milieu of rational consideration, originated with Leucippus78 and 
Democritus,79 and rested upon two core features: cosmology and determinism.
Democritus articulated the completely material cosmological view80 that supported the 
natural origins of an eternal and unchanging material universe.81 For Democritus, nothing was 
created out of the nonexistent, nor was anything destroyed into the nonexistent.82 His view, it is
76These early philosophers did not seek to explain how the amoral material cosmos 
could give rise to moral considerations.
77Compare Hicks, 205. Hicks states that the path of progress resembles a “spiral” and 
that whatever the reason the mechanical (in this case, atomism) explanation of nature was 
discarded by Plato and Aristotle. Compare also Andrew G. Van Melsen, From Atomos to 
Atom: The History o f the Concept Atom \  vol. 1, Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series, trans. 
Henry J. Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1952), 77-78, 81.Van Melsen writes 
that the seventeenth century was the century which saw a revival of philosophic atomism. Van 
Melsen, 77, notes that while there had been those in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance that 
appeared to be adherents of atomism, there was “no question of any steady traditional 
atomism.” Van Melsen gives two reasons for the limited following of Democritus’ atomism as 
an “infection” of “anti-Christian materialism” and as far as a physical explanation was needed 
in the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s minima theory “offered at least as many possibilities as 
atomism.” Ancient Greek atomism represented a separate root of Greek thought that grew for a 
period of time and then lay dormant until centuries later where it was cultivated once again.
78Hicks, 205. Hicks terms Leucippus “the earliest of the Atomists.” Cf. Laertius, 2:441. 
Laertius states that Leucippus was the “first to set up atoms as first principles.”
79Bailey, 116. Bailey says that Democritus learned the atomic theory from his master 
Leucippus. See also Laertius, 2:445, who writes that Democritus met Leucippus but does not 
say that he learned the atomic theory from him. Laertius, 2:453, does write that Democritus’ 
first principles of the universe were atoms and empty space. See also Hicks, 207. Hicks writes 
that the writings of both Leucippus and Democritus have perished with the exception of a few 
fragments. Almost all that is known of their theories is derived from Epicurus and from the 
Roman Lucretius in his poem On the Nature o f Things.
80Copleston, 1:74. The Atomists believed that all that existed in the beginning were 
atoms in the void. They reasoned that “. . .  no external Power or moving Force was assumed as 
a necessary cause for the primal motion.”
81Bailey, 119.
82Laertius, 2:453,455.
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believed, contains early roots of the laws of the universality of “cause and effect” and the 
“permanence of matter,”83 since the world was the “undesigned” result of “inevitable natural 
processes.”84 Democritus, unconsciously, had introduced thepossibility of an entirely scientific 
view of the world.85 In his mind there was neither purpose in the creation of the world, nor was 
it ruled by design. None of its parts, organic or inorganic, was the result of any purpose.86 
Creation was, therefore, the result of “inevitable natural processes.”87 This cosmological view 
constituted the first of the atomistic core features.
The second feature was the early seed thought that became determinism. In 
Democritus’ system “Necessity” (the “Whirl”) ordered all things which were predetermined 
from all eternity.88 At the same time, he believed that the “Whirl” was produced automatically
83Ibid., 455; and Bailey, 120. The world did not need semi-religious external forces as 
the efficient causes of the world. The World is a wholly physical existence, “purely 
mechanical,” and “controlled by the law of its own being and nothing more.” Bailey, 120-21. 
The universe was eternal and not created by anyone, Democritus believed, and had existed for 
all time.
84Bailey, 121-22.
85Ibid., 122.
86Ibid., 121-22. Bailey, writes that atomism was “an untrammeled system of natural 
physics” (ibid., 122). Religion had attached itself to philosophy from its conception, but in 
Democritean atomism it was absent totally. There was, for Democritus, no need for the 
mysterious, semi-religious external forces that formed a part of the systems of other 
philosophers. “Soul” was thought to be formed in the same sense as any other part of the body 
and would cease to exist when physical life ended. Compare also Walter Charleton, Natural 
History o f the Passions (London: T. N., 1674), n. p. Charleton states also that the soul was not 
considered to be immortal in atomism.
87Bailey, 121-22.
88Ibid., 121. Necessity, according to Democritus, was equal to natural law and was the 
foundation stone of his system (ibid., 122). Necessity was the governing cause of everything in 
the universe and not only did every effect have a cause, but there was an effect (motion) for 
which there was no cause except universal “necessity” (ibid., 133). Bailey believes that he 
might have employed “necessity” as a random means to explain what could not be explained. 
The eternal atomic motion was, in Democritus’ view, beyond all causes. He did not conceive, 
though, of the moral difficulty this created between free will and determinism.
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and by chance,89 an outcome of natural causes, and was undetermined entirely either by 
purpose or design.90
Atomism relates to Epicurean philosophy at this significant point. Atomism formed the 
core of Epicurus’ thought concerning the principles of causality and permanence as these relate 
to the natural world.91 Essentially, Epicurus believed also that every material thing had a 
material cause.92 Even though Epicurus claimed independence from any other philosopher, it is 
believed that elements of his system came from Democritus.93 Epicurus, then, was the link 
through which this concept of a material world transferred to later philosophers. Epicurean 
atomism lay virtually dormant until a convergence of ideas in the mid-sixteenth century 
revived a newfound interest in the underlying nature of matter.94 If matter was indeed 
purposeless, then mankind must evaluate his role in light of his advancements in the new 
“scientific” age.
A noticeable shift in philosophical moorings took place about the time when Galileo 
Galilei was forging new roads in science. The shift moved from an Aristotelian-Thomistic 
view, with its Christian presuppositions, to a new “natural philosophy.” This new philosophy 
was similar to the classical forms in that it took “its bearing from nature,” but it proved to be 
much different in its leanings.95 The old philosophy had understood nature in a teleological
89Ibid., 139.
90Ibid., 141.
91Ibid., 275.
92Ibid., 276.
93Ibid., 226. Epicurus’ disciples admitted that he owed credit to Democritus, but 
Epicurus seemed unwilling to acknowledge this dependence.
94Marie Boas, “The Establishment of Mechanical Philosophy,” Osiris 10 (1952):
452-53.
95Frederick Vaughan, The Tradition o f Political Hedonism from Hobbes to J. S. Mill 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 6.
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sense, with all things being ordered to their proper end, and that, in Aristotelian cosmology, 
“man’s proper end . . .  [was] found in moral virtue—injustice and magnanimity.”96
The new natural philosophy, however, rejected the teleological view of nature “and 
affirmed that nature could be properly understood only in terms of its physical properties-those 
properties which could be weighed and measured.”97 The new philosophy was grounded in the 
atomism of Democritus and, as a result, the only ancient philosopher who was himself an 
atomist and “provided an alternative to the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of nature and 
morality,” was Epicurus.98 Seventeenth-century philosophers, like the Frenchman Pierre 
Gassendi, articulated the fresh nuance. Nature before had established the norm in the old 
system. Now, “. . .  man ascribed the norm in a world which was viewed as fundamentally 
purposeless and even hostile.”99 When man judged the world to be “hostile,” his perspective 
introduced an ethical evaluation.
96Ibid.
97Ibid.
98Ibid., 23.
"Epicurus, 14. Cf. G. B. Stones, “The Atomic View of Matter in the XVth, XVIth, and 
XVIIth Centuries,” ISIS 10, no. 2 (1928): 462. Gassendi’s works form a catalyst for the thought 
and writing of others. His system is the basis of the English work by Walter Charleton (1619- 
1707), physician to King Charles II. Stones, 461. Boas, 452-53. Pierre Gassendi, the 
seventeenth-century French philosopher, is credited with reviving Epicurean philosophy and 
atomism with it. Gassendi developed the fundamental properties of atoms along the same lines 
as Epicurus believing that they could not be created or destroyed, that they were solid, and that 
they could not be divided into smaller parts. This revival of sorts was spawned initially, at least 
in part, by a general anti-Aristotelian attitude that had been engendered by Renaissance 
humanists.
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The Move from Atomism to Ethics
Democritus had not connected atomism with ethics intentionally.100 Indeed, he had 
asserted that the physical world was controlled by “Necessity,” eliminating the governance of 
the world by either chance or theological conception.101 However, his philosophical approach 
created an ethical dilemma because this “Necessity,” when extended to the realm of ethics, 
would result in determinism and hinder the possibility of free or autonomous human choice.102 
Epicurus used this foundational quandary of determinism versus individual choice to bring 
ethical dimensions of decision-making into philosophical discussions.
Epicurus held as a first condition of a moral life the belief that the gods had no part in 
the government of the world.103 It is not as though the gods did not exist, but that belief in 
mythology required no necessity to participate in prayer and worship as an attempt to influence
100Gosling and Taylor, 27. The authors write that the Democritean collection contains 
nothing that connects directly the physical theory with the ethical maxims. Cf. Bailey, 188. 
Bailey offers a viewpoint that Democritus’ ethics are largely independent of his physics. 
McKirahan contributes an important consideration when he notes that much of Democritus’ 
writings have been lost and one cannot really know. “In general, atomic theory provides a 
variety of viewpoints from which to approach epistemological issues, and our severely limited 
sources may simply not add up to a coherent theory just because their contexts may have been 
lost.” McKirahan, 334.
101Bailey, 186.
102Philip Wheelwright, ed., The Presocratics (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
1966,18th printing 1988), 182. This “unqualified determinism” does not appear to leave room 
for moral choice. Wheelwright notes that Democritus’ philosophy held fast to “human values 
and human assumptions” even though it was costly to logical consistency. See also Bailey, 
186-87, and McKirahan, 338-39. There is not much that remains of Democritus’ writings, and 
the authenticity of many of the ethical fragments is itself in question according to McKirahan. 
Democritus seems to have believed that the atomic theory provided a physical basis for ethics. 
Gosling and Taylor, 29-30. The tranquility Democritus wrote about could not be achieved 
externally (for example, by obtaining possessions) but by one’s state of mind. See also 
McKirahan, 339* Cheerfulness was the goal of life and Democritus did not identify this as 
being the same as pleasure. He calls this state, “well-being” along with many other names. He 
linked this with the movement of atoms and identified a particular physical condition of the 
soul (which was corporeal) as the goal of life. Cheerfulness was the condition that helped a 
person recognise whether he or she was in this state. Not all pleasures, according to 
Democritus, were to be pursued.
103Bailey, 438.
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divine beings to alter the course of temporal events.104 Epicurus did not believe the world could 
have been created by the gods because, in his mind, a perfect and all-powerful being could not 
create a world that had been made so poorly, an attitude consistent with his mechanical view of 
cosmology. Together, Democritus and Epicurus helped to pave the platform where man, 
unhindered by any outside authority, would take the centre place in moral decision-making. 
Hedonism as a philosophy was the bridge to the individual making moral decisions. Hedonists 
believed that an individual’s moral decisions then, would be prompted by internal pleasure 
feelings rather than the external forces like the gods.
Basics of Epicurean Hedonism
The hedonist believed that most human actions could be explained directly by reference 
to pleasure. Hedonists used pleasure to mean the kind of “feeling” that stimulated a person’s 
will to act in a manner tending to sustain or produce it. The volitional stimulus for pleasure was 
termed “desire.”105 Other actions could be explained by referring to pleasant consequences a 
person might desire, or to unpleasant consequences a person might wish to avoid.106 Herein lies 
a connection between Epicurean hedonism and the PAS debate. While detractors might argue 
the rationality of sustaining life at any or all costs, proponents might argue that it would 
sometimes be rational to kill if it helped to fulfill a person’s desire to eliminate pain. The basic 
hedonist position rested, then, upon the foundational principle that if an action were chosen, 
then the final reason for choosing it would have reference to pleasure or avoidance of pain.107
104Ibid.
105Sidgwick, 42-43. See also Epicurus, 64-65.
106J. C. B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case For Hedonism Reviewed (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1969), 1. Cf. also Sidgwick, 41. Sidgwick agreed with Bentham that “e. ..  on 
the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is’ inevitably Ted to pursue that line 
of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the 
highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness.. . . ’”
107Gosling, 9. And the converse would be true, namely, that if no pleasure is found in 
the end result of the action then the action was unreasonable. The hedonist does recognise that 
there are many things that are done not because they give pleasure but in spite of the fact that
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This hedonist principle formed the base of Mill’s HU, that if an action was chosen, then 
the final reason for choosing it would also have reference to pleasure or avoidance of pain.
Mill, though, added that the action would be for the greatest pleasure (or avoidance of pain) of 
the many.108 Mill, like Epicurus before him, believed that “tranquillity” was a key constituent 
of a satisfied life.109 He also believed that tranquillity enabled a person to be content with very 
little pleasure.110 Mill also centred moral decision-making within the individual who would 
judge “whether a particular pleasure was worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain.”111 
These core elements contained within Mill’s theory establish a core historical and 
philosophical framework for examining HU. Having defined the terms associated with 
utilitarianism, particularly HU, and the influence of John Stuart Mill upon the application of 
those terms, it is necessary to consider the terminology and ethical considerations of the PAS 
side of the dialogue.
Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Introduction
In recent years a trend has developed which has allowed greater flexibility for a patient 
to choose death, including physicians even aiding those who are terminally ill toward that
they give none: for example, having a tooth extracted, going to war, or climbing Mount 
Everest. Sidgwick, 120. See also Mill, 16-17. Happiness, according to Mill, meant pleasure and 
the absence of pain. Plato, 212. In contrast, Plato believed the good was “knowledge of the 
Good,” an understanding of the moral and physical order of the entire universe. John Rawls, 
“Classical Utilitarianism” in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 16-17. Rawls adds that if the good is defined as 
pleasure, then we have hedonism. If the good is defined as happiness, then we have 
eudaimonism. Aristotle, in contrast, held a different conception of the good. His conception of 
the good included the “realization of human excellence in the various forms of culture.” Plato, 
212. Socrates, himself, declined even to define the supreme good.
108Mill, 28.
109Ibid., 24.
110Ibid.
H1Ibid.,21.
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end.112 It is the latter feature of the trend that is in view in this thesis. Efforts to legalise PAS 
span the globe-from Australia to the United Kingdom to the Netherlands to the United 
States.113 Central to the debate for and against helping patients die are the philosophical and 
ethical claims used to support these efforts or arguments.
Many historians have noted the long history of voluntary active euthanasia (VAE) and 
PAS, with both practices dating back to Ancient Greece.114 Through current efforts of grass 
roots groups, media, and internet exposure, and a growing body of literature relevant to the 
subject,115 PAS issues and concerns, inclusive of ethical, legal, political, and practical facets,
112Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., Intending Death: The Ethics o f  Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 1.
113David C. Thomasma, “An Analysis of Arguments for and Against Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide: Part One,”in Cambridge Quarterly o f Healthcare Ethics 5 (1996): 62-76. 
Thomasma offers general information of the specific pieces of legislation in the United States, 
The Netherlands, and Australia’s Northern Territory. See especially p. 63. Donald W. Cox, 
Hemlock’s Cup: The Struggle for Death with Dignity (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1993), 
149-57,169-79. Cox offers a chronological account of PAS legal initiatives in Washington, 
California, and Australia’s Northern Territory. Wesley J. Smith, Forced Exit: The Slippery 
Slope from Assisted Suicide to Legalized Murder (New York: Random House, 1997), 66. Smith 
quotes and gives a brief explanation of the controversial PAS ruling of the New York State 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
114Committee on Medical Ethics Episcopal Diocese of Washington D.C., Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia: Christian Moral Perspectives, The Washington Report (Harrisburg, 
PA: Morehouse Publishing, 1997), 60. Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About 
Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 3.
115The following representative list of sources demonstrates the crucial importance of 
PAS in biomedical ethics. Representative sources that make a claim for legalising PAS are: 
Howard Brody, “Assisted Death—A Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure,” in New 
England Journal o f  Medicine 327, no. 19 (November 1992): 1384-88; Derek Humphiy, Final 
Exit: The Practicalities o f Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying (New York:
Dell Publishing, 1991); Sheila McLean and Alison Britton, The Case for Physician-Assisted 
Suicide (London: Pandora, 1997); and Timothy E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin, eds., 
Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care & Patient Choice (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 2004), 1-8.
Representative sources that make a claim against legalising PAS are: Kathleen Foley 
and Herbert Hendin, eds., The Case Against Assisted Suicide (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002), 1; Yale Kamisar, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to 
Active Voluntary Euthanasia,” in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal 
Perspectives, ed. John Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rev. paperback ed., 
1995), 225-60; Leon Kass, “Physician-Assisted Suicide Should Not Be Legalized,” 
Commentary 89, no. 2 (February 1990): 33-43; and John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and
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have increasingly clamoured for public attention and evaluation. The 1990s indeed was a 
decade when PAS began to be distinguished from VAE116 and was moved by right-to-die 
advocates in the United States to the forefront as a leading issue of importance in the right-to- 
die movement. Evidence of this fact may be adduced from the progressive development of 
sophisticated legislation that sought to canonise PAS into law. PAS legislation emerged in the 
early 1990s, but became re-focused following the success of the Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act in 1994 and its final passage into law in 1997.117
Initially, voter initiatives to legalise “aid-in-dying” were introduced in Washington 
State in 1991 (“Death with Dignity Act” or Initiative 119) and California in 1992 (“Death with 
Dignity Act” or Proposition 161).118 Both voter initiatives failed. Advocates of the initiative 
believed these propositions failed due to public aversion to the concept of doctors actively 
killing patients. Measure 16, Oregon’s “Death With Dignity Act,” was a physician assisted 
suicide bill only and this measure passed and went into effect in 1997.119 Overall, PAS 
legislation has developed in three phases: (1) legislation that did not differentiate between PAS
Public Policy: An Argument Against Legalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
reprint ed., 2004), 31-36.
Representative sources on the overall issue of PAS include: Robert F. Wier, ed., 
Physician-Assisted Suicide (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997); and Gerald 
Dworkin, R. G. Frey, and Sissela Bok, eds., Physician-Assisted Suicide: For and Against, ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
116See BMA, “End of Life Decisions-Views of the BMA”; internet, available at http:// 
www.bma.org/ap.nsfrContent/Endoflife~Physicianassistedsuicide#7; accessed 13 July 2006.
117See Valerie J. Volmar’s “Physician-Assisted Suicide” website at http://www. 
willamette.edu/wucl/pas/index.html. Volmar provides detailed development of national and 
international legislation related to PAS from 1997 forward. See also the U.S. Center for 
Clinical Ethics and Humanities in Health Care website on PAS legislation: http://wings. 
buffalo.edu/faculty/research/bioethics/court.html; and the State of Oregon’s website on PAS 
legislation at http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/ors.shtml.
1I8Rita L. Marker, “Assisted Suicide: The Continuing Debate,” ed. International Task 
Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide; internet; available at http://www.iaetf.org/; accessed
19 August, 2006.
119Ibid.
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and euthanasia; (2) Oregon’s “PAS” legislation; and (3) legislation combined with carefully- 
orchestrated political tactics that was reflective of Oregon’s law.120 PAS was initially subsumed 
within Voluntary Active Euthanasia, but by the 1990s it began to be viewed separately from 
VAE and legislation related directly to PAS began to emerge.121 A reason for this could be that 
advocates for changing laws related to medical killing viewed PAS as a middle way between a 
proscription of medical killing and VAE.122
The early legislation to permit medical killing had included both euthanasia and PAS 
language as in the cases of Washington and California.123 Following the losses of both 
campaigns, the Oregon Death With Dignity Act (1994) included “prescribing only” legal
120Eli D. Stutsman, “Political Strategy and Legal Change,” in Physician-Assisted Dying: 
The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, ed. Timothy E. Quill and Margaret P. Battin 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 254-55. Compare the International Task 
Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide website for a detailed discussion of PAS and 
euthanasia legislation. See http://www.intemationaltaskforce.org/cd.htm.
121Keown, Public Policy, 31. A significant indication of this was the introduction of 
“PAS” in separation from euthanasia legislation in the courts. Keown mentions the legislation 
to decriminalise PAS in the states of Washington, California, and Oregon. See also the 
recognition of PAS in the Netherlands’ 2002 euthanasia law: “The Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedure) Act,” accessed at http://www.minbuza.nl/ 
default.asp?CMS_TCP=tcpAsset&id=CA83D9494B444D268938017F2330E54E; 16 July 
2006.
122Jean Davies, “The Case for Legalising Voluntary Euthanasia,” in Euthanasia 
Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, ed. John Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, reprint ed. 1998), 89. Davies writes that legalising assistance with suicide in 
Britain might be “more acceptable” to those within the medical profession. She indicates that 
this approach might be more suitable than participating “directly in the action” that causes a 
patient’s death. There is, of course, the contrasting view that PAS is linked directly to the 
action. Keown, more recently, views a reason for distinguishing between VAE and PAS as a 
matter of political “tactics.” He suggests that “right-to-die” campaigners believe PAS can be 
sold more easily as an exercise of patient autonomy. Keown, Public Policy, 35. The reasons for 
a focus on PAS may actually centre on the belief that PAS offers a more palatable political 
strategy to all as a way to safeguard patient “rights” and “autonomy.” See Stutsman, 247. The 
desire to protect individual “rights” and to limit medical or governmental control over a 
person’s dying process, seem to be significant issues in PAS legislation. PAS, in theory, gives 
a patient more control over his or her dying process. The belief that PAS and laws to permit it, 
among other things, will give patients more control over the dying process, as the thesis intends 
to demonstrate, does not necessarily make it so. In any case, PAS has assumed centre stage in 
legislation in the United States.
123Stutsman, 254.
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language,124 which terminology has become a standard for “Oregon-style” legislation that 
followed.125 This indicates some move toward a “centrist” (PAS) position regarding right-to-die 
advocacy. Advocates for PAS, like McLean and Britton, believe that respect for a patient’s 
autonomy and a physician’s obligation to respect a patient’s liberty are compelling reasons to 
legalise PAS.126 Quill and Battin articulate a similar argument to call for the legalisation of 
PAS when they list patient autonomy and mercy as twin claims to support a change in laws 
concerning PAS.127
Opponents like Hendin and Foley, however, present a counter view of patients when 
they describe dying patients as vulnerable, and state the need for doctors to treat their patients 
“humanely,” “compassionately,” and “appropriately.”128 For them, PAS cannot fit these criteria 
for care. Whether agreeing or disagreeing with PAS, that PAS is of central import in end-of-life 
considerations is recognised by both its advocates and opponents. PAS also has been claimed 
to be of crucial political and legal significance, as it relates to the issue of the sanctity of human 
life129 and as a strategic political instrument to advance right-to-die issues.130 Yet, even with the
124Ibid.
125Ibid., 252-54. Michigan, Maine, and Hawaii legislative initiatives all included 
Oregon-style elements, but these initiatives failed. Part of the appeal of Oregon’s legislation, 
apart from the fact that Oregon’s law has withstood legal challenges, is its PAS-only emphasis. 
There is indication that the law provides for some balance between the two perceived extremes 
of either no such law at all and VAE.
126McLean and Britton, 23,25, and 29.
127Quill and Battin, eds., 6.
128Foley and Hendin, eds., 1.
129Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse o f Our Traditional Ethics 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press), 132-33,158. Singer states that “politically, it is here that the 
most vigorous battle against the sanctity of life ethic is now being fought.” Singer presents 
several human “stories” of assisted suicide to illustrate the “ways in which pressure is building 
for a change” in the traditional sanctity-of-life ethic (133-37). He believes the Dutch model 
will not be the most suitable approach for all countries to adopt. He believes that PAS will 
likely be the area where a change in United States law against medical killing will occur (158). 
While the thesis will also demonstrate the importance of PAS, the dissertation will draw 
different conclusions from Singer relative to life’s sanctity and a need for changes in medical
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abundance of information, a considerable amount of philosophical and ethical ambiguity 
remains about PAS. This section, therefore, will distinguish PAS from other forms of 
physician-aid-in-dying, define terms and explore key historical features of the PAS debate that 
affect the DPR, and note the emerging shifting patterns of acceptance regarding the practice. 
This understanding will clarify the philosophical and ethical ambiguities and lay the 
groundwork for the discussions in the following chapters regarding the influences of HU upon 
PAS.
What Is “Physician-Assisted Suicide?”
Distinguishing Concepts 
PAS has been grouped under a broader heading of “physician-assisted death” or 
“physician-aid-in dying,” an association that can confuse the meaning of both PAS and 
euthanasia.131 The umbrella term “physician-assisted dying” is used because PAS advocates 
believe it “carries with it no misleading connotations,” although it is recognised that
canons related to medical killing. Singer’s views, then, are not the only perspective on the issue 
of the sanctity of life, its meaning and application, and medical killing. See Keown, Public 
Policy, 39-51; and David Cook, Patients’ Choice: A Consumer’s Guide to Medical Practice 
(London: Spire, 1993), 161-62. See also chapter 3 of the thesis for a discussion of the sanctity 
of life.
130Keown, Public Policy, 35. Good evidence exists that PAS has surpassed VAE as the 
focus for legal initiatives. See Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin, “The Oregon Experiment,” 
in The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life Care, edited by Kathleen 
Foley and Herbert Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 172. As such, 
the focus on PAS in the thesis is warranted, and its importance cannot be understated.
13Beauchamp and Childress, 228. The authors say that assisted death and physician- 
assisted death, though now widely used, are ambiguous since both assisted suicide and VAE 
involve assistance with bringing about death. See also Beauchamp, Intending Death, 4. 
Beauchamp writes that the term incorporates several forms of assistance under one general 
heading. See also Charles F. McKhann, A Time to Die: The Place for Physician Assistance 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 6. McKhann uses the term “physician-aid-in- 
dying” instead of suicide because he believes “dying” is a more appropriate term than “suicide” 
for people who are already terminally ill.
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“physician-assisted suicide” is “technically accurate.”132 Quill and Battin, however, seek to 
eliminate the perception sometimes present in American writing that suicide may be “conflated 
with mental illness” and considered to be “self-destructive” and, therefore, an irrational act.133 
The latter term, euthanasia, has itself experienced an historical evolution in meaning and may 
be subdivided into several applications.134 The word euthanasia is a Greek word originally 
meaning nothing more than “gentle and easy death.”135 Originally, there was no implication of 
a physician, for example, causing a patient’s death. The term was used instead to describe the 
nature of the “dying process” that an individual or an institution might undergo.136 During the 
nineteenth century, the meaning of the term shifted.137
Today the word commonly means the act of painlessly putting to death a person 
suffering from a terminal illness, or is used as a metaphor by pro-life and pro-choice
132See also Quill and Battin, eds., Physician-Assisted Dying, 1-2. The thesis writer takes 
a different position of the term. Subsuming PAS under the overall rubric “physician-aid-in- 
dying” could lead a person to believe that PAS is a form of end-of-life care and potentially 
eclipses the view that PAS remains a form of medical killing. See the distinction at BMA,
“End of Life Decisions,” Internet. Although the BMA had taken a neutral position on 
endorsing PAS, the BMA presently neither endorses PAS, nor does it view PAS as end-of-life 
care. See also Keown, Public Policy, 31-35. See Netherlands’ 2002 Euthanasia Law, 
“Termination of Life on Request,” Internet. The Dutch euthanasia and PAS law, “Termination 
of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedure) Act,” now includes a requirement 
of “due care” so as to include both as forms of “medical treatment.”
133See also Quill and Battin, eds., Physician-Assisted Dying, 1-2.
134Beauchamp, Intending Death, 3. Beauchamp distinguishes between voluntary passive 
euthanasia, nonvoluntary passive euthanasia, VAE, nonvoluntary active euthanasia, and 
involuntary euthanasia.
135John Keown, ed., “Extracts from the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Medical Ethics,” in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, rev. 
paperback ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 99. Cf. also Beauchamp, 
Intending Death, 2-3; and C. Everett Koop, “The Challenge of Definition,” Hastings Center 
Report Special Supplement 19, no. 1 (January/February 1989): 2. See also Van Zyl, 2. The term 
was coined from the Greek in the seventeenth century and meant literally “a good death.”
136Van Zyl, 2.
137Ibid. Ch. 2 of the thesis examines some of the cultural background to this change in 
meaning and application. See thesis, ch. 2,123-25,130-32.
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individuals to express right-to-die concepts.138 Euthanasia as an umbrella term is actually 
subdivided into several more specific areas: it can be voluntary (active or passive), 
nonvoluntary (active or passive), or involuntary}29 VAE takes place when a patient requests a 
doctor’s aid to die. PAS is still another term which is commonly subsumed within the kindred 
term VAE.140 In all forms of VAE and PAS a patient desires to commit suicide, yet there 
remains a difference in meaning and intent in the usage of the terms.141
A technical difference between VAE and PAS lies in the agent who directly causes a 
death. This technical distinction, however, must be coupled with the awareness that a doctor’s 
assistance involves both the cause—the writing of a prescription and explaining how to use the 
drugs—and the intent to bring about the patient’s death.142 The difference between intentionally 
ending a patient’s life (VAE) and intentionally helping a patient end his or her life is 
negligible.143 An awareness of circumstances that surround a withdrawal of treatment can also 
have a bearing on PAS. Competent adult patients have a right to refuse medical treatment, but 
this right has its ethical and legal limits. A doctor is neither ethically nor legally bound to assist 
a refusal of treatment that is suicidal. Suicidal withdrawal of treatment is intended to hasten
138Thomasma, 67. Thomasma claims euthanasia has become the ultimate “patient’s 
rights metaphor” or “the way out.”
139Beauchamp, Intending Death, 2-3. There are two main subtypes to euthanasia: active 
or passive and voluntary and nonvoluntary. Voluntary means the patient requests the action, 
and assisted suicide is a subclass of this area. Nonvoluntary involves cases where the patient is 
not mentally competent to make an informed choice. Involuntary euthanasia “involves a person 
capable of making an informed request but who has not done so.” See also Keown, 100.
140Beauchamp, Intending Death, 4.
141There are philosophical considerations as well. One aim of the thesis will be to 
explore possible links and influences between HU and PAS relative to a philosophical blurring 
(and possible elimination) of distinctions between killing and allowing to die. See thesis, ch. 2, 
119-22,134-36.
142Keown, Public Policy, 33.
143Ibid.
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death144 and hastening death in this manner is unlawful.145 The withdrawal of treatment when 
further treatment would be futile or burdensome is to be distinguished from hastening death, or 
assistance with suicide, for other reasons. Therefore, while there remains a primary technical 
distinction between VAE and PAS, there also remains a critical difference of opinion between 
causation and intention and “conditions under which killing would be beneficent.”146 In the 
former, a doctor causes death; in the latter, a patient causes his own death.147 There is a primary 
distinction between VAE and PAS.148 It is important to clarify the meaning in the common 
usage of the terms. .
Defining Terminology 
In common use, euthanasia has now come to mean “deliberate intervention undertaken 
with the express intention of ending a life to relieve intractable suffering.”149 Specific
144Ibid., 253.
145Ibid., 254. A court order would be required.
146Edmund Pellegrino, “The False Promise of Beneficent Killing,” in Regulating How 
We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. 
by Linda L. Emanuel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 72. The 
focus of discussion surrounding PAS and VAE has shifted away from intrinsic evil and the rule 
about the wrongness of killing to utilitarian arguments that focus on motive and results.
147Beauchamp, Intending Death, 3.
148The writer has chosen to address the ethical issue of competent patients who make 
requests of a doctor for assistance in killing themselves. This places the matter of patients who 
do not have the capacity to understand the meaning of euthanasia or PAS outside the scope of 
this thesis.
149Ibid. Cf. also Beauchamp, Intending Death, 2-3. Beauchamp notes “that 
technological advances in medicine, which have made it possible to prolong the lives of 
patients who have no hope of recovery,” have led to the introduction of the term negative or 
passive euthanasia to indicate withdrawal of extraordinary means used to preserve life. The 
Select Committee (Keown, 99) felt the term passive euthanasia to be misleading. They felt that 
there was scope for argument over ethical equivalence of “killing and letting die.” See also 
Koop, 2. Koop understands active euthanasia to mean that someone plays an active role to 
bring about the “good death” of another. He understands passive euthanasia to be someone 
taking no action to prevent death from occurring.
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definitions of “VAE” vary slightly, but for the thesis150 the core definition will include the 
following ingredients: the killing of an incurably ill patient at his or her own request, the use of 
a lethal dose of medication, the express intentionality of the one doing the killing (other than 
the one dying), and the aim of painlessly and mercifully ending the suffering and life of the 
patient.151
In contrast, definitions of PAS vary as well, but its definitions indicate a middle-ground 
position that emphasises a patient’s choice to die and a resulting action which ends his life.152 
Even though death from VAE or PAS is often considered to be the same, a key point of
150Diane E. Meier, Carol-Ann Emmons, Sylvan Wallenstein, Timothy Quill, R. Sean 
Morrison, and Christine Cassel, “A National Survey,” New England Journal o f Medicine, vol. 
338, no. 17 (April 1998): 1194. The survey defines VAE from the perspective of the physician 
who kills. It is understood that in the case of VAE someone other than a doctor at times does 
the killing, but for the sake of equal comparison with PAS, the thesis will define the term with 
the physician serving as the one who kills.
151Keown, 99. Cf. also Beauchamp, Intending Death, 2-4; and Meier et al., 1194. See 
also Beauchamp, Intending Death, 3-4. Beauchamp defines the parent term euthanasia (of any 
type) as requiring the following exact conditions: “. . .  (1) the death is intended by at least one 
other person whose action is a contributing cause of death; (2) the person who dies is either 
acutely suffering or irreversibly comatose (or soon will be), and this condition alone is the 
primary reason for intending the person’s death; and (3) the means chosen to produce the death 
must be as painless as possible, or a sufficient moral justification must exist for a more painful 
method.”
152Lawrence E. Holst, “Do We Need More Help in Managing Our Death? A Look at 
Physician-Assisted Suicide,” Journal o f Pastoral Care, 47, no. 4 (Winter 1993): 337. Holst 
writes that assisted suicide involves someone helping a person to plan and carry out a “chain of 
events” intended to cause “self-inflicted death.” Beauchamp, Intending Death, 4. Beauchamp 
writes from the view of the decedent and states that a person whose death is “brought about” 
must be the “final cause” of that death. In Meier et al., 1194, the authors define PAS as “the 
practice of providing a competent patient with a prescription for medication for the patient to 
use with the primary intention of ending his or her own life.” Harold G. Koenig, “Legalizing 
Physician-Assisted Suicide: Some Thoughts and Concerns,” Journal o f  Family Practice 37, no. 
2 (1993): 171. Koenig’s definition is more specific about physician involvement. A physician, 
by his definition, would be intentionally and willfully involved by taking actions that help a 
suicidal patient to end his or her life. This assistance may involve providing information on 
ways to commit suicide, supplying a prescription for lethal medication, providing a syringe 
filled with a lethal dose of medication, inserting an intravenous line so that a patient can inject 
a lethal dose of medication, or providing a “suicide” device that the patient is able to operate. 
See also Keown, 100. Assisted suicide is defined as occurring when “. . .  a competent patient 
has formed a desire to end his or her life but requires help to perform the act, perhaps because 
of physical disability.” When a doctor helps the patient it is termed “physician-assisted 
suicide.”
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distinction between the two is that in PAS, the patient commits the action; that is, he is assisted 
by a physician, but administers his own lethal dose of medication.153 The choice is left, ideally, 
to the patient whether to end his or her life; therefore, the physician’s involvement in a case of 
PAS is purported to be less direct than it would be with VAE. Physician assistance with suicide 
can take two forms: actually giving a patient the means to commit suicide or giving advice 
about methods, for example, the most effective methods.154 Notwithstanding the moral 
questions surrounding PAS, advocates believe that PAS helps to buttress a patient’s autonomy, 
his right to self-determination, and allows him to remain in control of his dying process.155 PAS 
advocates also believe that the process of following through with PAS itself allows time for the 
patient to change his or her mind. The most effective method156 for PAS has been determined to 
be ineffective in a significant number of cases, however, which raises questions concerning 
whether patients are actually able to exercise control over the dying process with PAS after all. 
PAS may be defined as: the act of a physician who prescribes the necessary medication to 
commit suicide and supervises the process, when a competent patient makes a request to
153Yale Kamisar, “Physician-assisted Suicide: The Last Bridge to Active Voluntary 
Euthanasia,” in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, ed. John 
Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; reprint edition 1998), 230. Kamisar, 
while observing campaigns in the state of Washington and California, noted that the general 
public and the media either did not understand the distinction between VAE and PAS or they 
did not accept it. He states that examination of the literature on the law and morality of assisted 
dying reveals a blurring (and sometimes an obliteration) of the line between PAS and VAE.
154Keown, 31.
155Ibid, 32-33.
156Foley and Hendin, “Oregon Experiment,” 166. The Dutch typically use 9 grams of 
barbiturates, because that dosage is considered to be lethal. Studies reveal, however, that 20 
percent of patients who received this dosage lived for more than three hours following 
ingestion. Reports also indicate that in 18 percent of the latter category of cases, such delays 
caused doctors to intervene with a lethal injection.
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terminate his or her own life.157 This approach to the end stages of a terminal illness has not 
evolved without question or debate.
What PAS Is: Intentional Medical Killing
The current focus on PAS provides a unique platform for cultural, medical, 
philosophical/theological, and moral examinations of end-of-life treatment options and care. 
An examination of the nature of PAS, however, has been eclipsed somewhat by the focus on 
the preferable consequences that may be considered to result from such legalised 
implementation (for example, giving patients who face “intractable pain and suffering” a way 
to gain better control of their dying process). The aim to provide consequences that are 
favourable to patients, physicians, families, and medicine as a whole has clouded the reality 
that PAS still remains a form of medical killing, a reality that calls for careful examination of 
the impact its routine legalisation would elicit within medicine and culture.158 The definition of 
PAS, as it relates to a doctor’s involvement (acts of prescribing and supervising), suggests that 
PAS is not a “middle-ground” position between a patient’s choice to die and active 
euthanasia.159 Indeed, PAS remains clearly a form of medical killing, because a doctor 
participates both causally and with intent throughout the process.
The emphasis upon consequential reasoning when making end-of-life decisions has 
introduced an ethical application that runs contrary to traditional medical canons and law.
157Meier et al., 1194. See also Keown, 100. See also Smith, Forced Exit, xxv. See also 
Margaret Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (New York: .Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 57. While the Oregon law restricts PAS to the terminally ill this is not 
the case in The Netherlands.
158Keown, Public Policy, 31-36. Keown notes the “negligible” difference between a 
doctor “intentionally ending a patient’s life” (VAE) and a doctor “intentionally helping a 
patient to end his or her own life” (33). He makes a case that little difference exists between 
the various forms of medical killing.
159See also Kamisar, “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” 230-33, 244-45. Kamisar is arguing 
that the blurring of the lines between PAS and VAE indicates a deeper agenda on the part of 
advocates of PAS and VAE; namely, to gain legalisation of both (244-45).
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Medicine has historically placed great emphasis upon a physician’s intent with regard to patient 
treatment. When utilitarianism is used as a basis for justifying and implementing medical 
killing, the radical paradigm shifts that such a view would, of necessity, bring to end-of-life 
medical care call for careful analysis and thorough critique.160 The implications of such a 
paradigm-shift to legalise PAS are as significant if included under the rubric of overall end-of- 
life patient care.161
What PAS Is Not: End-of-Life Care
Some PAS advocates include PAS under a larger umbrella of end-of-life care 
options;162 however, to those who see PAS as a form of medical killing, this view raises
160Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, A Philosophical Basis o f Medical 
Practice .Toward a Philosophy and Ethic o f the Healing Professions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1981). See Edmund D. Pellegrino, For the Patient’s Good: The Restoration o f  
Beneficence in Health Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Edmund D.
Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” Journal o f Clinical Ethics 3, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 95- 
102. Pellegrino presents a case that medicine has traditionally aimed toward providing benefit 
to a patient or, at least, doing no harm to a patient. The law until recently remained consistent 
throughout history; medical killing was unlawful. See thesis, 116-40, for an examination of the 
historical and traditional understanding of medical killing with comparison to HU.
See also the impact of utilitarian and consequentialist reasoning on medical decision­
making; Luke Gormally, ed. Euthanasia Clinical Practice and the Law; Book One: Euthanasia 
and Clinical Practice: Trends, Principles and Alternatives; Book Two: Euthanasia and the 
Law: The Case Against Legalization (London: Linacre Centre, reprint ed., 1995), 28-29,184- 
85. Gormally discusses the utilitarian/consequentialist reasoning that no significant moral 
distinction exists between “hastening death as a foreseeable consequence of the administration 
of drugs aimed at controlling pain, and bringing about death as a result of administering a 
lethal dose of drugs aimed precisely at bringing about death.” He argues for maintaining the 
traditional medical understanding of intention by differentiating these distinctions within the 
definition of intention, even though a typical utilitarian argument would argue for the converse.
For an example of the shift in reasoning regarding end-of-life decision-making, see 
Charles H. Baron, “Hastening Death: The Seven Deadly Sins of the Status Quo,” in Physician- 
Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care & Patient Choice, ed. Timothy E. Quill and 
Margaret P. Battin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004), 309-21. Baron reverses the usual 
utilitarian argument that the death of a person who is less than happy might be well-received 
by reasoning that keeping patients alive in support of the status quo essentially means “You 
must continue to suffer because it is good for us.” In either view, Baron’s approach illustrates 
one facet of concern; namely, the focus in consequential reasoning is often on the desired 
consequences and not the means (a doctor killing) to the consequences.
161Quill and Battin, eds., Physician-Assisted Dying, 1-2.
162Ibid., 1.
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questions about the moral meaning and nature of including PAS under a rubric of “care” at all. 
Even when noting the medical and technical distinctions between VAE and PAS, there remain 
valid questions concerning whether a significant moral difference exists between VAE and 
PAS and whether such action equals care. Regardless of the technical or semantic differences 
between VAE and PAS, a physician exercises intention in bringing about the death of a 
patient163 which, historically, has been deemed an unsuitable action in the exercise of 
beneficent medicine. For example, even though PAS advocates claim that a patient gains a 
greater degree of control with PAS,164 the patient is still required to receive assistance in his 
dying process from a doctor.165 A doctor is significantly—indeed morally—involved in both 
instances of VAE and PAS when he intentionally exercises some measure of control over the 
patient’s dying process.166 A physician’s action towards a patient, to aid the bringing about of 
the death of that patient, is a moral action.167
163Keown, Public Policy, 33.
164The DPR is a place where a focus upon favourable outcomes (HU consequences) 
holds implications for patient autonomy. See thesis, chapter 3 for an examination of autonomy. 
This is also of crucial concern to an historic ethic of physician care, because the historic nature 
of the DPR is altered when a physician acts to aid a patient with his or her suicide. See thesis, 
chapter 4, for an examination of a medical ethic of care.
165Keown, Public Policy, 33. The doctor still exercises a “decisive” amount of medical 
control in PAS. A patient cannot require a doctor to assist with PAS. Further, a doctor will not 
assist a patient, unless he or she determines that suicide is appropriate in the patient’s case. 
Finally, a doctor will not agree to help a patient commit suicide, unless he or she forms a 
judgment that the patient’s life is no longer worth living and that death is the best alternative. 
The patient does not have as much control in the PAS equation as advocates promote.
166A question remains as to why a patient’s autonomous request for PAS carries more 
weight than the same sort of request for VAE.
167Ibid., 33. See also Kamisar, “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” 230-33. Even though PAS 
is considered to protect patient autonomy and to provide a beneficent response to end-of-life 
terminal illness and suffering, genuine moral concerns exist that surround physician assistance 
with a patient’s suicide. Felicia Cohn and Joanne Lynn, “Vulnerable People: Practical 
Rejoinders to Claims in Favor of Assisted Suicide,” in The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For 
the Right-to End-of-Life Care, ed. Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, paperback edition, 2004), 240. The authors note the abuses of PAS 
in The Netherlands of significant numbers of unreported PAS cases without patient request or 
consent.
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A further question, however, addresses whether PAS is truly an end-of-life palliative 
care option. Even though there are those who believe that PAS is one such option,168 promoting 
legalised PAS as a parallel treatment equal to hospice and palliative care is not an accurate 
assessment of “care.” PAS advocates proffer this treatment as an option when “nothing more” 
can be done to provide end-of-life care; however, medicine can—and often does—offer much 
care to a patient until the very end of a terminal illness.169 PAS opponents state that much more 
can be done to help allay the pain that patients experience.170 While advocates for medical 
killing promote VAE (and PAS) for “unbearable and unrelievable pain,” the reality is that pain 
symptoms can “almost always be relieved” with the help of good nursing and/or palliative 
care.171 Doctors not only need to inform patients about palliative care options, but they also 
need to help patients to gain easy access to such alternative care. Even when pain relief drugs 
are not working—noting the fact that 95 percent of patients receive pain relief and that 100 
percent can be helped—there are, for example, other non-drug methods such as a TENS 
(“Transcutaneous Nerve Stimulation”) machine.172 Under the surface, then, the arguments for 
the legalising of PAS are sometimes not actually as much about the presence or lack o f 
possibilities at end-of-life as they are more directly related to a failure to provide adequate 
arrangements for patients at the end of life.173
168Quill and Battin, eds., Physician-Assisted Dying, 1.
I69Cohn and Lynn, “Vulnerable People,” 243-44.
170Alison Davis, “Submission to the Voluntary Euthanasia Select Committee, House of 
Keys, Isle of Man”; internet; available at http://www.spuc.org.uk/about/no-less- 
human/IoMeuthanasia.pdf#search=%22%22Robert%20Twycross%22%20%22pain%20relief% 
22%20%22article%22%22; accessed 20 August 2006.
171Ibid.
172Ibid.
173Cohn and Lynn, “Vulnerable People,” 243-44.
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The failure to provide adequately for end-of-life circumstances is indeed related to 
another issue that surrounds PAS; namely, the withholding and/or withdrawing of treatment 
and the fear that surrounds such decisions.174 The situation in The Netherlands, for example, 
where significant numbers of patients were euthanised by their doctors without having 
requested such action, holds implications for families that will be treated by the same 
physician.175 This sort of circumstance is compounded by a lack of knowledge and training in 
medical personnel to alleviate suffering through palliative care176 which results, in some
174In a significant number of documented cases in The Netherlands, physicians did not 
explain treatment options with their patients. Patients were killed without requesting such 
action by their physicians. John Keown, “Euthanasia in The Netherlands: Sliding Down the 
Slippery Slope?” in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, ed. John 
Keown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint edition, 1998), 261-96.; and Keown, 
Public Policy, 215. Keown addresses the concern with English law and professional ethics that 
permits passive euthanasia, especially as it regards withholding/withdrawing treatment (or 
tube-delivered food and fluids) by a doctor with the intent to kill. He claims that this action on 
the part of doctors has important implications for the United States, among other jurisdictions, 
where some courts have moved from “inviolability” of life toward “quality” of life—thus 
moving incrementally closer toward sanctioned medical killing.
175Zbigniew Zylicz, “Palliative Care and Euthanasia in the Netherlands,” in The Case 
Against Assisted Suicide, ed. Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002), 122-43. Zylicz states that the majority of patients with end-stage 
cancer desire to be cared for at home by a general practitioner (124) who will continue to offer 
care for the rest of the family (128). He states that, “Mistakes and near-mistakes may have an 
impact on decades of care afterward” (128). See also Foley and Hendin, “Oregon Experiment,” 
166. Doctors administered lethal injections to a number of patients, whose attempts to die 
failed through PAS.
176Palliative care, as defined by the World Health Organization (2002) is: “. . .  an 
approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problem 
associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means 
of early identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, 
physical, psychosocial and spiritual.” See http://www.euro.who.int/document/E82931.pdf; 
internet; accessed 23 August 2006. Palliative care provides pain relief, offers care for other 
distressing symptoms, affirms life, and regards dying as a normal process. See thesis also, at 
Pellegrino and “ethic of care,” 289-93.
63
instances, in euthanisation of a patient.177 Patient fears concerning end-of-life treatment are 
often allayed when doctors discuss clearly end-of-life treatment and palliative care options.178
Ethical Implications of Physician-Assisted Suicide 
The contemporary moral and ethical debate about PAS centres upon the treatment of a 
terminally ill patient.179 Proponents cast PAS as a beneficent model to care for patients who 
often endure emotional and physical pain and suffering in the end stages of a terminal illness.180
177Zylicz, “Palliative Care,” 124-29.
178Anthony L. Back, “Doctor-Patient Communication About Physician-Assisted 
Suicide,” in Physician-Assisted Dying: The Case for Palliative Care & Patient Choice 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 105-8. Back states that patients often do not 
receive clear answers to questions about their terminal illnesses, especially as it relates to 
palliative care and withholding treatment. Back states that it is important for clinicians to have 
the ability “to describe the natural histoiy of illness and palliative care options in the last days 
of life.” Maria Silveria, as cited in Back’s discussion, found a substantial degree of 
misunderstanding among patients about withholding life-sustaining treatment and hastening 
death. Back, “Doctor-Patient Communication,” 105-8. See also Maria J. Silveria, Albert 
DiPiero, Martha S. Gerrity, and Chris Feudtner, “Patients’ Knowledge of Options at the End of 
Life: Ignorance in the Face of Death,” Journal o f the American Medical Association 284, no.
19 (November 15,2000): 2483-88. For example, patients did not know that they could refuse 
life-sustaining medical care, did not know that life support could be withdrawn once it was 
started, did not know that pain can be managed aggressively “by increasing medication 
dosages into the realm of a double effect,” and did not know enough to differentiate between 
PAS and VAE.
See also Dieter Giesen, “Dilemmas at Life’s End: A Comparative Legal Perspective,” 
in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives,” ed. John Keown 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rev. paperback ed., 1995), 200-13, esp. 205-7.
Giesen examines the legal issues that surround palliative care and withholding and 
withdrawing treatment, both within the context of life-sustaining treatment.
179Bemard Baumrin, “Physician Stay Thy Hand!” in Physician Assisted Suicide: 
Expanding the Debate, ed. Margaret Pabst Battin, Rosamond Rhodes, and Anita Silvers (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 181. Cf. also The Oregon Death With Dignity Act at http://www. 
rights.org/deathnet/ergo_orlaw.html; accessed 16 June 2000. Under section 1, “General 
Provisions,” item (12) defines “terminal disease” as “. . .  an incurable and irreversible disease 
that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce 
death within six (6) months.”
180Marcia Angell, “Helping Desperately 111 People to Die,” Regulating How We Die:
The Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Linda L. 
Emanuel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 17. Angell writes that the “problem of 
aiding people who face prolonged dying is so great that we cannot ignore it.”
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Noting both the difficult circumstances surrounding a terminal illness and the physician 
safeguards noted above in the definition of PAS, it might seem reasonable to conclude that 
PAS is warranted in some instances and that there would be a minimal amount of disagreement 
with or about such action on the part of doctors and patients. Further, PAS has been viewed as 
a middle ground position between VAE and no physician-aid-in-dying that would offer a 
choice between a natural or an accelerated death to each individual.181 An extensive body of 
literature examines various facets of debate, using the pillar arguments of mercy or 
beneficence, and/or respect for patient autonomy and authority to inform proposals for or 
against cultural perceptions and changes in medical policies and legal canon.182
181Lonny Shavelson, A Chosen Death: The Dying Confront Assisted Suicide (Simon & 
Schuster: New York, 1995), 222. Holst, 339. Holst states that a reason for this view is that PAS 
provides a balance of power that is more nearly equal between a physician and a patient.
182The general moral facets of the debate reflect roughly religious perspectives alone, 
religious and secular perspectives, and secular perspectives alone, but each facet (perspective) 
often deals with a central feature-the issue of who ultimately controls life and death whether it 
be governmental, institutional, or individual. There are religious moral concerns as noted by 
Cassel. Christine Cassel, “Physician-assisted Suicide: Are We Asking the Right Questions?” 
Second Opinion 18, no. 2 (October 1992): 96. She states that most of the world’s great 
religions believe suicide is an immoral act, an act against God. Cf. also Committee on Medical 
Ethics Episcopal Diocese of Washington D.C., Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Then there are 
those that de-emphasise such religious concerns and seek to approach the debate from a 
predominantly secular perspective. McLean and Britton, xii. While the authors state that 
religious reasons represent a portion of resistance to individuals managing their own deaths, 
they also believe fears that self-control will become public control are reasons for strong 
resistance to people securing a right to managing their own deaths (meaning, for example, 
using PAS as a means of managing death). The law, in their view, sees itself as the upholder of 
traditional values such as the sanctity of all life. Dan W. Brock, “Physician-Assisted Suicide Is 
Sometimes Morally Justified,” in Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Robert F. Weir 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 88. Brock writes from a strictly secular 
perspective with the belief that religion should not play a role in the discussion of PAS based in 
part that we live in a pluralistic society where religious views are rejected by a “substantial 
portion of society.”
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Beneficence (Mercy) for a Dying Patient
One primary pillar used to support a claim for physician-assistance-with-suicide has 
been the argument from mercy.183 Few persons, if any, would dispute the fact that a terminal 
illness poses deep difficulties for a patient, his family, and his friends. It is reasoned that the 
avoidance of such misery is beneficial to all involved and, when an action (in this case, for 
example, PAS) would decrease the misery, then the reduction of misery is the strongest reason 
in favour of PAS.184 Advocates for physician-aid-in-dying believe that the medical community 
responds beneficently when a physician offers assistance with a patient’s request for aid in 
dying.
Another application of the principle of beneficence is that which refers to a moral 
obligation for a physician to act for the benefit of others;185 that is, that a physician has a moral 
obligation to further the “important and legitimate interests” of a patient.186 PAS advocates 
would claim that aid in dying is sometimes a legitimate interest. This raises questions about the 
historical meaning of physician beneficence. Historically, beneficence meant that a benevolent 
physician would act from merciful, kind, and charitable motives. Such a principle directed a
183Paul J. van der Maas and Linda L. Emanuel, “Factual Findings,” in Regulating How 
We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. 
Linda L Emanuel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 155. See also British 
Medical Association, “Arguments and Counter-arguments for Active Termination of Life,” in 
Euthanasia: Report o f the Working Party to Review the British Medical Association’s 
Guidance on Euthanasia (London: British Medical Association, 1988), 39. The BMA does not 
endorse VAE or PAS but it does recognise the need for mercy in the face of terminal illness. 
“There is a strong case, based on common sense and compassion, for granting the wish of 
terminal patients for a merciful release from prolonged and useless suffering.” See also 
Margaret P. Battin, “Is a Physician Ever Obligated to Help a Patient Die?” in Regulating How 
We Die: The Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. 
Linda L Emanuel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 32. Battin states that 
self-determination and mercy jointly support a moral right to physician assistance in suicide.
184James Rachels, The End o f Life: Euthanasia and Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 156.
185Beauchamp and Childress, 260.
186Ibid.
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physician to secure more good than harm for a patient.187 These historical concepts of physician 
beneficence are built, in part, upon various philosophical approaches to the subject of aid in 
dying. Proponents who use this argument from mercy often buttress it by the use of both 
utilitarian and non-utilitarian arguments.
The utilitarian GHP, for example, calls for calculations that increase happiness 
(pleasure) and reduce pain. According to this principle, an action to end a life should be judged 
as either right or wrong based upon whether it increased happiness or reduced misery. Either 
euthanasia or PAS could be adjudged morally acceptable from this perspective.188 It could be 
further reasoned that the death of a person who is less than happy could be well-received, 
unless that person’s death produced new unhappiness for surviving individuals.189 Utilitarians 
are aware that such calculations carry the potential for negative results for the patient but, in a 
case where the balance of benefits over injury would accumulate to others from the suicide of 
an individual, it might appear that suicide ought to be encouraged.190
A typical non-utilitarian argument from mercy reasons also that there are some 
situations where pain and suffering may become so intense that it would be morally
187Allan S. Brett and Laurence B. McCullough, “When Patients Request Specific 
Interventions: Defining the Limits of the Physician’s Obligation,” New England Journal o f  
Medicine 315, no. 21 (November 1986): 1347-51.
188Rachels, 154-55.
189Margaret Pabst Battin, Ethical Issues In Suicide (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1982), 109. While it might be supposed that the death of a loved one usually produces 
unhappiness in the life of survivors, the cessation of the patient’s pain is thought to outweigh 
this experience of unhappiness.
190Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide, 107. She states that “. . .  harm to the deceased would 
be nil.” There would be, in her view, no consequences for the individual who commits suicide. 
Battin estimates that this would not matter ultimately to a terminally ill patient because he or 
she would be deceased. See also Rachels, 154. Rachels reasons, too, that killing a hopelessly ill 
patient who is suffering great pain, at the person’s request, would decrease the amount of 
misery in the world.
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permissible for another person either to kill the sufferer or to assist the sufferer in committing 
suicide. A Christian argument, for example, might reason that a merciful and compassionate 
God would not allow such an excruciating death for a person;191 thereby, the taking of a life in 
an extraordinary case might be justified when it prevents “intolerable and uncontrollable 
suffering near death.” Advocates of mercy killing call for strict safeguards for such action, and 
for VAE and PAS to be used only in a rare, extreme, and catastrophic case.192 While patient 
misery draws merciful concern from others, a second pillar argument used in support of PAS 
forms the important catalyst in initiating and completing a request for physician-assistance- 
with-suicide in which a patient makes an “autonomous” request for physician-aid-in-dying.
Respect for Patient Autonomy
A central tenet of current medical ethics is the principle of respect for patient 
autonomy.193 PAS occurs following a patient’s voluntary (autonomous) and repeated request 
for assistance with suicide.194 Inherent in the patient’s autonomy argument are three angles: an 
individual has a fundamental right to direct the course of his life, that respect for this individual
191Committee on Medical Ethics Episcopal Diocese of Washington D.C., Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia, 63.
192Ibid., 64.
193Beauchamp and Childress, ch. 3. Autonomy forms one principle of a cluster of four 
principles of common morality found in medical morality.
194Oregon Death With Dignity Act. Section 3.06 “Written and oral requests” outlines the 
procedure the patient must follow. The patient is to make an oral request followed by a written 
request and then a second oral request within fifteen (15) days of the first oral request.
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self-determination mandates legalisation of PAS,195 and a person has the right to be free of 
governmental interference when he chooses to end his life.196
The argument for PAS from patient autonomy raises implications that proponents of 
legalising PAS and YAE question, such as, whether laws meant to promote patient autonomy 
might instead give rise to new “extrajudicial” authority to physicians that might result in 
resurgent paternalism.197 For example, a physician might be given powers to deny assistance 
for suicide to legally competent persons by “declaring them decisionally incapable.”198 Another 
question is whether the value of human life outweighs an autonomy claim.199 Another issue is 
that autonomy safeguards in PAS and VAE legal proposals could impact personal autonomy: 
for example, the authenticity of a patient’s request (“carefully considered, informed, rational, 
and mature”), and ability (the patient must be able to demonstrate the ability to self-administer 
the lethal substance).200 Finally, it is also believed that seeking to end one’s life intrinsically
195New York State Task Force, 86-87. Proponents believe that legalising PAS would 
grant individuals further control over their dying process. It is stated further that a tolerant, 
pluralistic society should support such a decision on the part of a patient. Proponents of patient 
autonomy and PAS believe that legalising PAS would demonstrate respect for individual 
beliefs about the meaning of life and the significance of death.
196New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death Is Sought: Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context (Albany, NY: Health Education Services,
1994), 87. See also Brock, 89. He states that people ought to be able to make the important 
decisions about their lives for themselves according to “their own values or conceptions of a 
good life and in being left free to act on those decisions.”
197Stephen Miles, Demetra M. Pappas, and Robert Koepp, “Considerations of 
Safeguards in Laws And Guidelines to Legalize Assisted Suicide,” in Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, ed. Robert F. Weir (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 217. Autonomy 
and physician paternalism will be examined in detail in the third chapter of the thesis.
198Ibid.
199New York State Task Force, 87.
200Miles, Pappas, and Koepp, 212-13. The authors believe that some restrictions on 
responses to PAS and VAE rather than promote respect for autonomy could, in fact, undermine 
the rights of persons “whose autonomy should be promoted and are inadequate to protect those 
whose capacity for an authentic choice is impaired.”
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contradicts the value of autonomy201 and also makes the action a communal one when a second 
party becomes involved in PAS.202 The point is that patient autonomy argument is fraught with 
cultural, legal, and ethical implications that still must be addressed.
The one place where patient autonomy advocates converge is in asserting that a patient 
has a moral right to physician-assisted death, based upon an underlying affirmation of patient 
rights.203 This alleged right functions as “the crucial unquestioned premise in the argument for
PAS ”204 This premise, however, raises fundamental concerns about what limits, if any,
there are to personal rights, what communal responsibilities a patient has, and how appropriate 
suicide is.205 Regardless of the limits some might place upon individual autonomy, there are 
those who would claim that an individual should have the right to control his or her physical 
being, even to the point of physician-aid-in-dying.206 This argument for autonomy over one’s 
own death conflicts most often with three authoritative entities: religion, the government, and 
the medical establishment.207
201New York State Task Force, 88.
202Ibid.
203While there is agreement that there is a broad continuum that encompasses discussion 
and debate about a “right-to-die”—one that covers, for example, everything from a right to 
know the truth about one’s condition to involuntary euthanasia of the incompetent incurably 
ill-there is much disagreement about the far end of the continuum, legalising physician- 
assistance-with-suicide. Patient autonomy is embraced on the end of the continuum that 
includes treatment decisions (i.e., a right to refuse treatment) and is restricted on the opposite 
end of the continuum where decisions about suicide and euthanasia fall. See New York State 
Task Force, 49. See also Derek Humphry and Mary Clement, Freedom to Die: People, Politics, 
and the Right-to-Die Movement (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1998), 81. The New York 
State Task Force and Humphry/Clement represent differing conclusions about suicide and 
euthanasia, but both sides understand autonomy to be a central cog in the entire debate.
204David J. Baggett, “On The Legality and Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide,” 
Asbury Theological Journal 50, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 57.
205Ibid. See also New York State Task Force, 49. New York law prohibits assisted 
suicide and euthanasia for the individual’s own benefit and for the sake of the common good. 
Ch. 2 of the thesis will examine the subject of a “right-to-die.”
206Humphry and Clement, 81.
207Ibid., 167.
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Patient Autonomy, Authority, and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Religious perspectives on suicide, VAE, and PAS have drawn considerable attention in 
the PAS debate.208 The issue is not directly related to a person’s belief or disbelief in a deity. 
Indeed, in the broader dialogue surrounding PAS there seems to be little antagonism toward 
those who might worship a deity or approach ethical decision-making from a religious 
perspective.209 Rather, the debate centres upon the basis for ultimate authority in decision­
making. In the view of some advocates of PAS, a religious authority that limits an individual’s 
autonomous decision to request and receive physician-assistance-with-suicide is to be
208Ibid., 167-85. Richard Doerflinger, “Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?” 
Hastings Center Report, Special Supplement 19 (Januaiy-February 1989): 16. In discussing 
assisted suicide, Doerflinger notes that the intrinsic wrongness of directly killing is “all but 
axiomatic” in Jewish and Christian worldviews. These views helped shape the laws and mores 
of Western culture and the self-concept of its medical practitioners. He notes also that the 
secularisation of Western culture has led to a cutting of the religious roots. See also Eike- 
Henner W. Kluge, The Practice o f Death (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 133-40. 
Kluge outlines in some detail the religious arguments against euthanasia. Eduardo Rodriquez, 
“The Arguments for Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Ethical Reflection,” Linacre 
Quarterly 68, no. 3 (August 2001): 258. In Rodriquez’s argument against euthanasia and PAS 
he notes the religious prohibition in practically all religious traditions. McLean and Britton, xii. 
While the authors do not believe the religious argument is a main key, they still note religion as 
an influence against the legalisation of PAS.
209Ch. 3 of the thesis will examine thoroughly the area of autonomy. Indeed, religious 
authority over an individual, whether the matter was suicide or not, has been challenged by 
some from the Renaissance forward. See also Gary B. Femgren, “The Ethics of Suicide in the 
Renaissance and Reformation,” in Suicide and Euthanasia: Historical and Contemporary 
Themes, ed. Baruch Brody, vol. 35 in Philosophy and Medicine, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. 
and Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Klewer Academic Publishers, 1989), 155- 
62. Femgren writes that it was during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the 
traditional Christian view related to suicide began to receive challenges; “obliquely” at first, 
then with “increasing boldness.” Suicide, by the end of the seventeenth century, according to 
Femgren, was considered to be merely a matter of personal choice that was unencumbered by 
theological or dogmatic considerations. See, for example, Mill, 33. Mill was not antagonistic 
toward religion, but he did believe that any religious ethic must “fulfil [sic] the requirements of 
utility in a supreme degree.” See also Timothy N. Gorski, “No: Should Spirituality Play a 
Bigger Role in American Healthcare?”; internet, available at http://umm.drkoop.com/news/ 
focus/January/spirituality no.html; accessed 16 July 2001. Gorski asserts that religious and 
spiritual concerns have traditionally been in the background of American healthcare, but the 
“subordination” of these concerns does not give licence to healthcare professionals to belittle 
or ignore religious beliefs and practices. He believes that these beliefs and practices are an 
integral part of a person’s sense of well-being.
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resisted.210 Authority for decision-making is considered to belong to the individual alone and 
that individual is to be free of all external control. Therefore, religious authority is viewed by 
some as an impediment to an individual’s choice to develop the framework of his or her life 
autonomously.211
A second authoritative entity impacting autonomous decision-making is government.212 
Again, the issue for PAS proponents is the patient’s loss of control over his freedom to make 
an autonomous decision about the framework of his or her life free from governmental 
interference—in this case to choose and receive physician-assistance-with-dying. As of April 
2004, the only jurisdictions granting the patient the legal right to terminate his own life with the 
assistance of a physician are the state of Oregon in the United States, the Netherlands, and 
Belgium.213 Legal jurisdiction does in fact inform, and sometimes control, the patient’s options 
for end-of-life decisions. The same holds true for medical canons.
Depending upon a variety of factors a patient has little opportunity to exercise the 
autonomous choice with supervision unless a physician is either morally willing and/or legally 
able to assist him. Longstanding medical practice, pledged to sustain life, militates strongly 
against pressure to accept a patient’s final control over his or her own life.214
210Humphry and Clement, 167.
211Ibid. Yet, see also Committee on Medical Ethics Episcopal Diocese of Washington,
D. C., Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 67-68. There are those within religious circles who 
support VAE and PAS under the belief that God’s dominion over a person’s life does not 
require a person to continue to live in pain and suffering.
212Humphry and Clement, 167.
213Rita L. Marker and Kathi Hamlon, “Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Frequently 
Asked Questions,” ed. International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide; internet, 
available at http:www.intemationaltaskforce.org/faq.htm; accessed 23 April 2004. PAS is not 
yet legal in Switzerland, but it is practised. See also “Medical Body Breaks Euthanasia Taboo”; 
internet, available at http://www.nzz.ch/2004/102/105/english/ page-synd4696720; accessed 23 
April 2004.
214See ch. 3,179-83, for a fuller discussion of this topic.
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Patient control raises questions about the limits of autonomy. Currently, a patient is 
only free to do whatever he or she desires within certain limits.215 PAS advocates claim that a 
patient may lack the knowledge and means necessary to take his own life and that a physician’s 
aid is needed, which case represents a technical inability. In other cases a patient might not 
have the mental or physical capability of committing suicide, representing a physical limitation 
or mental competency inability. These technical and physical restrictions in the case of PAS 
only add to those limits already imposed by authoritative entities, the latter of which have 
struggled to maintain a consistency of policy in the face of the onslaught of the rhetoric of both 
public and private sectors. The tension between these above mentioned authoritative bodies, 
technical and physical restrictions in the instance of PAS, and heightened patient desire for 
control over the dying process has created a shifting current within culture.
Evidence of Cultural Shift 
Cultural Indications 
Heightened Awareness and Public Fear
One of the strongest voices in the debate surrounding PAS is the message delivered by 
an ever-widening phenomenon of euthanasia societies.216 These groups have increased public 
awareness of right-to-die issues, helped people to prepare for death and its inevitability, and 
advocated the legalisation of both VAE and PAS.217 Derek Humphry, one of the original 
founders of the Hemlock Society, an aggressive proponent of VAE and PAS, has written: “The 
phrase most often heard by euthanasia societies is: T have a dreadful fear of being trapped and
215See David Cook, Freedom and Authority (London: Scripture Union, 1988), 30-32.
216Information on the World Association of Euthanasia Societies can be accessed at 
“Euthanasia Research and Guidance Organization (ERGO)”; internet, available at http://www. 
finalexit.org/worldfed_frame.html; accessed 19 May 2004.
217Battin, Least Worst Death, 7. See also Cox, 59-60; and Samuel I. Greenberg, 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Psychosocial Issues, with a foreword by Ralph Slovenko 
(Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1997), 107.
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out of self-control like my mother/father was.’”218 Humphry also writes that “fear of dying in 
the cold clutches of modem technology has given a major boost to public acceptance of 
voluntary euthanasia.”219
Battin cites the sales success of Humphry’s how-to book on self-deliverance, Final 
Exit, as a clear message of public ferment sent to the medical establishment.220 She also 
suggests that these vocal advocates for legal change have aroused the public into wresting the 
control of dying from both physicians, in whom authority has traditionally rested, and medical 
institutions, in order to hand that control to the patient221 The seminal influence in the 
euthanasia movement in the United Kingdom was the Voluntary Euthanasia Society222 
established in 1931;223 the founding group in the United States (1938) was named the 
Euthanasia Society of America, later to become the United States Society for the Right to 
Die.224 Both groups advocated an energetic approach to active euthanasia, but this is not to
2I8Derek Humphry and Ann Wickett, The Right to Die: Understanding Euthanasia 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986): 189.
2I9Ibid., 188. Humphry and Hemlock did not begin actively pushing PAS until some 
years later when a Hemlock Society-supported euthanasia initiative failed in Washington State. 
Humphry is not alone in recognising the fear many people have of a long and painful illness. 
See also David Lamb, Therapy Abatement, Autonomy and Futility: Ethical Decisions at the 
Edge o f Life (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995): 38. Lamb also cites Robert F. Weir’s 1990 appraisal 
of therapy options for the terminally ill. He says “fears of medical technology out of control are 
well expressed. . . ” in Weir’s work.
220Battin, Least Worst Death, 7. Battin states that Final Exit sold more than 540,000 
copies within a year and a half of publication and “hit the top of the New York Times how-to 
bestseller list.”
221Ibid.
222Ibid. The Scottish affiliate of VES is now named EXIT.
223Robert G. Twycross, “Voluntary Euthanasia,” in Suicide and Euthanasia, ed. Samuel
E. Wallace and Albin Eser (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1981), 88.
224David C. Thomasma and Glenn C. Graber, Euthanasia: Toward an Ethical Social 
Policy (New York: Continuum, 1990), 185.
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imply that all pro-euthanasia groups are the same. Since that decade other societies emerged 
worldwide and now take varied positions on the matter of euthanasia and PAS.225
A recent type of society which advocates a more conservative approach to the subject of 
euthanasia and PAS concentrates its energies on disseminating information, holding legal and 
medical seminars, winning court cases, and passing legislation to assist in passive death.226 
While no less energetic than the active euthanasia groups, these societies seek to use 
information and action to help patients “to maintain some control over their dying process, 
based upon their respect for autonomy bom out of patient rights.”227 The success of these 
societies hinges on several factors: the public fear of a protracted and painful death, an 
aggressive agenda to popularise euthanasia and PAS, and efforts to legalise PAS. The public’s 
fear of a painful, protracted death is a reality both detractors and proponents in the PAS debate 
must take into account.
A second reason for the heightened public interest is the aggressive agenda of 
euthanasia societies to popularise euthanasia and PAS. Smith notes the “indomitable spirit” of 
these societies in the United States by naming them “death fundamentalists.”228 Britain’s EXIT 
has been providing dmg dosage information to its members for years, “sometimes directly, 
sometimes through its Scottish affiliate.”229 With the uniting of individual euthanasia societies
225Cox, 54. Cox writes of thirty-one different societies in nineteen nations that were 
formed in the late 1980s. The umbrella organisation for this world network of euthanasia 
groups is named the World Federation of Right to Die Societies (WFRDS).
226Ibid., 60. The conservative National Council on Death and Dying was the result of a 
merger in 1990 between Concern for Dying and Society for the Right-to-Die (formerly the 
Euthanasia Society). “Conservative” means they do not advocate going beyond the removal of 
tubes and respirators for the terminally ill. They do push for the legalisation of living wills and 
powers of attorney. Cf. also Battin, Least Worst Death, 7.
227Thomasma and Graber, 185. See also Battin, Least Worst Death, 7.
228Smith, Forced Exit, 116. Smith also notes that euthanasia advocates are undaunted in 
their efforts even though they suffer legal or political setbacks.
229Battin, Least Worst Death, 7. This action led to legal challenges.
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into a world federation,230 the movement now has a global forum for collecting and 
disseminating information, lobbying legislation, and advancing the stated agenda of the 
organisation.231 Derek Humphry, editor of the World Right-to-Die-Newsletter, used a 1993 
edition to call for legal reform with regard to euthanasia and PAS for the terminally ill. He 
suggested that the President of the United States appoint a special “President’s Commission” to 
make recommendations on “how to solve the impasse on both the state and federal levels.”232 
The fact of a worldwide developing organisation of right-to-die activists was not enough to 
gamer public focus; something else was required to galvanise concern. Several watershed 
events occurred within the medical community at large that helped to draw the public’s 
attention to the subject of physician-aid-in-dying.
Medical Community
An HU Interface with Medicine
The concept of the moral permissibility of PAS, as well as suicide and assisted suicide, 
has been discussed for centuries. Both ancient and contemporary societies have presented 
strongly divided viewpoints, offered ethical and medical perspectives, crafted and, in some 
instances, passed laws allowing for PAS. Even though the concept of physician-aided death has 
a long history, only within the last several decades—with the advent of life-sustaining 
technology and the qualitative considerations of pain measured against the prospect of future 
happiness—have the cultural, medical, legal, and ethical discussions captured such broad 
attention and considered the possibility of legalisation. Several watershed cases where 
medicine applied life-sustaining technology-for example, Quinlan (1976), Cruzan (1990), and 
Bland (1993)-captured global attention as they related to the appropriateness of the removal,
230See thesis, 39, footnote 169.
231Cox, 225. The World Right-to-Die Newsletter is the chief organ of the global
euthanasia organisations.
232Ibid.
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or the refusal, of such life-sustaining medical treatment. Of key and critical importance in 
these, and other cases to follow, was the growing discussion of actively shortening lives no 
longer considered to be worth living.223 Such qualitative discussions of life’s value in culture, 
medicine, and law have evolved over these many centuries of philosophical, ethical, and moral 
consideration surrounding the basis and nature of life itself—even to the point of establishing 
life’s sanctity. Of key concern to this thesis is the utilitarian and consequential reasoning that 
has contributed to some of the advocacy for a change in medicine and law that would allow for 
a form of medical killing, based upon a determination that a life is no longer worth living.234
A widespread “residue of philosophical utilitarianism” in the broader culture has been 
an object of focus235 in this thesis’ discussion because such an awareness acknowledges the
233Loretta M. Kopelman and Kenneth A. De Ville, eds., Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
What Are the Issues? Philosophy and Medicine, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt, no. 67 (Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). This is also a focus in this thesis, because PAS has 
emerged as an option for patients in order to shorten actively lives no longer considered to be 
worth living.
234See Peter Singer’s utilitarian and consequentialist perspectives on end-of-life 
decision-making in Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse o f Our Traditional 
Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994), 1-6. Singer argues from a utilitarian perspective 
and his book seeks to establish this form of ethic to replace a traditional sanctity of life ethic.
Of course, Singer’s intent does not make it so, but Singer’s use of Mill’s “harm principle” as 
one leg of support for his overall utilitarian ethical approach is illustrative of utilitarian 
reasoning. See also Sheila McLean and Alison Britton, The Case for Physician-Assisted 
Suicide (San Francisco, CA: Pandora, 1997), 29. The authors refer to Mill’s harm principle and 
utilise a collective “happiness” argument (GHP) as twin utilitarian supports for their belief that 
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide is immoral. See Baron, “Seven Deadly Sins,” 312-14. 
Baron’s perspective illustrates the pervasive application of utilitarian reasoning. Again, the 
focus is on consequences and not on the motive and intent behind the physician’s action—the 
doctor who helps to kill his patient.
235Gormally, ed. Euthanasia Clinical Practice and the Law, 28-29,184-85. Values must 
be attached to outcomes in this line of reasoning. For example, it is assumed that a common 
measure (commensurable) can be placed upon the value of a child’s life and the “burdens” 
associated with the medical treatment needed by that child. The value of a severely 
handicapped child’s life would be calculated, for example, alongside the burdens (financial, 
physical, and psychological) of treating the child. Alongside both of these calculations, a 
person would measure the value of alternative possibilities if the child were not kept alive. The 
assumption is that the value of a child’s life can be computed on some sort of calculus 
applicable to all of the other values. The value of a child’s life can be reckoned, according to 
Gormally, as a positive or negative contribution to greater “happiness.”
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impact philosophical utilitarianism and consequential reasoning make on medical decision­
making. Gormally notes, for example, that the discussion surrounding the concept and practice 
and legalisation related to euthanasia is consequential in nature. Gormally states that there is a 
widespread inclination to frame medical-ethical questions in terms of outcomes: “What course 
of action will have the best outcome?” As such, utilitarian and consequential reasoning offers 
significant implications for medical-ethical decision-making especially at the end o f life?36 
That application of utilitarian reasoning to support end-of-life PAS medical killing introduces a 
divergent philosophical framework that is contrary to established medical canons and law.
HU also has provided a philosophical basis for arguments aimed toward legalising 
PAS. James Rachels characterises his utilitarian approach “not as a matter of faithfulness to 
abstract rules or divine laws, but as a matter of doing what is best for those who are affected by 
our conduct.”237 Through utilitarian reasoning, he deems killing “beneficial” in the case of 
people with subnormal lives. Such reasoning can be applied well beyond the limits of end-of- 
life terminal illness—a fact of which Rachels is aware. He is willing to run the risk of a slide 
toward greater killing to gain the benefits of hastened death for those with “subnormal lives.”238 
McLean and Britton cite utilitarian arguments as influential supports for the legalisation of 
PAS. They believe, like Bentham and Mill, that the essence of morality is not as much “the 
service of God” or “obedience to abstract rules,” but rather the promotion of the greatest 
possible happiness for creatures on earth and that the only reason for interfering with a 
person’s actions would be if those actions have a negative effect on others.239 They believe that
236See also Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, 57-80. Singer presents a detailed 
argument for a change in the traditional “sanctity of life” ethic and cites the landmark medical 
and legal cases of Quinlan, Cruzan, and Bland as support for his view—that a quality-of-life 
ethic, based on utilitarian and consequential reasoning, is needed to supplant the former 
sanctity-of-life ethic.
237See Rachels’s argument in Pellegrino, “False Promise,” 72.
238Ibid.
239McLean and Britton, Case for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 29.
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one individual test of moral validity is the “cumulative effect of individual decisions.” As a 
result, the authors focus on utilitarian outcomes as they call for a change of laws to allow for 
PAS.
HU, by its focus on good outcomes, neglects important moral consideration of the 
entire scope of an end-of-life decision, which includes a doctor’s intention with PAS. PAS and 
VAE, when viewed simply as actions or avenues that leads toward desired outcomes, hold 
serious implications for both traditional medical-ethical decision-making and for law.
Watershed Events
When PAS actually took place, physicians themselves became the focus in the ever­
growing PAS debate. Physicians in the Netherlands had been practising VAE and PAS for 
some years prior to the first public instances in the United States which drew close observation 
by advocacy groups, philosophers, and the world medical community.240 Dr. Nigel Cox in the 
UK was tried and convicted after having aided a patient’s death by a lethal injection.241 The 
names in the United States associated most commonly with PAS are Timothy Quill and Jack 
Kevorkian. Interestingly, both physicians242 first assisted patients with suicide within one
240See “Laws on Assisted Suicide Come with Strict Conditions”; internet, available at 
http:/icwales.icnetwork.co.uk/printable_version.cfm?objectid=13216038&siteid=50082; 
accessed 5 August 2003. Doctors had practised helping patients to die for decades before the 
law was changed in 2002. See also International Task Force on Euthanasia and Assisted 
Suicide, “Holland’s Euthanasia Law”; internet, available a thttp://www.intemationaltaskforce. 
org/hollaw.htm; accessed 4 August 2003. The Dutch law was approved April 10,2001 and 
went into effect April 1, 2002.
241Keown, 97. Dr. Nigel Cox was tried and convicted in court for attempted murder 
after he administered a lethal dose to a suffering patient. His conviction prompted great 
controversy.
242Quill was a hospice physician at the University of Rochester and Jack Kevorkian was 
a licensed but retired pathologist at the time he first assisted a patient with suicide. See Fred 
Rosner, et al., “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” New York State Journal o f  Medicine 92, no. 9 
(September 1992): 388-89.
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month of each another.243 Similarities exist between each of these separate, but chronologically 
related, events. Physician compassion for a “suffering” patient generally led the doctors to take 
steps to demonstrate mercy. In addition, Quill and Kevorkian also attested to their respect for 
the autonomous decision of their patients. Such watershed events occurred internationally.
In the Netherlands
The Netherlands views legal PAS and VAE comparatively.244 Formerly, any doctor 
assisting in the suicide of a patient including providing the means for any person to take 
another person’s life, was guilty of a crime.245 Article 294 of the Penal Code also included 
physicians acting upon the request of a patient. However, a number of court cases in the 1980s 
and 1990s allowed physicians to provide such help under certain conditions.246 PAS emerged in 
a different light when cases began including psychiatric patients who did not fit the usual 
profile of euthanasia patients.
In one celebrated case, the psychiatrist assisted a woman to commit suicide who was 
not terminally ill.247 She was depressed over the break-up of her marriage and the deaths of her 
two sons. She wanted to join them in death and turned down all forms of therapy suggested by 
her psychiatrist.248 Two lower courts acquitted the psychiatrist but the Supreme Court found
243Quill assisted his “patient” Diane in May 1990 and Kevorkian assisted his “patient” 
Janet Adkins in June of the same year. Rosner et al., 387-89.
244Sjef Gevers, “Physician Assisted Suicide: New Developments in the Netherlands,” 
Bioethics 9, no. 3-4 (1995): 309.
245Ibid.
246Ibid.
247Herbert Hendin, Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients and the Dutch Cure (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), 60-69. Cf. also Smith, Forced Exit, 104-6.
248Gevers, “New Developments in the Netherlands,” 310. Cf. also Smith, Forced Exit, 
104-6; and Hendin, 60-69.
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him guilty although he was not punished.249 He was found guilty because he had not consulted 
two other psychiatrists who had also examined the woman. Two points apply to this section of 
the thesis. PAS gained separate notoriety from VAE, and media coverage helped to spread PAS 
information to the public.250
Another celebrated court case involved a doctor “who euthanized an infant.”251 The 
child, a three-day old girl, was bom with spina bifida, hydrocephaly, and leg deformities. The 
child was killed with her parents’ permission because of a poor prognosis and because the baby 
screamed in pain when touched. Some controversy was aroused for medical reasons252 and also 
because of the subsequent trial.253 The court refused to punish the doctor, and the prosecutor in 
the case appealed to the Supreme Court to establish a precedent to govern euthanasia for people 
who cannot consent.254
In the United Kingdom
Two celebrated cases occurred in the United Kingdom, and, while neither case directly 
involved PAS, both demonstrated basic arguments used to support physician-aid-in-dying-an 
argument from mercy and an argument from respect for patient autonomy. As stated before,
Dr. Nigel Cox administered a lethal dose to a suffering patient. He, after a later public 
admission, was charged with attempted murder, handed a suspended sentence, and given an
249Hendin, 67-69.
250Gevers, “New Developments in the Netherlands,” 311. Gevers notes that public 
reaction to the case of PAS was favourable. Cf. also Hendin, 60. Hendin, writing of the Chabot 
case, states that it aroused “controversy and international interest.”
251Smith, Forced Exit, 106.
252Smith notes the child was in pain because she was neglected medically. Ibid.
253Smith responds negatively to the case which is contrary to the Dutch judicial 
response. Both the negative and the positive responses indicate the tension involved in the
overall matter.
254Ibid.
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admonishment by the General Medical Council (GMC).255 The debate centred on whether the 
physician should have been prosecuted at all since he had acted in accordance with the wishes 
of the patient and her family and with a merciful motive.256 Others were concerned that having 
broken the law and breached the ethical code of his profession, the physician only received a 
suspended sentence 257
The second UK case involved a patient by the name of Tony Bland who was severely 
injured in a stadium accident in 1989 and survived several years in a persistent vegetative state. 
The local health authority with the support of his family sought and received permission to 
discontinue artificial feeding.258 Some, indicating a merciful response to Bland’s situation, 
welcomed the decision because they felt that all the functions that had made Bland an 
“individual” had been “irretrievably lost.”259 Others felt that nutrition and hydration are such 
basic elements of care that they should only be withdrawn “when the patient is in the final 
stages of the dying process.”260 They felt that their discontinuance led to an act of deliberate 
killing. Even though this case was not a case directly about euthanasia or PAS, it did give rise 
to much press comment and public debate.261
In the United States
255Keown, 97.
256Anthony Fisher, “Theological Aspects of Euthanasia,” in Euthanasia Examined: 
Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, ed. John Keown, reprint edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 317-18.
257Ibid.
258Ibid.
259Keown, 97.
260Ibid.
261Ibid. Bryan Jennett, “Letting Vegetative Patients Die,” in Euthanasia Examined: 
Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives, reprint edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998,170. It has been noted, too, that the issue has some relation to respect for patient 
autonomy in that it touches upon patient-centred medical ethics. This also has been a central 
concern in the United States for years. See thesis, ch. 2,137-38, for Diane Pretty’s recent case.
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In the United States several celebrated cases have led to increased focus on PAS and 
great public debate over the phenomenon. On June 4, 1990, Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a retired 
pathologist, used his “suicide machine” to assist in the death of Janet Adkins, a middle-aged 
woman diagnosed with Alzheimers.262 Though diagnosed with the disease, Adkins was not yet 
terminally ill or hospitalised at the time.263 Kevorkian’s method of death through his “suicide 
machine” aroused “enormous controversy.”264 At the other end of the spectrum, Dr. Timothy 
Quill, a physician in active practice, revealed his participation in the suicide of a woman 
diagnosed with acute leukaemia. The patient, Diane, decided not to undergo the recommended 
course of chemotherapy and instead discussed suicide as an option with Dr. Quill.265 Rosner’s 
Committee on Bioethical Issues noted that Dr. Quill’s article “. . .  was met with considerable 
understanding and even praise for his courage and forthrightness” and that Quill’s case 
“reopened the debate of physician-assisted suicide.”266 Quill based his argument for assisting 
his patient with her suicide on compassion (mercy).267 Then, in the summer of 1997, the United 
States Supreme Court voted 9-0 against legalising PAS.268
262Battin, Least Worst Death, 5. Yeates Conwell and Eric D. Caine, “Rational Suicide 
and the Right to Die: Reality and Myth,” New England Journal o f  Medicine 325, no. 15 
(October 1991): 1100-1103. Rosner et al., 388.
263Nancy S. Jecker, “Giving Death a Hand: When the Dying and the Doctor Stand in a 
Special Relationship,” Journal o f American Geriatric Society 39, no. 8 (August 1991): 831.
264Ibid.
265Conwell and Caine, 1100. Cf. also Timothy E. Quill, “Death and Dignity—A Case of 
Individualized Decision Making,” New England Journal o f Medicine 324 (1991): 691-94. Cf. 
also Rosner et al., 388-89.
266Rosner et al., 389.
267Beauchamp, Intending Death, 17.
268M. Cathleen Kaveny, “Assisted Suicide, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutive 
Function of the Law,” Hastings Center Report 27, no. 5 (September-October 1997): 29. Cf. 
also John Leo, “On Society: Good Sense on ‘Right to Die,”’ U. S. News and World Report 123, 
no. 1 (July 1997): 14.
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Australia’s Northern Territory
On May 25,1995, the parliament of Australia’s Northern Territory legalised VAE when 
it passed the Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally 111 Act.269 Within six months, two 
letters written in the New England Journal o f Medicine disputed the initial praise given to the 
Act.270 The statute was the result of a “personal crusade” of the generally conservative Liberal 
Party’s leader and Chief Minister of the Northern Territory of Australia.271 The man had 
watched his mother die an agonizing death that he said “ he did not want others to have to 
repeat.”272 The initiative permitted both euthanasia and assisted suicide and formally legalised 
the process.273
Critical points of similarity exist between these cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 
Doctors were often moved by compassion for suffering individuals and assisted in patient death 
because of merciful intentions. Patients often wanted to be freed from undignified death and 
sought the freedom to end their lives in the manner they chose. There were legal and medical 
challenges in each of these instances. These challenges often gave rise to patient concerns in 
the PAS debate.274 These patient concerns, added to the cultural indicators such as public fear
269Christopher James Ryan and Miranda Kaye, “Sounding Board: Euthanasia in 
Australia—The Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally 111 Act,” New England Journal o f 
Medicine 334, no. 5 (February 1996): 326-28.
270Paul Andrew Glare and Bernadette Tobin, “Correspondence: Euthanasia in 
Australia,” New England Journal o f Medicine 334, no. 25 (June 1996): 1668-69.
271Robert L. Schwartz, “Rights of the Terminally 111 Act of the Australian Northern 
Territory,” Cambridge Quarterly o f Healthcare Ethics 5, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 157.
272Ibid.
273The “Rights of the Terminally 111 Act” was overturned in 1996, 8 months after it was 
legalised. Four patients had died under the terms of the Act before this court action. See “Laws 
on assisted suicide come with strict conditions”; internet, available at http:/icwales.icnetwork. 
co.uk/printable version.cfm?objectid=l 321603 8&siteid=50082; accessed 5 August 2003.
274These foundational issues of rights, justice, and patient autonomy are the subjects of 
chs. 2 and 3.
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and heightened awareness of PAS, combined with the medical community’s watershed PAS 
events, produced a complex matrix which expressed several cultural trends.
Core Cultural Concerns
PAS as a cultural phenomenon has been well-chronicled in the media and through 
various advocacy groups.275 Several cultural concerns surface which interact with the thesis, 
intersecting both philosophical and medical-ethical areas under examination. One issue gaining 
societal attention is that of individual control over the process o f dying?16 Polls indicate that 
society has consistent concern over maintaining bodily control and individual dignity through 
the dying process. This cultural attitude has implications for individual autonomy and 
physician paternalism 277
275A  representative sample follows: see also Marrijoy J. Kelner and Ivy L. Bourgeault, 
“Patient Control Over Dying: Responses of Health Care Professionals,” Social Science 
Medicine 36, no. 6 (1993): 757. Robert J. Blendon, Ulrike S. Szalay, and Richard A. Knox, 
“Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying?: The Public Perspective,” Journal o f 
American Medical Association 267, no. 19 (May 1992): 2659. Melinda A. Lee, Heidi D. 
Nelson, Virginia P. Tilden, Linda Ganzine, Terri A. Schmidt, and Susan W. Tolle, “Legalizing 
Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon,” New England Journal o f Medicine 334, no. 
5 (February 1996): 310-15. Jerald G. Bachman, Kirsten H. Alcser, David J. Doukas, Richard 
Liechtenstein, Amy D. Coming, and Howard Brody, “Special Articles: Attitudes of Michigan 
Physicians and the Public Toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia,” New England Journal o f Medicine 334, no. 5 (February 1996): 303-9. Larry R. 
Churchill and Nancy M. P. King, “Physician-Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, or Withdrawal of 
Treatment: Distinguishing Between Them Clarifies Moral, Legal, and Practical Positions,” 
British Medical Journal 315, no. 7101 (July 1997): 137-38. Meier et al., 1193. Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, “Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Review of the Empirical Data from 
the United States,” Archives o f Internal Medicine 162, no. 2 (January 2002): 143.
276Chamicia E. Huggins, “Oregon Patients Request Suicide to Take Control”; internet, 
available at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/news/fullstory_9042.html; accessed 16 
September 2002. A study of terminally ill patients in Oregon suggested that dying patients 
requested suicide assistance not because they were depressed or lacked family support but 
because they wanted to “take control of their end-of-life experience.” See also Kelner and 
Bourgeault, 757. The authors claim that a patient desire for more control over healthcare and 
ultimate destiny reflects the “. . .  pervasive trend in Western society toward individual 
autonomy.” Robert J. Blendon, Ulrike S. Szalay, and Richard A. Knox, “Should Physicians 
Aid Their Patients in Dying?: The Public Perspective,” in Journal o f  American Medical 
Association, 267, no. 19 (May 20,1992): 2659.
277Blendon, Szalay, and Knox, 2659. Kelner and Bourgeault, 757.
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Another cultural concern relates to the nature o f beneficence and nonmaleficence. There 
seems to be a desire on the part of a cross-section of individuals to receive relief from 
perceived medical intrusion when faced with the prospect of a protracted and painful terminal 
illness. This has implications for the DPR, the subject of philosophical writings, and—of key 
concern to this thesis—specific utilitarian writings.
A further cultural concern relates to the subject of rights and, more recently, the right- 
to-die. The subject is broad-ranging and includes everything from a belief that government is 
obligated to provide a minimum of healthcare to citizens, to the belief that the government and 
medicine are obligated to provide the knowledge and means necessary to end the life of a 
person who is suffering from a terminal illness. A final cultural concern reflected in opinion 
polls has been the subject of justice. Relating to the subject of rights and the receipt of 
healthcare are those who deem distributive justice to be a significant issue in PAS 
discussions.278 For example, in the current medical environment, where there is an ever­
growing demand for healthcare and skyrocketing medical costs, some form of rationing is often 
thought to be necessary. How and in what manner limited resources are distributed have 
become a key societal concern. It is also of concern to society which has input into how these 
scarce resources are distributed.
All of these cultural concerns pinpoint potential areas of conflict between HU and PAS 
that open the way for examination. It is important to explore these difficult and complex areas 
in order to demonstrate whether HU provides sufficient moral ground for the changes in the 
medical canons regarding medical killing. Further, this chapter has established a basis for the 
following chapters by defining terms of the PAS dialogue, delineating the philosophical 
background to Mill’s key utilitarian PH theme, and introducing how the HU theme interacts 
with PAS in the contemporary medico-cultural debate.
278The subject of ch. 2.
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The following chapter will examine three core features in the PAS debate by defining 
each one and by conducting an historical examination of the growth and development of each. 
The three features to be examined include rights, justice, and medical killing. These three 
features will be linked together because Mill believed rights and justice were intimately 
associated with one another and with the principle of utility. PAS advocates, as well, link the 
notions of rights and justice together as support for their claims to medical killing. The 
discussion will now turn to the examination of these three features.
CHAPTER 2
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND MEDICAL KILLING IN RELATION TO 
HEDONISTIC-UTILITARIANISM AND PHYSICIAN- 
ASSISTED SUICIDE
Introduction
Across the years, advocates of PAS have advanced claims upon which consideration of 
PAS arguments have been constructed. These foundational claims, taken together, provide the 
platform which calls for the legal relaxation, if not wholesale legalisation, of PAS. PAS 
advocates, in part, buttress their claims by citing John Stuart Mill’s views on rights, justice, and 
autonomy. Therefore, an elaboration of Mill’s views in the claims that follow provides an 
opportunity to examine whether such claims may be valid. First, PAS advocates claim that a 
person has a moral right to exercise his life preferences according to his own personal desires 
and that this right is binding upon medicine, even to the point of obliging doctors to assist with 
those preferences. According to Mill, justice was believed to be closely associated with an 
individual’s rights. Whether this was truly the case will be examined.
In similar fashion, PAS advocates also claim that justice obliges a physician to honour 
the preferences of a patient, which, in some cases, includes assisting a patient with suicide. The 
third, the “mercy killing” claim, asserts that medical killing is sometimes permissible, indeed, 
even morally obligatory for the physician, especially when the twin principles of autonomy and 
mercy are present in selected circumstances. Mill believed that an individual’s moral right to 
shape freely the course of his or her own life according to individual desire carried with it a 
powerful claim upon others not to interfere with such freedom. To do so would be a violation 
of a person’s right to freedom and would be an injustice.1 This chapter as a whole deals with
!This chapter addresses each of the above-stated claims. Mill, Utilitarianism, 78. See
also Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Essay On Bentham, 135. These sources provide
\
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the HU and PAS claim that, in certain circumstances, an individual patient is justified not only 
to request to die, but actually to receive physician-assistance-with-suicide.
Rights. Hedonistic-Utilitarianism. and Physician-Assisted Suicide 
History records numerous social and political movements that could be termed human 
rights’ movements.2 Moral considerations in each movement were important, and the manner in 
which they were applied was both “delicate” and “complex.”3 The same is true of the moral 
considerations that surround the “right-to-die” movement. It is not unusual in democratic 
societies for complex moral debate to emerge from the life issues related to human rights, but a 
debate whether to recognise a right to die is especially significant because the human rights’ 
debate has characteristically been about preserving and enhancing life. To designate a right to 
die as a basic human right bears far-reaching moral and ethical implications for society and is 
deserving of closer examination.4 Each rights’ movement sought to promote or protect some
Mill’s classic statements on rights, justice, and freedom from external interference with a 
person’s autonomous preferences. The use of these sources is not to suggest that there is a 
philosophical agreement on the part of this writer with Mill’s claims in part or in whole.
2This chapter will be devoted to the specific subject of human rights. The term “rights” 
will be used throughout to refer to human rights. Warren Lee Holleman, The Human Rights 
Movement: Western Values and Theological Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1987), 1. 
Holleman offers, as examples of human rights’ movements, the democratic “urge” in ancient 
Greece, the democratic revolutions in France and America, various nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century Third World revolts against colonialism, the abolitionist movement, and the gay rights’ 
movement today.
3Ibid., vii. Holleman writes of the difficulty of applying an ideologically oriented 
morality that is capable of simple rights and wrongs. He points to the fact that persons on 
opposite sides of an argument will often defend their position by invoking the “sacrosanct” 
name of human rights.
4Battin, Death Debate, 166,195. Battin claims that suicide is a basic human right on par 
with other rights like the right to worship, freedom of speech, and liberty. She does not 
distinguish, however, between rights that promote and enhance life and rights that end life.
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aspect of what is termed today “human rights” but, for all of its history, the theory of human 
rights has never gone unchallenged.5 The same is true of the proposed “right” to die.
Holleman suggests that a reason for the challenges to human rights is the tendency 
Westerners have to define these too narrowly. He believes Westerners focus on the rights of the 
individual and ignore the rights of the community (and the responsibilities of the individual to 
the community).6 “Human rights,” however, is necessarily a multi-faceted concept that runs far 
deeper than the more narrow focus on individual rights. There are rights of individuals in 
relation to their governments, communal rights, and rights to material necessities, as well as 
rights that “accrue to persons as members of a particular nation or culture.”7 Even though it is 
common knowledge that the citizens of ancient Greece had rights, some of which were similar 
to those listed above, they were not individual rights in the same sense as today. A broad 
historical examination of rights adds clarity and perspective to a current understanding of 
rights. The subject of rights in this section of the chapter will be examined first from several 
broad, but pivotal, historical perspectives: natural rights’ heritage, events surrounding and 
leading to the secularisation of both legal and modem human rights. Human rights will also be 
examined for the possible implications that changes in rights may have, or any potential 
influence that an HU rights’ and justice perspective might exert, on the DPR.
What are Rights?
Rights Defined
The OED defines a “right” as “the standard of permitted and forbidden action within a 
certain sphere; law; a rule or canon.”8 A right, according to the OED, is also “a legal, equitable,
5Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973), 3.
6Holleman, 6.
7Ibid.
sOED, 2d ed., s.v. “right.”
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or moral title or claim to the possession of property or authority, the enjoyment of privileges or 
immunities,.. .”9 The OED also states that a right is “a justifiable claim, on legal or moral 
grounds, to have or obtain something, or to act in a certain way.”10 The dictionaiy definitions 
indicate a wide range of meaning to the word that implies a wide range of possible 
interpretation and application. The definitions indicate, however, that a “right” includes 
boundaries (permitted and forbidden action), and suggests that a right may permit the holder to 
lay a justifiable claim to something.
Other sources sharpen the focus of the term “right.” A right may be termed a “positive 
right,” meaning it is a right that someone actually possesses by means of having been conferred 
and enforced by the system of municipal law that prevails in any country. “Legal” rights fall 
into this category.11 This type of right is one that “men actually have”12 by law, in contrast to 
those men “ought” to have,13 which are often termed “Moral” rights. In contrast, a “negative”
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
nHolleman, 88, 95. Holleman writes that positive rights are guaranteed by “actual” law. 
Cf. Maurice Cranston, 4-5. Positive rights are actual laws of actual states. Yet, cf. Beauchamp 
and Childress, 72-73. They define a positive right as “a right to be provided with a particular 
good or service by another,” but they make no mention of a law that supports the right. 
Elsewhere, they write of legal rights that are justified by legal principles and rules, and moral 
rights that are supported by moral principles and rules (71-72). The context implies that 
positive rights and negative rights are those that may be supported legally or morally. They 
write further “A person’s positive right entails another’s obligation to do something for that 
person.” For example, while the Supreme Court in the United States recognises a woman’s 
negative right (right to privacy) to abortion, it has not yet recognised a positive right 
(governmental obligation) for her to receive government funds for a nontherapeutic abortion. 
Yet, for the purpose of the thesis, a positive right will be considered as one that is guaranteed 
by actual law.
12Cranston, 4-5. He likens the idea of justice or deserts to the concept of “moral” rights. 
The difference between a positive right and a moral right is that the former is enforceable by 
law, and the latter is not necessarily enforceable (6). Cf. Holleman, 84.
13This distinction helps to illuminate a portion of the PAS debate. Advocates for PAS 
claim a moral right to physician-assistance-with-suicide, but are also seeking a legal right to 
protect their moral claim. But cf. Holleman, 85. Holleman terms a moral right an “ideal,” 
because he claims that rights said to be granted by God, or by the laws of nature or by some
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right is a right of noninterference, one that guarantees that no other person has an obligation to 
act or to interfere .14
What is clear, then, is that the meaning of “right” is varied: at times carrying the weight 
of law, at other times bearing the weight of morality, and sometimes carrying both meanings 
congruently. Generally speaking, since people are the primary subjects of rights,15 whether 
individually or corporately, the claiming of rights also implies a responsibility (an act of duty or 
duties) on behalf of the person holding them or on behalf of the one obligated by them (whether 
that act is permissible or forbidden). While the above sources help clarify the meaning of the 
word, the historical background will also add important understanding.
The Natural Rights’ Heritage
There is a distinct chronological order to the evolution of rights, but there is also an 
interesting “kairos,” or epochal development to this aspect of human life. In the language of
other transcendental source, are not true rights—only ideals. These do not become rights, 
according to Holleman, until the “ideals” are granted by an authority willing and able to enforce 
them. See also Cranston, 4-5. This type of right, for example, the right to know what goes on 
under one’s roof, is termed a “moral right.” A positive right is enforceable, according to 
Cranston, whereas, a moral right is not necessarily enforceable.
14The term “negative” right will be used in this thesis to refer to a person’s obligation to 
refrain from doing something. Compare Beauchamp and Childress, 73. Cf. Battin, Death 
Debate, 163-64. Battin terms this sort of right a “noninterference” right, which means that a 
person has no obligation to do an act and that other persons have a corresponding obligation 
not to interfere.
15Compare, however, Singer, 95-101. Singer holds a position that humans are not the 
only beings that can be described as “persons.” A person is a being that is “capable of 
conceiving itself as a distinct entity existing over time.” A person’s “right to life,” for example, 
would be determined valid if that “person” is capable of desiring to continue to live as a distinct 
entity. He also believes that only a being that is capable of conceiving itself as a distinct entity 
existing over time could have such a desire. He concludes that some nonhuman animals are 
persons with rights, and he rejects the doctrine that places the lives of members of the human 
species above the lives of members of other species (117). His view has implications for an 
unborn foetus, an infant, and a mentally incapacitated adult. His view also links to end-of-life 
decision-making where physical or psychological issues related to terminal illness affect a 
person’s desire to live. Singer, however, does not address clearly the issue of what 
responsibilities a nonhuman “person” might have as a possessor of a right.
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epochs, the period of time from Ancient Greece through the Renaissance demonstrates a 
formative rights’ epoch, that was characterised by certain general features. Rights were linked, 
even though loosely, to deity.16 While an individual might be said to have rights, this did not 
mean that the individual recognised himself as an individual, or that the individual was seen as 
independent from his attachment to the Polis. Rights, then, were associated broadly with 
communities like the city-state, the church, or even the state as a whole.17 Rights were 
characterised also by duties, regardless of whether those duties were perceived to be good or 
bad.18
Origin of Rights: Ancient Greece
Rights have their historical antecedent in “natural rights” in ancient Greece.19 Among 
the pre-Socratics there was the general belief that “unwritten laws” had a divine origin and 
were believed “to take precedence over (possibly faulty) human laws.”20 The Stoics later
16McKirahan, 409; and J. B. Schneewind, The Invention o f Autonomy: A History o f  
Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 18. Schneewind 
writes that Cicero believed natural law was the legislation of the gods and was not alterable by 
human rulers.
17Cranston, 3. Certain ancient Greek cities enjoyed rights, freedom of speech, and 
equality before the law.
18Schneewind, 80.
19Cranston, 1. Cranston writes that the twentieth-century name “human rights” was 
known traditionally as “natural rights” or the “rights of man.” The idea of natural law as a 
universal moral law that transcends the law of states is not new. It is an idea that has 
“permeated” European politics for more than two thousand years (11). Cf. Carl Wellman, An 
Approach to Rights: Studies in the Philosophy o f Law and Morals (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publisher, 1997), 15. Wellman states that human rights are the theoretical 
descendants of what were once called natural rights. He adds that these are rights that one 
possesses not by virtue of some special status, but simply as being human. Cf. Michael Bertran 
Crowe, The Changing Profile o f the Natural Law (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1977), 234.
20McKirahan, 409-10,412. Of note is the belief in this age that the nomoi were thought 
to be universal in the sense that all people at all times recognised them or that they at least 
should be recognised even if people did not. Of importance to this thesis is the way people 
would invoke “unwritten laws” whenever it suited their advantage. They would do this as a way
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combined natural law with the concept of natural rights and embodied both in their elementary 
principles of justice. These they believed were apparent to the eye of reason.21 Aristotle, writing 
on political justice, speaks of natural law—a law which has validity everywhere and is not 
dependent upon either acceptance or rejection by human beings.22 While natural law and natural 
rights were considered valid in ancient Greece, it is noteworthy that they did not carry any 
specific obligation, on behalf of the one invoking them, to act. In fact, “human rights” fell into 
the category of rights that were not necessarily warranted by law.23 Rights are not a modem 
discovery, according to Crowe. They are as ancient as natural law itself. He writes that rights 
depend upon law—natural rights upon natural law.
If it could be said that ancient Greece provided the root system for rights, then early 
Christianity helped the idea of rights to flourish. Christianity put great stress on natural law and 
understood it to be a part of the law of God, and it believed the Creator’s law was higher than
of invoking a higher authority when human laws were evil (412).
21 Cranston, 10-11. Cf. Copleston, 1: 395-96. The Stoics believed that a virtuous life was 
lived in accordance with nature and that a life lived in accordance with nature is a life lived in 
accordance with right reason. One was to live life according to the principle, logos, that is 
active in nature. This consisted in submission to the divinely appointed order of the world. See 
Schneewind, 17. Schneewind writes that the Stoics can be credited with introducing natural law 
to the Romans.
22Aristotle, 189. He states that there are two types of political justice: natural and legal. 
The latter takes the form of law; the former is, as stated above, valid everywhere. Aristotle did 
not believe that natural laws were immutable, except in the case of the gods where “justice 
presumably never changes” (190). He believed that in our world there is such a thing as natural 
law, but that everything is subject to change.
23McKirahan, 412. McKirahan describes the differences between physis (nature, 
universal, things by nature that are necessary to all humans, 392) and nomoi (laws formally 
enacted and enforced by the state, 391). He contrasts the two concepts which included, among 
other things, a difference concerning what weight or authority physis was to be given.
Generally, nomoi was given a prescriptive meaning (how things ought to be) and physis a 
descriptive (how things are) meaning. Some, however, attributed a prescriptive dimension to 
physis (392). McKirahan’s description provides an early example of uncertainty related to the 
best way to ground human rights’ claims.
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positive law.24 Even though the concept of rights was still in its infancy, and could not be 
described with the same depth of meaning as in this century, it can be said that there was a 
developing awareness of the concept.
The Middle Ages and Rights
The medieval papacy could be described as a period where popes continued to assert the 
right to enthrone and dethrone kings, as well as the exclusive right of jurisdiction in all church 
affairs. Political and spiritual matters were held firmly in their hands 25 Yet, under the umbrella 
of papal authority, Thomas Aquinas (unknowingly) initiated an intellectual framework for 
rights. He linked natural law and eternal law,26 recognising God to be the eternal legislator 
because he was the Creator.27 Man, through the use of reason, had a natural inclination to do 
good, to know God’s truth, and to live in society.28 Aquinas’ work bore implications for the 
coming Renaissance, and while his work would not prove to be the most significant event in 
the development of rights, it did provide a seminal influence in the forthcoming evolution of 
thought about man’s relationship to authority (primarily government and church). It was in the 
Renaissance that the idea of man’s worth and role in nature, though ill-defined, and still 
composed of classical and Christian notions, was to gain its greatest prominence 29
24Crowe, 10-11.
25William R. Estep, Renaissance and Reformation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1986), 13.
26Crowe, 174-75.
27Ibid., 173. See also Schneewind, 19-21.
28Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, la2ae.94.2. Cf. Crowe, 178.
29Ibid.
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The Renaissance and Rights
The notion of individual rights had not been a part of the legal ideas of Ancient Greece30 
(or Rome for that matter), and while some moral idea of natural rights was conceived in 
Ancient Greece, it had not yet been linked to the freedom to live as one (recognised as having a 
separate identity and interests apart from government and church) preferred.31 It was in the 
Renaissance that the focus on the individual functioning in society, guided by the use of his 
own reason began to emerge. This was aided by the re-emergence of a cluster of Ancient Greek 
ideas concerning the dignity of man.32 Natural law theory contained also the idea that man 
possessed the ability to reason for himself and had the power to determine for himself his own 
ends.33
An unexpected outgrowth of this growing individual awareness was man beginning to 
question the authoritative claims of institutions.34 It would not be accurate to state that man at 
this point was emerging fully from the cocoon of institutional control, but some change was 
occurring. While a hallmark of Renaissance humanism was the assumption that it was possible 
to mould the development of the personality by education,35 Renaissance thinkers had not yet 
discovered the idea that man possessed certain rights that are linked to his nature as man.36
30Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 129.
31Ibid.
32Charles Trinkhaus, The Scope o f Renaissance Humanism (Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan Press, 1983), 344.
33Jacques Maritain, The Rights o f Man and Natural Law, trans. Doris C. Anson (New 
York: Gordian Press, 1971), 60.
34Alan Bullock, The Humanist Tradition in the West (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1985), 17-18. Bullock states specifically “religion” and “science.”
35Ibid., 11. Hence “reason.”
36Maritain, 65,
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Man soon began to associate and ground his worth (dignity) in natural law, however, 
and reached the conclusion, in his new-found self-valuation, that he both possessed and was the 
subject of rights, and that he had the right to expect respect from others because of his value.37 
This significant modulation occurred within the development of natural law after the 
Renaissance, when natural law was restated in secular, modem, individualistic terms.38
Events Surrounding and Leading to the Secularisation of Rights
It is a curious twist of history that the epoch of reform that opened the way for man’s 
direct link to God (deity) apart from the assistance of the Church proved also to be the epoch 
where man’s need of God was brought into serious question. As humanism continued its 
uneven forward development,39 a new notion of rights, separated from direct attachment to 
deity, began to emerge. Up until this point in history, laws created rights, but from this point 
forward, rights were viewed as being a part of man’s rational and sociable nature.40
The Reformation and Rights
It is curious, and somewhat ironic, to think that the one receiving credit for the 
secularisation of natural law (and, subsequently, rights) was a Christian writer who may never 
have intended this to occur. A watershed in the history of ideas occurred with the publication of 
On the Law o f War and Peace, the work of Hugo Grotius (1625). Grotius believed that God 
was the author of nature and its law, but his Prolegomena introduced the possibility that natural 
law would remain valid even if there were no God—or if the affairs of men were of no concern
37Ibid.
38Cranston, 11.
39See thesis, ch. 3, p. 147ff.
40Schneewind, 80.
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to him.41 Grotius initiated unwittingly the secularisation of the natural law even though a non­
religious approach had been taking shape since Ancient Greece.42 He did this in several ways.
In his thinking, rights were not derived from laws, but were those foundational tenets 
from which laws themselves derived. Rights, unlike before, were viewed as belonging to each 
person “prior to and independently of5 the person belonging to any community.43 A right was a 
moral quality of a person that made it possible to have or do something lawfully.44 The norm 
practised in Ancient Greece was reversed here, with focal attention now being given to the 
individual. Until Grotius, rights were thought to be created by laws.45 Now laws were created 
because rights already existed for the individual. This supported his idea that a central pillar of 
society was the individual’s right to pursue his own good.46 Grotius also believed that rights 
were “alienable,”47 a position that changed in the next era when the Enlightenment political 
fathers referred to the “inalienable rights” of their citizenry as they drafted the French and 
American declarations.
The philosophical formulations of Grotius also proved to be an important catalyst for 
the removal of natural law from the jurisdiction of moral theologians. Now natural law became
41Crowe, 223-24.
42Alexander Passerin D’Entreues, The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought (New 
York: Humanities Press, 1959), 23. Aristotle conceived the state as the fulfilment and end of 
human nature. Later, Thomas Aquinas felt that the state, as part of the natural order, was to be 
“considered in the general frame of the divine direction of the world, and is entirely subservient 
to that direction.”
43Schneewind, 80.
44Ibid., 78.
45Ibid., 80.
46Ibid., 81. Life in the community was still important. Grotius’ position serves as a 
middle way between the natural law epoch and the modem era to come.
47Ibid. He believed that rights provided no guarantee against personal slavery or 
governmental authority.
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the responsibility of lawyers and philosophers.48 This opened the way for the secularisation of 
natural law and rights. Such rights’ discussion before (for example, Aquinas) had been attached 
to the notion of deity, but from this time forward this approach began to change. Numerous 
writers on ethics and the foundations of politics followed Grotius in using natural law language, 
but detaching it from specific doctrines of any particular religious confession.49
The Reformers, themselves, served to widen the separation of natural law from a divine 
impetus. They also did this unknowingly by advancing the focus on human reason.50 The 
individual need not confess to the priest when he or she could go directly to God.51 This helped 
centre the question of morality within the mind and heart of the individual. Martin Luther, as an 
example, was willing to defend what he perceived to be the truth, and to defy institutional 
(albeit religious) authority, even to the point of personal death,52 desiring to “believe freely and
be a slave to the authority of no one ”53 Luther’s reform was not only theological, but
political, social, and cultural as well. Luther did believe, however, that the individual was 
accountable to God, and that a certain level of morality was within the reach of all men.54 
Luther believed the natural law to be embedded in the Ten Commandments and that men could 
apprehend it. Even though he held a deep belief in God’s authority, he helped set the stage for 
an individual to exercise his morality apart from an outside authority, even if that external
48Ibid., 82.
49Ibid.
50Alister E. McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 2d ed. (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1993), 40-41.
51Ibid., 54.
52Roland H. Bainton, Here I  Stand (New York: New American Library, 1950), 92.
These are a portion of the words spoken by Luther in his celebrated debate with John Eck.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
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authority was the Church.55 While Luther and other Reformers propelled forward the concept of 
individual rights in large measure, they still did not advance a claim to certain rights based on 
the worth of the individual. This assertion would take place in the next era.
The Enlightenment and Rights
The Enlightenment opened broadly the way for awareness of human rights with several 
circumstances paving the way for this awareness. First, even though not all Enlightenment 
thought was anti-God or anti-religion, there was a belief that science was the way to truth.56 
Another example was the Enlightenment belief that a person could use his own understanding 
without the guidance of another.57 Enlightenment man was encouraged to use his freedom to 
make public use of his reason in all concerns. Enlightenment man also believed that the ability 
to think for oneself and to determine for oneself what was morally right and wrong was 
inherent in everyone.58 This ability was by virtue of the human capacity for reasoning, which 
was innate.59 This did not mean that Enlightenment thinkers abandoned morality in the 
traditional sense. These thinkers were revolutionary in their ideas about the “sources” of 
morality, but not yet revolutionary in their particular moral opinions.60 One unrecognised result 
was a widening separation of the notion of rights from their foundation in deity.
55Ibid., 176.
56Peter Gay, ed., The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1973), 17-19.
57Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive 
Anthology, ed. Peter Gay (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 384.
58Immanuel Kant, Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f Morals, analyzed and trans. H. J. 
Paton (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1964), 71-72.
59Sullivan, 14.
60Rachels, 18-19.
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As the Enlightenment unfolded, further attention was given to individual rights.
Political individualism emerged, unlike the variety known in Ancient Greece.61 Ryan states that 
the state was made the supreme good in Ancient Greece (and Rome), and that the individual 
was a mere means. John Locke presented the different view that every man had the right and 
duty to preserve himself and everybody else as much as was humanly possible.62 There was a 
“fundamental” law of preservation and, while Locke did not demonstrate the truth of this 
claim,63 its impact was important.
Locke’s ideas set new boundaries to protect the individual from governmental intrusion, 
much like the previous Reformation challenges to church authority. Locke’s writings were 
epoch-shaping because they laid down the key idea that all men were naturally in a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they saw 
fit.64 In theory, an individual could then exercise a moral and political right to act as he or she 
determined without external interference. Locke grounded this political claim to 
noninterference in natural law,65 but this was not an easy position to occupy. He, in effect, 
sought to strengthen his ideas by supplementing his Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism 
with divine revelation.66
61John A. Ryan, “Individualism,” transcribed by Bob Elder in New Advent online 
Catholic Encyclopedia; internet, available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07761a.htm; 
accessed 2 June 2004.
62John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, reprint edition, 1997), 98.
63Ibid.
“ Ibid., 269.
65Ibid, 98.
^Ibid., 88-89. Locke believed human reason required assistance and, in his belief, the 
Holy Scriptures (God’s divine written revelation), buttressed human reason.
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Locke did not believe that human reason left unaided was properly sufficient to sustain 
man in the business of morality.67 He is important because he demonstrated the often uneven 
awkwardness that is characteristic of rights’-oriented thinking. One of his feet seems planted 
squarely in empiricism and rationalism, but then he seems compelled to place the other foot in 
the realm of some outside (or higher) authority.68 This did not mean to say that he believed the 
reverse of Grotius. Natural law was a part of Locke’s rationalism in which he believed that 
empirical facts about the created world and human behaviour and even the workings of deity 
could be observed and interpreted rationally.69 This did not mean, however, that man was set 
free to live as he chose without accountability to anyone or anything other than himself. Locke 
recognised that there could be no orderly exercise of rights without some order in society.70 
Rights included duty. This indicated a faint cry for the individual to be valued as a “whole” 
morally and politically responsible being.71
Thomas Paine extended and clarified further the ideas of political individualism with 
his claim that civil rights were grounded in man’s natural rights. He was careful, however, to 
write that he did not intend to touch upon any sectarian principle of religion. What he intended 
to show was that an impediment to tracing the rights of man back to man’s creation was the 
intervention of “upstart governments, thrusting themselves between, and presumptuously
67Ibid.
68Locke is not unusual in this regard. Bentham felt that laws and sanctions were 
necessary to get people to act in a certain way. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, 102-3.
69Locke, 88.
70Ibid., 271. The state of Nature, he believed, had a law of nature that governed it. This 
law obliged everyone.
71Holleman, 51. Holleman cites Maritain as being the one who viewed humans as an 
“open whole” as opposed, for example, to utilitarians who viewed man as part of the whole. 
Holleman means by “open whole” that individuals are not complete unto themselves, but that 
they also have need of communion with others.
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working to un-make men.”72 Paine meant, by natural rights, those rights that “appertain” to man 
in light of his existence.73 Paine was revolutionary with his claim that civil right grows out of a 
natural right.74 Just as Paine had written to establish clear political boundaries around the 
individual, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “social contract” clearly set the individual apart from the 
state. In his view, the state was merely the outcome of a freely crafted compact by individual 
actions.75
The evolution of thought from Locke to Rousseau, across a broad political spectrum, 
helped set the stage for greater attention to moral considerations. What Rousseau envisioned 
and applied politically was also applied morally with Scottish “common sense morality.” By 
definition, common sense morality is derived from nature and is common to a great majority of 
mankind. This great majority of individuals, when they arrive at the age and use of reason, are 
able to form a “common and uniform judgment.”76 This common-sense morality is not derived 
from education or habit, but is instinctive or natural to mankind.77 The influence of common- 
sense morality on the subject of individual rights lies at the point of authority. The individual’s 
reason is not merely a subjective rule, but it is the only rule—there is no other higher, or
72Thomas Paine, Rights o f Man (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1999), 29.
73Ibid., 30.
74Ibid., 30-31. Cf. Battin’s discussion of natural rights and suicide. Battin, Death 
Dehate, 163-74. Cf. Beauchamp and Childress, 71. The authors cite the theoretical history 
(moral and political) of rights and the “freedoms from established orders of religion, society, 
and state” that grow out of the rights’ tradition.
75Ryan, “Individualism.” Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Selections from the Social 
Contract,” in The Making o f Society: An Outline o f Sociology, ed. V. F. Calverton (New York: 
Random House, Modem Library, 1937), 149-50. Rousseau claimed that the sooner man shakes 
off the political yoke and reclaims his right to liberty the better. The individual was the original 
holder of rights, not the state.
76S. A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy o f Common Sense (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1960), 112.
77Ibid.
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external, authority that he is bound to consider.78 While the new political ideas of men like 
Locke, Paine, and Rousseau were significant, these men had not yet begun to apply intellectual 
or rational rights to the affairs of daily life.
The influence of men like Paine and Rousseau was invaluable, however, to the 
formation of France’s Declaration o f the Rights o f Man and the United States’ Declaration of. 
Independence. The French Declaration states that the aim of all political association was the 
preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man.79 The Declaration o f Independence in 
the United States speaks of “inalienable” rights as entitlements that are granted by the laws of 
nature and nature’s God.80 While God was mentioned, the authority or force behind natural law, 
however, was justice or morality.81 When positive law coincides with natural law, however, it 
has the authority both of force and of justice.82 The application of both documents served to 
increase the strength of human rights by giving them the force of both natural law and positive 
law. Perhaps the framers of each document embraced the inherent tension, but necessary 
relationship, between natural law and positive law. One might believe that this was the zenith 
in the evolution of rights’-oriented theory, the place where natural law and positive law finally 
combined to give the individual a full expression of rights. This was not the end to the
78Ryan, “Individualism,” n.p.
79A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in The World: An Introduction to 
the Study o f the International Protection o f Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 4th edition, 1996), 3. Note also the evolution of thought from Grotius’ “alienable rights” 
(see thesis, 60-61) to the “inalienable rights” found in these documents.
80Holleman, 84. Cf. Hamilton Albert Long, The American Ideal o f1776: The Twelve 
Basic American Principles (Philadelphia, PA: Your Heritage Books, 1976), 25. Long writes
that God-given rights are sometimes called natural rights, meaning rights that are possessed by 
man under the Laws of Nature. These rights are possessed under the laws of God’s creation
and, therefore, are held by created mankind as gifts of God.
81Cranston, 14.
82Ibid.
104
development of rights, however, because a fresh philosophical development was to come that 
would re-introduce another ancient Greek philosophical perspective of the individual.
John Stuart Mill. Hedonistic-Utilitarianism. and Rights
John Stuart Mill sought to establish the individual’s everyday political and moral liberty 
by his writing on utility. His belief was simple: the only reason that power can be exercised 
rightfully over a member of a civilised society, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.83 
This strong statement concerning the individual derived from Mill’s HU theory which 
emphasised the value of individual security.84 A person had rights by virtue of being human and 
was sovereign over his own life. Mill’s basis for this claim was similar to natural law 
proponents in that the focus was the individual, but dissimilar in that he believed moral 
principles were not derived a priori. Mill believed that the principle of utility that held pleasure 
to be the highest good lay at the root of all morality.85 Mill’s thinking had been influenced
83Mill, On Liberty, 135.
84Mill, Utilitarianism, 71-72. Mill’s chief concern with rights was centred on preserving 
individual security—personal protection against harm (71). He believed that a desire to protect 
one’s own security garnered such intense feelings (he terms it an “animal element” or “thirst for 
retaliation”), that it produced a claim with the “character of absoluteness” (72). He believed that 
every human being’s powerful feelings for security demanded a responsiveness on the part of 
others until his claim for security became a moral necessity. What all persons felt concerning 
security, since everyone alike shared the same sentiment, changed the “oughts” and “shoulds” 
about life into “musts.” Mill believed a person could claim justice as a moral right (67). He 
believed that both rights and justice grew originally out of conformity to law, but eventually an 
injustice was defined as violation of a law that “ought to exist.” Even though Mill’s theoretical 
belief is fraught with difficulties and has received criticism, this brief review helps to introduce 
how Mill believed rights and justice were linked in HU.
85Ibid., 253-54. Cf. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory o f Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 2, vii. Macpherson names 
what he terms a “unifying assumption,” “possessive individualism.” He summarises the 
propositions that comprise possessive individualism as follows: (1) what makes a person 
“human” is freedom from dependence on the will of others; (2) freedom from dependence on 
others means freedom from any involvement with others except those contacts which the 
person enters voluntarily with an eye for his own interests; and (3) the person is essentially the 
proprietor of his own “person and capacities” for which he owes nothing to society (263-64). 
While Mill believed that the principle of utility was the glue that bound people together, 
MacPherson differs in that he does not include this as the unifying element of political society.
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greatly by the philosophy of Epicurus, whose hedonism was practised in detachment from 
community. Mill’s writings were aimed toward transforming the ideal of moral rights into 
positive rights, or those which are backed by laws.86 Even taking into account the difference 
between Mill’s view and the traditional natural rights’ view, the commonality at root was the 
individual.
Rights’ Heritage and HU
The growth of the concept of rights, from the period of ancient Greece forward, had 
developed along the lines of natural law theory, and later was buttressed by a Christian 
understanding that rights of human beings are rooted in creation and the law of God.87 Mill, 
however, sought to develop HU empirically apart from an a priori understanding of morality. 
Mill’s divergent stream in the formation of rights included a rejection of a natural law approach 
to securing human rights; however, his theory resembled natural law tenets by recognising the 
basic value of an individual. Mill’s approach to rights sought to establish something that natural 
law had not articulated throughout its history; namely, providing protection for the 
individual—for security (non-interference) and room “to expand and flourish according to our 
own conception of what that entails.”88 Mill’s conception of a right to non-interference, a 
liberty right, was based upon the belief that security was the “most vital of all interests,” and a 
value no one could do without.89 Mill, in his consideration of rights, did not go so far as to
86Holleman, 86-87. Cf. Stephen Lukes, “Five Fables about Human Rights,” in The 
Human Rights Reader: Major Political Writings, Essays, Speeches and Documents from the 
Bible to the Present, ed. Micheline R. Ishay (New York: Routledge, 1997), 234. Stated 
succinctly, to the utilitarian “what counts is what can be counted.”
87See thesis, 92-94.
88John Skorupski, ed., A Cambridge Companion to Mill (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 502. See also West, 157. Mill, however, recognised particular cases
where some other social duty was so important as to overrule a person’s rights.
89Mill, Utilitarianism, 71.
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develop the notion that dignity was bound up with rights.90 This idea of human rights and 
personal dignity was forthcoming in the new century.
The Twentieth Century and Rights
The new century brought much in the way of change: two world wars, a world 
economic depression unlike any before, and the emergence of a new human rights’ emphasis. 
Some things about rights’ discussion remained unchanged (i.e. the focus on the individual). 
Prior to this century, rights’ discussion had been centred largely on the right to ownership of 
one’s property (including oneself) and the right to be left alone (unless one’s actions might be 
harmful), but a new ingredient was now added. The advent of the Universal Declaration o f  
Human Rights brought to the forefront rights’ discussion that centred on the obligation those 
rights might impose upon others.
While the lofty human rights claims of the Universal Declaration were not enforced by 
law or were readily attainable,91 the document helped to spawn at least forty state constitutions 
in the following years.92 These constitutions enacted laws that protected individual human 
rights. It is somewhat ironic that, while the Declaration has influenced much in the way of
90Berger, 290. Mill’s HU does not extend to the M l complexity that many current 
writers give to the notion of human dignity and morality (ibid., 291). Mill used the language of 
dignity, but he never analysed the concept. PAS advocates today sometimes argue that some 
people face a loss of dignity during a terminal illness. Even though Mill affirmed the dignity of 
human beings, for example, by championing women’s rights and suffrage for all, his focus was 
not upon expounding upon the notion of dignity itself.
9IFor example, the costs of universal healthcare alone would be astronomical, not to 
mention the difficulty of delivering that healthcare to all individuals. See also Carl Wellman, 
Real Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4. Wellman writes that even in the 
most affluent societies today, the rapid rise in costs related to medical technologies and 
traditional medical treatments are seriously threatening the quality of medical care. In the 
United States, many cannot afford to purchase needed drugs or receive advice and treatment
from physicians. In the United Kingdom, eveiy citizen is eligible to receive urgently needed 
treatment under the National Health Service (hereafter, referred to as the NHS), but these 
treatments are often delayed for some period of time due, in part, to a lack of public funding.
92Robertson and Merrills, 30.
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protection and preserving life, there has also been a developing movement toward ending 
individual life.
As people pondered potential human rights’ violations, they began to turn their focus to 
an area of perceived (and permitted) intrusion. In the healthcare industry, technology made it 
possible to forestall death and extend life well beyond its normal (and, at times, desirable) 
limits. In the 1970s, patients sought and gained the right to refuse medical treatment,93 which 
evolved into the 1980's right to die, followed by the 1990's right to determine the time and the 
manner of one’s own death.94 Human rights’ discussions now included, at times, a discussion of 
a right to die.
Patient Rights
Patient autonomy and the delineation of patients’ rights have assumed a prominent role 
in medical ethics.95 In fact, the patient autonomy role has been identified as a movement that 
reflects basic American natural rights’ heritage.96 An important feature of this movement is the
93Robert M. Veatch, A Theory o f Medical Ethics (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 47. 
Veatch writes that the Patients’ Rights Movement has been the most important expression of 
liberal western political philosophy in medicine. The PRM encompasses a broad coalition of 
those who are unhappy with the paternalism and “good consequences” (seemingly, 
beneficence) of traditional medicine. The movement includes advocating freedom of choice for 
or against treatments for the terminally ill. Veatch also writes that this movement reflects the 
basic American natural rights’ heritage. Many of the basic ethical commitments of this secular 
ethical tradition, according to Veatch, were incorporated in the 1973 Patient Bill of Rights 
(PBR).
94Jack Coulehan, “The Man with Stars Inside,” in Annals o f Internal Medicine, vol. 126, 
no. 10 (May 1997): 799-802. Cf. Battin, Least Worst Death, 279. Battin writes that the right to 
suicide (including assisted suicide) is a fundamental human right on a par with the right to life, 
to freedom of speech, and to worship.
95Thomas May, Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998), 4.
96Veatch, 47. The PBR summarises many of the deeply held convictions of lay people
and some physicians who are beginning to question the Hippocratic heritage. Veatch goes on to
state that the Patients’ Bill of Rights (PBR) has no legal standing. The PBR couches moral 
advice in terms of what is in the patient’s best interests from his own point of view, whereas the 
Hippocratic tradition couched moral advice in terms of what is of most benefit to the patient
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surfacing of claims that extend beyond the right to be left alone--the right of basic 
noninterference.97 The intent of these claims is to generate an obligation upon another to 
provide the resources necessary to exercise one’s chosen option.98 One example is the “right to 
healthcare,” which is increasingly thought to extend beyond the mere choosing of one’s 
healthcare service. This type of right is being used to assert that someone would be obliged 
actually to deliver the health service irregardless of the patient’s financial responsibility.99
Another example of claim-obligation, based upon rights, is the assertion that a patient 
has the right to die, to determine the time and manner of his death, and to receive assistance 
with that death.100 The doctor, in essence, would be obliged to provide assistance with the 
suicide of a patient. Suicide,101 according to this view, is seen as a right in view of an 
individual’s general liberty to do as he or she chooses, provided that his or her choices do not
from the physician’s standpoint (48).
"Veatch, 48.
"Ibid.
"Ibid. This sort of right is termed an “entitlement right.” It lays claim, for example, on 
the NHS in the UK to provide primary care or on Medicare in the US to provide abortions. Cf. 
Brett and McCullough, 1347. The “entitlement right” illustrated in the examples above also 
may be termed a “positive right.” Brett and McCullough state that such a right endorses the 
patient’s prerogative to select a particular intervention and implies a “coexisting obligation” on 
the physician to make that intervention possible. They also state that the principle of autonomy 
further justifies positive rights.
100See section claim, 50.
101 Suicide itself is defined as “one who dies by his own hand” and “one who commits 
self-murder.” OED, 2d ed., s.v. “suicide.” Cf. Ronald W. Maris, “Suicide Rights and 
Rationality,” in Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, A Special Issue—Suicide and Ethics 13, 
no. 4 (Winter 1983), ed. Margaret P. Battin and Ronald W. Maris (New York: Human Sciences 
Press, 1983): [7] 223. Maris uses the descriptive term “intentional self-destruction” for suicide. 
Cf. British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today: Its Practice and Philosophy (London: 
BMJ Publishing Group, 1993), 174. According to the BMA, suicide in the medical context 
occurs when the act of death is performed by the patient. Assisted suicide is, by these 
definitions, something of an oxymoron. Thus, the use and implications of the term “right” with 
PAS is questionable.
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harm the interests or violate the rights of another person.102 Suicide is construed in this case as a 
liberty right like that which was propounded by John Stuart Mill.103 This type of right is now 
heralded as a fundamental human right on the same level as the right to life, liberty, freedom of 
speech, and worship.104
Suicide as a Liberty Right?
A movement to permit “assisted” suicide105 emerged in the midst of the blossoming 
human rights’ movement when, as early as the 1930s, philosophical discussions about 
euthanasia had arisen.106 A slow evolution of ideas led to the change in the legal status of 
suicide, which had historically been treated as a felony in early English law and was the subject 
of harsh penalties—both religious and civil.107 For example, the decedent’s property was 
forfeited to the crown, the body was publicly desecrated, and the burial could not take place in 
consecrated ground.108 This would not be surprising in light of the status of human rights (in 
relation to governmental controls) at that particular time. France had relaxed its penalties
102Battin, Least Worst Death, 278.
103Ibid. “Liberty Right” means a “negative right,” meaning the right to noninterference.
104Ibid., 279. Battin extends this sort of thinking on rights to include a right to choose 
one’s death in accordance with one’s own values (193). The right-to-die movement seeks 
governmental protection of what is believed to be a fundamental human right. Cf. Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 198-99. 
Dworkin has stressed the importance of government protection of rights. He states that the 
point of this claim is to preserve human dignity and to provide political equality which grants 
the same freedoms to all.
105Although suicide was illegal, persons began to consider seeking help in taking their 
own lives.
106Humphry and Wickett, 13.
107Battin, Death Debate, 17.
108Ibid.
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against suicide following the revolution in 1789, but it was almost two hundred years later that 
the decriminalisation law was changed in England.109 This legislation took place in 1961.
Many states in the United States also had laws that made suicide a criminal offence. The 
general trend in Europe and America has been to drop, or at least elect not to exercise, criminal 
sanctions against suicide or the one attempting to commit suicide. Battin believes this change in 
the legal aspects of suicide is due to the increased acceptance of deterministic models of suicide 
where suicide is seen largely as an involuntary symptom of illness and/or psychosocial 
pressures.110
Battin may be accurate in assigning some clinical influences in the changing legal 
aspects of suicide, but of greater importance is a “long and complex” philosophical influence as 
well.111 The discussion of suicide can be dated to Ancient Greece where the philosophical 
schools discussed its permissibility.112 Even though individual identity was still bound together 
with the state, there was a developing recognition of individual responsibility. The growth of 
interest in and discussion of suicide does not emerge without reason, but actually parallels the 
evolution of ideas concerning human rights and autonomy.113 While suicide had long been a 
part of moral discussion, it was not until late-to-post-Enlightenment that some began to count it
109It is important to note why suicide was decriminalised in the UK. Compare Kamisar, 
229. The fact that suicide is no longer punished does not mean that government approves of 
such acts, that it recognises an individual right to “self-determination,” or that “personal 
autonomy” extends this far. The decriminalisation came about not because suicide was deemed 
a human right, but because punishment was seen as unfair to innocent relatives.
110Ibid. A deterministic model of suicide (involuntary), however, seems to undercut a 
claim that suicide is a “rational” act of self-determination.
1HIbid.
112Ibid.
113Compare Humphry and Wickett, 1-19. Humphry and Wickett give a detailed 
historical perspective on the development of ideas surrounding suicide. See also thesis, ch. 3.
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as a human right.114 Schopenhauer’s argument, for example, concerning the permissibility of 
suicide was based upon a person’s “unassailable title” (hence, right) to his own life and 
person.115 Humphry writes of Nietzsche’s influence on the suicide discussion when the German 
philosopher wrote of suicide as “a strong consolation. . .  one can get through many a bad night 
with it.”116 The important point is not so much that Nietzsche wrote of suicide, but the reason 
why he wrote about suicide. His emphasis targeted the right for someone to decide himself 
about what he did with his own body.117 At the close of the nineteenth century, the French 
sociologist Emile Durkheim published Le Suicide, which examined the act as a social 
phenomenon and placed it in the realm of social policy.118 Suicide, while still illegal and 
considered to be socially taboo, had been added to the rights’ discussion across a broad 
spectrum—philosophical, sociological, legal, and—eventually—medical.
These philosophical and sociological viewpoints merged with the medical when a 
German psychiatrist-philosopher coined the term Selbstmord-“ba\ance-shQGt suicide”—in citing
U4It is important to note that not all Enlightenment thinkers viewed suicide in a positive 
light. Locke, 270-71. Locke states that while man is in a state of “uncontrollable liberty” as it 
concerns the disposal of his person or possessions, he does not have the liberty to destroy 
himself. He adds that everyone is bound to preserve himself and “not to quit his station 
willfully.” Locke believed that reason, based on the law of nature, taught this. Cf. Kant, 
Groundwork, 89, 96-97. See also Sullivan, 56. Sullivan writes that Kant “contended that we 
have a strict negative duty not to commit suicide only in order to avoid a life promising more 
pain than pleasure.” For Kant, to destroy one’s own life would be a contradictory use of the 
same self-love that wills moral improvement or benefit for one’s life.
115Arthur Schopenhauer, “On Suicide”; internet, available at http://www.Hackvan.com/ 
publstig/life/Schopenhauer_On_Suicide_l.html; accessed 12 May 2004.
116Humphry and Wickett, 10.
117Ibid. Humphry’s and Wickett’s analysis seeks to link changes in attitude about the 
permissibility of suicide to the long development of personal autonomy. Cf. Battin, Death 
Debate, 86-87.
118Humphry and Wickett, 11. Cf. Battin, Death Debate.
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examples of apparently rational suicide.119 A bridge was crossed in the next three decades as 
rational suicide was melded into euthanasia and assisted suicide. In 1931, for example, an 
English health officer120 presented a talk, “A Plea for Legalisation of Euthanasia,” that appealed 
for a change in the law.121 Euthanasia societies emerged soon thereafter in both the United 
Kingdom and the United States. It is possible that the combined growth of humanism/autonomy 
and human rights would exert influence on a perceived impediment to human progress-suicide 
legislation. The focus, as indicated before, would not be upon law itself, but upon the perceived 
restriction it placed on individual rights to bodily privacy and self-determination.122 This allows 
for a careful examination of rights within the context of the DPR.
How Are “Rights” Evident in the Doctor-Patient Relationship?
General “Rights” Considerations
The DPR implies by its designation that some interaction will occur between the 
physician and the patient. A wide variety of interaction that occurs between doctor and patient 
does not involve rights. However, since both the physician and the patient are human beings, 
and both possess and exercise rights by virtue of their humanity, the relationship has the
119Humphry and Wickett, 11. Humphry believes that the “concept of physical and 
mental pain,” at this point, was “considered by physicians and writers as a possible justification 
for ending one’s life.”
120Dr. C. Killick Millard was health officer for the city of Leicester.
121Humphry and Wickett, 13. Millard subsequently drafted a bill entitled the “Voluntary 
Euthanasia Legalization Bill.” The British Voluntary Euthanasia Society was formed in 1935 
specifically to promote the bill. A similar bill, patterned after Millard’s, was presented to the 
Nebraska (United States) state legislature in 1937. Millard’s bill was defeated in the House of 
Lords and the Nebraska bill was never acted upon.
I22Ibid., 241. In the case of Karen Arm Quinlan, a main argument used to authorise the 
removal of life support was the right to privacy. Keown, 225-28. Quinlan’s case, while not a 
suicide case, was a watershed case that established a further medical-legal bodily privacy 
foundation for subsequent ethical issues surrounding death (Roe v. Wade had established 
privacy boundaries for a woman wanting to have an abortion).
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potential for conflict should there be a difference between how each party interprets its own 
rights.123
The medical profession has attained a high level of authority,124 and medical 
practitioners apply this authority through direct and intimate contact with patients on an almost 
daily basis. In his illness, the individual patient often perceives his own bodily dignity and 
worth to be at risk, a threat which generates a deep concern for preservation. At the same time, 
the circumstances of his bodily illness may induce his acceptance of the physician’s judgment. 
When such decisions are made, especially when the suggested course of treatment or medical 
decision lies contrary to the desires of the patient or those of his family, the patient may feel 
that his rights have been disregarded.125
A perceived breach of a patient’s “rights” will often become the focus126 when he feels 
he has not been privy to, or consulted about, the information concerning the disposition of the
l23Compare Edmund Pellegrino, Humanism and the Physician (Knoxville, TN: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 98. Of course, such potential collision is not unique to 
the DPR alone. A concern for rights is normative in democratic societies where people expect a 
broad protection of their privilege to exercise autonomy. Jim Ife, Human Rights and Social 
Work: Towards Rights-Based Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 61. Cf. 
Beauchamp and Childress, 71. While the authors acknowledge the important role of civil, 
political, and legal rights in protecting the individual from societal intrusions, they state that 
individual interests are often at odds with communal interests. A hallmark of Western culture is 
the deeply ingrained spirit of individualism that pervades all phases of public life—including the 
DPR. This individualism is so entrenched within the culture that it is nearly impossible for 
individuals to think in terms of the collective whole. It is not unusual for individuals to claim 
boldly their individual rights, even to the neglect of others or in the presence of authority.
124Paul Starr, The Social Transformation o f American Medicine: The Rise o f a Sovereign 
Profession and the Making o f a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, reprint edition, 1982), 
4.
125Ibid., 5. Starr writes that doctors offer a “kind of individualized objectivity” and 
“authoritative counsel.” The circumstances of sickness promote the acceptance of their 
judgment. Whenever pain or fear of death is involved, the patient has a special “thirst for 
reassurance and vulnerability to belief.” This assessment by Starr has meaning also for the 
discussion on physician paternalism that will follow in the third chapter of the thesis (173).
126James F. Childress, “Paternalism and Health Care,” in Medical Responsibility: 
Paternalism, Informed Consent, and Euthanasia, ed. Wade L. Robison and Michael S.
Pritchard (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1979), 19.
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management of his own case.127 The expectation on the part of many patients is that they will 
be involved in such decision-making.128 The potential for conflict, is present in the DPR, and is 
especially exacerbated to the degree that the patient’s illness is life-threatening. Although the 
question of patient rights is—to a certain degree—generally accepted, a variety of complex issues 
and philosophies both surround the subject of, and claims to, these prerogatives. “Rights” may 
even be applied in different ways within the DPR.
Negative Rights
One such rights’ application is the negative right. A negative right implies that a 
healthcare provider is obligated to refrain from doing something.129 Competent patients have a 
right to choose to seek a physician for help with a health issue, a right to discuss the physician’s 
suggested course of treatment, and a right to decline that course of treatment. This recent 
phenomenon, a right to decline a suggested treatment, touches upon a patient’s negative right, 
i.e. the right to noninterference. If, for example, a physician recommends a therapeutic 
abortion, the female patient can refuse that suggested procedure. The doctor (or even the state) 
would, on one level, be expected to refrain from interfering in some way with a woman’s right 
to procreate, and, on a more significant level, to refrain from committing assault.
A more likely scenario involves a patient’s right to forego, for example, a suggested 
medical procedure and to be left alone by the doctor. A patient may request that his doctor
l27Pellegrino, 98.
128This is not to imply that all patients are involved in decision-making because there are 
patients who do not wish to be involved. Compare Carl E. Schneider, The Practice o f 
Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical Decisions (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 41. Schneider demonstrates that while some patients wish to be informed about their 
medical situations, a substantial number do not want to make their own medical decisions, or 
even to participate in those decisions in a significant way. The elderly are less likely than the 
young, for example, to want to make medical decisions, and the graver the illness the less likely 
the patient is to be able to make medical decisions.
129Beauchamp and Childress, 73.
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cease treatment of his terminal illness in order to permit the disease to run its course allowing 
life to end. This seems clear-cut, but the reality is far different. New technologies make it 
possible, more than ever before, to extend life well beyond its natural boundaries. Some 
patients and their families express concern that their requests for treatment to cease have been 
overlooked or ignored. The application of this right does carry some limitations,130 but this sort 
of negative right is well known to be grounded in the principle of respect for autonomy.131 In 
the end-of-life decision-making, although the patient most often does not choose the time and 
place for his or her own death, the patient still desires the right to forego further painful 
treatment or decide when he or she is ready for death.132 The patient, even if the doctor suggests 
the application of life-extending technologies, has the right to decline the suggested treatment 
regimen and allow the illness to take its course.
Positive Rights
Another rights’ application is a positive right. Complexity and controversy surround the 
issue of positive rights in the DPR because this form of right obligates someone to do 
something on behalf of the one claiming the right. A patient, for example, may make a positive 
right claim with the belief that he or she is entitled to certain medical goods and services
130This sort of right has its limits, however, especially if the patient’s illness presents a 
threat to the health of others. An example would be a person who has tuberculosis and poses a 
health risk to others. The health concerns of others, in certain circumstances, will override the 
right to noninterference.
131Compare Brett and McCullough, 1347.
132British Medical Association, Euthanasia, 39. There is often a desire on the part of the 
patient to put an end to painful treatment. Cf. David Cook, Patients ’ Choice: A Consumer’s 
Guide to Medical Practice (London: Spire, 1993), 159. Cook writes that a patient does not have 
a right to die, but he can request that a physician allow him to die. What he does not have the 
right to do is to expect the physician to kill him. The right to die will be examined in greater 
detail in a following section of this chapter (81-82; 117ff.).
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irrespective of the ability to pay.133 Such a right would be grounded in the claims of justice 
where fair and equal treatment for all is the aim.134 Even though such a claim is discussed in 
human rights’ discourse, the basis for such a right is hard to establish and such a programme all 
the more difficult to implement.135
The reality is that healthcare resources are limited, and finding a way to distribute them 
equitably would prove to be controversial.136 The implications of such a right and the sheer 
magnitude of the obligation it imposes upon the healthcare provider indicate something of the 
struggle over this type of right. Physicians on the whole are interested in their patients’ needs 
and care about their well-being, but financial and resource obligations that a positive right 
claim imposes are but one aspect of the burden that this claim engenders. Doctors have 
responsibilities to other patients who also have rights, and deciding where best to allocate the 
resources of the medical profession is a significant aspect of the positive right debate.
As opposed to the negative right, whereby a patient may elect to exercise the right to 
choose not to pursue a recommended course of treatment,137 a positive right cannot guarantee
133Beauchamp and Childress, 73. Cf. the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 
Article 25.
134Ibid.
135Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 219. Cook writes that world starvation and global disease 
where millions suffer and die seem to cast some doubt on the effectiveness of claiming such a 
right.
136Beauchamp and Childress, 348.
137The basis for this positive right is the principle of autonomy that will be examined in 
ch. 3 of the thesis (147). Compare Brett and McCullough, 1347. There are limits to patient 
choices.
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that a patient may demand, and receive any medical treatment he or she chooses.138 A difficulty 
with positive rights lies with the supposition that the doctor is obliged to provide what the 
individual right-holder demands regardless of the impact it may have on the doctor, other 
patients with similar or greater needs, or the healthcare delivery system. An infertile woman 
may, for example, expect her doctor to provide the reproductive technology, no matter the cost, 
to enable her to become pregnant. She may base her claim on her positive right to procreation.
If this expectation is acknowledged and granted as a “right,” the doctor (and even the state) may 
then be fully expected to provide the same level of care for each citizen who desires such aid.139
Rights’ interactions, like healthcare provision and procreation, are common to the DPR, 
but they are not the only common occurrence where positive rights claims are made. Another 
area of growing impact is end-of-life decision-making. Some patients in pain and suffering 
request physician-aid-in-dying. While euthanasia and PAS have been discussed and, in some 
cases, practised throughout the centuries, the subject of physician-aid-in-dying has only become 
common in the last several decades. When mixed with the subject of rights, however, the issue 
becomes complex and controversial. It is not uncommon for a patient to request to be allowed 
to die. It is quite another matter for a patient to claim a right to physician assistance or to 
assume that a physician will be actively involved in bringing about the patient’s own death. The 
positive right-to-die claim has been posited to oblige the physician to supply assistance with or, 
in the case of euthanasia, directly cause the patient’s death.
138Marcia Angell, “The Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind o f ‘Right to Die’ Case,” 
New England Journal o f  Medicine 325, no. 7 (August 1991): 511-12. Angell makes this 
statement, but it is couched within an article where the hospital, not the family, wanted to 
terminate the care of Mrs. Wanglie. Cf. Stephen H. Miles, “Sounding Board: Informed Demand 
for Non-Beneficial Treatment,” New England Journal Medicine 325, no. 7 (August 1991): 512- 
14. A patient’s positive right does not obligate the physician to injure them (i.e., mutilation), or 
provide inappropriate therapies (i.e., amphetamines for weight reduction), or therapies that have 
no value (i.e., laetrile for cancer).
139British Medical Association, Euthanasia, 98.
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Why Is a “Right-to-Die” Claim Significant in the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship?
A claim to a right-to-die, aside from being somewhat strange in light of the fact that 
death is inevitable for all human beings,140 highlights two other realities in the DPR. First, 
although the fact that patient-death is not uncommon in the DPR, the focus on death has been 
heightened by the advent of medical technologies that can prolong the act of dying. A patient 
may fear the kinds of circumstances which often accompany a long drawn-out death—among 
which may be the loss of dignity, loss of privacy, loss of control over one’s environment, the 
perceived inevitable dehumanisation that institutional and technological factors bring to the 
scenario and, not least, the threat of financial insolvency that may accompany a lingering death. 
Patients also fear that physicians may overstep boundaries with the use of the technology.141 
Patient physical and emotional anxieties are serious enough realities to warrant solutions 
regarding patient-rights’ considerations, yet the other facet which feeds the complexity is the 
expanding philosophical discussion and debate that serves as a backdrop to the issue of rights.
The second reality which affects the DPR-the taproot of the rights’ issue-derives from 
the concept of the individual and evidences itself in some patients’ notions that pain and 
suffering are to be avoided at all costs and that personal happiness is the supreme goal. If the 
pleasure/happiness goal cannot be achieved, then life is not worth living. For example, some 
terminally ill patients, in order to end their suffering, preserve their dignity, and maintain as 
much physical, emotional, and financial control over the dying process as possible, are 
requesting that physicians provide them with the knowledge and means necessary to kill 
themselves. Patients reason that these requests and subsequent actions are morally sound 
because the consequences are beneficial to them. For example, although individual patients
140Cook, Moral Maze, 140.
141Ch. 3 of the thesis examines this fear in greater detail within the section on medical 
paternalism (173).
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may be killed, this action may be regarded as beneficial or of ultimate good, because the 
patient’s pain and suffering have been eliminated, the financial drain has been brought to 
closure, and scarce medical resources may even be reallocated and maximised elsewhere. Such 
reasoning, however, raises additional concerns that surround end-of-life decision-making and 
PAS.
So Where Does This Lead?
One concern growing out of the heavy emphasis Westerners place on individual 
happiness is that a claim of a “right-to-die,” even if established under the premise of patient 
happiness and beneficial consequence, carries an implied obligation on the part of a physician 
to assist a patient with his suicide. Physicians approach this question from many different 
philosophies of life, any or all of which may be applicable to the DPR. Physicians consider it 
morally significant to assess how these are applied and might affect the relationship they have 
with their patients.142 Central among the considerations is the search for equal justice for both 
patients and doctors.
The question has implications for the physician’s own personal autonomy by infringing 
upon his own right to noninterference when it obliges him to kill. Thus, the attitude that PAS is 
beneficial and just, by offering good consequences to some terminally ill patients, obscures 
another important moral concern—that is, justice from the physician standpoint. The 
abovementioned patient interpretation of justice bears similarity to Mill’s HU, but it is certainly 
not the only approach. If a patient’s claim now obliges a doctor to assist with a patient’s 
suicide, then such a claim needs to be examined closely through the filter of justice, because 
such a claim may raise historical, moral, legal, and medical questions. The following discussion 
will examine this critical area of justice.
142Compare Beauchamp and Childress, 44-119.
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Justice. Hedonistic-Utilitarianism. and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Introduction
This section examines the claim that a physician is morally obliged to satisfy a patient’s 
preferences in the DPR, even to the level of assisting a terminally ill patient with suicide, on the 
ground of justice. Along with autonomy and mercy, justice has also been cited as grounds for 
physician-assisted death.143 Such a claim has implications for the DPR as well as traditional 
physician paternalism.144
Traditionally, justice has been foundational to the practice of striving to ensure that a 
patient, or groups of patients, received equal care or were not in some way being discriminated 
against.145 Some who cite justice in support of PAS now view the denial of PAS in a terminal 
illness as being discriminatory, and hence, an injustice.146 This has legal implications (since
143Patient autonomy will be examined in ch. 3 of the thesis (147). Battin (113-23) 
discusses the claim of justice as it relates to euthanasia. See Battin, Least Worst Death, 113.
She cites Ramsey’s position, among other positions, on people who are “irretrievably 
inaccessible” to human care. Battin’s view is not a recent one. Compare Paul Ramsey, The 
Patient as Person: Explorations in Medical Ethics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1970), 160-64. Ramsey, himself, asks if there are any “specifiable” just (and charitable) 
qualifications of one’s duty to care for the terminally ill (“dying”). He then offers a sketch of 
two possible justifiable qualifications: hastening the dying of a comatose patient (“irretrievably 
inaccessible”) and taking positive steps to “usher out” a patient whose pain cannot be “kept at 
bay.” In these cases he says medical killing might be justified. His comments have implications 
for the DPR because he believes the choice in the matter should be left to the physician and not 
the “moralist” (161).
144Physician paternalism is one of the subjects covered in ch. 3 of the thesis.
145Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 228-29.
146Compare the “equal protection” Supreme Court case, Vacco v. Quill, as an example 
of this argument in the form of PAS. The Equal Protection clause of the United States 
Constitution embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike, but may treat unlike 
cases on a separate basis. The question was whether it was discriminatory (and hence unjust) to 
permit a patient to refuse life-saving treatment, but to make it a crime for a physician and 
patient to engage in PAS. George J. Annas, “The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to 
Physician Assisted Suicide,” New England Journal o f Medicine 337, no. 15 (October 1997): 
1099. A question whether it is just to maintain a distinction between refusing life-saving 
treatment and choosing to hasten death is a philosophical consideration as well. See Paul 
Ramsey, 163. Ramsey likens this decision to an injured, slowly dying solider who must be left 
behind in jungle warfare by his comrades. Ramsey says such extreme cases place one into
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PAS is unlawful in most jurisdictions), compelling further reflection on the moral implications 
of such an argument as well.
This chapter examines one aspect of justice—i.e., the moral justness of PAS in the DPR. 
Justice is one of a group of medical moral values often associated with an alliance of principles 
sometimes identified by the title, “common morality,”147 and given key consideration in 
medicine. Current discussions debate whether a consensus of “common morality” actually 
exists,148 and the varying meanings of the word “justice,” together with its multiple 
applications, make it difficult to reach an agreed level of understanding.149
In order to clarify the concept of justice as it relates to PAS in the DPR, together with its 
accompanying PAS claim, the term “justice,” like the term “rights” in the previous section, will 
be examined. This survey will explore key historical contexts where the word was discussed, 
experienced developmental change, and came to constitute the grounds for PAS, including its 
origin and use in Ancient Greece, its development through the Middle Ages into the 
Enlightenment, its further definition in the writings of John Stuart Mill, and its twentieth-
another moral realm where the normal distinction between acts of omission and acts of 
commission might be abrogated.
147Beauchamp and Childress, 100. Chs. 3 through 6 in the book offer an expanded 
discussion of the four common morality principles—autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
and justice. Cf. Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 228-29. See also the examination of autonomy in ch. 3 
of this thesis (147).
148See Alan Gewirth, “Common Morality and the Community of Rights,” in Prospects 
for a Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder Jr. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 29-52. Gewirth describes in some detail the evidence for and 
objections to a “common morality.” His description reveals a complexity to any 
conceptualisation of a common morality, as well as the controversy which surrounds its claims. 
For example, he outlines two core objections (ethnocentric and egoistic) to a common morality. 
Not all would agree with the universality of the principles of a common morality that are 
claimed to form the basis of human rights, especially those formed from a Western individualist 
viewpoint. A claim is that the conception of self in Western culture is foreign to much of the 
world (40) and an obstacle to establishing a universal common morality.
149Sidgwick, 264. Sidgwick, himself, noted the difficulty of defining the term and 
admitted that the result was often disputed.
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centuiy development within the medical-ethical arena. The evolving concept of justice has 
implications for current medical practice.
Justice Defined
“Justice,” according to the OED has several meanings, each of which may be applicable 
in a variety of contexts. For example, justice is the “conformity of an action or thing to moral 
right, or to reason, truth, or fact; rightfulness; fairness; correctness; propriety.”150 The word may 
be used to describe a characteristic of a person or a group. In this sense, justice is defined as the 
quality of being morally just or righteous, including the principle of just dealing and the 
demonstration of this quality in action. The concept of justice connotes just conduct, integrity, 
and rectitude. Justice also carries the idea of authoritative action or force. In this sense, it means 
“the exercise of authority or power in maintenance of right; vindication of right by assignment 
of reward or punishment; requital of desert.”151
The following core ideas and applications may formulate a general definition of justice. 
Rightness and wrongness o f attitudes and actions, or conforming to a standard, attach a moral 
dimension to the meaning of the word. The exercise o f authority or power in the maintenance 
o f right is yet another application of justice. From the earliest of times, these core elements 
were evident in the development of the term.
Origin of Justice: Ancient Greece
Ideas about justice did not develop in a cultural or conceptual vacuum. Ancient Greece 
was a fertile seedbed for the definition and application of the concept which emerged in this 
Pre-Socratic cultural and philosophical milieu. The term was used to convey different
150 OED, 2d ed., s.v. “justice.” When the concept of justice is applied to law, for
example, a legal decision rendered might be considered unjust or fair, implying that the law 
conformed to moral right, to right reason, or to some standard of fairness which is consistent to 
or with the rest of law.
151Ibid.
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conceptions of how the world, made up of a variety of different elements, was nevertheless an 
ordered whole.152 “Justice” before Plato would not be considered an established philosophical 
concept or principle; it was rather an “orally-managed” idea.153 Several key ideas began to 
emerge as the word evolved in meaning.
The Greek term for justice, dike (then dikaiosune), came to represent a concept central 
to Greek moral and political philosophy. The term was disseminated by the Greeks to their 
heirs in the European tradition.154 While it may not be accurate to say that the concept was of 
regulative importance yet to the Ancient Greeks, it may be noted that Hesiod isolated and 
converted it into a formal topic of discussion.155 Hesiod codified justice by describing what 
justice did, yet he failed to define the concept. In a similar vein, Heraclitus wrote of justice 
“catching up with people.”156 By this he did not mean that people would necessarily be arrested 
and tried in court, but that they would likely not enjoy their reasonably good reputations 
forever.157 While the term was still in its formative stages, it was gaining moral shape and 
influence.
152G. E. R. Lloyd, Methods And Problems in Greek Science (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 150.
153Eric A. Havelock, The Greek Concept o f Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its 
Substance in Plato (Cambridge, MA, 1978), 2. Havelock uses the term “orally-managed” to 
convey descriptively the idea that the term was in its developmental stages and had not yet 
been, for example, codified.
154Ibid., 13.
155Ibid. Cf. McKirahan, 70. Hesiod wrote of the world having moral order with the 
inferior divinities performing their functions as assigned by Zeus. Thus, “Justice” was mitigated 
by Zeus, and he was the “guarantor of justice through a system of rewards and punishments.”
156Ibid.
157Havelock, 267.
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Contained within the idea of justice was a rule of reciprocity, that which was required to 
keep “regularity” in both cosmic and human affairs.158 Parmenides viewed justice as regularity, 
custom, accepted order--what was to be expected of normal behaviour.159 The moral authority 
of the term was identified, in part, with the gods. Indeed, the idea of reciprocity was so much a 
part of the concept of justice that, at times, retributive acts which corrected an injustice were 
also included.160 Thus, the concept of justice by the end of the early Greek period had begun to 
reflect both that which was inside a man as well as that which was operative in society.161
The Hippocratic position on justice may also be included within the Pre-Socratic era. It 
offers a focussed view of the use of the concept of justice in a particular context. The 
Hippocratic physician pledged to treat all of his patients equally.162 The context for such an 
application was indeed broader than today, and it is Carrick who believes that the Hippocratic
158Ibid. See also McKirahan, 141-42. The authors state that from God’s perspective, a 
view superior to a human one, all things are “beautiful, good, and just,” whereas humans think 
some things have negative qualities [unlovely, bad, and unjust]. The implication is that it must 
be wrong to think anything unjust, for example, when one has gained the correct view of things. 
It is possible that the order in the kosmos is not morally or aesthetically neutral, but is good and 
beautiful. In this case, one can see a primitive, albeit developing, view that equated moral good 
with being just.
159Havelock, 268. See also McKirahan, 158-59. Parmenides is best known for a poem 
that he wrote in a style that was common to Homer and Hesiod and that connoted wisdom and 
authority. There is the way of mortals (no true reliance) and the way of Truth that has divine 
origins. Parmenides is a “knowing mortal” who has received a divine revelation. Of note is that 
Justice is viewed as the gatekeeper that allows only those sent by Right to enter. Justice and 
right behaviour, it appears, were of divine origin and must be communicated to man. In this 
sense it can be said that justice has moral force and authority because of its origin with the 
gods.
160Havelock, 267.
161Ibid., 306.
162Paul Carrick, Medical Ethics in Antiquity: Philosophical Perspectives on Abortion 
and Euthanasia, Philosophy and Medicine, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. And Stuart F. 
Spicker, no. 18 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985), 184. However, a 
physician was not obliged to take a patient or to provide charitable medical care.
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Oath may “certainly” be credited with helping to focus the eyes of Western medicine on at least 
five central medical ethical issues.163
One of those five issues, for example, was justice in the distribution of health 
services.164 Similarly, the Hippocratic Oath (P6) required “equal treatment” of patients 
regardless of their sex or status, whether free or slave.165 Even though justice was not regulated 
by law at this time, it is apparent that the Hippocratic physician was at least aware of its moral 
value and sought to conform his behaviour to the constructs of perceived justice as it related to 
patient care.
Justice was given a clear conceptual framework during Plato’s era. Plato was the first 
writer after Hesiod to deal with the problem of justice as a topic, “converting it into a 
conceptual entity and making it a normative principle.”166 It is possible that Plato’s “justice” 
vocabulary-that is, just or unjust--was a reflection of the effect of increasing legal procedure 
and practice in the Greek city-states.167 His examination of justice is found prominently in The 
Republic, where his overall aim is to show that a person is better living justly than unjustly.168 
Plato’s view is grounded in the Greek view of virtue, that value which makes it possible for
163Ibid., 180. The core issues are: patient confidentiality, abortion, euthanasia, truth- 
telling, and justice in the distribution of health services.
164Ibid.
165Ibid., 183-84. The Hippocratic physician’s pledge to give equal treatment to patients 
was for the most part “uncharacteristic” of the Greek and Roman world.
166Havelock, 14.
167Ibid, 297.
168Norman O. Dahl, “Plato’s Defense of Justice,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 51, no. 4 (December 1991): 809, 811. See also David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato’s 
Republic,” Philosophical Review 72 (1963): 141. Sachs states that the main argument of the 
Republic is the argument about justice and happiness; namely, the just man is happier that the 
unjust man.
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people to live a typically human life and to live that life well.169 The just man, according to 
Plato, was the man in whose soul justice existed, and this man would be happier than the unjust 
man. For men to live well requires a balance of virtue and justice, both individually and within 
society.170 In Plato’s Republic, justice occurs when the three parts of society exist in harmony: 
“the philosophic,” “the pugnacious,” and “the commercial” spirits. Justice is not only 
demonstrated by external behaviour toward others, but exists as an “internal order of the soul” 
which produces that right behaviour.171 Furthermore, the just man was one who recognised the 
value of right living, whether obligatory, or virtuous, and would be motivated to support, 
safeguard, or protect it.172 Plato’s view of justice, therefore, contained a moral dimension 
coupled with a sense of the obligatory. One who desired to be happy would practise justice, 
thereby demonstrating a link between justice and virtuous or right human behaviour.
Aristotle saw justice from two perspectives: from the vantage point of individual 
responsibility, and from that of the state. Aristotle believed an unjust person was one who 
broke the law, who took advantage of another, i.e. who acted unfairly.173 “Just” also meant law- 
abiding, and Aristotle illuminated his views with several examples which demonstrated this 
characteristic: brave conduct constituted not leaving one’s post or taking flight; temperate 
conduct refrained from committing adultery or assault; and patient conduct refused to mete out
169Plato, 353; see also Dahl, 810.
170Sachs, 151.
171Injustice, according to Plato, is the opposite state of harmony or balance when 
internal discord and factions prevail. See Plato, 139-43.
172Dahl, 810. Dahl likens Plato’s conception of justice as “internalist.” There is a 
necessary connection between value and motivation. If a person values something, then he or
she will be motivated to protect and preserve it. See also Carrick, 113. Carrick believes that the 
highest value in Plato’s system was justice.
173 Aristotle, 172.
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blows or abuse upon another person.174 “Just” had civil connotations, meaning that which was 
lawful or fair (equitable),175 or anything that tended to produce or conserve happiness, “and the 
constituents of happiness,” within a political association.176 For Aristotle, the emphasis upon 
the legal aspects of justice is demonstrated in such political associations. Justice in each of 
these examples indicated both a moral responsibility that one person had toward another 
person, or group of others, and the moral responsibility of a legal, constituted body toward its 
subjects.
The combined Platonic and Aristotelian development of justice established a broad 
framework for the concept. Justice after this period in Ancient Greece became conjoined to the 
notion of human wellness, both morally and legally. Even though the ancients did not examine 
justice with a future cultural intent in mind, they did establish the structure upon which later 
thinkers would build emerging notions of humanism.
The Middle Ages to Enlightenment: An Era of 
Re-emerging Humanism
The scholastic theologian of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), 
synthesised Greek thought and Roman Catholic doctrine into a Christian philosophy. He 
accomplished this by connecting the ideas of virtue and justice, contained in classical antiquity, 
with similar ideas recurrent within Christian thought, which resulted in his belief that “natural 
law” could be discovered by the exercise of right reason. He was aided in this development by 
the writings of Aristotle and was able to reach the conclusion that right action would promote 
and aid the realisation of human flourishing.177 The result was a rational foundation to ethics
174Ibid., 173.
175Ibid., 172.
l76Ibid., 173.
177John Haldane, “Medieval and Renaissance Ethics,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. 
Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, reprint edition, 1994), 141.
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that introduced a compelling and attractive path to virtue.178 In Aquinas’ system Justice was 
placed in the realm of relationship to God and viewed as covering the whole of man’s 
relationships with other persons.179 Any obligation to just action would be related to the law of 
God and derived from a reasoned application of virtue. The effect of Thomist theology was to 
transform the goal of virtue in Aristotelian moral theory by adding both supernatural assistance 
and a supernatural result—the state of beatitude, or “blessedness.”180
Aquinas’ association of justice with deity highlighted a stream of thought which had 
been attaching to the word from its inception and demonstrated his particular moral 
understanding of the term.181 Hugo Grotius’ writings, although arguing from a decidedly non- 
Thomistic approach, provided a moral counterweight to the views of Aquinas.182 Grotius was, 
in fact, credited with establishing modem natural law and that law’s secularisation. Writing 
some three centuries after Aquinas, he believed that fundamental injustices occurred when 
someone took another’s property, when a person failed to keep his word, and when a violator of 
another’s rights went unpunished.183 One may see demonstrated in Grotius’ views of injustice
178Ibid.
179Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica la2ae.66.4; see also Schneewind, 78.
180Haldane, 142. In Aristotelian moral theory, the individual sought the state of 
flourishing (eudaimonia), and in Thomist moral theory, the individual sought blessedness 
(beatitudo).
181Stephen Buckle, “Natural Law,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer 
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, reprint edition, 1994), 167. Buckle writes that in both 
ancient and medieval accounts it was believed that the law of nature was, in some sense, placed 
in us by God (or the gods). See also Haldane, 142. Aquinas gave place to the religious 
dimension of morality, but he also combined it with a “broadly rationalist theory.” He moved 
along a path between two philosophical groups: those that held to a naturalistic version of 
Aristotelian eudaimonism and those that claimed divine law to be a source of obligation rooted 
in God’s legislative will.
182Haldane, 144. Hugo Grotius was “deeply hostile” to the religious associations of 
Thomistic moral philosophy, but who, nonetheless, developed ideas similar (though 
unknowingly) to Scholastic ideas.
183Schneewind, 79.
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the concomitant core ideas of justice-the elements of moral rightness and the implication that 
one’s freedoms were legally protected. Even though writing as a Christian (like Aquinas), 
Grotius’ perspective on justice was humanistic in that his stated authority for right behaviour 
was constituted from the natural law within human nature and demonstrated the exercise of 
right reason.184 Whether the source of authority was divine or human in origin, the concept 
involved fair treatment of people and articulated the awareness that human wellness was 
diminished when justice was absent. Aquinas and Grotius each served as pivotal catalysts for 
the continued development of the concept of justice.
Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke and Immanuel Kant further refined justice both 
in its definition and its application. John Locke recognised the element of fair dealing when 
writing on justice. He believed that all persons were created in a state of equality.185 While 
Locke drew authority for his ideas on justice from natural law and deity, Kant’s authority for 
thought was lodged in categorical imperatives based upon human reason. Kant’s aim was to 
help man establish and sustain his freedom apart from absolute governmental power,186 and
184Buckle, 167. See also Schneewind, 78-80. Schneewind pinpoints the uniqueness of 
Grotius’ position on rights and justice. He discusses how Grotius differed from Aquinas and 
Luther in his belief that justice and rights were grounded within a person. This belief that rights 
were grounded within a person was not totally innovative, but it was through Grotius that the 
idea of rights as natural attributes of individuals began to hold a prominent place in modem 
European thought (81). Grotius’ views began to open the way for a shift in moral focus to the 
“inner life” or moral quality of a person. Virtues like rights and justice now came to be viewed 
as being grounded within a person and were not necessarily attached to a deity or to another 
external source of authority, for example, a government.
185Locke, 269. Locke recognised that equality in all areas was the ideal; however, he 
believed that there was to be no subordination or subjection unless the Lord and Master of all 
creation should, by “manifest Declaration [sic] of his will set one above the other.”
186Sullivan, 11.
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apart from the need to conform to mores based upon supernatural revelation.187 In addition, he 
saw that the overriding characteristic of a good state was justice.188
To ensure that just dealings took place, and that human autonomy was preserved, Kant 
proposed a pre-political principle of legislation based upon human reason alone. This principle 
was to derive its authority from the reasoned moral thinking of ordinary people.189 Moral 
obligation, according to Kant, must arise from a law that a man himself must legislate.190 He 
termed his proposal the “Universal Principle of Justice.”191 The principle linked to human 
autonomy because it meant that just civil arrangements would only be those that allowed for the 
most freedom for everyone equally.192
An important characteristic of his proposal was that claims of justice could originate 
from an autonomous individual within the bounds of civil and religious authority and obligate 
others morally. A second characteristic was a two-stage notion that an autonomous individual 
must first settle what was right before then determining what was good.193 Kant’s views on 
justice, considered within the greater context of humanism, indicate one part of the broad 
understanding of human development. Kant’s belief that human reason was the authority 
behind decision-making helped to shape the claim that a person might judge for himself what is
187Schneewind, 151; and Kant, Groundwork, 110-11.
188Sullivan, 11.
189Ibid., 12-13.
190Schneewind, 151.
191 Sullivan, 11.
192Ibid., 12. A person was to behave in such a way that his choices were compatible with 
the greatest amount of external freedom for everyone. Kant believed that the “Universal
Principle of Justice” in an enriched form was also the basic moral norm for personal life as 
well.
193Schneewind, 151.
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morally binding for his own life.194 Kant’s view that ordinary people can choose to act justly by 
“consciously applying abstract moral principles”195 was a view advocated by Jeremy Bentham 
and others.196 Although Bentham advanced a utilitarian theory that could be used for decision­
making, it appeared to call for calculations that ordinary people would find difficult to make. 
John Stuart Mill’s theory, however, advanced a variant form of autonomy and justice; namely, 
that good consequences determine what is right.197 Believing that a person should have as much 
freedom as possible, and that justice rendered a single individual’s happiness as equal to that of 
any other,198 it remained to be seen whether this view would promote individual well-being or if 
the pursuit of the happiness of the many might actually yield unhappy consequences for the 
individual.
John Stuart Milk Hedonistic-Utilitarianism. and Justice
John Stuart Mill addressed Bentham’s theories in his Utilitarianism, where Mill 
suggested that common sense moral principles may be known intuitively.199 He believed that
194Kant, Groundwork, 80. Kant wrote that everything in nature works according to laws 
and only a rational being has the power to act “in accordance with his idea” of laws 
(principles). This is why he or she has a will (he also termed will as practical reason ). Will is 
the power a person has to select goals, to form rules for achieving them, and finally to act on 
those rules. Cf. Sullivan, 114-16.
195Kant also discussed the origin of evil and man’s predisposition to evil. He held man 
to be personally accountable for his decisions. Since man possesses a powerful desire to 
maximise pleasure over pain, he must undergo a moral revolution. Man battles with his inward 
predisposition to do good and his desires. Compare Sullivan, 134. See also Kant, Groundwork, 
122. Kant writes of the inner battle of desire and the use of reason to bring it under control. 
Kant expressed, by his views, a somewhat optimistic view of man’s inner goodness and 
individual ability to overcome evil desires. See Sullivan, Introduction, 147, footnote 3.
196Schneewind, 151. Thomas Reid’s common-sense morality is another example of such
a view.
197Kant believed a person first determined what was right, then actions were to follow.
198Mill, On Liberty, 319.
199Mill would allow, as an example, common sense moral principles like Reid’s 
beneficence, acting fairly toward others, and truth-telling. Schneewind, 151-52. Compare Mill,
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these principles represented the collected wisdom of mankind about those “consequences” of 
actions that were “desirable” and “undesirable.”200 The basis for moral decision-making, 
therefore, was a first principle, or common ground of obligation, that lay at the root of all 
morality. Mill called this common ground the GHP and believed that, in usual or new cases, 
direct appeal to the principle of utility was appropriate and would lead to conclusions that 
would be acceptable to common sense. If individuals made decisions in this way, the result 
would be a just and equitable society.
Mill, writing specifically about justice, believed also that judgments about fairness and 
equality were important201 He believed that justice implied not only something which was right 
to do, but would also be wrong to fail to do. For Mill, justice also meant something that an 
individual could claim as his or her moral right.202 Mill, at this point, remained within the 
historical boundaries of the concept.203 His contribution to the development of justice was to 
propose a set of moral rules which would guarantee human well-being. While he recognised the 
essential social nature of morality and that society has a moral end—that is, the moral good of
On Liberty, 251-55. Yet, it should also be stated that Mill believed the GHP both took 
precedence and was at the root (253) of these intuitive principles. He believed that an 
individual’s moral faculty only supplied him with general principles of moral judgments, not 
for perception of concrete doctrines of morality (252). Mill believed that the GHP was essential 
in order to perceive the concrete doctrines of morality (254).
200Schneewind, 152.
201Mill, Utilitarianism, 82. Mill claims that “justice is the name for certain moral 
requirements which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility and are 
therefore of more paramount obligation, than any others.” Barrow, 158-59. Barrow writes that 
utilitarianism is “understood to incorporate a principle of impartiality.” He also states that this 
“formal distributive principle” derives its substance from happiness. All are to be treated the 
same out of respect for happiness unless a reason for discrimination can be provided. Though 
happiness (eudomonia) to Plato did not mean the same as happiness (pleasure) to Mill, justice 
carried the same core meaning.
202Mill, On Liberty, 305.
203See definition, 3.
133
its members204--it was the self-conscious goal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
that was at the centre of his claims concerning justice.205 Mill believed that human well-being 
would be preserved if each person’s happiness was equal in degree and was valued exactly as 
much as another person’s happiness,206 adding to the historic understanding of justice-a 
utilitarian philosophical interpretation by grounding justice in the GHP 207
Whether intentional or not, Mill united several streams of thought that had been 
developing since the Renaissance,208 establishing a philosophical framework that made it 
possible to link together individual autonomy, rights’ claims, and justice. His view was unique. 
From this point forward a person could theoretically begin to cite claims of fairness, based 
upon individual preferences about happiness, and use moral arguments to do so. Of course, 
Mill’s theories neither gained unqualified acceptance, either in his own day or in the present 
day, nor do they belong to the realm of verified truth. Yet, his philosophy, like that of Kant 
before him, was used by later generations of thinkers to buttress arguments for the preeminence 
of autonomous authority. Those arguments may be heard most recently in the PAS/DPR 
dialogues209 and are ideas which engender sharp debate.
When viewed together under the overall rubric of justice, Aquinas’s view of justice 
based upon a Christian conception of natural law, Grotius’s conceptions of justice based upon a
204Davidson, 183.
205Davidson, 183. See also Mill, On Liberty, 127,135. Mill established clear autonomy 
boundaries in On Liberty. Cf. Schneewind, 152. Schneewind notes that Mill and others wrote 
from a context where vindicating moral autonomy was an important concern.
206Mill, On Liberty, 319.
207This was a part of Mill’s contribution to the ongoing development of autonomy and 
humanism. This addition also has implications for the PAS debate where Mill is cited in 
support of autonomy claims (71-72).
208Ch. 3 will examine the origin and development of human autonomy (147).
209Battin, Least Worst Death, 278; see also McLean and Britton, 29.
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secular understanding of the same, and Kant’s theory of justice based upon human reason 
alone, provide a trilogy of advances that helped to secure further the theoretical foundations of 
justice. Mill’s HU, while an attempt to further secure claims of justice, actually creates the 
possibility that an individual claim of justice may be overridden to satisfy the justice claim of 
the aggregate GHP.
Critique of Mill’s Approach
Mill’s view of justice bore far-reaching implications. It is important to recognise that his 
theory has its critics. The first point of criticism involves the just distribution o f satisfactions 
related to the rightness and wrongness of certain acts and is stated by non-utilitarian and 
utilitarian thinkers alike. While equal distribution of fairness is important in Mill’s idea of 
justice, John Rawls and other non-utilitarians believe that it would not matter to a utilitarian 
how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals.210 It is this angle of the argument 
that is problematic for the non-utilitarian.
For example, Rawls counters the utilitarian view by arguing that, since utilitarian justice 
as a precept derives, in part, from the goal of achieving the greatest balance of happiness for the 
greatest number, utilitarian justice actually necessitates, in effect, that the greater (happiness) 
gains of some would compensate for the lesser (happiness) losses of others.211 Rawls further 
questions why the violation of the liberty of the few might be viewed as justifiable as long as 
the greater good is shared by the many.212 Rawls’ skepticism of Mill’s view of justice derives
210John Rawls, “The ‘Separateness of Persons’ Objection,” in Utilitarianism and Its 
Critics, ed. Jonathan Glover (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990), 91.
211Ibid, 91-92.
212Ibid. But compare Mill, On Liberty, 316. Mill recognised the importance of society 
observing the moral rules that forbid hurting one another. He believed it was their observance 
“alone” that preserved the peace between human beings. If they were not observed, each person 
would see another person as a potential enemy. Mill, it appears, had a high view of a man’s 
moral capacity and a willingness to choose the good over evil.
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from the corresponding notion that morality is structured around the self-governing individual, 
stemming from his or her preferences about happiness.213
Arthur Holmes agrees with Rawls in identifying this dependence upon personal 
preference to define happiness as a weakness in Mill’s argument, adding that when Mill spoke 
of equal justice, he defined it as the state of “maximal utility.” In other words, one should 
respect the rights and liberties of another for the sake of recognising the common good.214 
Holmes rightly questions whether this principle is sufficient to ensure equal justice for all 
persons.215 Thus, differences between the arguments of non-utilitarians and Mill rely, in part, 
upon the varied perspectives about the justness or unjustness of an act and its relation to its 
moral assessment.216 Yet, non-utilitarian writers were not the only ones to challenge Mill on 
this notion.
J. J. C. Smart, writing from a utilitarian perspective, recognises not only an 
uncomfortable weakness in utilitarianism, but one that he identifies as an irony of the theory.217
213See Schneewind, 155-56.
214Arthur Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1984), 45.
215Ibid. See also John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 
revised edition, 1999), 445. Rawls states, in contrast to Mill, that justice-as-faimess is not a 
maximising theory. Rawls believes that it is, instead, based upon the minimum ground of the 
capacity for moral personality, and that this capacity alone is sufficient to render justice “fair” 
(443).
216Tziporah Kasachkoff, “Utilitarianism and Justice,” in Moral Philosophy: An 
Introduction, ed. Jack Glickman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 648.
217Smart and Williams, 69-70. Smart cites H. J. McCloskey, “A Note on Utilitarian 
Punishment,” Mind 72 (1963): 599. McCloskey writes of the possibility of horrible 
consequences in certain exceptional cases. An example of this consequence may be found in 
the illustration of a small town sheriff who can prevent serious riots, where hundreds of people 
will be killed, only by “framing” and executing as a scapegoat an innocent man. While the 
utilitarian may be unhappy about the situation, he may ultimately arrive at the decision to act 
unjustly. The point is that the innocent man must die in order to save the hundreds from a 
possible deadlier riot, thus exposing a weakness of the utilitarian “Greatest Happiness” 
argument. In this theory, there can be no guarantee of just distribution of satisfactions.
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Sometimes, he says, an individual commits an injustice in his pursuit to obtain or realise 
happiness. Since people have egoistic tendencies as well as beneficent ones, a person could be 
prompted and succumb to act wrongly, even very wrongly.218 Therefore, the fewer times the 
utilitarian has to choose between the lesser of two evils, the better pleased he will be.219 This is 
an irony of the theory—that in pursuing the greatest happiness, a person could negatively affect 
the happiness of another.
Tziporah Kasachkoff argues, that for most people, the rightness or wrongness of an act 
corresponds to the perception of its justness or unjustness.220 Both Kasachkoff and Rawls agree 
that the right precedes the good, and that no utilitarian view can adequately incorporate a 
person’s common sense convictions.221 Their argument counters that of Mill’s, however, which 
suggests that utilitarian principles would lead to conclusions that common sense also would 
find to be appropriate.222 While Mill does stress justice as a key element, the problem with Mill 
is that he seems to have two separate principles at work at the same time: the principle of 
justice and the principle of utility. It is conceivable, using Mill’s HU theory, that an action may 
maximise the sum of good in the world (GHP) and yet be unjust in the distribution of the 
sum.223 Another difficulty for Mill’s utilitarianism lay in the fact that preferences differ 
significantly from person to person, leaving the determination of what is considered right 
action, or the good, based solely upon the satisfaction of individual desires. Non-utilitarians, 
like Rawls, argue that principles of right action—i.e., justice, cannot be derived simply from the
218Smart and Williams, 71.
219Ibid.
220Kasachkoff, 648.
221Schneewind, 155.
222Ibid., 152.
223Frankena, 41.
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satisfaction of individual desire. In fact, he questions whether a valid conclusion could be 
drawn about what was good simply from the premise of personally desired satisfaction,224 since 
some people obviously condone bringing pain to others in great numbers in their quest to find 
their personal desires met.
Nevertheless, despite criticisms that Mill’s utilitarian view fails to ensure a just 
distribution of satisfaction for all persons, and that common sense alone does not always lead to 
moral and/or appropriate behaviour, his utilitarianism has been, nonetheless, influential in the 
moral and legal debate concerning PAS. Beauchamp and Childress, for example, elaborate at 
length on the application of Mill’s utilitarian principles in medicine,225 while advocates cite 
Mill as support for both autonomy and PAS claims. The medical-ethical arena, from both 
physician and patient perspectives, is one place where utilitarian views are used to call for 
action, to cite claims based on justness and fairness, and to buttress arguments from varied 
sides of the question, all clamouring for justice in the modem medical context.
Twentieth-Century Medicine and Justice
H. Tristram Engelhardt notes that people who live in modem, pluralistic societies long 
for a unified view of justice.226 Both the concept of “fairness” and determining what is “just” in
224Schneewind, 155-56. See also Rawls, Theory o f Justice, 27-30. Henry Sidgwick 
provided something of a middle ground by attempting to show that the intuitionist view about 
the foundations of morality could, in fact, be used by the utilitarian viewpoint (153). He said 
that while the utilitarian method needed an intuition at its foundations, this method was, 
nonetheless, essential in order to settle moral disputes (152). Furthermore, he had difficulty in 
finding in “Common Sense” [sic] any definite agreement as to clear principles from which 
natural rights could be systematically deduced. Thus, he proposed one clear mode of 
systematizing these rights brought under one principle—“Freedom from Interference.” This 
universal establishment of the right to freedom would be, in his view, the complete realisation 
of “Justice” (153), which he qualified as not only freedom but “all other benefits and burdens” 
that should be distributed justly, or free, from arbitrary inequality. See Henry Sidgwick, 274.
225Beauchamp and Childress, 47-55. Cf. British Medical Association, Medical Ethics 
Today, 74, where Mill’s autonomy view is cited as relating to the autonomy of children.
226H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations o f Bioethics, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 3,10. Engelhardt believes this view of justice to be one that was once
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the medical community have become essential components in the widespread debate which 
continues to rage at the beginning of the new millennium. The debate is fuelled by the various 
interpretations surrounding, and applications of, the term “justice.”227 Several moral theories, 
through which principles of justice are often filtered, contribute to the conversation,228 as do 
new definitions which threaten to supplant traditional meanings of the term. Vast inequities 
associated with access to healthcare and health insurance, together with dramatic increases in 
the cost of that healthcare, only exacerbate the tensions.229
Basic Meaning
Though controversial rhetoric surrounds the word, its meaning, and its application in 
medicine, a basic terminology has been used to define justice in the medical arena: fairness, 
desert (that which is deserved), and entitlement (that to which one is entitled).230 Beauchamp 
and Childress note that a situation calling for justice to be meted is present whenever a person 
is due “benefits or burdens” because of their “particular properties or circumstances.”231 This 
aspect of “benefits due” may come about because a person has been productive and has earned 
a just apportionment or is entitled to specific assistance of some kind. Conversely, a person
found in religious communities. Whether or not his construct is accurate as to the definition of 
that community’s values may be questioned. His work clearly recognises that communities long 
for clearly articulated and implemented concepts of justice.
227Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 228.
228Beauchamp and Childress, 334. The authors list utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian, 
and communitarian theories as possibilities. See also van Zyl, Death and Compassion, who 
writes on the subject of euthanasia and justice from the perspective of virtue ethics. Each of 
these moral theories claims to apply justice with validity.
229Beauchamp and Childress, 326.
230Ibid., 327. Cf. Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 228. Cook writes that an essential element is 
treating patients fairly. This includes making sure similar cases are treated similarly and 
different cases are treated differently.
23‘Beauchamp and Childress, 327. -
139
may have been harmed in some way, and because of damages assessed, would be entitled to 
compensation.232 A valid claim based on justice would seek either appropriate redress for a 
harmful consequence or the fulfilment of benefit promised in the case of entitlement233
An injustice claim, on the other hand, would involve either the commission of a 
wrongful act against another person or the omission (whether conscious, subconscious, or 
unconscious denial) of a benefit perceived to be rightfully due, at least in the mind of the 
aggrieved party. The concept of injustice also includes the failure of an individual or an entity 
to distribute burdens fairly (in this context, perhaps medical resources, responsibilities, or 
costs).234 Cook provides another perspective on the meaning of justice by showing that, while 
the concept itself is often embodied in the laws of the land, the end value of implemented 
justice is to ensure equal treatment for people—to eliminate the “wrong kind of discrimination” 
against persons or groups. Cook’s perspective echoes an ethos of traditional medicine that 
seeks to go beyond the mere letter of the law in treating people fairly.235
Complex issues surround medical justice, aspects of which determine for patients, 
medical healthcare personnel, and institutions, the standards of moral right and wrong, fairness, 
benefits due, burdens assigned, correctness and propriety, equality, and the stewardship of 
resources by governing entities. These issues remain both difficult to define and even more 
difficult to regulate. To illustrate how the argument for justice is used to inform decisions
232Ibid.
233Ibid.
234Ibid.
235Cook, Patients’ Choice, 229. The example here of the result of applied justice is 
actually one of “Utilitarian ends,” as opposed to a “value” in itself. The question is whether 
treating people fairly is valuable in itself, or because it results in greater happiness for the most 
people (preventing negative discrimination). See also Cook’s advocacy of fair treatment that 
goes beyond legal requirements which is, in some ways, congruent with the Hippocratic 
statement (cf. P6) that called for physicians to treat patients equally, even in an era when 
medicine was poorly regulated.
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regarding public policy, one example may be found on the battlefield of resource allocations, 
using the BMA’s suggested list of guidelines as the methodological tool.
Guiding Principles for Just Medical Resource Allocation Decisions
A central question pervading the discussion regarding the distribution of healthcare 
resources is exactly what constitutes the guiding principles which aim to establish the “justice” 
or “fairness” of that care. A survey of four of the BMA’s most commonly held principles 
illustrates the concept of justice as it is applied to current medical resource allocations.236 The 
following principles are options that might be employed alone or in combination with others 
within the DPR and wider medical contexts.237 It may be well to note at the onset that, while 
ostensibly seeking to provide justice for all concerned, the reality is that some of the principles 
are not necessarily ethical, acceptable, or even practical.238
First, treating patients equally means that a doctor treats similar cases in a similar 
fashion and different cases in a different fashion. Fairness lies near the centre of the concept of
236Cook, Patients’ Choice, 214-19. Beauchamp and Childress, 329-31. British Medical 
Association, Medical Ethics Today, 309-13. The BMA lists and describes these “guidelines” for 
dealing with the problem of rationing healthcare resources in a just manner.
237While it is recognised that these principles might be applied alone or in combination, 
they will be discussed individually in the thesis.
238Compare British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today, 309-13. One example 
of a questionable “guideline” concerns the selection criterion (311) which would dispense 
treatment according to merit. For a positive example, if a patient donates blood, she might be 
given priority later when she needs a transfusion. Negative examples might include patients 
whose own past health patterns contribute to their diseases and who might not receive 
treatment, or patients whose ill health relates to smoking, abuse of alcohol or drugs, high-risk 
sporting activities, poor dietary choices, or unsafe lifestyles and who could potentially be 
excluded from state-funded medical treatments. A more substantial concern for such a selection 
criterion would attach to the patient whose disease is due to genetic predisposition rather than 
to lifestyle. It would be difficult to assess how responsible an individual is for his or her 
misfortune. Still a different example altogether is the nontreatment of a patient’s sexually 
transmitted disease which would potentially put more people at risk and force the innocent 
dependents of the patient to bear the cost of nontreatment.
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justice where the aim is “no bias or unwarranted discrimination.”239 This is a worthy ideal; 
however, the principle is open to challenge from many different perspectives. An example of a 
challenge to this principle already has been levelled in court cases involving PAS, as was the 
case in 1997, when the United States Supreme Court overturned a Second Circuit court ruling, 
upholding New York State’s ban on assisted suicide under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution.240 The United States Supreme Court case demonstrates the reality 
that a guideline of this nature would be difficult to assess accurately and to apply equally.
Some patients have claimed this principle of “treating patients equally” to argue that to 
offer free medical care to those who cannot pay for their healthcare is an example of fairness or 
justness. They postulate, however wrongly, that fair distribution of resource allocations means 
that those patients who are able to pay for treatment receive it, and others who are unable to pay 
for it should still receive treatment (treating patients equally), albeit in the form of charity. The 
mistaken notion is that charitable care is necessarily just.
Beauchamp and Childress help distinguish between equal distribution of healthcare and 
charitable care. Charitable care is virtuous, but not necessarily just.241 Regardless of economic 
viability, justice is served when other considerations are brought to bear upon the case, such as 
desert, entitlement, “no bias or unwarranted discrimination,” and treating similar cases in a 
similar fashion and different cases in a different fashion (medical diagnosis and treatment 
decisions). Thus, “treating patients equally” is a fairness goal which has been easily 
misappropriated and misinterpreted. The argument surrounding treatment based upon financial 
stability, however, raises a question which a second guideline addresses.
239See Cook, Patients’ Choice, 217-18. See also British Medical Association, Medical 
Medical Ethics Today, 313. Compare Beauchamp and Childress, 341-42.
240Vacco v. Quill.
241Beauchamp and Childress, 349-50.
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A second principle dealing with just distribution of resources concerns the practice of 
treating patients according to the ability to pay. In the current United States’ healthcare system, 
those patients able to afford quality health insurance receive treatment. At the same time, the 
poorest patients may also receive government assistance, indigent, or “charity” care. The ones 
often failing to receive care, however, are those sick persons who work but cannot afford health 
insurance.242 High medical costs prohibit their access to regular healthcare. Stated plainly, the 
better one is able to pay for healthcare, the better healthcare one receives. A realistic concern 
for the terminally ill patient in the middle category (with no healthcare) would be his inability 
to receive sufficient and sustained comfort throughout the often lengthy process of dying. If 
economics rather than justice for all patients is the primary impetus for the delivery of 
healthcare, the potential for injustice is ever-present.243
242See Cook, Patients’ Choice, 217; and British Medical Association, Medical Ethics 
Today, 309. See also Timothy Quill, A Midwife Through the Dying Process: Stories o f Healing 
and Hard Choices at the End o f Life (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 
216. The unstable healthcare delivery system in the United States has not escaped the view of 
advocates of a right to die. Quill writes that healthcare in the United States is undergoing 
radical reform. Today it is driven more by the need to control costs than by guidelines for 
improving quality and access. Quill noted that forty million Americans (at the time of 
publication) were without health insurance, and the number was growing. Beauchamp and 
Childress, 348. The authors state that thirty-seven million Americans (note the 1994 publication 
date) are without healthcare insurance. They also add that roughly 7 percent of uninsured 
Americans are uninsurable by current underwriting practices (note, too, that these policies do 
change, but that this statement reflects a general condition). Cf. British Medical Association, 
Medical Ethics Today, 300. The BMA adds perspective by clarifying that “cost” does not 
necessarily refer only to monetary considerations. The BMA is quick to add that a focus on 
financial costs primarily (for example, those who advocate the desirability of low-cost services) 
would contribute to . . .  “low morale, stress, loss of compassion in healthcare providers, and 
reduced quality of relationship with patients.” There are a number of articles in media sources 
that direct attention to the chronic nature of limited access to healthcare. Compare Charlotte 
Huff, “Texas Has Greatest Percent of Uninsured,” Fort Worth (Texas) Star Telegram, 30 
September 2002, sec. A, 1,11. The article states that 14.6 percent of Americans were uninsured 
in 2001. This is approximately forty-one million people.
243Maxwell J. Mehlman, “Economic Motives for Physician-Assisted Suicide”; internet, 
available at http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/articles/bioethics/asst suicide_6/; 
accessed 24 April 2004. Mehlman writes that the debate about PAS is filled with concern over 
the role of economic factors.
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. A third commonly held principle is to treat according to need which is the most basic 
and widely used standard for medical judgment.244 When applied to the just allocation of 
medical resources, the issue is complex, involving such weighty decisions as deciding whether 
a patient lives or dies, applying ordinary or extraordinary treatment options, or distinguishing 
between reasonable and unreasonable patient requests. Each patient and physician routinely 
make assessments, whether consciously or unconsciously, regarding what is essential for the 
life of that patient. When the two differ about what constitutes “true need,” the potential exists 
within the DPR for conflict at worst and stress at best245 The physician may determine that the 
patient’s “need” is merely a “wish” and refuse to do what the patient desires. An infertile 
woman may desire to have a child, for example, and consider fertility treatments a “true need,” 
a conviction with which her doctor may disagree. The discussion of “need” might be 
complicated further by resource limitations and obligations. Typically, the greatest and the most 
urgent patient needs receive priority. This principle is used to invoke, interact with, and often 
challenge the notion of justice when the patient perceives that his own interests either have not 
been considered or his medical condition has been relegated to lesser-priority status in the face 
of another’s greater need of resources.
A final commonly held principle used to assess the concept of justice in resource 
allocations is treating according to the right to treatment. This tenet implies a “fair 
distribution” based upon a “right” for all persons in need to receive medical care. However, 
even if such a claim could be considered binding, many problems collect around this guideline. 
Much confusion and debate surrounding right’s claims exist. For example, patients and doctors 
wonder whose rights are to be protected, what constitutes having the “right” to treatment, what
244British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today, 312. Cook, Patients’ Choice, 
214-16.
245The issue of conflict between doctors and patients has deeper implications than 
assessing the validity of patient “need.” The subjects of patient autonomy and physician 
paternalism will be discussed in ch. 3 of the thesis (147,173).
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kind of treatment and how far that treatment will apply to the individual patient’s illness, and 
what governing body determines who chooses the “rights” and the “treatments” which will be 
addressed in applying this principle.246
People claim the right to live, a right to have an abortion, a right to have a baby, and 
even, of late, a right to die.247 However, insuring that a patient has a right to treatment does not 
serve as warranty for the result; nor does it necessarily guarantee that the treatment would 
follow the desires of the individual patient in question. The successful implementation of the 
principle of treating according to the right to treatment, then, rests upon a strong consensus 
among the medical community, physicians, and patients, who work within present medico-legal 
systems to provide equitable care for the greatest number of persons.248
246See thesis, ch. 1, 36-39. A central concern in the PAS debate has centred on the 
source of ultimate authority in decision-making. Religion, government, and medicine have been 
cited as areas of imposed authority.
247See Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 219. One might note here that outside the realm of this 
specific context (patient treatment within the resource allocation discussion), are the 
overwhelming realities of the logistical difficulties associated with global diseases, like the 
AIDS epidemic, for example, or worldwide starvation. These and other global health issues are 
dire and complex situations with implications of monumental proportions. The sheer numbers 
of patients or victims in each of these examples is staggering. A viable solution seems to 
remain far beyond the financial reach of most governments or private agencies at this time. The 
principles articulated above, then, are not yet used to inform decisions about justice for persons 
affected by these issues.
248Cook, Moral Maze, 141. “Rights,” such as the right to honesty and respect apply to 
patients and doctors equally. It remains questionable, however, whether it is just to require a 
physician to treat any given person. Some advocates of this position insist that every person has 
a right to a physician’s treatment, which would then place a burden on that physician to perform 
the specified treatment. Neither aspect is necessarily true, however, for there may be cases in 
which a patient does not have the right to a physician’s care. Furthermore, even should the 
patient gain the right to treatment, that physician may not be compelled to act as the patient 
desires. A patient, for example, might desire an unlawful course of treatment. Herein lies a 
weak argument in the PAS debate.
Another faulty argument is heard when people confuse the concepts of justice and 
charity, and suggest solutions to modem healthcare problems based upon misconceptions of the 
terms. Beauchamp and Childress indicate that proposals to alleviate unfair distribution of 
healthcare and resources have often centred not on justice but on charity, benevolence, and 
compassion toward sick persons. See Beauchamp and Childress, 349. While a doctor may treat 
a patient without charge out of compassion, or as a “charity case,” and while his action may be 
commendable in many respects, it does not follow that charity is equal to “justice.”
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Patient rights, and the way that those rights are acknowledged and addressed by the 
medical community, often influence patient perceptions about whether justice has been served. 
A closer look at the medical principles listed above, particularly the first three guidelines from 
the perspective of the patient, reveals a significant reason for some of the patient unrest within 
the last three decades. Whether a medical decision regarding justice revolves around treating a 
patient equally, according to his ability to pay, or according to his need, the primary agent in 
control is rarely the patient. For example, the patient’s inability to be in control of his own life 
may be a product of happenstance or necessity.
It may be a result of public policy unconditionally applied. It may be the result of a 
physician’s decision or his healthcare programme’s provisions (or lack thereof). Regardless of 
the reason, the reality is that the patient often perceives himself to be without input into the 
decisions made on his behalf which affect his future condition.249 In seeking the care of a 
physician, a patient expects interaction about his condition and course of treatment. When this 
communication does not satisfy the patient’s expectations, the patient sometimes suffers.250
Resource allocations may also contribute to the patient’s distress by limiting the range 
of options for care, whether that is in the UK or the US.251 In fact, the justice-based goal of 
universal access to healthcare coverage often conflicts with current pressing healthcare 
practices connected to healthcare financing and delivery systems that allocate resources and 
their treatments with sometimes severe restrictions.252 The place where expectations of the ideal 
and the reality best meet together with the concept of justice is in the DPR.
249In the United States where managed healthcare is prominent, sometimes the doctor is 
not in control either.
250Cook, Moral Maze, 141.
251Compare Beauchamp and Childress, 365.
252Ibid., 375.
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Justice Applied in the Doctor-Patient Relationship
The allocation of resources within the medical environment is one area of justice that is 
both hotly debated and difficult to depersonalise.253 Debate rages over claims of equal 
distribution of scarce resources, or if possible discriminatory action has occurred in 
distribution, giving rise to moral questions regarding human life and the best use of financial 
and other assets.254 One moral feature was recognised a generation ago when Ramsey discussed 
whether there was a line of moral reasoning that would aid in determining how one might 
answer the question of resource allocation. He clarified the issue by illustrating the moral 
dilemma a physician faces when he or she must choose among medically eligible patients, 
inviting a broader discussion of what moral model will ultimately be chosen and exercised, and 
whether the patient is to help make those decisions. Ramsey’s moral analysis was helpful, 
particularly regarding the latter point.
Despite the centuries’ long development of the term justice, which took a decisive turn 
when the individual was given consideration in claims about justice, medical praxis has lagged 
in acknowledging patient rights to participate in the decisions concerning his or her own health 
issues. In medical history, the emerging views of the patient, patient rights, and patient justice 
have loosely parallelled the corresponding growth of the broader views concerning autonomy, 
human rights, and justice. Cast in terms of the individual, the patient is an autonomous being, 
and his rights as a human being guaranteed for him certain rights associated with his own 
medical care.255
253Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 229. See also British Medical Association, Medical Ethics 
Today, 299-316. Cf. Beauchamp and Childress, 326-94. Their entire chapter on justice contains 
a key discussion of the subject of resource allocation. See also Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 208-21. 
Cook offers a clear overview of resource allocation with an eye to the patient.
254Ramsey, 239. Cf. Starr, 382. Starr writes that the cost question was the catalyst for 
examining other deficiencies, including the 1970's lists of medicine’s inadequacies.
255See thesis, ch. 1,34-39. The case of the treatment of a terminally ill patient, for 
example, has become a moral and ethical focus in the PAS debate.
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The concept of justice, or “fairness,” became significant as he interacted with the 
various constituencies from his healthcare arena, particularly as funds, distribution of resources, 
treatment options, and competition with other patients for the same services grew increasingly 
complex. The potential for moral conflict in this progression emerged as patients consulted 
with their healthcare personnel, particularly if unrest and indecision characterised the latter’s 
views of patient access and control regarding healthcare.256 Still today the questions addressed 
by both patients and physicians revolve around the best methods to employ to help patients, 
how good patient health will result from those treatment decisions, whose definition of what is 
ultimately “good for the patient” will predominate, and how justice will be employed to ensure 
the fulfilment of that “good” ideal.
Justice and the Definition of “Good”
One area where the claims of justice are often applied in the DPR concerns the 
definition of what is best, or the “ultimate good” for the patient.257 The doctor’s view and his
256Beauchamp and Childress, 326. The authors ask a chapter-opening question whether 
or not inequality in access to healthcare is a moral problem in discussing the difficulty of 
balancing patient claims with beneficence. Engelhardt notes the same (121). H. Tristram 
Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations o f Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2d ed., 
1996), 121.
257See Cook, Patients’ Choice, 210. Decisions about an individual patient’s healthcare 
still largely depend upon the physician. Establishing priorities in healthcare at local or public 
policy levels is also an area in which patients have little input. One tool that has been developed 
by health economists for such decision-making is “Quality Adjusted Life Years’” (QALYS). 
The approach attempts to measure the quality of life (hereafter referred to as QL) in terms of 
the number of years that a patient might be given from a particular treatment. It also seeks to 
measure QL enjoyed by the patient. Compare British Medical Association, Medical Ethics 
Today, 304. See also Beauchamp and Childress, 368-69. The authors cite Oregon’s use of 
QALY (the Beauchamp and Childress acronym does not include the “S” used in Cook’s work) 
as one that raises questions of justice. The authors note that utilitarian criteria are used as part 
of the Oregon plan where the “life-sustaining impact of a treatment is weighed.” Medical 
judgment of quality life years, however, may not correlate with patient self-estimations, and 
these self-estimations may vary radically from one patient to another, forming the question, 
“What type of endpoint is worth paying for?” The determination of what is a patient’s “ultimate 
good,” therefore, derives not as much from the relationships between patients and their doctors 
as much as from a formulaic assessment tool that may by-pass patient input. The answer to this 
question, of course, depends upon how patient quality care is assessed. Some research entities
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determination of what constitutes “good” often shape the medical decisions made within the 
DPR.258 For example, a patient might view her preference for a costly fertility treatment as the 
“ultimate good” for her life, worthwhile because it offers the potential to satisfy her concept of 
personal happiness-i.e., to bear a child. While her doctor might agree that her goal to become a 
mother is a good one, he may still refuse to recommend the treatment, not because he does not 
believe it would be good for her to be pregnant, but because the treatment, for a variety of 
reasons, may not be the best option.
Questions about what is best, or what is “ultimate good” for patients, evoke input from 
many comers of the medical community. The best use of resources, considerations regarding 
“well-being over a lifetime,” and fairness also figure into decisions made about patient 
treatment. The latter consideration, what is “fair treatment,” in part grows out of the practice of 
excluding patients from key decision-making opportunities regarding their health. Fairness, a 
key element injustice, implies that a person is given equal opportunity to choose options best 
suited to his happiness or well-being, inasmuch as he is able, based upon the principle of the 
worth of human life.259
The centuries’ long development of human autonomy, rights, and justice has 
contributed to this positive view of human worth. Dworkin recognises such a need for human 
beings to experience a sense of worth, especially as he relates this idea to a government’s 
responsibility in protecting an individual citizen’s rights. He states that the government’s role is
use individual/group patient test scores.
258Starr, 379. Starr notes that at one time medical professionals were thought to be best 
equipped to decide how to organise the healthcare needed by Americans. This view, he states, 
began to change in the 1970s.
259Kelner and Bourgeault, 758. The authors state that a prolonged dying process that is 
marked by medical interventions can produce for a patient a life that he or she might not 
choose. See also Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, 180,209-10. Dworkin writes descriptively about 
the loss of dignity that often accompanies being kept alive by doctors who see patients not as 
people but as “battlegrounds.”
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to protect rights; in part, to preserve human dignity.260 Patients may also wrestle with deeper 
issues of an existential variety that lie beyond the pale of medical technology or a doctor’s 
control. For example, patients often face a moral crisis of trying to maintain QL when faced 
with an advancing illness, or to maintain emotional and physical stability when their diagnosis 
or prognosis is unknown, both of which are important and worthy of physician sensitivity and 
awareness.261
Whether these weighty decisions concern routine health or terminal care, the delivery of 
“ultimate good,” “fair,” and “just” healthcare is a legitimate perplexity in America, where the 
reality of privatised health insurance leaves the uninsured and less financially able often 
deprived of necessary treatment. Similar questions surface also in the United Kingdom where 
financial constraints seem to be a perennial issue, impacting physician and hospital decisions 
regarding the level and quality of care offered to patients.262
Veatch, by way of example, illustrates this evaluative process at work in a discussion of 
the just allocation of resources and the assessment of what is best for the patient related to
260Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 198-99; and see also idem, Life’s Dominion, 
210- 11.
261Linda Ganzini and Susan Block, “Physician-Assisted Death: A Last Resort?” New 
England Journal o f Medicine 346, no. 21 (May 2002): 1663-65; internet, available at http:// 
www.deathwithdignity.org/resources/articles/nejm_5-23-02.htm.; accessed 7 December 2002. 
Studies on Oregon ALS patients indicated that patient requests for PAS were based upon 
concerns with loss of autonomy, control, independence, and the ability to pursue pleasurable 
activities. HIV patients have cited the fear of worsening symptoms and of function as well as 
the progressive loss of the ability to maintain close relationships as reasons for requesting PAS. 
What may be concluded is that the basic fears regarding encroaching loss of autonomy or 
independence, affecting relationships and daily routines, is common to both groups requesting 
PAS.
262See Beauchamp and Childress, 369. See also British Medical Association, Medical 
Ethics Today, 299. The BMA states that it has been questioned whether the NHS was ever 
really expected to pay for itself. Traditionally priority has been given to medical need and to 
welfare maximisation, leaving those with learning disabilities, mental illnesses, the physically 
disabled, and the elderly most often vulnerable.
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xenotransplants.263 He would argue for the autonomy of a competent patient to enter into a 
voluntary agreement with his doctor to receive healthcare. Veatch considers the autonomy 
claim of the patient to be a primary element in the DPR when both parties understand that the 
requested treatment will bring “well-being over a lifetime.”264 The patient expects that his 
desired course of treatment will be followed by the physician and that the patient’s own 
“ultimate good” will be the result. This ideal progression does not always follow, however.
Many other factors enter into the DPR at the point of determining what the patient 
perceives as “good” or “just,” often placing stress on the DPR. When these assessments are 
made, including such routine matters as treatment costs,265 they can leave a patient groping for a 
sense of justice and fair treatment. This potential for friction in the DPR exacerbates when
263Robert M. Veatch, Death, Dying, and the Biological Revolution: Our Last Quest for 
Responsibility (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, revised edition, 1989), 204. Veatch 
writes that those who are more concerned with autonomy and fairness than with maximising 
utility would find a prohibition of xenotransplantation hard to justify. The utilitarian argument 
might be to forego the transplantation of a baboon heart into a child because it is difficult to 
determine how much good eventually will come from xenotransplantation.
In a case, for example, of a young adult mother with two small children, a utilitarian 
calculation of the aggregate good of performing a transplant may be required. The just course of 
action would be that which would maximise the aggregate good. Of course, it might be in the 
interest of a utilitarian to grant such a costly procedure for a young mother because of the 
negative aggregate utility (the privation of young children left without their mother) that such a 
prohibition might incur. Veatch, however, fails to take into account what the general effect of 
the procedure would be on the general population. See also Beauchamp and Childress, 335-36. 
Here the authors discuss the limit of a utilitarian approach as it relates to individual rights.
When the utilitarian focus is aggregate welfare, the possibility exists that weak or vulnerable 
persons might be harmed.
264Compare Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution , 204-5. Veatch argues 
for a theory of justice that “considers well-being over a lifetime as the basis for allocating 
resources.” He asserts that “fairness” requires that a person be given the opportunity to have 
well-being over a lifetime that is equal to the well-being of others over the same period, an idea 
which assumes, of course, level playing fields from which to start. Veatch’s view begs the 
question, however, because it assumes that the patient’s view of well-being is the sole arbiter of 
fairness in such decisions. The basis of such a patient right’s perspective is tenuous at best, 
because it assumes a universal positive right to healthcare. Further, his view is weighted heavily 
toward the patient’s PH assessment. This could create a medical-financial nightmare. His view 
also places medicine in the unfortunate and impossible role of “leveling the playing field.”
265Cook, Patients’ Choice, 210.
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patients and doctors hold differing views about extending life in the face of critical end-of-life 
choices. Doctors, for example, have new technologies and drugs that enable them to sustain life 
and to treat previously irremediable diseases; yet, these are not merely costly, straining the 
limited resources available to physicians, patients, and the medical system, but often levy 
emotional and physical burdens which those patients and their families must decide whether or 
not to take. QL questions relate to the definition of “good” for all persons involved.
Verhey corroborates that human finitude adds to the difficulty of these decisions about 
“patient good.”266 Since human beings are finite, and medicine—even for all of its advanced 
technical wizardry—is also limited in what it may accomplish, tough choices sometimes must 
be made.267 One of the most poignant places where questions about justice arise is at the point 
of terminal illness. Patients and their families seek treatment based upon a perceived claim to 
“justice” when technological intervention, which may or may not be available, may extend life. 
Yet, even hospital administrators operate within the harsh realities of choices when dealing 
with a finite source of funds with which to purchase equipment and operate medical units.
At a different level, human and time resources are also finite. Nurses and doctors 
struggle with the inability to meet the medical and relational needs of dying patients while other 
patients, concurrently, call for physicians’ attention and time from a perceived equal claim for 
“just” treatment.268 Finite limitations, then, contribute to the confusion which exists when 
claims of justice affect the DPR, especially when an individual patient’s desires for his own 
“ultimate good” either actually go unmet or are perceived to have done so. The disparity and 
complexity of representative views render the application of guiding principles difficult.
266Allen Verhey, “Sanctity and Scarcity: The Makings of Tragedy,” in On Moral 
Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, ed. Stephen E. Lammers and Allen 
Verhey (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2d ed„ 1998), 975. He uses 
the term “tragedy” in reference to the “Sophoclean” proportions of these decisions.
267Ibid., 976.
268Ibid.
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Summary
Discussions regarding the search for definitions and applications for the concept of 
justice are important. Because no widely recognised consensus has yet been reached concerning 
meaning,269 the practice of wielding the term “justice” very often confounds, rather than 
elucidates, the arguments people and institutions use to call for specific actions. Differences in 
views about what is the “ultimate good” for patients, the stewardship of resource allocations, 
and even human finitude, affect decision-making and further complicate the DPR, even more 
so when basic terminology remains unclear. Nevertheless, because the root concepts inherent 
within the idea and practice of justice historically were fairness, desert, and entitlement, these 
elements impact how medical care is expected to be practised in its moral and ethical 
dimensions.270
Justice has been used to claim that a physician is obliged to satisfy a patient’s 
preferences in the DPR, even to the level of assisting a terminally ill patient with suicide. This 
claim may not be based upon the historical view, however, for in the long development of the 
term in medical circles, “justice” has consistently championed the preservation and 
enhancement of human life. Despite the historical view, PAS proponents still claim that 
sometimes a justice claim obliges a doctor to aid a patient’s preferences by providing the 
knowledge and means necessary for suicide. The converse argument is also used in support of 
PAS—some proponents question whether the acts of prohibiting or denying PAS are, in fact, 
“just.” Today, in addition to the rights’ and justice claims, PAS advocates question the fairness 
or rightness of requiring a terminally ill patient to suffer a painful and protracted death. PAS 
advocates emphasise one feature of the principle of beneficence which refers to a moral
269Beauchamp and Childress, 326-27.
270Kelner and Bourgeault, 758. The authors cite R. Blauner, “Death and Social 
Structures,” Psychiatry 29 (1966): 378-94. Eighty percent of patients, for example, die in 
hospitals and long-term care institutions. The nature of the bureaucratised system means that 
the dying process is often subjugated to the hospital’s requirements.
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obligation for a physician to act for the benefit of others. In some cases this would mean 
assisting with the suicide of a patient. It is believed the physician is obliged morally to further 
the broad continuum of patient preferences,271 even assisting with a patient’s suicide, which in 
some cases is believed to be a legitimate patient interest. The phase of this stance which 
supports “medical killing” is the content of the next section.
Medical Killing. Hedonistic-Utilitarianism. and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide
Introduction
The final claim addressed by this chapter is that medical killing is sometimes 
permissible and, indeed, even morally obligatoiy for physicians, especially when the two 
principles of autonomy and mercy are present in selected circumstances.272 Sincere 
physicians,273 philosophers,274 and grassroot supporters275 advocate this permissibility of the
27ISee ch. 1,36-37.
272Battin, “Is a Physician Ever Obligated?” 32-33,36-37. Battin writes that all sides 
recognise these two fundamental moral principles, but she admits there may be differences in 
belief about their relevance in the issue of PAS. Timothy E. Quill, “Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Is Moral,” in Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Daniel A. Leone (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 
1998), 17. Quill reasons that PAS motivated by compassion can be moral and ethical, if not 
legal. Sissela Bok, “Euthanasia,” in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: For and Against, ed. 
Gerald Dworkin, R. G. Frey, and Sissela Bok (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
110. Such a claim might at face value seem contradictory in light of the medical principle of 
non-maleficence, but this claim is receiving a hearing in current medical dialogues. The idea of 
a physician taking a life raises ghosts of past war atrocities and fears of recurrences. PAS 
advocates insist, however, that such atrocities would not become reality again. See, Quill, 
“Physician-Assisted Suicide,” 16. Cf. Humphry and Wickett, 46. Humphry and Wickett reason 
that the Nazi euthanasia programme failed because it was clandestine instead of voluntary, and 
because it lacked mercy. Beauchamp and Childress, 231-32,239-40.
273Quill, “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” 17. While not using classical utilitarian 
language, Quill’s reasoning suggests a consequentialist approach. Suicide, he determines, can 
be rational, if the circumstances are hopeless for the terminally ill patient. Joseph J. Fins and 
Matthew D. Bacchetta, “Framing the Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active 
Euthanasia Debate: The Role of Deontology, Consequentialism, and Clinical Pragmatism,” 
Journal o f the American Geriatric Society, 43, no. 5 (May 1995): 563-68.
The authors outline three representative positions in the PAS/VAE debate. 
Consequential arguments, according to the authors, form the bulk of the literature on the 
subject. Quill’s position, stated above, fits patterns of consequential approaches to PAS/VAE.
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medical killing claim within the medical community. At the same time, spokespersons in the 
same categories276 oppose strongly any change in the historical position that the philosophy and 
practice of medicine has opposed killing patients. Advocates and opponents have lined up to 
give and gamer support on either side of the issue, and much has been written to argue for the 
respective positions. The possibility that medical killing may be legalised engenders moral 
concerns, even implications, for the DPR. In the midst of a shifting cultural and medical 
climate, conceptual distinctions are difficult to establish, leading to confusion when trying to 
determine the exact meaning of, and boundaries for, medical killing.
Cf. Marcia Angell, “Helping Desperately 111 People,” 17. Angell writes that the problem of 
aiding people who face prolonged dying is so great that “we cannot ignore it.” Lee, et al., 310- 
15. The authors conducted a survey among physicians in Oregon and found that 60 percent 
thought PAS should be legal in some cases, indicating at least some openness to the idea among 
one segment of the medical community in that state.
274Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide, 109. Battin writes, “The death of a person who is 
less happy than average is to be welcomed provided, of course, that death does not produce new 
unhappiness for surviving individuals.” She also comments that where a balance of benefits 
over injury will accrue to others from the suicide of a person, then it may seem that the suicide 
ought to be encouraged, since there would be no harm to the deceased (107). See also Rachels, 
End o f Life, 156. He writes that the utilitarian argument from mercy still has considerable force 
even if the promotion of happiness and the avoidance of misery are not the “only” morally 
important things. Stating that these are still very important, he points out that should an action 
decrease misery, the misery reduction would render the action commendable.
275Compare Larry R. Churchill and Nancy M. P. King, “Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
Euthanasia, or Withdrawal of Treatment: Distinguishing Between Them Clarifies Moral, Legal, 
and Practical Positions,” in British Medical Journal 315, no. 71701 (July 1997): 137-38. Polls 
show 60 percent of the American public favours legal reforms that would permit PAS to end 
the suffering of competent patients. For similar assertions, see also Meier, et al., 1193.
276British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today, 157-58,174-77. Edmund 
Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” Journal o f Clinical Ethics 3, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 95. 
Pellegrino argues that doctors should not kill, even out of compassion. Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 
156. Luke Gormally, ed., Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law (London: Linacre Centre 
for Health Care Ethics, 1994; reprint edition, 1995), 42. Humphry and Wickett, 162-69. 
Humphry and Wickett name a number of individuals who oppose euthanasia—including former 
United States Surgeon General, Dr. C. Everett Koop, and the UK’s Malcolm Muggeridge. 
Muggeridge, now deceased, headed the Festival of Light movement at the time Humphry’s and 
Wickett’s book was printed. Cf. the anti-euthanasia advocacy group “International Task Force 
on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: About the International Task Force”; internet, available at 
http://www.internationaltaskforce.org/about.htm.; accessed 2 February 2001.
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Before evaluating the section claim, therefore, it is important to lay the groundwork for 
the discussion by defining the term “killing” and its various forms of common usage. Next, just 
as the previous sections traced the terms “rights” and “justice” across periods of broad 
paradigmatic changes, here the term “killing” will be examined in Ancient Greece, the 
Christian Era through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the 
nineteenth-century to the present medical-ethical environment. Finally, the concept of medical 
killing will be analysed from the standpoints of medical ethics, utilitarianism, and law, as each 
of these contexts relates to PAS and the DPR.
“Killing Defined”
To “kill,” according to the OED, means “to put to death,” or “to deprive of life,” to 
“slay” or “slaughter.”277 In its early use the word implied personal agency and, most often, the 
use of a weapon. In general terms today, the word is used loosely, connoting various causes 
which might ultimately lead to a shortened lifespan—i.e., accidents, overwork, grief, drink, or 
disease.278 Just as this broad range of meanings and possible applications of the word may be 
found in current cultural parlay, the same is true about its usage by the medical community.
The meaning of “killing” has important implications for medicine where life-and-death 
situations occur on a regular basis. “Killing” represents a cluster of ideas that surround a central 
condition—that is, direct causation of another’s death.279 While the focus of killing within the 
realm of medicine specifically crystallises upon the ideas of intent and causation,280 the broader 
connotations related to medical killing render definitions complex. One of the sources of this 
complexity is the related concept of “allowing one to die.”
111OED, 2d ed., s.v. “kill.”
278Ibid.
279Beauchamp and Childress, 220.
280British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today, 150.
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Clarification
The distinction, if any, between killing a patient and allowing her to die has been the 
cause of serious discussion about the moral, ethical, even legal, implications of such deaths.281 
Thus, whether there is a medical distinction between “killing” and “allowing one to die” is 
important to determine. In either case, the actor, or agent of death must be considered. The one 
who acts as agent, or the cause of the death, historically has been linked to the responsibility for 
or consequences connected with the death. The distinction between the concepts is also 
significant because it bears implications for the related medical situations which form the basis 
of the PAS debate: between suicide and foregoing treatment and between homicide and natural 
death.282
In the instance of allowing a person to die, the central point is the absence of causal 
intervention or the decision not to employ treatment that would prolong life.283 These acts of 
omission themselves may seem simple enough to determine, whether from the patient’s or 
physician’s point of view. Yet, opponents of PAS argue that, if the physician makes the 
decision to allow a patient to die, to allow nature to take its course, to allow whatever may 
happen simply to happen, without intervention, his decision may be classified as “killing” if he 
intentionally withholds treatment from someone who might or could be treated or, for the 
purposes of this discussion, a patient who is terminally ill.
281Raymond G. Frey, “Intention, Foresight, and Killing,” in Intending Death: The Ethics 
o f Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1996), 66. Frey questions whether there is a genuine distinction that may be extracted 
between taking an action with the intent to cause death and merely foreseeing death as a result 
(“side-effect”) o f one’s act. If such a distinction may be extracted, Frey asks whether it may be 
used to evaluate moral differences between cases.
282Beauchamp and Childress, 219.
283Beauchamp, Intending Death, 7. In such a scenario the doctor might avoid 
intervening so that a “disease, system failure, or injury causes death” instead.
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Today, terminal illness often extends for a lengthy period of time. Medical technology 
is sometimes used to sustain life, in many cases, well beyond the limits which would normally 
accompany the illness were intervention not used. The practice of using technology to sustain 
life has become a common flash point in the debate surrounding the issues of “killing” and 
“allowing patients to die” among some groups now seeking to clarify and alter established 
moral and legal boundaries that surround end-of-life decisions.284 The point is, PAS advocates 
argue, there is negligible moral difference between “killing” and “allowing to die” when it is 
certain that the patient would die relatively soon anyway.285 In this case, the argument reads, to 
forego treatment to allow death cannot be “meaningfully distinguished” from taking active 
steps to kill a person.286 In fact, a physician could be showing mercy to such a patient by
284Allen E. Buchanan, “Intending Death: The Structure of the Problem and Proposed 
Solutions,” in Intending Death: The Ethics o f Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, ed. Tom L. 
Beauchamp (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 24-25.
285This argument assumes that one can be truly certain when a person might die. See, for 
example, James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New England Journal o f Medicine 
292, no. 2 (1975): 78-80; Ramsey, 162; and Beauchamp and Childress, 225. The authors reason 
that simply labeling an act as either “killing” or “letting die” does not help to determine 
whether one type of action is either “better or worse, or more or less justified,” than another 
type of action. They assert that the “rightness” or “wrongness” of an action depends not so 
much upon the act itself but, rather, upon the merit of the justification upon which the action is 
grounded. These authors would consider essential such factors as an agent’s motive (whether 
benevolent or malicious, for example), the patient’s request, the patient’s own motive, and the 
consequences of the act itself. Yet, the discussion these authors still avoid is the moral question 
concerning the nature of the action itself.
286There is a wealth of philosophical material focusing on the difference and/or 
distinction between killing and allowing a person to die. Authors discuss in intricate detail the 
issue and its implications related to euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide. A representative 
sample of sources is cited here, where authors suggest that there are instances when the 
distinction between killing and letting die is, at times, morally insignificant. Rachels, “Active 
and Passive Euthanasia,” 78-80. Rachels wrote what is now considered a classic article on the 
subject. But see also Ramsey, 157-58. Ramsey dealt with the issue of hastening death six years 
earlier in his 1969 Lyman Beecher lectures at Yale Divinity School. See also Battin, Least 
Worst Death, 15-20. Beauchamp, Intending Death, 7.
Other authors write on the issue from different perspectives. See Cook, Patients ’
Choice, 157-58, where he offers a concise and clear statement of the issue within a chapter on 
suicide and euthanasia. Cf. Gormally, 126-28, who discusses killing and justice along with 
Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 95-102.
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hastening death.287 Such claims, with their variant conclusions, add to other moral arguments, 
including those used at different points in the historical development of killing.
The topic of “killing” in the medical context surfaced at various times in history 
parallelling, in some instances, key developmental periods in the growth of humanism and 
autonomy.288 In order to clarify better the complexity of the issue, both when it occurred in 
history and in today’s debate, it may be helpful to examine historical discussions about 
distinctions between “suicide,” “killing,” and “allowing a person to die.” Interwoven 
throughout the developing understanding of the medical distinctions between the terms is a 
foundational question about what it means to be human.
Ancient Greece: Suicide and “Killing”
Ancient Greek medicine offers an early context for discussions about cases of “suicide,” 
“killing,” or “allowing patients to die.” The Hippocratic Oath, with its prohibition against 
physician-assistance-with-suicide, immediately comes to mind when one thinks of ancient 
medicine; yet today there is speculation about how widely the Oath was accepted and the 
prohibition practised. Attention has been given to the Oath’s apparent localised religious
287Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” 78. Rachels adds to this argument another 
point, which is that of physician “mercy,” to justify the killing of a cancer patient who is in 
terrible agony. Thus, “mercy-killing,” or “euthanasia,” will be added to the discussion of this 
section.
288Humphry and Wickett, 8. See also, for example, the statement of Humphry and 
Wickett that a reawakened interest in individualism during the Renaissance aided a change in 
view about suicide. They see a link between a growth in humanism and a separation from the 
institutional controls of the Church. The implication is that Church views about suicide would, 
as a result, be brought into question. Their perceived link may or may not be the case but see, as 
another example from a slightly different context, W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks And Their 
Gods (London: Methuen & Co., 1950), 184. Guthrie writes of interstate warfare that 
characterised Ancient Greece from the fifth century onward and that helped to loosen the 
foundations of established traditions. This opened the way for natural philosophy, mysticism, 
and the sophist movement. Man’s religion might concern his individual soul and not his duty to 
the state. Both epochs were characterised partly by challenges to traditional concepts about 
being human. Paradigmatic changes were occurring in both epochs that may have more to do 
with changes in human concepts than any one individual factor, such as the loosening of 
Church controls.
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influence and, in fact, to the likelihood that all of its injunctions were violated at one time or 
another from the period of Hippocrates through to Galen.289
Suicide, or self-killing, was known in Ancient Greece, practised relatively freely, and 
was aided by physicians in certain situations outside the boundaries of Hippocratic medicine.290 
Suicides were categorised roughly as heroic and nonheroic. Suicide used to escape a 
“relentlessly painful illness or infirmity” fell into the latter category.291 This kind of illness was 
thought to be incurable in nature and generally, though not always, linked in some way with 
advancing old age.292 A doctor possessed lethal drugs, held the unique position to declare a 
patient unbeatable and, if so requested, could provide a patient with an appropriate “cup of 
death.”293 In Ancient Greece, then, suicide was not unknown. This drinking of poison to cause
289Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation, 
Supplements to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine, ed. Henry E. Sigerist, no. 1 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1943; reprint edition 1964) , 63.
290See Edelstein, 9, 15. Edelstein paints a different picture of the Hippocratic physician 
when he writes that a patient would consult his own doctor first, or urge his friends to speak 
with the doctor. If his physician confirmed the seriousness or hopelessness of the case, the 
physician would suggest directly or indirectly that the patient commit suicide. Edelstein cites 
Pliny, Epistulae, I, xxii, 7 ff. Edelstein’s point is that suicide was both practised and accepted 
throughout antiquity, was aided by physicians, and that the Hippocratic influence was not as 
pervasive as it has been made out to be.
29ICarrick, 133.
292Ibid.
293Ibid. Carrick states that suicide was made easier in this period because by the late 
Hellenistic and Roman Imperial Period, the religious stigma attached to suicide had all but lost 
its force. Civil penalties against suicide, except in the case of soldiers and slaves (whose lives 
were considered valuable for militaristic and labour needs, respectively), were practically 
unknown by this time. Hemlock was one of a variety of methods used to commit suicide. 
Ludwig Edelstein, Ancient Medicine, ed. Owsei Temkin and C. Lilian Temkin and trans. C. 
Lilian Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, paperback edition, 1987), 11. 
Edelstein and, to a lesser degree, Carrick overemphasise the role of the physician in the ancient 
practice of euthanasia. The emphasis in Ancient Greece was on the ways a person might take 
leave of life with peace of mind, hence “good death.” The physician’s “cup of death” was but 
one of a number of ways that a patient might choose to commit suicide.
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one’s own death, provided by one’s physician, however, does not correspond to the modem 
understanding of the term “euthanasia” or PAS.
In Ancient Greece, “euthanasia” was broader in scope294 and, in fact, was not practised 
at all in the sense of taking the patient’s life for benevolent motives.295 The physician’s Oath 
required him to attend primarily to his guild, to care for his patients, to preserve life according 
to established ethical parameters. The physician’s reputation as a healer was highly prized; 
therefore, even if for beneficent reasons, for a patient to die would have severe negative 
consequences on the physician’s own social and medical standing.296
In this period, involuntary euthanasia was not a part of the Greek’s general concept of 
euthanasia at all. Instead, the broader concept of euthanasia included an element that is often 
included in the meaning of voluntary euthanasia today. A patient’s prior consent was implied, 
based upon a genuine human concern for a patient’s psychological state o f mind. It was 
considered morally significant that a patient remain free to make a reasoned decision regarding 
the option to hasten or not to hasten his or her death.297 Even though this period was well before
294New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 78. Carrick, 127. Carrick notes that 
the linguistic result of the development and subsequent use of hemlock in the fifth century B.C. 
was that these forms of suicide were sometimes, although not categorically, described as 
instances of “euthanasia.” His conclusion about terming such acts as “euthanasia” begs the 
question, even if he notes that the focus with euthanasia was on a patient’s state of mind, not on 
the means of death. There is an element of conjecture to Carrick’s claim, notwithstanding his 
attempt at historical accuracy.
295New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 78.
296Edelstein, Ancient Medicine, 51,76-77. Reputation, in this sense, was lasting fame in 
the eyes of society. Physicians prized being well-considered in their communities and acquiring 
wide reputations for correct prognoses. See also Carrick, 89-90. Carrick attributes this 
physician-motivation to “acquit himself’ well partly to acquire and preserve a good reputation, 
although surely there were other equally valid reasons, such as a desire to relieve human 
suffering, the value of human life, and even less altruistic reasons such as the financial gain 
which accrued to the accurate and “successful healer.” A different question altogether is 
whether physicians may have been involved in the suicides of patients if such assistance was 
“unknown” or secret.
297Carrick, 128. Carrick writes that the notable exception to all of this discussion was 
infanticide.
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the time when a patient might think of himself in terms of being an individual with independent 
autonomy, the concept of voluntary euthanasia, then and now, is similar in that such action 
would require the choice of suicide.
Other similarities include the general assumption that a physician would be involved in 
euthanasia primarily through diagnosis and prognosis,298 with the emphasis trained upon the 
patient’s psychological state of mind. Moral appraisals seem to have been of secondary 
concern.299 Thus, a typical question in ancient Greece might have been whether the decedent 
met death voluntarily, with peace of mind and minimal pain. One further consideration supplies 
instruction to the Greek reflection on medical killing. Edelstein suggests that the primary 
reason for the Hippocratic proscription of euthanasia was the influence of Pythagorean religion 
which opposed the practice. Edelstein argues that the Hippocratic Oath was written by the 
Pythagoreans as a moral authority to limit a physician’s role in these situations, regardless of 
the physician’s motive concerning his patient.300
298Edelstein, Ancient Medicine, 11-12.
299While this psychological state-of-mind element remains a part of end-of-life 
discussions, today there is often an added concem—whether the death is morally justifiable. 
Carrick, 129. Carrick does not suggest that the Greeks were “oblivious” to the “moral 
challenge” presented by voluntary euthanasia. However, Carrick writes that the focus today is 
different—the question is whether euthanasia may be morally justifiable under any condition.
See also Erich H. Loewy, “Harming, Healing, and Euthanasia,” in Regulating How We 
Die: The Ethical, Medical and Legal Issues Surrounding Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Linda 
L. Emmanuel (London: Harvard University Press, 1998), 52-53. Loewy points out that the 
discussion of Greek physicians targeted whether doctors should be permitted to hasten a death 
rather than the more “general” issue of whether any person should be allowed to kill. Edelstein, 
Ancient Medicine, 11-14. Edelstein indicates that since suicide was commonly practised, that 
there was no substantive ethical consideration given to the distribution of poison to a patient. 
Timothy E. Quill, “Death and Dignity-A Case of Individualized Decision Making,” in Arguing 
Euthanasia: The Controversy Over Mercy Killing, Assisted Suicide, and the “Right to Die, ” ed. 
Jonathan D. Moreno (New York: Simon & Schuster, Touchstone Book, 1995), 59. Quill, in the 
now classic case, writes of Diane’s “preoccupation with her fear of a lingering death.” Her 
psychological state played a primary role in his decision to assist with her suicide.
300For a counterview see Darrel W. Amundsen, “The Significance of Inaccurate History 
in Legal Considerations of Physician-Assisted Suicide,” in Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. 
Robert F. Weir (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 5. Amundsen writes that 
Edelstein’s support for his view of Pythagorean authorship of the Hippocratic Oath is now
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At the same time, it is interesting to note that Carrick also discusses at some length the 
Pythagorean opposition to suicide on religious grounds.301 Correspondingly, he cites the 
contribution religious thought gave to Socrates’ arguments against most forms of suicide.302 It 
seems that a broader, though still ill-defined religio-moral current, perhaps flowing out of 
natural law, contributed to early moral awareness of issues like killing.303 Since Ancient Greek 
belief in the pantheon of gods, to a greater or lesser degree, was part of a framework which 
predated Christianity’s influence on the subject of suicide, an earlier moral influence than has 
been previously considered may have some validity. However, the moral aspects of assisted 
death still seemed of lesser importance to physicians in Ancient Greece than the psychological 
state of the deceased. It was Christianity which ushered in a new viewpoint.
accepted by few, if any, specialists in ancient medical history.
301Carrick, 134-36.
302Ibid., 137. Compare Phaedo , 62c-4, “No man has the right to take his own life, but 
he must wait until God sends some necessity upon him, as he has now sent to me” with 
Aristotle’s opposition to suicide in Nicomachean Ethics V. 10.
303Guthrie, 184. Natural law discussions seem to resurface throughout history at key 
times of paradigmatic, social, or political changes. For example, see Daniel Westberg, “The 
Reformed Tradition and Natural Law,” in A Preserving Grace: Protestants, Catholics, and 
Natural Law, ed. Michael Cromartie (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 103. Westberg 
notes that there was a “rehabilitation” of natural law among Protestants in the late 1960s as a 
reaction against situational ethics. One stabilizing current of thought, apart from traditional 
monotheistic faiths like Judaism and Christianity, that influences issues like euthanasia and 
suicide during times of political or social change may be natural law. Natural law theory may be 
rooted in the human mind, nature, or in the mind of God and, as noted above (57, footnote 19), 
“natural law” and “natural rights” have a two thousand year history. See also Russell Hittinger, 
“Natural Law and Catholic Moral Theology,” in A Preserving Grace: Protestants, Catholics, 
and Natural Law, ed. Michael Cromartie (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 2. Hittinger 
believes that contemporary literature shows there is little or no agreement as to how the three 
foci (human mind, nature, or the mind of God) ought to be integrated. It is conceivable, then, 
that Edelstein’s critique of Pythagorean religious influence is too narrow, and that a 
contributing factor to early moral reflection on death matters like euthanasia, may have 
originated from within a collective pool of natural law thought.
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The Christian Era, and the Enlightenment
Early Christians opposed all suicide as being morally unacceptable.304 Augustine’s (354- 
430) and Aquinas’ (1225-1274) views provided an axis of opposition against suicide that 
influenced and shaped culture until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Augustine’s 
proscription against suicide was aimed primarily at a Christian culture that he perceived to be 
infatuated with self-martyrdom, while Aquinas’ opposition to suicide, though not as intense, 
was equally uncompromising.305 In the medieval period, most physicians were priests, and the 
practice of medicine was regulated by the Church.306 If the Christian influence and Church 
control were powerful influences over the lives of individuals, it should come as no surprise 
that their influence would affect equally the philosophy, customs, and concept of death?01
With the coming Renaissance, however, the rebirth of interest in Classical Antiquity 
took hold. A shift from the Medieval Christian prohibition of assistance with suicide may be 
found most clearly in the person and writings of Sir Thomas More (1478-1535). More favoured
304Loewy, 53. See also Humphry and Wickett, 8; and Albert R. Jonsen, “Criteria That 
Make Intentional Killing Unjustified: Morally Unjustified Acts of Killing that Have Been 
Sometimes Declared Justified,” in Intending Death: The Ethics o f Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 43. Jonsen 
writes that during the first five centuries of the Christian era, the Church Fathers almost 
unanimously repudiated killing for any reason whatsoever.
305Robert N. Wennberg, Terminal Choices: Euthanasia, Suicide, and the Right to Die 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989), 55-57, 65-66. Augustine, The 
City o f God, ed. with an introduction by Vemon J. Bourke, forward by Etienne Gilson, and 
trans. Gerald G. Walsh, Demetrius B. Zema, Grace Monahan, and Daniel J. Honan (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1958), 441. Augustine wrote that the fundamental command of 
nature is that a man should cherish life and shun death. A man should work with all his “might 
and main” to keep himself alive and to preserve the union of body and soul.
306Loewy, 53.
307Helga Kuhse, “Euthanasia,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 2d reprint edition, 1994), 294. Kuhse states that most historians of Western 
morals attribute Judaism and the rise of Christianity to the general belief that life has sanctity 
and must not be taken. To take a life is to usurp the prerogative of God to give and to take life. 
Christian writers also see the taking of innocent life as a violation of natural law.
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a society where euthanasia would be accepted.308 In his Utopia, More advocated the act of 
ending a life tortured by disease (through starvation or by being given a “soporific”) to put the 
person painlessly out of his misery. This was to be strictly voluntary.
Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) argued in a related fashion that suicide was not a 
question of Christian belief but one of personal choice.309 Such views were countered by 
philosophers like John Locke and Immanuel Kant.310 Locke opposed suicide and based his 
opposition on the grounds that man is God’s property. He also believed that a person was not to 
take the life of another person unless it was to deliver justice upon the offender.
Kant opposed suicide as well, but for a different reason than Locke’s. Kant viewed 
suicide as a paradigmatic example of an action that violated moral responsibility, a statement 
that contradicted historical discussions surrounding the idea of killing, even in his day.311 
Kant’s approach is important because it vocalised a growing moral awareness surrounding life- 
and-death issues and gave direct moral force to an individual human life. He emphasised self- 
restraint apart from institutional controls312 and believed that killing a human life was a serious
308Loewy, 53. See also Humphry and Wickett, 7-8. Loewy agrees with Humphry and 
Wickett that euthanasia has become more popular in the current climate because of the growth 
of the concept of individualism, an idea foreign during the Medieval period. The authors note 
that a reawakened interest in individualism was at the centre of More’s perspective on suicide. 
See Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Paul Turner (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 102. In an 
era before medical regulation, More’s focus was more directed toward allaying human suffering 
than advocating any particular change within medicine. It is noteworthy, however, that common 
considerations in his view were individual choice and medical mercy.
309New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 80. New York State Task Force 
cites Femgren, 159-61.
310Locke, Two Treatises, 271; see also Kant, Groundwork, 89, 96-97.
311New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 81. Compare More, for example, 
who felt that two good reasons for choosing suicide were the presence of prolonged, unbearable 
pain and the fear of a worse form of death than suicide itself.
312See also Battin, Death Dehate, 106-12. Battin recognises the difference in Kant’s 
position. The Greeks might have viewed life from the biological or intellectual perspective, but 
Kant’s view of human life as a moral life was different from the Greek view. His moral life 
view recognised the “capacity to generate and observe moral principle or law” (106).
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moral error in most circumstances. Kant’s approach was different from that of Locke’s in that 
the basis for his belief was not God’s ownership of man, but of man, himself, as a moral end.313 
While his argument did not yet include the notion that a person could direct another individual 
to kill him, it bore significant implications for a person’s choice to take his own life. Even 
though Kant was opposed to such use of one’s autonomy, his writings were used to support this 
growing idea.314
For example, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher, David Hume, argued for the 
moral permissibility of suicide based on the grounds of individual autonomy and social benefit. 
He believed a suicide could be deemed laudable if the person’s death would benefit the group 
and the individual. He did not advocate the position that all suicides were justifiable, but he did 
argue that a life plagued by suffering was an acceptable warrant for a suicide decision.315 These 
varied views about human life and death, and the interrelated questions regarding self-killing, 
emerged during the Enlightenment when a fundamental change occurred in the way people 
began to consider the notion of human potential.316 A claim that philosophers either solely or 
knowingly introduced this change would be an exaggeration, but it was curiosity, in some
313Battin, Least Worst Death, 24. Battin uses Kant’s strong autonomy argument to imply 
that even in cases where death is sought, the choice of the autonomous person ought to be 
respected. Kant’s view of man as a moral end was significant in itself, but somewhat ironic 
because his belief in SL and its protection was later utilised by, and used as an argument for, 
those who believed the choice to kill rests in the hands of the autonomous individual.
314Ibid. Contrast with Kant, Groundwork, 89. Kant would disagree with Battin’s logic. 
His principle of autonomy has been misapplied from his original intention; nevertheless, it is 
still cited as support for autonomous decisions regarding assisted suicide and euthanasia.
315New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, 80-81. See also David Hume, “On 
Suicide,” in David Hume: Selected Essays, ed. With an introduction by Stephen Copley and 
Andrew Edgar (Ne York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 323.
316Frederick Copleston, A History o f Philosophy, vol. 6, Modem Philosophy (New 
York: Doubleday, Image Books, 1994), 1-3. Copleston explains the two sides of the French 
Enlightenment: the negative, anti-Church, and anti-Christian side; and the more positive aspect 
that consisted of an attempt to understand man and the world in his “psychological, moral, and 
social life.” Copleston writes of man’s use of reason to explore his world and the growth and 
extension of the scientific outlook (3).
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cases, even scepticism, that pushed back the boundaries of human discovery in many arenas. 
Several events occurred during this period that proved to influence future thought about 
medical killing.
The first was a resurrection of the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus (at least an 
Enlightenment form of it) in the writings of the astronomer-mathematician, Pierre Gassendi 
(1592-1655). While Gassendi did not agree with the entirely materialistic worldview of 
Epicurus, he did help to re-inject the notion into the mainstream of philosophical thought. 
Indeed, in this seventeenth century, an atomistic revival of sorts, a scientific form of atomic 
theory first emerged.317 The atomistic revival was congruent with the emerging scientific 
worldview that became sceptical about that which could not be empirically proven—for 
example, the existence of and claims about Deity.318 The materialistic atomism of Democritus 
and Epicurus also served to trace an emerging humanism, based upon human reason, and no 
longer thought to be totally dependent upon the perceived external control of ecclesiastical 
dogma or institutions.319
Part of the excitement surrounding this new humanism related to individual autonomy 
and how it would relate to a wide variety of human concerns—including life and death. 
Voluntary euthanasia, as understood in the contemporary sense, was not discussed per se in the 
seventeenth century. There was, however, a noticeable similarity between the Enlightenment
317Andrew G. Van Melson, From Atomos to Atom: The History o f the Concept Atom \  
trans. Henry J. Koren, vol. 1, Duquesne Studies Philosophical Series (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1952), 81.
318Copleston, 6:3. The Enlightenment philosophers’ rejection of religion was based upon 
the belief that it was an enemy of intellectual progress and of “the unimpeded and clear use of 
reason.”
319It is overambitious to suggest that Enlightenment thinkers envisioned the results of 
their inquiries at the time, but it is important that these atomistic views were rediscovered and 
reinterpreted afresh. Democritean and Epicurean atomism had been rejected by the Ancient 
Greeks, the Church Fathers, and medieval philosophers alike, and had lain dormant for many 
centuries. See Van Melson, 91.
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view of suicide and that of Ancient Greece—that is, the notion that individual choice should be 
freed from external constraint. This did not mean that suicide, or assistance with suicide, was 
now to be considered morally permissible. That particular aspect of the debate would surface in 
the next era.
The Nineteenth Century, the Impact of Mill’s HU. and 
the Present Medical Environment
Medical euthanasia was broached as a subject in the early part of the nineteenth century 
through an oral essay presented by Carl F. H. Marx. Marx (1826) criticised physicians who 
treated diseases rather than the patient. He insisted that physicians were not expected to have 
remedies for death, but that they should seek such remedies for skilful alleviation of suffering 
and apply them when all other channels had closed.320 Many voices echoed this thinking in the 
next few decades.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, L. A. Tollemache pled strongly for the 
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia based upon a mercy claim.321 In 1889, Dr. Frank E. 
Hitchcock urged physicians not to ignore the needs of the terminally ill, especially those in 
pain, and to assist the patient in and out of his suffering. He linked the reasons for aiding the 
patient’s death not to mercy, like Tollemache, but to fairness and justice.322 Again, at the turn of 
the twentieth century, a British physician, Dr. C. E. Goodard, suggested ways to terminate 
absolutely hopeless cases of injury and disease based upon a compassion claim.323
320Humphry and Wickett, 10. See also Liezl Van Zyl, 2. Van Zyl writes that Dr. S. D. 
Williams, in 1872, was the first to use the term euthanasia, in the modem sense of the act of 
painlessly “putting to death those suffering from terminal conditions.”
321Humphry and Wickett, 11. Even though he advocated a mercy-claim justification for 
voluntary euthanasia, Tollemache recognised that a physician, even if responding to an 
agonised patient’s entreaty, would be held liable for manslaughter under the law at that time.
322Ibid.
323Ibid.
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The historical development of the concept of medical euthanasia might seem 
compelling at the level of relieving the suffering patient; however, advocates spoke no more 
authoritatively than did those physicians who opposed the practice. The growth of the 
movement to support medical euthanasia was unsteady, but perhaps not totally unexpected, 
given that active killing became a topic of suicide law reform in this time period.324 What was 
unexpected, and of sobering significance, was the introduction of a new claim that medical 
killing—for the physician—is sometimes permissible, even morally obligatory, when the twin 
principles of autonomy and mercy are present. This claim insisted that doctors should become 
causal agents in aiding death. In this period, then, the historical discussion of self-killing, or 
suicide, evolved into a different field of discussion, that of physician-caused killing.
A patient might have previously implored a physician to offer aid-in-dying, but to argue 
that his terminal illness now obliged his physician to perform that service added a perceived 
level of moral force to the plea. Some people cite Kant’s pre-political principle of legislation, 
which was based on human reason alone, to suggest that just civil arrangements were those that 
allowed for the most individual freedom.325 Since Kant postulated that human reason was the 
authority behind decision-making that helped a person to determine what was morally 
obligatory, Kant’s justice views may have served as a partial philosophical link to this new 
claim. After all, Kant believed that a person ought first to discover that which was right in order 
to determine that which was good.326 However, considering the fact that Kant was opposed 
strongly to the concept of suicide, based upon one’s obligation to duty, he did not advocate the
324Battin, Death Debate, 17. Battin suggests that a contributing element to the change in 
attitude toward suicide was acceptance of deterministic reasons for suicide—suicide as an 
involuntary symptom of illness and/or psychosocial pressures, for example.
325See Sullivan, 12. However, Kant did not agree that justice obliged one person to 
assist another with death.
326J. B. Schneewind, “Modem Moral Philosophy,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter 
Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, reprint edition, 1994), 151.
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intentional removal of a morally autonomous life from the world. Kant’s views on justice and 
autonomy, therefore, may hardly be cited as valid catalysts for this philosophical shift.
The catalyst that did provoke a change in thinking regarding suicide and euthanasia was 
the atomism and empiricism found in the writings of utilitarians like John Stuart Mill. His ideas 
were seminal to this discussion of PAS because no historical and philosophical foundations had 
been established for such a conversation until the reintroduction of atomistic ideas birthed the 
early scientific method and the growth of humanistic rationalism from the Renaissance 
forward.327 Mill’s theory, indeed, provided a distinct theoretical alternative and point of 
separation from the historical deontological moorings concerning killing. John Stuart Mill’s 
utilitarian model must not be stated as being directly supportive of doctor killing. However, 
there are those who believe inductively that Mill would have supported such a position had he 
been presented with an occasion to write about it.328
Advocates of PAS use Mill to establish a link from Enlightenment thinking on 
autonomy (the negative freedom from institutional control, for example) to a modem form of 
autonomy. The modem understanding is likely more often seen as a positive freedom with 
inherent, morally binding obligations that may be used to compel others to act on one’s behalf. 
It may be possible that Mill’s utilitarian empirical concepts advanced a view of humanism that 
evolved into the claim that autonomy and mercy oblige a physician to assist a patient with his 
or her request for suicide. Mill’s view of HU then, may be critical to the progression, helping to 
build the philosophical bridge that links the historical discussion of suicide with the current 
claims for physician-caused killing.
327Compare Femgren, 155,175-76. Femgren states that suicide (as a principle) in the 
seventeenth century was thought to be in harmony with nature and reason.
328Battin, Least Worst Death, 278,286; and McLean and Britton, 29.
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Mill’s Hedonistic-Utilitarianism and Humanism
Mill believed that the only reason why a person or entity should interfere with another’s 
personal liberty was if the exercise of that personal liberty was a threat to others.329 Every 
individual was to be given as much freedom as possible and was to be sovereign over his or her 
life. Mill defined his theory of autonomy carefully—that is, “the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection.”330 Mill believed that knowledge of right or wrong, and true or false, 
was to be gained from observation and experience.331 In addition to knowledge, Mill believed 
that principles of morality were determined not a priori, but learned inductively as well. The 
foundation for Mill’s system was one fundamental principle or law that served as the basis for 
all morality decisions.332 The use of Mill’s calculus would produce an individual who was 
autonomous, morally reasoning, who could reach a cogent decision on matters pertaining to his 
own happiness and well-being, including issues of life or death. Mill’s view of autonomy, then, 
was a powerful point in his own structure, but there was another element in his system.
Mill’s view of justice interjected a social nature to morality, whereby society has a 
moral end, and that self-governance will contribute both to individual and corporate “greater 
happiness.” In Mill’s justice, each person’s happiness is to be considered in equal degree and to 
count exactly as much as another person’s happiness.333 Mill’s reasoned utilitarian view about 
individual autonomy, rights, and justice, later spawned other derivative arguments—from
329Mill, On Liberty, 135.
330Ibid.
331Ibid., 253.
332Ibid.
333Ibid., 319.
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emancipating individuals from institutional slavery in the U.S. to homosexual rights to medical 
killing, none of which Mill directly addressed in his own day.
Advocates of PAS use Mill’s philosophical argument for autonomy and “greatest 
happiness” to claim that, since personal happiness is of supreme importance and future 
happiness might be threatened by suffering, then certain persons in specific medical situations 
may claim the right to bring that suffering life to an end. According to the argument, at this 
juncture a physician would be morally obliged to aid such a suffering individual in the desire to 
end his life because justice demands equal happiness for all and the alleviation of suffering 
would be the “greatest happiness” for that individual. Mill’s utilitarian philosophy, then, was 
one plank in the progressive bridging of ideas that linked together autonomy, rights, and 
justice,--all issues of basic human concern. Medical killing is one of the primary concerns that 
combine these three concepts.
Utilitarianism and “Medical Killing”
Utilitarianism, as a normative view of what it is right to do, holds that the moral nature 
of an action is to be judged by an examination of its consequences.334 Both the performance of 
an action and its consequences are to be considered.335 To illustrate this argument, Hare writes 
that if he were to give a patient an overdose of a drug, a strict division between act and 
consequence might lead one to say the giving of the drug was the act and that the death was the 
consequence. Hare asserts that strict consequentialism includes both under “the 
consequences.”336
334R. M. Hare, “Ethics: Utilitarianism,” in Encyclopedia o f Bioethics, vol. 1, ed. Warren 
T. Reich (London: Collier Macmillan, 1978), 424.
335Ibid.
336Hare, 424. This assessment is partly at the root of the PAS debate. Hare’s point is 
debatable. See Donagan, 37-52. Some acts are morally right or wrong regardless of the 
consequences. See also Frankena, 16.
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Other utilitarian writers and physicians agree with Hare and his assessment of killing, 
and would gauge the physician’s assistance as acting as the causal agent in the patient’s 
death.337 Although the emphasis in this debate is not primarily one of motive or intent, the 
weight of the argument is placed not on the cause, but on the result.338 The utilitarian might 
agree that, in the case of a terminally .ill patient, the most a physician could do is to try to 
alleviate patient misery.339 In assisting with a death, the physician would focus primarily not on 
how the death occurred unless, presumably, the death was agonising (eg., by torture). Instead, 
the physician would assess whether the death eased the suffering and promoted greater 
happiness. If the death raised the level of happiness, then the death was considered to be good, 
depending, of course, upon when one calculated the consequences and of what they consisted. 
While intent may not be the most primary factor, it is important in this discussion to clarify the 
utilitarian perspective.
Rachels explains that intentional killing proceeds from motive and fulfills what one is 
trying to accomplish by an action,340 as in the case of Cain intentionally killing Abel, the first 
recorded murder in history.341 However, according to utilitarianism, the possibility exists that
337See, for example, Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: 
Penguin Books, 1977; reprint edition, 1990), 71. Glover writes that killing, to a utilitarian, is 
not intrinsically wrong but is only wrong in relation to the implications the killing has for 
happiness and misery. Cf. Battin, Death Debate, 93-98. Battin develops the classical utilitarian 
perspective in relation to suicide. Cf. James Rachels, End o f Life, 156. In each of these sources 
the focus is on the end and not the means. If the death raises the aggregate happiness, then the 
means, in this case killing, was justified.
338Rachels, End o f Life, 156. Rachels outlines a utilitarian argument from mercy. He 
states that killing a “hopelessly ill” patient at his own request, who is suffering great pain, 
would decrease the amount of misery in the world. Rachel’s conclusion is that this sort of 
action is morally right. It should be noted that he does not state that it is legally right. He, of 
course, means that it is morally right from the utilitarian perspective.
339Smart and Williams, 30.
340Rachels, End o f Life, 15.
341See the Bible, Gen. 4:1-16 NIV (New International Version).
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good consequences might render killing morally right. The aim or motive in the killing is the 
key determiner.342 The utilitarian views the death of a terminally ill patient, whether by active 
means or by “letting die” as one and the same. Yet, tensions exist between utilitarian 
perspectives and actions based upon those views. While happiness as an aim does not 
correspond exactly to happiness as consequence, happiness can be both the motive and the 
result. The issue is seldom simple. The response to these tensions derives from how decisions 
are made and applies to the actions associated with “killing.” An alternative, natural law theory, 
still stands as a response to a utilitarian approach to killing. Whereas, Rachels would place the 
emphasis on motive in a utilitarian perspective on the rightness or wrongness of killing, a 
natural law approach would emphasise the rule against killing another innocent human being.343
Natural Law: a Classic Alternative to HU and Medical Killing
Natural law theory is not new, since it has been discussed since the ancient Greek 
philosophers attempted to identify the human goods that provided the foundation for the 
objective moral order.344 The idea inherent in natural law theory is that certain norms are 
common to mankind, that they are not manmade345 and, as such, the theory neither requires a 
religious belief nor a basis in deity.346 A central norm of natural law, and one that is central to
342Rachels, End o f Life, 15. Nonintentional killing would be killing as the foreseen, but 
unintended, by-product of an action that is aimed at some other good, such as trying to increase 
the general utility. Consequential approaches to medical killing are but one of several 
possibilities since there are levels and varieties of intention in this one act.
343Pellegrino, “False Promise,” 71-72.
344Alfonso Gomez-Lobo, Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction to Natural 
Law Ethics (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 126.
345Ibid.
346John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (New York: Clarendon Press, reprint 
edition, 1996), 48-49. Aristotle recognised a presumed belief in natural law such as, that true 
justice could be found among the gods, although he did not base his approach to natural law 
upon such a belief. See Aristotle, 190; and Gomez-Lobo, 128.
See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. Finnis presents an argument for natural law and
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this thesis, is the norm of forbidding the intentional killing either of an (innocent) fellow human 
being or oneself. This tenet, figuring prominently in the right-to-die debate,347 assumes that life 
is a basic good—one of the components of the most fundamental-and basic human “goods.” 
Furthermore, this norm, which can be summed up in the injunction “do not kill,” is a core 
“value”348 that corresponds “to the drive for self-preservation”and the value of life.349 That life 
is a good prefaces all other conditions or circumstances, such as chronic illness, pain, and 
suffering, that occur in a person’s life and, as such, is to be valued intrinsically—meaning that 
life is worth having for its own sake.350 Without life a person cannot experience other goods.
An ethical proscription against killing, then, may be based upon a core natural law 
value.351 For example, such a natural-law based ethical proscription against killing may be
its implications for rights, justice, responsibility, and authority in community. His approach 
provides an alternative to consequentialist theories. See also Gomez-Lobo, Morality and the 
Human Goods, who links morality to the protection of basic human goods, such as life, family, 
and community. He does so through a statement of natural law ethics, which argument presents 
a contrasting viewpoint from HU on SOL, rights, human autonomy, and responsibility. See also 
Germain Grisez, The Way o f the Lord Jesus, vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1983). Grisez has argued that life is an intrinsic good. He also argues 
that individuals, by their personal choices, contribute to their moral identities. His natural law 
approach, despite the title that may suggest otherwise, contrasts sharply with utilitarian 
reasoning that does not emphasise moral character in decision-making. This natural law 
approach has implications for end-of-life decision-making and medical killing as well, for all of 
these authors present a case for life’s value that can be applied as a nonreligious argument in 
contrast to utilitarian reasoning.
347See also Gomez-Lobo, 60-61.
348Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 86. Finnis uses several terms for value 
synonymously: “good,” “basic good,” and “well-being.” He does not use them, however, in the 
sense of “moral” good.
349Ibid. See also Gomez-Lobo, 10. Life is a basic good and, while it is not the only good, 
it is necessary for the “partaking” of other goods.
/
350Gomez-Lobo, 12.
351There is a counter view that natural law might allow, at times, that the instinctive 
drive for self-preservation may be overridden by a wish to preserve one’s dignity and 
autonomy. Telfer states that “Human beings also have by nature the capacity to use reason to 
consider their own greatest welfare and ask whether instinct is serving them well, and the 
decision that existence is no longer worth having is one which exercises just those faculties
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grounded on the principles of practical reason, meaning “the principles which are known 
through themselves to all.”352 The first principle of practical reason rests upon the premise that 
“what is good ought to be pursued, [and] what is bad avoided,” and upon the claim that the 
principle is a self-evident a priori proposition.353 This first principle makes a claim, about how 
a person should act. If something is good, then it is rational to pursue it, and if something is 
bad, then it is rational to avoid it.354
which are traditionally thought to be peculiarly human. We might also say that it is particularly 
characteristic of human nature to wish to preserve its own dignity and autonomy. I would 
therefore argue that the formula of Natural Law need not be seen as ruling out either suicide or 
voluntary euthanasia.” See http://www.euthanasia.cc/telfer.html. Of course, a natural law 
counter-claim would assert that this approach is counterintuitive to the first principle that what 
is good (hence, life) ought to be pursued. Gomez-Lobo argues that Telfer’s view is 
misconceived. Life, as such, is not “bad” in itself, but things like chronic illness and pain that 
happen to people, are bad. Furthermore, Telfer’s argument fails to account for a person’s self- 
sacrifice or martyrdom. Gomez-Lobo, 10-13.
352Gomez-Lobo, 126. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2. See 
also Aristotle, 190. When referring to those who held to the immutability of natural law, 
Aristotle described such belief with the analogous phrase that “fire bums both here and in 
Persia.” While he believed in the existence of natural law, but held as dubious the belief in the 
immutability of such law, his analogy underscores his assumption that some principles are 
“known through themselves to all.”
353Gomez-Lobo, 127. Gomez-Lobo provides a detailed account of the first principle of 
practical reason in chapter one (pp. 1-5). He uses the term “practical reason” in its 
philosophical sense meaning the capacity to use one’s rational powers to guide him or her in 
what he or she does. Such a principle of practical rationality provides a guide for what one 
ought to do. Good action is that which is valued by a person or that which is worthwhile, and 
bad action is that which is not valued or is not worthwhile. As such, the terms “good” and 
“bad” are nonmoral. A person, for example, might be exhorted to earn good grades or to avoid 
purchasing a bad car, which is an appeal to a general principle of practical rationality. Mill, 
Utilitarianism, 1987), 11-12. Mill believed the GHP to be the one fundamental law at the root 
of all morality, or if there were several laws, the GHP would be the law to which one would 
turn whenever there was a conflict between other varying principles. The thesis calls into 
question such a claim as well as the usefulness of HU as a comprehensive theoiy for end-of-life 
ethical decision-making, especially as it relates to medical killing.
354Ibid., 4. In applying this notion of “rational” pursuance and “rational” avoidance, the 
claim could be made that the taking of one’s life would be considered “bad” (to be avoided), 
based upon the natural law belief that life is a basic good and is to be valued. Yet, there are 
those who sometimes view the taking of life as a good, some of whom are VAE and PAS 
advocates (ibid., 11). Battin has claimed that sometimes suicide, in the case of illness and 
suffering, for example, can be a rational act. See Margaret Pabst Battin, The Death Debate: 
Ethical Issues in Suicide (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 115-16. Opponents of
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While natural law theory provides a nascent perspective on basic values, such as the 
value of life, it does require an intermediate step in the application of such a principle to 
specific moral situations. Of significant importance, then, is the determination of how a person 
moves from a first principle (for example, life and its preservation) to practical guidance in 
moral living (for example, acting in order to enhance life and its preservation). There have been 
any number of moral approaches that sought to assist with such a move from moral principles 
to moral precepts—processes established upon such judgments as human “goods” to the right 
thing a person should do.355
Natural law theorists put forward “practical reason” as their intermediate principle. 
Practical reason is the use of one’s rational powers to guide one in what to do. Such a 
conceptualisation is not new. Aristotle presented the idea of phronesis, practical wisdom, as the
“rational” suicide would offer a counter-claim, based upon the first principle of practical 
reason—that suicide is not a rational act. See Gomez-Lobo, 4-5.
355John Finnis, Fundamentals o f Ethics (Washington D. C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 1983). Finnis offers examples of such attempts to provide “intermediate principles.” 
Several approaches include Kantian ethics, existentialist ethics, and utilitarian ethics. Aquinas 
assumed a theological ethic based upon divine revelation, which is outside the direct scope of 
this thesis. The thesis writer, while not adhering to a nonreligious natural law approach, 
recognises it as a plausible alternative to a utilitarian model. See also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Ethics (New York: Touchstone Book, 1995), 85-89. Bonhoeffer’s “system” (method) of ethics, 
while counter to Mill’s inductive approach, is an incarnational model that rests solidly within 
the boundaries of an intrinsic moral ethic. Therefore, an intermediate religious principle based 
upon Bonhoeffer’s model of “ethics as formation” is equally as credible.
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intermediate step.356 Kant supplied as his guiding principle a categorical imperative,357
Mill’s intermediate principle is the Greatest Happiness Principle. Mill, of course, would agree 
that there are first principles, but he would go one step beyond to posit his intermediate step in 
the process; namely, that such principles are subservient to the GHP.358 He would deny, 
however, that one could know intuitively359 what is right and wrong in a particular case.360 He 
states that the GHP should be the basic law or principle at the root of all morality and goes so 
far as to state that it is indispensable.361 Mill, according to this belief, would allow for a general 
first principle that life is a basic good, but he would subject all claims as to how one should or 
ought to apply this basic life principle, for example, in the case of PAS, to the GHP. While Mill 
could agree that life is a basic good, like natural law theorists, he rejected out of hand an ethic 
based upon nature or natural law.362
356See also Aristotle, 209-10. Phronesis (prudence) is that virtue that enables a person to 
reason between what is good and what is bad for him or her. See also Edmund D. Pellegrino 
and David C. Thomasma, The Virtues In Medical Practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 84. The authors state that Aristotle used the term phronesis to mean the virtue of 
practical wisdom, or a capacity for moral insight and the capacity “to discern what moral choice 
or course of action is most conducive to the good of the agent or activity in which the agent is 
engaged.” Pellegrino and Thomasma write that Aristotelian phronesis is the link between the 
intellectual virtues which enable a person to attain intellectual truth and those virtues that 
dispose to good character. One can infer, then, that good action would follow. Such a 
perspective holds implications for beneficent medicine and an ethic of care.
357Immanuel Kant, Groundwork o f the Metaphysic ofMorals, trans. and analysed H. J. 
Paton (New York: Harper & Rowe, Publishers, 1964), 80-88. See also John Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights, 88-89; and Aristotle, 209-10.
358Mill, Utilitarianism, 11-12.
359This is contrary to Aquinas’s belief that man could apprehend such principles.
360Mill, Utilitarianism, 11. Mill would allow for a moral faculty that supplies a person 
with the general principles of moral judgments, which is the point with natural law, but Mill 
believed the GHP served as the one fundamental principle or law at the root of all morality. See 
thesis, chapter 1,10, for an exposition of Mill’s HU. Of course, this does not make his belief, 
or theory, necessarily the case. The thesis writer takes exception to Mill’s assumption.
361Miii, Utilitarianism, 12.
362West, 37-38.
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When Mill believed that man was bound to follow nature (the entire system of things) 
with all of his actions being “done through” and in “obedience to nature’s physical or mental 
laws,” he also believed that man should intervene and not leave things as they are.363 Nature did 
not instill the ideas of right and duty. According to Mill, man inculcated them.364 As a result, 
Mill’s belief that man was bound to follow nature was mildly deterministic. He contradicted 
himself, by adopting this belief, when he stated that man should devote his energies to 
improving the spontaneous course of nature.365 Furthermore, he believed that “killing,” “the 
most criminal act recognized by human laws,” was committed once to every being that lives by 
Nature—and in many cases “after protracted tortures.”366 Mill believed that this reduced to 
absurdity the claim that a person should model his or her behaviour on the course of Nature.
Mill seemed unable to find any other cause but Nature for the evil that befell man. In 
such a belief, he demonstrated, once again, that he believed morals should be grounded 
inductively upon the GHP as governing first principle rather than being grounded intuitively 
upon Nature’s laws. Mill’s presentation was of a mechanical, rather meaningless view of nature 
and man’s attachment to it.367
363John Stuart Mill, “Nature,” in Three Essays on Religion (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., 1874), 64.
364West, 39. West quotes Mill’s 1849 letter to William Ward George.
365Ibid., 38.
366Mill, “Nature,” 31; see also West, 38.
367Mill missed the point of Natural Law theory, however, especially when he laid the 
blame for man’s suffering (tortures) at the feet of Nature. There have been centuries-long 
debates about the origin and existence of evil and man’s relationship to it, yet one need not 
necessarily reject a natural law approach solely upon the reality of the existence of evil. Natural 
law theory, as was stated earlier, can also be based upon the nature law value that life is a basic 
good and, therefore, is to be protected without having to rely upon nature itself or human 
nature. Therefore, to adopt practical reason as an intermediate step to moral action is also a 
viable position.
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Whatever intermediate step a person applies to moral action, the key for the idea of 
practical reason (wisdom) is that a person should act in such a way that he or she enhances, or 
at least does nothing to diminish, the basic goods—one of which is human life.368 Medicine, 
since the Hippocratic era, has embraced life as a good and has sought to protect it; hence, a 
proscription against medical killing. Natural law, then, emphasizes the sanctity of human life 
for the most basic of all reasons, and adds its historical weight on the side that would oppose 
the legalisation of PAS. Furthermore, it is questionable whether or not legalised PAS actually 
preserves this most basic human good.
Utilitarianism in Current Perspective
Rather than promote greater “happiness,” the legalisation of VAE and PAS in the 
Netherlands and PAS in Oregon has resulted in practices that could contribute to greater 
suffering for patients, their families, their doctors, and the legal and medical professions. 
Hendin notes the common practice of doctors who violate guidelines and cause non-consensual 
patient deaths. Eighteen percent of PAS cases in the Netherlands resulted in serious 
complications and doctors were required to intervene with lethal injections.369 In fact, evidence 
indicates that a number of patients experience VAE or PAS complications under the Dutch
368A counter argument to the PAS belief that beneficent medicine sometimes kills is the 
approach formulated and applied to medicine by Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues In Medical 
Practice, 84-91. The authors believe that “medicine, or more properly healing, is a practical 
enterprise requiring a fusion of technical competence and moral judgment” (ibid., 86). 
Phronesis (prudence) fulfills the role of providing the physician with good clinical judgment. 
See also Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 98. Pellegrino argues that physicians are to help 
patients toward “wholeness” and medicine is a “healing” relationship, even when a cure is not 
possible. Therefore, it may be concluded, good medical judgment (phronesis) leads a physician 
not to kill, or not to aid in the killing of, his or her patient (ibid., 95). See thesis, 289-93 for the 
alternative development of a medical ethic of care.
369Foley and Hendin, “Oregon Experiment,” 166.
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experience which actually increases the potential for added suffering on the part of patients and 
their families.370
Concurrent with these cases of complications and guideline violations, and a potential 
medical concern in the United States as well, is the fact that when serious PAS complications 
arise, or when PAS fails to accomplish its intended outcome at all, the event is often unknown 
or underreported.371 In Oregon, for example, when a patient makes a request for assisted 
suicide, medical law requires that a physician must inform the patient that palliative care and 
hospice care are feasible options.372 However, physicians are not required to be knowledgeable 
concerning ways to relieve “either physical or emotional suffering in patients.373 While physical 
and emotional suffering and clinical depression are likely to occur during a terminal illness, the 
likelihood of complications with lethal dosages is also high.374 Furthermore, the Oregon Health 
Department has placed emphasis on doctor-patient confidentiality, but has not directed an equal
370Herbert Hendin, “The Dutch Experience,” in The Case against Assisted Suicide, ed. 
Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 97- 
121. See also Foley and Hendin, “Oregon Experiment,” 144-74.
371Gregory Hamilton, “Oregon’s Culture of Silence,” in The Case Against Assisted 
Suicide, ed. Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002), 175-91. Hamilton writes of “possible added suffering” that PAS and VAE were 
expected to alleviate due to the occurrence of serious complications with PAS, or the failure of 
PAS to work at all.
372See also Foley and Hendin, “Oregon Experiment,” 145.
373Ibid. Most cases of suicide, and most of those who respond to terminal illness with a 
desire to hasten death, are suffering from depression (150). Depression, far and away, is the 
most important factor in a patient’s desire for death; ironically, however, the Oregon PAS law 
does not require either the presence or absence of the diagnosis of depression for cases of 
assisted suicide.
374See also ibid., 166-67. Foley and Hendin state that Dutch studies have revealed that 
the normal 9-gram barbiturate dose (considered to be lethal) is not always enough to kill the 
patient, with some living more than three hours after ingestion (ibid., 166). In some cases, 
families intervened and used pillows or plastic bags to kill the patient.
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amount of attention to monitoring compliance with, or abuse of, the law.375Details surrounding 
the practice of PAS in Oregon, then, have raised questions regarding the resulting greater 
happiness or greater suffering of patients and their families, the practice of PAS itself, and the 
now-noted significant risk of medical complications, the emotional and physical stressors 
which affect doctors, patients, and families, and the legal aspects of monitoring the practice of 
PAS to prevent abuse and violations on the part of physicians and medical personnel.376 The 
Oregon health Department’s focus on possible negative utility related to PAS overlooks other 
significant moral concerns.
Placing the focus on correct medical methodological safeguards and legal procedures 
for VAE and PAS, whether in The Netherlands or in Oregon, while vitally important, are but 
two facets in a larger and more complex matrix of end-of-life treatments for terminally ill 
patients. There are also moral concerns that arise in such circumstances—concerns like 
beneficence and non-maleficence, truth-telling and trust, and maintaining an overall healing 
ethos of medicine. The potential hazards that legalised PAS pose to these key components of 
the historical practice of medical healing offset the potential “happiness” increases in the areas 
of medical and legal safeguards that have typically surrounded the arguments for legalisation of 
PAS.
A final trend to note in this section is one that has transpired in The Netherlands, where 
the practice of VAE/PAS has moved from legalised VAE/PAS to non-voluntary euthanasia and 
involuntary euthanasia.377 The Dutch experience, and the almost immediate post-Oregon legal
375See also ibid., 160-61. The authors raise concerns about the “anonymity and secrecy” 
surrounding “physician practice of assisted suicide” in Oregon. They believe that such practice 
is contrary to standards of medicine, “which depend upon openness about facts, research data, 
and records to assess the appropriateness of treatment.”
376Hamilton, 175-91.
377See John Keown, “Euthanasia in The Netherlands,” 261-96. Keown cites the 
Remmelink Report as evidence VAE/PAS has already been bridged, and physicians are 
practising nonvoluntary and involuntary forms of euthanasia. See also Kamisar, “Physician-
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challenges in the United States to allow PAS for the disabled, based upon a due process legal 
argument, are well-noted.378 Such practices raise questions concerning a slippery slope into 
greater killing, the subject of which is discussed in chapter four of this thesis, and simply adds 
greater challenges to the claims of PAS advocates that PAS brings greater happiness than 
suffering.379
Current Medical Ethics: “Killing” Applied Generally and Legally 
Beauchamp and Childress define killing, from a medical perspective, as originating 
from a family of ideas that possess the central condition of direct causation of another’s 
death;380 namely, a circumstance in which one person intentionally causes the death of another 
human being.381 The BMA, in comparison, does not specifically define the term killing, but 
defines medical killing in a discussion about cessation of treatment and euthanasia as
Assisted Suicide,” 225-60, esp. 244-45. Kamisar believes that once PAS is legalized, little 
would stand in the way of the legalisation of VAE. See also Gormally, ed., Euthanasia Clinical 
Practice and the Law, 201-18. Gormally offers evidence, that once VAE is legalised, no barrier 
will exist to the practice of nonvoluntary euthanasia. He cites legal and ethical evidence of a 
slippery slope from active euthanasia to nonvoluntaiy euthanasia.
378Andrew I. Batavia, “Disability and Physician-Assisted Dying,” in Physician-Assisted 
Dying: The Case for Palliative Care and Patient Choice, ed. Timothy E. Quill and Margaret P. 
Battin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 55-74. Batavia submitted a 
requested amicus brief along with Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg. See also 
Hamilton, 183. Hamilton writes of an official opinion issued by Oregon’s deputy attorney 
general that once assisted suicide is accepted, lethal injection may need to be provided because 
of the inability of some disabled persons to swallow. Such an opinion was seen as indication of 
a strategy to introduce lethal injection or “infusion and other more efficient forms of 
medicalized killing once the failure of oral overdoses is recognized.”
379See thesis, chapter 4, 312-17.
380Beauchamp and Childress, 220.
381Ibid. It must be stated that Beauchamp and Childress assign the same definition to 
“letting die.” Their reasoning is that neither “killing” nor “letting die” occur by “accident, 
chance, mishap, and the like.” The difficulty with this reasoning is that not all of the above 
qualifiers reflect motive on the part of the physician or assistant.
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“deliberately” cutting the “thread of life.”382 Key ideas of intentionality and motives are 
contained in both Beauchamp and Childress and in the BMA definition,383 demonstrating that a 
consensus that killing is the intentional causation of another’s death still resides deeply within 
the medical-ethical psyche. Defining these terms is both complex and labour-intensive, for the 
term “killing” in medical circles has both general and legal applications.
The definitions of medical killing are similar in several ways. The obvious point of 
agreement is that in all discussions and definitions, one person takes the life of another. A 
simplistic reading might attribute a single, clear motive or intention to every death. Instead, 
however, the issues are neither lucid nor simple. Within the utilitarian approach, for example, 
an important feature that calls for additional examination is the question of possible implied 
obligation. In some instances, the strict application of this approach to killing carries the idea of 
obligation when one person might be obliged to kill another person either for the positive 
maximation of happiness for the many or, in the case of negative utility, when that death would 
reduce the level of unhappiness for the many.384
Current UK (the Suicide Act of 1961) and US laws forbid physicians to aid or 
participate in patients’ suicides.385 Whether violating the laws would constitute murder, as in 
the case of active euthanasia, or in the aiding and abetting of a suicide, as in PAS, would
382British Medical Association, Medical Ethics Today, 150.
383Ibid., 149-50.
384Battin, Ethical Issues in Suicide, 98; see also Glover, 71-73.
385“No U.S. state now consider suicide a crime. Helping someone complete suicide, 
however, is criminally punishable in several states.” Encarta Suicide, “Suicide Facts: Encarta 
Explanation”; internet, available at http://www.alb2c3.com/suilodge/facencl.htm; accessed 19 
May 2004.
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depend upon the particular circumstances of the death,386 but it is currently unlawful 
deliberately to end a patient’s life, even if the patient rationally requests such action.387
This law was applied to a recent year 2000 case in the UK involving a woman, Mrs. 
Diane Pretty who, having been diagnosed with motor-neurone disease, desired her husband to 
be granted immunity from prosecution for helping her to die with physician-assistance. Her 
lawyers challenged the standing law, arguing that the physician should be able to assist the 
husband with her desire to die.388 The authors claimed that “if death is in a patient’s best 
interest then death constitutes a moral good.”389
In the United States, the debate over medical killing elicits high emotion on both sides 
of the issue. It remains unlawful both to aid directly the suicide of an individual through 
euthanasia, and, in all states except Oregon, to assist with a patient’s suicide.390 The United 
States Supreme Court ruled recently on two aspects of similar assisted suicide cases that set 
clear legal boundaries around medical killing. In both Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) and 
Vacco v. Quill (1997), the Supreme Court unanimously reversed two lower court decisions and 
upheld the constitutionality of state laws that forbid assisted suicide and, by direct association, 
PAS.391
386British Medical Association, Euthanasia, 63. As o f2004, a new UK committee is 
reviewing suicide and assisted suicide.
387Ibid. See also Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 155.
388Len Doyal and Lesley Doyal, “Why Active Euthanasia and Physician Assisted 
Suicide Should Be Legalised,” British Medical Journal 323, no. 10 (November 2001): 1079-80.
389Ibid., 1079. The authors believe that acts of omission and commission are not as 
important to the “killing” event as the “justifiability. . .  of the clinical outcome.” This 
consequentialist argument states that the cause of the patient’s death is not as important as that 
the patient dies well. The authors advocate legal changes that would relax restrictions 
concerning PAS within the DPR.
390Compare the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (1997).
391See Loretta M. Kopelman and Kenneth A. DeVille, eds., Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
What Are The Issues? Philosophy and Medicine, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt, no. 67 (Dordrecht:
185
The court was challenged to rule on a liberty interest in Washington v. Glucksberg. 
Washington’s law against assisted suicide was challenged on the claim that it placed an undue 
burden on the terminally ill. The argument, based upon the similar argument that says women 
have a right to abortion, was that terminally ill patients have the accompanying right to access 
medical assistance. The Supreme Court, however, voted 9-0 to reject the argument citing over 
seven hundred years of Anglo-American common-law prohibition of assisted suicide, including 
current criminal law.392 The Court did not see the right to refuse lifesaving treatment as parallel, 
or even similar, to the abortion precedent which granted access to medical treatment. In short, 
the Court ruled that assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.393
Having found that there was no personal liberty right to assisted suicide, the Court then 
turned its attention to the other case from New York, Vacco v. Quill. Unlike Washington v. 
Glucksberg, this challenge to a New York law prohibiting assistance with suicide was argued as 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.
This clause requires that state action must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases in 
different ways. If states do not comply with this Equal Protection Clause, their decisions are 
then subject to judicial ruling.
The case was based on Quill’s claim that, since individuals could refuse unwanted 
treatments that would result in their deaths, such refusals were indistinguishable from assisted 
suicide. In this case a patient’s refusal of unwanted treatment was deemed parallel, or “like,” a 
patient’s right to receive physician assistance with his own death. The lower court had ruled 
against Quill on the basis that there is a difference between “allowing nature to take its course”
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 2.
392Ibid., 5.
393Ibid.
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and “intentionally using an artificial death-producing device:”394 The Supreme Court ruled in a 
9-0 vote that New York’s law prohibiting assisted suicide neither infringed upon a fundamental 
right nor discriminated against a single group.395
Chief Justice Rehnquist then responded to the lower court’s contention that refusing 
life-sustaining medical treatment “is nothing more or less than assisted suicide.” His answer 
upheld the majority opinion that “the distinction is widely recognised in both medical and legal 
traditions, and thus supported a sufficiently rational distinction upon which a state legislature 
can distinguish one action from another.”396 A significant issue that emerged from both of the 
cases, Vacco v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg, concerned to what degree individual 
liberty, or autonomy, obliges others to comply with a person’s PH aims. The ever-changing 
influence of autonomy bears implications for many areas including the DPR and medical 
killing.
Autonomy, the Courts, and the Doctor-Patient Relationship
As this section has shown, discussions about medical killing have emerged in the last 
generation along with patient autonomy claims.397 Defining legal moments in this progressive 
discussion further stretched the established boundaries with new cases,398 as the concept of 
patient control—whether autonomous or assumed-advanced within the healthcare context. For 
example, Timothy Quill responded to his patient “Diane’s” autonomous pleas to end her 
psychological pain and suffering when he assisted her with suicide, and in the Quinlan and
394Ibid., 7.
395Ibid., 8.
396Ibid.
397Ramsey, Patient as Person; and see Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” New
78-80.
398Certain cases and names have become household names: Karen Anne Quinlan, Nancy 
Cruzan, and Anthony Bland. In the 1990s, it was “Diane,” Timothy Quill’s patient, and in 
2000, Diane Pretty has become a focal point of the discussion.
187
Cruzan cases involving artificial hydration, certain privacy rights were assumed even if the 
patients could not state them.399
These much-publicised court cases and their accompanying arguments have elevated 
medical killing discussions to the arena of national, even global, concern. In a number of 
critical cases the courts consistently denied any constitutional or legal precedent that establishes 
a patient’s claim to receive medical assistance with suicide. At the same time, a patient’s 
personal autonomy and privacy in making decisions about his or her life have been not only the 
subject of intense consideration but, in some cases, protected. The rights of patients, and 
decisions regarding end-of-life issues, have continued to be critically important to the ongoing 
dialogue.
The legal response to autonomy regarding “medical killing” has been upheld within the 
DPR, particularly as it relates to PAS. This discussion, having evolved through the years, has 
now, in fact, resulted in the articulation of legal decision and law in some areas, such as in the 
state of Oregon.400 In cases where PAS has been practised, the general guidelines as laid out by 
physicians include the patient’s voluntary, competent, repeated request, a physician’s aid in 
deliberation, secondary and even tertiary medical assistance with the decision, the presence of 
suffering which has been determined to be unbearable by the patient, and the use of a means of 
death that is as painless and comfortable as possible.401
399Beauchamp and Childress, 172.
400See the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (1997).
401Beauchamp and Childress, 240. Cf. Howard Brody, “Assisted Death—A 
Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure,” New England Journal o f  Medicine 327, no. 19 
(November 1992): 1385-86. Brody’s desire is to use medical interventions to result in death as 
long as the patient has been able to live a “natural lifespan.” He states that this lifespan is 
measured ideally in biographical terms rather than by chronological age. He believes that a 
decision to assist a patient in death should be made on a case-by-case basis (1386) and that the 
patient’s decision is of critical importance (1386). Timothy E. Quill, Christine K. Cassell,
Diane F. Meier, “Sounding Board—Care of the Hopelessly 111: Proposed Clinical Criteria for 
Physician-Assisted Suicide,” New England Journal o f Medicine 327, no. 19 (November 1992): 
1381-82.
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The debate in favour of medical killing, then, contains sincere expressions to advance 
the causes of medicine in a thoughtful, caring manner402 as well as the intention to regulate the 
practice of assisted suicide in order to mitigate the risks of unregulated PAS.403 In all of these 
ways, proposed clinical guidelines consider the interrelated impact PAS will make on a patient, 
her family, and the doctor, as well as the consequences for future patients and the practice of 
medicine at large.404
However, the abovementioned clinical guidelines established to ensure adequate PAS 
safeguards beg a critical philosophical question concerning end-of-life patient care and medical 
killing. Some who support PAS assume that the clinical care taken to provide adequate medical 
safeguards for medical killing at the end of life somehow resolves the questions that remain 
concerning patient rights, justice, and medical killing. Some believe also that proper care taken 
to ensure good consequences answers all lingering questions about rights, justice, and medical 
killing.
Summary
The discussion concerning rights, justice, and medical killing, however, continues to 
require balanced evaluations of a complex matrix of philosophies; medical, ethical, and legal 
issues; HU; and PAS, along with the recitations of historical data and reviews of clinical 
boundaries and procedures. A growing corpus of literature also addresses the morality of 
assisted suicide in which both supporters and opponents register opinions concerning the 
consequences of PAS, from patients’, physicians’, and the medical community’s perspectives.
402Beauchamp and Childress, 238. Beauchamp and Childress decry the lack of 
professionalism by Jack Kevorkian, but recognise the compassion of Timothy Quill. Cf. Brody, 
1386. Brody writes specifically of Quill’s compassionate response to what he terms a medical 
failure and exemplifies the literature that supports PAS, which often states the importance of 
showing ample compassion for patients and family who are making life-ending decisions.
403Fins and Bacchetta, 565.
404Ibid.
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Some of these writers, arguing from a framework of HU in which they seek the GHP,405 use 
consequential reasoning to approach the DPR and arrive at propositions which may not be 
sustained either historically or philosophically. For example, notwithstanding their fairly 
primitive medical technological level, the Greeks’ view of death did not focus so much upon 
extending natural life as much as to assist the forces of nature . .  in finding a natural 
resolution of patient discomfort and disease.”406 Thus, it would be historically inaccurate to 
postulate that doctors were “actively” (intentionally) involved in “assisting” patients with their 
deaths. Current philosophical speculation about acts and omissions and consequences was not a 
consideration in a medical environment that viewed death not as an enemy, but as a natural part 
of life. Philosophical justification of current medical killing, based upon Ancient Greek 
medical attitudes and practice, runs the risk of begging the question because, at that time, the 
focus at the time of death was not centred on acts and omissions and consequences.
Again, in the medieval period, the DPR was not a concern at the moment of life and 
death because the person most likely to be at the dying patient’s bedside was a priest, and the 
patient’s soul and eternal destination was of primary import rather than the extension of life. To 
say that a physician would intentionally aid a patient’s death, for example, would be historically 
unsupported in this case because the prevailing view was that God was the only one who had 
the ultimate right to give and take a life. During the Renaissance, a slight change occurred in 
concepts about death with an emergence of views that supported suicide which might include 
medical assistance. To suggest that history would support medical killing would again be a 
misreading of the historical record because the focus was on an emerging individualism rather 
than any particular change in medical canons about killing.
405Ibid., 563-68. For example, consequential reasoning suggests that the doctor’s action
in the patient’s death will lessen the collective pain and suffering of the patient, and thus, 
contribute to the PH of both the patient and the broader community.
406Carrick, 166.
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As medical history progressed through the Enlightenment and into the modem period, 
however, and medical technology made it possible to extend human life-sometimes well 
beyond its normal limits-logical, rational philosophies were evolving concurrently. Utilitarian 
thinking was one view that some people thought could answer the medical life-and-death 
dilemmas created by medical advances. Utilitarianism supplied a framework that answered the 
consequentialist view of moral decision-making; as long as the “good” end was based upon the 
GHP. Such a consequentialist view has failed to silence all of the moral questions about 
individual human life, about rights, and about justice in the current medical-legal climate.
Thus far, the examination of rights, justice, and medical killing through the lense of HU 
has revealed several areas of concern. The first area of concern relates to the PAS view that 
there is a liberty right (right to noninterference) to suicide that is akin to Mill’s harm principle. 
Mill’s conception of individual rights was grounded in his hedonistic view that an individual 
had a moral right to shape and absolute sovereignty over living his life according to his own PH 
preferences. On this, PAS advocates base a claim that a patient has a right to suicide. This 
claim to a right to suicide is unfounded, however, because it is based on an incomplete view of 
Mill and individual rights. Mill did not believe rights were inviolable. In fact, Mill believed that 
an individual’s right could be overridden in order to maximise utility. On this basis, it is 
conceivable that there are utilitarian calculations that would require an individual to yield his 
claim to a right to suicide.
Further, Mill’s view of justice has been cited as a support for right-to-die claims. Such 
claims are predicated upon an understanding of Mill that overlooks a central criticism of his 
views on justice. The view that each person is to be counted equally with another is not the 
entire case with Mill. While he did cite such a claim, he also believed there were instances
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when such a claim could be overridden by the greater claim of the GHP. It is conceivable that a 
justice claim by a larger group using a utilitarian calculus could render null a similar justice 
claim by an individual or a smaller group.
The examination of medical killing through the lense of HU produced similar questions 
about its usefulness. It was not clearly demonstrated that an HU calculus for assessing end-of- 
life decisions regarding medical killing is adequate to require changes in medical canons related 
to killing. Advocates of PAS use Mill’s philosophical arguments for rights, justice, autonomy, 
and greatest happiness to claim a right to bring patient suffering to an end. The questions that 
surround the use of Mill to buttress claims for PAS cast doubt on the overall effectiveness of 
Mill’s arguments in supporting a claim for medical killing.
Chapter 2’s discussions have demonstrated that autonomy underlies each of the features 
discussed to this point. Mill’s HU emphasises heavily the autonomy feature. PAS advocates 
also assign a powerful moral emphasis to autonomy, a force they claim obliges a physician to 
facilitate their requests in the DPR; and that sometimes includes assistance with suicide. This 
raises questions concerning the validity of assigning such force to the concept of autonomy. An 
examination of autonomy in the DPR also requires a careful inspection of the correlative notion 
of physician paternalism.
These two viewpoints (patient autonomy and physician paternalism) represent 
philosophical perspectives that have clashed at times, particularly in the case of the DPR. The 
concept of individual autonomy, then, with its concomitant nature and meanings, still lies at the 
centre of any discussion related to the subject of medical killing. This chapter’s exploration of 
the claim that a physician is sometimes morally obliged to kill based upon twin claims of 
autonomy and mercy has proven to have insufficient historical, philosophical, or legal support 
unless, as autonomy advocates claim, a person assigns moral force to individual autonomy. The
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third chapter, then, will examine the historical development of the remaining three key PAS 
features through the lense of HU: autonomy, physician paternalism, and SL.
CHAPTER 3
AUTONOMY, THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP, AND THE 
“SANCTITY OF LIFE” IN RELATION TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED 
SUICIDE AND HEDONISTIC-UTILITARIANISM
Introduction
Respect for autonomy is one of a core of medical values which, together with a loose 
confederation of other principles, is often identified by the rubric, “common morality.”1 As a 
principle of medical ethics, the concept of individual autonomy, with its varied historical 
application, has received intense scrutiny. Although little sustained agreement exists about the 
nature or claims of patient autonomy, the respect for autonomous choice is a foundational 
theme that runs deeply within common morality discussions.2 It is not a simple matter to 
examine autonomy because the concept has undergone much change through the centuries. The 
discussion is important, however, because of the emphasis placed on the term in the current 
PAS and DPR dialogues and the ensuing claims derived from the notion.
Current PAS claims related to autonomy, rights, and justice, as demonstrated in chapter 
2, draw support from John Stuart Mill’s HU foundation. HU attempts to strengthen individual 
autonomy, rights, and justice by emphasising noninterference with an individual’s PH 
preferences and providing a measure of self-governance. The chapter discussion raised, 
however, some significant questions about HU rights-and-justice claims that are used to 
buttress an autonomy argument for PAS. Even so, the chapter indicated that autonomy
!Cook, Patients’ Choice, 224-29. Cf. Beauchamp and Childress, 100-102,120. The 
authors define common morality as being pluralistic, meaning two or more nonabsolute tenets 
form the general level of normative statement. Common morality theories rely heavily upon 
ordinary shared moral beliefs for their content. Cf. Henry Sidgwick’s “morality of common 
sense.” Sidgwick, 337-61.
2Beauchamp and Childress, 120. The authors devote four chapters (3-6) to the 
discussion of four principles of common morality: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
and justice.
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continues to provide an important foundational plank in the PAS philosophical platform and, 
thus, opened the way for a deeper examination of autonomy in this chapter.
PAS advocates cite Mill’s autonomy views as support for claims against medical and 
physician paternalism. After all, Mill sought to establish clear boundaries around the individual 
in order to safeguard a person from outside interference. Further, both patients and physicians, 
through the vantage point of their own perspectives (patient autonomy and physician 
paternalism), at times approach the DPR with differing views about life and its sanctity. This 
difference of viewpoint alone can breed tension, but the added element of an end-of-life 
terminal illness can elevate the tension and become a cause for misunderstanding and 
disagreement, if not conflict. Autonomy, physician paternalism, and SL, as such, are three 
interrelated concepts that provide fertile ground for exploring end-of-life PAS claims. This 
chapter will examine these three related PAS features—autonomy, physician paternalism, and 
SL—and evaluate them, when applicable, in light of Mill’s HU theory.
Autonomy. Hedonistic-Utilitarianism. and Physician-Assisted Suicide
A claim of this chapter is that the DPR is currently being influenced by a new, and 
perhaps over-accentuated, emphasis on patient autonomy causing, in turn, critical changes in 
the way the notions of physician paternalism and “SL” are being viewed by medical decision­
makers. This emphasis on autonomy draws some of its support from key concepts within HU. 
Additionally, there is a long history of the concept of human autonomy, and much literature 
that details its growth and evolution through the centuries.3 This historical framework, which 
illuminates the changes in the established concept of the term, as well as the influence from 
HU, provide a rich foundation from which to examine the term’s usage.
3Schneewind, Invention o f Autonomy, 4. Schneewind writes of a seventeenth-century 
change in the established conceptions of morality as obedience that occurred as a result of 
emerging conceptions of morality as self-governance.
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The evolution of the notion of “autonomy,” together with the intermittently related 
concept of physician paternalism, will be examined in several of the critical historical contexts 
where the concepts were discussed. These contexts include origins in ancient Greece, further 
development in the fourteenth-fifteenth-century Renaissance, and again in the sixteenth- 
century Reformation. The word autonomy will also be examined in seventeenth-eighteenth- 
century Enlightenment thinking, its definition amplified in Mill’s nineteenth-century writings 
on utility, and its meaning rendered in the modem medico-legal arena. Autonomy also will be 
explored both in relationship with, and in contrast to, physician paternalism, and for its 
interconnection with SL.
As the notion of “autonomy” developed, it influenced the DPR as patients insisted upon 
greater opportunities for input when it came to making decisions regarding patients’ own 
health. These changing notions about human health then interconnected with the concept of the 
sanctity of human life, bringing focussed attention upon the present nature of the DPR. When 
the medical community addressed PAS, these three features (autonomy, physician paternalism, 
and sanctity of human life) became central to the arguments, both for and against the practice. 
A good working definition for each concept, then, is important for the purpose of this chapter. 
The first notion to consider is autonomy, with its rich historical meaning and varied 
application.
What is Autonomy?
Defined
Autonomy was originally a compound word in ancient Greek civilisation and carried no 
single meaning.4 The OED gives a broad definition of the word in several historical contexts. 
Originally the word was used in a political context and meant “the having or making of one’s 
own laws,” meaning that a state had “the right of self-government, of making its own laws and
4Beauchamp and Childress, 68. The two Greek words were autos and nomos.
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administering its own affairs.”5 A definition alone, of course, cannot indicate how the historical 
context shaped the development of the term. Thus, in the case of “autonomy,” the following 
broad historical overview of the concept’s usage will illustrate stages in its development.
Ancient Greece
The concept of autonomy has had an uneven evolution throughout history. In fact, the 
progression of the term may be more easily traced from ancient Greece along political and 
literary links rather than chronological ones. The concept came to be applied in ancient Greece 
to citizens who established their own norms or laws primarily in political and military affairs.6 
The word, however, did not yet extend to include the notion of individual liberty. It was not 
until much later that the idea of individual freedom, so important in modem Western culture, 
became a part of the meaning.7
5OED, 2d ed., s.v. “autonomy.”
6Cook, Patients’ Choice, 224-29. Cf. Beauchamp and Childress, 100-102,120. The 
authors define common morality as being pluralistic, meaning two or more nonabsolute tenets 
form the general level of normative statement. Common morality theories rely heavily upon 
ordinary shared moral beliefs for their content. Cf. Henry Sidgwick’s “morality of common 
sense.” Sidgwick, 337-61.
7Berlin, 129. Cf. Ostwald, 47. OED., 2d ed., s.v., “autonomy.” In the seventeenth 
century, “liberty to live after one’s own laws,” “liberty to follow one’s will,” and “personal 
freedom” became added features of the word and changed its meaning. See also Richard 
Lindley, Autonomy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1986), 6. Lindley 
writes that individual autonomy has been regarded as of enormous importance in the Western 
political tradition since the late eighteenth century. Compare Schneewind, Invention o f 
Autonomy, 4. He writes that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries an emerging 
conception of autonomy as self-governance began to challenge the established conceptions of 
morality as mere blind obedience based upon supernatural revelation.
197
Renaissance Humanism and Autonomy
The long leap forward through the centuries from ancient Greece to the Renaissance8 
may suggest that there is but scanty background to the examination of “autonomy.” The 
concept did not suddenly reappear without reason on the Renaissance political and 
philosophical landscape, however.9 The Medieval Period (fifth-thirteenth centuries) promoted 
individual, albeit limited, learning, which provided a foundation for the coming Renaissance 
(fourteenth-fifteenth centuries), as its monastic scribes and other scholars preserved and 
studied the ancient classics.10
Following the fall of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade, Western Europe 
experienced an explosion of new trade routes, the fusion of cultures between East and West, 
and the rediscovery of the classics, particularly the Greek and Latin classical heritage. The old 
political-ecclesiastical union of the Medieval Period began to unravel, ushering in 
revolutionary changes in society.11 A new interest in the study of history and the development 
of the idea of “perspective,” together with a “sentimental nostalgia” for past civilisations, 
became catalysts for receiving the knowledge and skills of the east as the classics were
8William R. Estep, Renaissance and Reformation (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., reprint edition, 1995), 18, 20. Estep’s concise, yet pithy, overview of 
the Renaissance states that even though the era was identifiable and separate from the “Low 
Middle Ages,” it does not mean that the Renaissance had no roots there.
9Walter Ullmann, Medieval Foundations o f Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1977), vii. Ulmann writes that Renaissance humanism is “strongly 
embedded” in the “antecedent medieval past.” Of significance is his statement that Renaissance 
humanism and its relevant manifestations are “incomprehensible” without the ecclesiological 
background. Ullmann writes, “Precisely because Renaissance humanism evolved from its 
medieval environs, it moulded the complexion of society and decisively shaped its thought 
processes, its outlook, and philosophy.” Estep states that fourteenth century dissent took many 
forms (political, religious, economic, and intellectual) that indicated that the Constantinian 
“symbiosis” (referring to the union of the Catholic Church with the Roman Empire) was falling 
apart. Cf. Estep, 20.
10Ibid., 13. Cf. Frederick B. Artz, Renaissance Humanism 1300-1550 (Oberlin, OH: 
Kent State University Press, 1966), 16.
nEstep, 20. Estep uses Yoder’s terminology (“symbiosis”) to describe the slow 
dissolution of the union between the Catholic Church and the Roman Empire.
198
reintroduced,12 resulting in a new era-the Renaissance. This period “rebirthed” patterns of 
thinking and learning13 that sought to recover that “lost,” or “forgotten” knowledge. Called via 
moderna, this new way of thinking applied the recently rediscovered knowledge in fresh ways.
One instance of this application concerned the notion of the individual. The ancients 
had believed, for example, that one could mould personality development by education. This 
idea was recaptured in the Renaissance,14 so much so that the changing ideal of education that 
marked the Italian Renaissance, an ideal that included developing the individual human 
personality to its fullest extent, became a pivotal element in the redefinition of the term 
“autonomy.”15 This is one of the ways in which the ancient view of humanism16 gained both 
renewed life in the Italian Renaissance and redefinition as a result of the freshly acquired study 
of ancient literature in its original language.
A leading figure in this rebirth of interest in classical antiquity was an Italian named 
Petrarch (1304-1374),17 whose desire was to recapture the old Roman glory and reshape the 
present in accordance with ancient political and moral values. Part of his contribution was his 
perspective that an individual should resolve to leave his own mark on time, whether
12Myron P. Gilmore, The World o f Humanism: 1453-1517 (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1952), 236. Cf. Frederick S. J. Copleston, A History o f Philosophy, vol. 3, Late 
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, Image Books, 1993), 207-9.
13Trinkhahus, 4,13. Cf. Bullock, 13-14,17. Copleston, 3:210.
14Bullock, 11.
15Copleston, 3:208.
16The term comes originally from the Latin humanitas and is the Roman version of the 
Greek concept of paideia, or education of a child. This concept is not to be confused with the 
term humanism, which is of near-recent origin, formulated in 1803 by a German pedagogue. 
See Trinkhaus, 4,13. Cf. Bullock, 13-14,17.
17Compare Copleston, 3:207. Copleston notes the absurdity of trying to assign clearly 
defined temporal dates to the Renaissance, but insofar as the Renaissance involved a rebirth of 
“literature and a devotion to classical learning and style,” it may be stated to have begun as 
early as the twelfth century.
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militaristic, political, literary, or pietistic.18 Indeed, it has been stated that the Renaissance was 
the era when human beings began to think of themselves as “individuals.”19
During the Renaissance, the specific cognates in the term “individual autonomy” were 
not mentioned per se. It is important to note, however, that human experience in Renaissance 
“thought” buttressed the authoritative claims of neither religion nor science.20 Instead, whether 
strategic or merely consequential, human experience actually challenged traditional authority.21 
The tensions created by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, together with elements of 
“pagan” philosophical currents in Renaissance thought, challenged the old authoritative claims 
of the Church. What actually emerged from within the Renaissance was a new type of “man” 
who was shaped by the “imitation of antiquity.”22
The dignity of man, since antiquity, had been associated with a cluster of ideas that 
blended with biblical concepts of the nature and role of man in the universe within the history 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition.23 This conception of what constituted “man” changed as the 
Renaissance idea of human dignity became additionally coloured by the fresh study of, and
18Trinkhaus, 13-14.
19McGrath, 41. McGrath cites Jacob Burckhardt for the idea, but adds that there is 
“powerful evidence” for strongly collective values in the Renaissance. Cf. Estep, 20-21. Estep 
refers to Burkhardt’s analysis as well and states that “political circumstances and Italian genius 
combined to give birth to the first modem man.” It was in the Renaissance that man became 
consciously aware of his individualism. This was a separating feature between the Renaissance 
and its antecedent era.
20Bullock, 17.
21 Compare Louis Bouyer, Erasmus and the Humanist Experiment (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1959), 26, 34. Bouyer writes that the rebirth of the Classics brought with it a revival 
of paganism and its culture. He said this “was profoundly anti-Christian,” and by the second 
generation of Renaissance humanism it became “insistent” and seemed likely to dominate the 
entire movement. Copleston, 3:208. Copleston is more reserved in his assignment of paganism 
to the Renaissance, but he does note that some of the humanists were “pagan” in outlook. He 
terms an aspect of the Renaissance as “amoral individualism,” in the sense that the focus was 
not opposition to Christianity per se as much as to developing human personality to the fullest.
22Bouyer, 34.
23Trinkhaus, 344.
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emphasis upon, “natural laws.”24 The new Renaissance man imitated the Greek arete of the 
ancients by seeking to accomplish great, heroic deeds.25 Thus, though ill-defined, dignity was 
acquired through the study of the liberal arts, or humanitas, and was linked with the Petrarchan 
ideal of high civic, pietistic, literary, or military achievement.26
Renaissance thought was further aided by three important developments: the increased 
integration of classical scholarship with literary composition in the vernacular, the translation 
of Plato and the Neoplatonists, and the spread of the new invention of printing.27 Each of these 
developments opened doors to ever-increasing numbers of people being influenced by the 
classics. Two significant bridges connected the Renaissance to the following era—the 
Reformation.
The idea of learning as a conduit to improving oneself was one such bridge.28 The 
watchword was adfontes, or “back to the original sources,” referring to the desire to reclaim 
the intellectual and artistic resources of the classical period.29 Another bridge into the 
Reformation was the mechanical invention of the printing press. While the press itself was not 
capable of spawning intellectual change, it became the vehicle people used to mass-market
24Ibid., 343.
25Bouyer, 34-35.
26Trinkhaus, 343.
27Ibid., 23-24. Bouyer, 37. Cf. Gilmore, 186-90,191-94, 206. The printing press made 
possible the growth of the secular reading public. Humanism, to this point, largely 
characterised the clergy and operated within the circles of their private domains. Italians like 
Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), for example, spent a lifetime translating the works of Plato from 
Greek to Latin and trying to reconcile Neoplatonism of the Florentine variety with Christianity, 
further advancing Renaissance philosophy. Ficino placed an emphasis upon freedom of the will 
and the duty of intellectuals to try to apprehend higher things so as to ascend toward a union 
with the divine. This, he believed, was the true end of man, although not everyone agreed with 
his assessment.
28Gilmore, 206.
29McGrath, 45.
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their ideas.30 Having thus acquired his dignity through humanitas, the Renaissance individual 
then applied his new knowledge and values to his own life and his surrounding culture, 
opening up whole ranges of questions the answers to which bore implications for the changing 
expression of autonomy.31
Reformation Humanism
If the printing press was the single most important new invention for sixteenth-century 
scholarship,32 then Erasmus (71467-1536) represents the generation which seized upon its use 
and maximised the opportunity.33 Thousands of copies of books, manuscripts, pamphlets and 
treatises, letters, and the like were printed and circulated, widening greatly the dissemination of 
the via moderna, exemplified in the teachings of the humanist scholar, Erasmus. This flood of 
fresh reading material resulted in an ever-broadening secular reading public,34 in whose hands
30Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent o f Change: Communications 
and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). Eisenstein discusses the revolutionary nature of the “book culture” 
which arose from the Medieval “scribal culture” and its interrelatedness to the Renaissance 
(vol. 1,181-225). Estep, 95-96. Myron P. Gilmore, 186. Cf. Bard Thompson, Humanists and 
Reformers: A History o f the Renaissance and Reformation (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), 39-46.
31Trinkhaus, 13-14.
32Gilmore, 189. Erasmus joined forces with Johann Froben, ca. 1514, to see some of 
his projects “through the press.” See John C. Olin, ed., Christian Humanism and the 
Reformation: Selected Writings o f Erasmus with His Life by Beatus Rhenanus and a 
Biographical Sketch by the Author, 3d ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), 15. 
Lewis W. Spitz, The Renaissance and Reformation Movements (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1971), 306. Spitz points to the importance of the printing press related to the mass 
dissemination of ideas when he writes that between 1500 and 1517 German printers turned out 
but forty books per year. Once the Reformation was launched, however, the figure “rocketed to 
five hundred titles” per year in Germany alone.
33Gilmore, 189. See also Henry Osborn Taylor, Erasmus and Luther (New York: 
Collier Books, First Collier Books ed., 1962), 38. Taylor writes that Erasmus’ influence was 
“tenfold greater” because he spent his entire strength making books that were of “enormous 
educational effect.” Erasmus also chose his cities of residence according to the availability of 
facilities for the printing of his books (33).
34Gilmore, 187. Cf. Thompson, 42-43. He “extended the circle of a lay intelligentsia” 
to nonmonks and learned orders. Of course, had the reading populace been exposed to different
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the printed word became the weapon of individuals with political ideas. In a real sense, the 
press became a wedge between a church struggling to retain its control and a people who were 
increasingly bombarded by new philosophical formulations concerning their own individual 
values.35
Erasmus of Rotterdam used the printing press to introduce another catalyst for the 
growth of autonomy. While a loyal Catholic, he emphasised the value of “inner” religion, 
instead of mere external moral observance.36 This is significant because Erasmus’ “inner 
religion” was cultivated by the individual, no longer necessarily solely by the church.37 
Erasmus reached a much wider circle than had earlier humanists.38 Under his influence, 
external authority structures were challenged by a growing concept of individual authority, 
thereby adding this notion to the definition and practice of humanitas.
His Reformation counterpart, Martin Luther (1483-1546), was responsible for further 
modifying the term “humanism.” Although Luther’s humanism was more strictly biblical in 
tone, both he and Erasmus believed the church should return to its earlier purity and practice. 
Luther sowed seeds of autonomy when he read the scriptures as an individual, interpreted them 
in ways that were contrary to those of the established church, and then applied them against 
abuses he saw within the church. Both men challenged the church in ways that both defined 
and permeated the Reformation, even though each man approached the matter of reform 
somewhat differently. Erasmus was more conciliatory and Luther more militant in his
literature, the result perhaps could just as easily have been an anti-autonomy stance which 
could have squelched the concept of the individual.
35Gilmore, 186.
36McGrath, 40-41, 54. See also Olin, 9.
37James McConica, Erasmus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 47. Erasmus 
was concerned with the “interiorizing of conviction,” and “meaning it.” Christendom’s 
enemies would be conquered by the allure of truth manifested in the lives of Christ’s followers.
38John Huizinga, Erasmus and the Age o f Reformation (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1957), 39.
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approach; nevertheless, their contrasting styles, their conflict over ideas and attitudes, and their 
individual reflection on human worth advanced different aspects of the Reformation’s 
humanistic movement in its slow evolution toward individual autonomy.
While it is true that neither Erasmus nor Luther, despite all incumbent discords, sought 
intentionally to eliminate the church entirely, what was unseen by these men in their lifetimes 
was the effect their reform would have upon the growth and spread of autonomy in subsequent 
eras. People felt freed at last to use their minds and to act in ways which would effect changes 
in the culture that surrounded them.
Enlightenment Humanism
In the Enlightenment,39 the interest in classical antiquity continued but with an ever- 
increasing emphasis on the individual use of human reason.40 As Kant illustrated, 
“Enlightenment” was the ability of a man to use his own understanding without another’s 
guidance.41 An indication of this use of reason was the emerging separation between the 
individual and the traditional source of authority—the Church. Scientific methodology soon 
became the tool to discover truth, leaving behind Christianity and other supernatural revelation 
or faith-based expressions of authority.42 It was at this time that a clearer secular picture of
39The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 1995, s.v. “Enlightenment.” The term will be 
used to mean the period also known as the Age of Reason. The Enlightenment marked a 
philosophical development between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries that focused 
on the use of one’s reason without the external guidance of another. Cf. Peter Gay, ed. The 
Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).
40Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, 384.
4‘Ibid.
42Gay, 17. Gay also notes that Enlightenment thinkers were not “anti-God” or anti­
religion” per se, but that they agreed, for the most part, that religion and Christianity were not 
the sole pathway to truth or happiness (17,19).
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autonomy began to emerge. Kant noted that the Enlightenment required nothing but “freedom,” 
and by that term he meant the freedom to test one’s reason openly.43
The Petrarch of the Enlightenment was John Locke (1632-1704) who added his 
emphasis upon “individual” political liberty, and advocated the position of noninterference 
from the State as a corollary.44 In the emerging Enlightenment, philosophers like Kant and 
Locke expressed their desire for the right to be freed from external interference and from the 
dual chains of Church and State authority.45 John Locke’s emphasis upon using the rational 
mind to solve current problems was another important feature of Enlightenment autonomy. The 
Church might be interested in the eternal, but the enlightened man was interested in the 
present. This emerging view shared origins with the Renaissance union of man and nature,45 
and took voice in the work of Thomas Paine.
Thomas Paine (1737-1809), whose literary work proved to be a moving force in 
America’s separation from Great Britain, was a passionate advocate of man’s freedom from 
governmental interference based upon God-given natural rights.47 The chief goal of
43Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, 386.
44John Locke, Second Treatise, 8. Cf. Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 386.
45Locke, Second Treatise, 8; see also Kant, Groundwork, 105-8. Cf. Sullivan, 15. Note 
that the aspect of individual freedom emphasised here was still, at this period, freedom from 
interference and not freedom to be or to do what one pleased.
46Bullock, 52-54.
47Paine, 30, 65. Cf. Thomas Paine, “Independence—A Natural Right,” in The Liberal 
Tradition in American Thought, ed. Walter E. Volkonner (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1969), 50. Paine felt that government was at best a necessary evil. Government was established 
to restrain the vices of men. Cf. Harold Nicolson, The Age o f Reason: The Eighteenth Century 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961). Compare Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. 
with an introduction and notes by J. C. A. Gaskin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
86-88. Hobbes held the view that all men possessed natural rights, but his view of man was 
markedly different from writers like Paine and Locke. Man was warlike, was governed only by 
his own reason, and had a right to everything, even the body of another person (87). Each 
person was to use his rights for self-preservation. A person could transfer some of his rights to 
another for protection, but could not give up all his rights (i.e., the right to defend himself 
against attack). Hobbes felt that all men were brutish and that government was needed to keep 
them from harming one another. Men would transfer their rights to a sovereign and establish a
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government was to preserve the natural rights of man--liberty, property, security, and the 
freedom to resist oppression.48 Other natural rights were the rights of the mind, and the rights 
of acting as an individual for one’s own comfort or happiness, as long as one did not injure or 
interfere with another’s pursuit of the same.49 In his Declaration o f  the Rights o f  Man and o f  
Citizens,50 Paine stated that men were bom free and should always have the right and 
opportunity to continue to live freely and equally within those rights. The resultant idea of 
individual political liberty, a term synonymous with the notion of freedom,51 was premised on 
the then-radical concept that a person should have the right to make determinations concerning 
his own life.52 This was believed to be a natural right grounded simply in the fact that the 
person was human, having been created by God.
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) pushed the concept of autonomy further by 
introducing the Age of Sensibility with his “Social Contract” of 1762. He believed that all 
individuals were bom free and equal and that the depravity of civilised institutions had stifled 
or, in some cases, robbed them of freedom and equality through injustice and corruption.53 He, 
therefore, believed that individuals were justified in using force to ensure freedom for others.54 
Rousseau further believed that each individual might have a private, or personal, will in
contract (89). This contract became the great Leviathan to which men owed their peace and 
defence. The Leviathan had absolute power and was above the law as long as it secured order 
within the state.
48Paine, Rights o f Man, 65.
49Ibid., 30.
50Ibid, 65.
51Berlin, 121.
52Lindley, 6-7, 9. Lindley believes the concept of individual autonomy has been central 
to the “liberal” political tradition which, rather insufficiently, he defines as the type of political 
system found in the UK and the US (7).
53Jean Jacques Rousseau, “Forcing a Man to Be Free,” in The Portable Age O f 
Reason Reader, 167. Cf. Nicolson, 416.
54Rousseau, 167. Cf. Nicolson, 417.
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addition to the general will one might express as a citizen.55 Rousseau’s thought demonstrates 
an extended stage of development of the concept of autonomy in which there was a noticeable 
awareness of, and difference between, the “individual-as-a-person” as over against the 
“individual-as-citizen.”56
Men like Paine and Rousseau began not only to view the individual as someone who 
should be free from outside interference, but also to advocate the liberty of that individual to 
act contrary to the State if that freedom were jeopardised. The French and American 
revolutions serve as examples of the application of this new way of thinking about the roles of 
citizens and their governments. The notions of individualism and identity spawned the concept 
that government was to be at the disposal of the people and not people for the sole disposal of 
government without checks and balances to curtail the potential abuses of individual or 
political power. This does not suggest that every humanist of the Enlightenment era used the 
specific term autonomy when discussing self-rule or self-governance; yet the evolving concept 
of individual autonomy formed the backdrop to ongoing discussions of political and personal 
liberties—ideas considered radical, even in a revolutionary age.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was one of the premier Enlightenment writers whose 
concept of autonomy remains influential even today. While it is true that the elements of 
ancient autonomy, those of self-rule and constraining external interference, are contained in 
Kant’s view of autonomy, he also believed that a person was morally autonomous if he were 
free from coercion in the use of his reason and resultant action according to his will. The centre 
of autonomy for Kant was human reason. Interference with that human reason or autonomy 
could be either physical, like a State’s control over one’s property, or more subjective, such as
55Rousseau, 166. An important distinction about the Renaissance in contrast with the 
Middle Ages was the emergence of man the “citizen,” whereas before he had been man the 
“subject.” See Ullmann, viii.
56It is of note that what has been perceived as an “anti-authority” current within the 
developing concept of humanism may instead be a refocusing of where that authority lies.
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the institutional Church’s influence over one’s belief system and attending actions involving 
the will. If nothing else, Kant’s perspective on autonomy indicates that, while the concept 
contains nuances of meaning, it remained clearly within the general scope of the ancient 
definition.
By the end of the Enlightenment the definition of autonomy had evolved to the point 
that man, as individual, had begun to wrestle with the notion of authoritative structures that 
shaped and even, sometimes, controlled his manner of living. Both Church and State now came 
under the light of rational scrutiny, and at some points their authoritative claims were 
challenged. It is important to note, however, that as the concept modified in subtle ways as it 
was applied in new contexts, limits on individual autonomy still remained. For example, 
individuals were still limited in their challenges to the authoritative claims of church and 
government. Since the notion of “freedom of thought” had not yet reached the point where it 
became an ideal that championed full liberty from external constraint, Enlightenment man still 
lived, in large measure, under the unified umbrella of governmental and ecclesiastical 
authoritative structures. This notion of challenging authoritative structures even more 
thoroughly from the claim of autonomy became a central feature in the nineteenth century, 
especially in the writings of John Stuart Mill.
John Stuart Mill’s Nineteenth-Centurv Humanism
John Stuart Mill writes of the long battle between “Liberty” and “Authority,” and 
“Government” and the slow evolutionary contest between subjects, or classes of subjects, in 
the struggle to liberate the individual.57 By liberty, Mill meant freedom from the tyranny o f  
political rulers.5* Mill’s philosophy of the individual shows further development from that
57Mill, “On Liberty,” 126-27,135, 205.
58Ibid.
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which was articulated in the Enlightenment.59 Enlightenment thinking, found in spokesmen like 
Paine and Rousseau, as well as events like the French and American revolutions, was echoed in 
Mill’s “progress of human affairs,” for Mill’s writing reflects changes that took place after the 
revolutions. While the Enlightenment thinkers had rejected a philosophical foundation based 
upon supernatural revelation, for the most part they still reflected a transcendent, rather than 
immanent God and considered the implications of His existence for humanity.60
Mill, on the other hand, while not antagonistic toward religion,61 was clearly man- 
centred in his positions,62 confident in man’s capability to pursue happiness, to reason for 
himself, and to act apart from divine impetus. In comparison with the Enlightenment writers of 
the previous era then, Mill built stronger boundaries around the concept of the individual--a 
noteworthy change from pre-Enlightenment humanism.
Mill, for example, defined the autonomous individual as one who possessed liberty of 
thought, feeling, tastes, and pursuits.63 Mill advocated that an individual’s personal liberty was
59Ibid. He writes of a time when in the “progress of human affairs” . . .  “men ceased to 
think it a necessity of nature that their governor should be an independent power, opposed in 
interest to themselves,” 127.
60Locke, Two Treatises, 151. Cf. Paine, Rights o f Man, 28. Most Enlightenment writers 
believed that a God, or Governor of the Universe, existed and that mankind felt obliged to 
worship Him. Furthermore, a moral code ought to be followed in order to establish an orderly 
society, which included reparations for wrongdoing and a reward system that was both present 
and future in its scope. These common elements, expressed in Lord Herbert of Cherbury’s De 
Veritate, first published in 1624, were accepted in variant forms and included in most writings 
of the Enlightenment period.
61Mill, “On Liberty,” 241. Mill, in a larger discussion of testing in the public education 
arena, states that there is nothing wrong with examining an atheist in the evidences of 
Christianity, for example, as long as he is not required to profess a belief in Christianity.
62Ibid., 139. Mill was sceptical of religion because its power was often wielded by an
hierarchy or by the “spirit of Puritanism.” Cf. 136, where Mill shows his high view of man by 
labelling man as a “progressive being.” The ground for moral decision-making is man alone. If 
man chooses to seek the wisdom of deity, then that is considered to be good, but there is no 
dread of deity if man chooses to look elsewhere for help. Note that the vestiges of man-centred 
humanism of the Renaissance are still evident in the developing thought of autonomy here as 
well.
63Ibid., 138.
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to be respected deeply,64 so much so that he placed severe limitations on the possibility of 
outside interference with that liberty.65 Contrary to those who postulated interference in the 
exercise of individual freedom upon the basis of morality or physical good, Mill believed the 
only reason to interfere with a person’s freedom (liberty) was to prevent harm to another.66 A 
free person was absolutely sovereign over his own body and mind.67 This self-sovereignty Mill 
believed to be a right for all humankind68 was in contrast to Thomas Paine and other 
Enlightenment writers who based man’s autonomy on God-given natural rights. Mill did not 
base his conceptions of autonomy upon God-given (apriori) natural rights; rather, he chose to 
base his conceptions of the same upon empirical grounds and the GHP. This, once again, like 
Mill’s claims concerning rights and justice, was a departure from the historical development of 
autonomy. In so doing, Mill separated himself distinctly from the ancient ideas of human 
dignity69 and the reemergent Renaissance focus of human dignity grounded upon natural laws. 
Mill based man’s autonomy, then, upon the individual alone and the GHP.
Furthermore, whereas Kant centred autonomy in human reason, Mill centred autonomy 
in an individual’s desire for his own greatest happiness. Even though Kant and Mill centre their 
approaches to autonomy in differing sources, the concept of self-rule is still present in the term, 
as well as the idea of limiting the interference of coercive “others,” whether those influences 
are governmental, ecclesiastical, or even the “tyranny of the majority.”70
64Berlin, 127-28; and Lindley, 44.
65Mill, “On Liberty,” 135.
66Ibid.
67Cf. Schneewind, Invention o f Autonomy, 1.
68Mill, “On Liberty,” 135.
69See thesis, 152. The notion of human dignity since antiquity had been associated with 
a cluster of ideas that blended together nature and Judeo-Christian traditions.
70Ibid., 127-30. Mill states that a time came when it appeared to men that it would be 
much better for the various magistrates of the State to be “their tenants or delegates, revocable 
at their pleasure.” He also notes that society can restrict the freedom of the individual in a
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Mill’s distinguishing shift in the definition of autonomy from Enlightenment thought, 
then, lies in his detachment of the concept from a link to deity. What had begun with 
Renaissance humanism in general had now evolved into nineteenth-century individualism. The 
idea of personal autonomy had emerged; however, it had yet to receive preeminent status.71 
That would come in the following era.
Twentieth-Century Humanism and Beyond72
Mill’s view of autonomy provided support for the late-twentieth century’s modem 
understanding of the concept. Noninterference with an individual’s personal freedom, as well 
as the maximum liberty for autonomous action, solidified into key elements within the 
concept’s general definition.73 At the end of the twentieth century, the dialogue concerning 
PAS used Mill’s emphasis on the self-governing individual to claim that the individual is to be 
morally free in every respect with the limit of inflicting harm upon others.74
The principle of autonomy gained preeminence, especially in the medico-legal arena, 
within the last three decades of the twentieth century.75 In contemporary biomedical ethics, the
much more damaging way than can government. He labels this the “tyranny of the prevailing 
opinion or feeling.” See thesis, ch. 4,228-29. However, Mill’s GHP conceivably could fall into 
a tyranny of the majority.
71Compare the statement of Beauchamp and Childress.
72For the purpose of this thesis, references to this time period will be stated in terms of 
the present and will include the first four years of the twenty-first century.
73Mill, “On Liberty,” 135,138.
74Ibid., 184. It is important to note, however, that even in Mill’s era, the principle of 
autonomy did not carry the added emphasis of obliging another person or group to perform 
some action to ensure the happiness or desire of a specific individual.
75Lamb, 112. Lamb states that PRA has grown to “considerable stature.” Norman L. 
Cantor, Advance Directives and the Pursuit o f Death with Dignity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1993), 2. Cantor writes that “patient control” over medical intervention has 
now become both the legal and medical norm. See also Beauchamp and Childress, 272, in 
which the authors state that medicine, especially in the last thirty years, has been confronted 
with the patient’s need to “make an independent judgment.”
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word autonomy refers to the position of individual authority from which personal choices and 
preferences are made that determine the outcome of a person’s life.76 The concept carries the 
idea of self-rule and the capacity both to choose and to make one’s own rational decisions.
This means that the person, or patient in the medical context, has the expectation that she will 
be free to make her own decisions, regardless of how ill-defined, irrational, or limited her 
understanding of her situation or medical condition may be.77
How is Autonomy Evident in the Doctor-Patient Relationship?
It is important to establish a link between the historical development of autonomy and 
the DPR. To begin, general agreement exists about what constitutes the essentials of autonomy: 
namely, liberty and agency.78 An autonomous person demonstrates liberty when he is free from 
coercion and exercises his ability to make an independent decision. Second, an autonomous 
person also demonstrates the capacity for intentional action that can be explained by reference 
to his own goals or purposes. The evolution of the concept of autonomy has not changed 
historically in relation to these features.79 Today, US patients choose freely whether to go to a 
doctor in the first place and then, within the confines of certain limitations, choose which
76Beauchamp and Childress, 58.
77Beauchamp and Childress, 123. For example, the elderly patient may exhibit various 
degrees of understanding and independence.
78Ibid., 121. Cf. Lindley, 6; and McLean and Britton, 20-21. Of course, it must be 
noted that any individual is “autonomous”: whether she chooses to admit it or exercise it may 
be a different point altogether. In fact, one cannot be forced to choose, or to exercise individual 
choice to do something. When a patient has exercised the choice not to select an option, the 
patient has actually made an intentional determination. If patients are acknowledged as having 
the liberty to act, the notion of “agency” may then take both active and passive forms in the 
medical context.
79Compare Renaissance humanism where men began to view themselves as individuals 
(thesis, 152) and where man began to react against any compulsion to do the will of the Church 
(thesis, 155-56). See Enlightenment humanism where man began to react against political 
compulsion (thesis, 157-60). Cf. Mill’s more fully developed views that autonomous 
individuals should be free from outside interference and free to pursue their own life plans and 
purposes (thesis, 160-63).
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doctor(s) to see. Patient autonomy is often exercised through free choices a patient makes 
concerning acceptance or refusal of treatment, accepting or rejecting recommended 
hospitalisation, and accepting or foregoing end-of-life treatment, just to name a few examples.
To assert that the word “autonomy” still carries much of its original meaning, however, 
is not to say that its implications have remained static. There are those who now interpret its 
meaning to advocate practically whatever one desires.80 The notion of “autonomy,” as a result, 
has become the dominant consideration in medical-ethical decision-making. Its corollary 
implications and their applications, such as moving from noninterference in medical treatment 
to positive liberty emphases, have sparked fresh debate within the context of the DPR. Some 
patients and PAS advocates assert that the principle of patient autonomy now obliges the 
physician to satisfy the patient’s desires, including such practices as ordering certain medical 
tests or procedures, permitting end-of-life decision-making to be made primarily by the patient 
and his family, and even aiding a patient with his own suicide.
Cultural Shifts
These changes within the autonomy definitions, implications, and their applications 
may indicate a broader cultural shift, similar in many respects to the sweeping changes 
reflected in the earlier Renaissance period. As was demonstrated in this chapter, the 
Renaissance and Reformation were both engendered, and were furthered in part, by revolutions 
in culture that facilitated a climate for deeper moral consideration; for example, the invention
80Beauchamp and Childress, 70-71. The authors discuss rights’-based theories. See 
Paul Kurtz, ed., Humanist Manifestos I  and II (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1973), 
17. The section entitled “Ethics,” states that ethics is autonomous and situational. “Ethics stems 
from human need and interest.” Human life has meaning for the individual when one creates 
and develops one’s own future. The Manifesto does state elsewhere that humanists believe in 
maximum individual autonomy with social responsibility (18). See Humphiy and Clement, 28. 
The authors recall the 1960's era and use, as an example, Tom Hayden’s Students for a 
Democratic Society belief that a democracy should ensure that society be “organized” to 
encourage independence in people. See also Dictionary o f Medical Ethics (1981), s.v., “moral 
autonomy.” The dictionary distinguishes between autonomy, libertarianism, and individualism. 
See Daniel Callahan, “When Self-Determination Runs Amok,” Hastings Center Report 22, no. 
2 (March-April, 1992): 50-55, esp. 52.
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of the printing press that opened the doorway for the spread of Renaissance humanism. Today, 
a parallel exists with the advent of computerised technological information systems and the 
mass distribution of knowledge at the fingertips of society. Part of the information 
disseminated through the media and internet is medical in nature, and patients now often freely 
access information about their medical questions independent of their physicians. A patient’s 
potential for conflict with his physician increases if and when the patient’s own research does 
not lead to conclusions which correspond with those of his physician.
A second similarity demonstrates a cultural shift. Tremendous conflict arose in the 
Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment era about the often coercive control which was 
perceived to have been exercised by both Church and governments over people, individually 
and collectively. Today, similar unrest may be felt when doctors, other medical authorities, and 
courts use medical technology to provide legally mandated treatment for patients, sometimes in 
contradiction to the desires or financial capability of family members.81
A third comparison involves the questions, often termed moral questions, which surface 
when a patient’s desires are left unsatisfied. A catalyst for growing Reformation and 
Enlightenment humanism was the moral argument which arose out of the struggle between 
institutional control and the growing notion of individual autonomy. This moral outcry, added 
to complex perceptions of injustice in many arenas, joined together into a cause for revolt 
against political tyranny. While social, political, and ecclesiastical situations in the US and the 
UK in no way parallel the pre-French Revolutionary period, current medical literature reveals a 
growing struggle with the moral nature of medical authority and its perceived injustice or, at 
least, threat to patient autonomy. An examination of this specific struggle within the DPR 
yields insight into the state of cultural humanism at present.
81Compare the cases of Tony Bland (UK) and Karen Ann Quinlan (US) where court 
involvement, early on, caused lengthy delays and hindered family desires to end medical 
treatment.
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Perspectives: The Relationship Between Patients and Physicians
A focus on patient autonomy alone would be one-sided. Since patients’ judgments now 
sometimes differ from longstanding medical values,82 the practical result of this clash is that 
the exercising of patient autonomy runs counter, in some cases, to the established medical 
obligation to act beneficently toward the patient.83 Since the prevailing climate in medicine 
increasingly favours patient autonomy--that is, the fulfilling of a patient’s will~“physician 
paternalism” has been cited as one form of interference with those ends. It is, therefore, 
important to examine the validity of the claim that a physician who refuses to grant a patient’s 
autonomous choice of treatment is “paternalistic” in his treatment of his patient.
There are at least two areas of the relationship between physicians and patients where 
differences in values may occur, thereby leading to potential conflict. These areas represent 
places where the patient is most vulnerable in the DPR, and where medical authority and 
practice most often become an issue with a patient. The first area is that of informed consent, a 
practice instituted in order to safeguard a patient’s interest in the DPR. Informed consent 
consists of two aspects, which are the information given by the physician and the consent given 
by the patient.84 The “autonomous patient,” therefore, is entitled to receive clear information 
from the doctor about her condition and should have dominion over her own body so as to 
make decisions about her treatment.85
Respect for autonomy centres on the patient’s privilege to refuse the doctor’s suggested 
course of treatment, even if the patient’s understanding is less than the physician’s 
understanding, or even if the patient makes the wrong choice. The Patient Self-Determination
82Beauchamp and Childress, 210.
83Ibid.
84Samuel Gorovitz, Doctors ’ Dilemmas: Moral Conflict and Medical Care (New York: 
Oxford University Press, paperback edition, 1985), 38. Patient competence, while not 
specifically noted, is essential to “informed consent.”
85This is true except in cases of an emergency or of diminished capacity.
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Act o f1990, for example, is public law in the United States, guaranteeing the right of 
competent adults to make their own medical treatment decisions. Patients in the UK or US may 
choose treatment from several alternatives.86 They may also refuse treatment.87
Yet, for all of the emphasis upon, and legal protection of, patient consent, studies have 
shown that some physicians seem reluctant to accommodate patient preferences.88 In these 
studies, when faced with patient challenges, physicians asserted their dominance, resorting to 
the use of persuasion techniques based upon the claim of their medical expertise.89 Doctors 
suggest supporting reasons for this physician-response. Doctors may discuss the medical 
situation with their patients, but the patient may not understand clearly either his medical 
condition or treatment options.90 Doctors might also find it nearly impossible to explain a 
medical matter well enough to bring the patient into full understanding. In another scenario, the 
patient may be relatively well and willing enough to participate in life-and-death decisions, or 
he may not be capable of so doing.91 The underlying issues which create conflict between 
patient autonomy and physician paternalism are not only real, but are also complex.
It is important to clarify that the DPR is not merely one-sided, with physicians currently 
at the total mercy of patient responses based upon autonomy. Patients may also make requests
86BMA, Euthanasia, 39. Compare the updated version in BMA, “End of Life 
Decisions,” 3. Cf. Brett and McCullough, 1347-51. Cf. Cook, Patients’ Choice, 159. Cook 
writes that free and autonomous individuals can decide what they want to happen to them.
87Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 228. Marcia Angell, “Case of Helga Wanglie,” 511-12. 
BMA, “End of Life Decisions, 1. All references to a right to refuse treatment refer to 
competent adult patients.
88Marrijoy J. Kelner, and Ivy L. Bourgeault. “Patient Control Over Dying: Responses 
Of Health Care Professionals.” Social Science Medicine 36, 6 (March 1993): 757.
89Kelner and Bourgeault, 757. Cf. Carol Moody, “The Right to Refuse Medical 
Treatment,” Hospital & Health Services Administration 31, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 147-53. The 
article gives legal insight into the issues involved in these cases.
90Gorovitz, 39-40.
91Gordon L. Snider, “The Do-Not-Resuscitate Order,” American Review o f Respiratory 
Disease 143 (1991): 666.
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of physicians and have their views discussed, all within certain boundaries. A patient request 
for treatment neither guarantees employment of said treatment, nor obliges a provider or a 
healthcare system to carry out such treatment.92 Autonomous patients are not free to demand 
that a physician injure them, provide “plausible but inappropriate” therapy (for example, 
amphetamines for weight reduction), or order therapy that has no value.93
While some confusion about end-of-life decision-making grows out of the current 
rhetoric concerning the right-to-die debate, an important clarification is that patients already 
have a choice about their end-of-life decisions. This basic right is rooted in American 
constitutional freedoms. The patient has the right to decide when he or she is ready for death 
and to have that decision acknowledged by caregivers94 The patient is free to choose to forego 
life-prolonging procedures95 and for his illness to take its natural course ending in death. This 
right-to-die is qualified by the corresponding limit that, while the patient can expect care and 
support in terminal illness, the patient cannot expect the doctor to kill.96 The Patient Self- 
Determination Act o f1990 “requires healthcare institutions to disseminate written information 
at the time of admission about the patients’ rights under state law to refuse treatment and to 
formulate advance directives.”97 This is not a new concept. Since the turn of the twentieth
92Miles, 513. BMA, “End of Life Decisions,” 3.
93Miles, 513. Compare end-of-life requests in BMA, “End of Life Decisions,” 3. If a 
patient requests a “doctor to contravene the rules laid down by the regulatory body, the General 
Medical Council or the doctor’s own conscientiously held views, then the request can be 
denied.
94BMA, Euthanasia, 3. “The BMA emphasises that doctors should accede to a request 
not to prolong a patient’s life of treatment which the patient does not want.. . . ”
95Angell, “Case of Helga Wanglie,” 511.
96BMA, “End of Life Decisions,” 3. The conclusion is “. . .  the BMA’s policy, 
approved by its membership at several annual representative meetings, is that doctors should 
not actively intervene to end life or give assistance to this end.” Cook, Patients’ Choice, 159. 
“A patient cannot force a doctor to act contrary to the law or to his conscience.”
97Lawrence O. Gostin, “Deciding Life and Death in the Courtroom from Quinlan to 
Cruzan, Glucksberg, and Vacco: A Brief History and Analysis of Constitutional Protection of
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century, the United States Supreme Court has “recognized that the competent person has a 
constitutionally protected ‘liberty interest’ in refusal of unwanted medical treatment.”98 The 
Supreme Court, with the Cruzan case, now extended this significant liberty interest to include 
the refusal of life-sustaining treatment.99
At this point, it may be beneficial to note that much of this discussion regarding the 
DPR is still more theoretical than practical. Indeed, while autonomy may be guaranteed by law, 
this end-of-life autonomy is not always put into practice by either patients or their physicians. 
For example, studies have shown that while patients largely wish to be informed about their 
medical circumstances, a substantial number of them do not want to make their own medical 
decisions. Findings show that they might not even care or want to participate in their own 
medical decisions in a significant way.100 Furthermore, another important study determined that 
even when physicians were given detailed reports on their patient’s prognosis and were told 
their patient’s feelings about CPR, the treatment of pain, receiving information, and advance 
directives, “no significant change occurred in the timing of DNR orders, in physician-patient 
agreement about DNR orders, in the number of undesirable days [patients experienced], in the 
prevalence of pain, or in the resources consumed.”101 Similarly, the study determined, in spite
the ‘Right to Die,”’ Journal o f the American Medical Association 278, no. 18 (November 
1997): 1524. For information on “advance statements,” see also the British Medical 
Association; internet, available at http://www.bma.org.uk/public/bmapas.nsfrguidevw/ 
terminology; accessed 18 July 2001. For information on “advance directives,” see also 
American Medical Association PolicyFinder-Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs, “E-2.225 Optimal Use of Orders Not to Intervene and Advance Directives”; 
internet, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_ online/pf_online?f_n=re.../CEJA&& 
nth=l&&st_p=0&nth=T; accessed 18 July 2001.
98Gostin, 1524.
"Ibid.
100Schneider, 41. Schneider writes that the graver “the patient’s illness, the less likely 
the patient is to want to make medical decisions.”
101Schneider, 208-9. The study was titled “SUPPORT” (Study to Understand Prognoses 
and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments). It focused on over nine thousand 
seriously ill patients in five prominent teaching hospitals across four years.
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of the emphasis upon better communication between patients and their doctors, that patients 
did not alter their preferences about DNR orders, their communication with physicians, or even 
their overall satisfaction with their care.102 Given these significant, if not surprising results, the 
observation may be made that patient autonomy is expressed at times by choosing to make no 
decision concerning treatment simply by deferring to the advice of the doctor,103 or sometimes, 
as an odd juxtaposition, requesting assistance with suicide.104 The latter request conflicts with 
law in most places.
The law in the UK and in the US, except for the state of Oregon, prohibits doctors from 
complying with a patient’s request for suicide assistance. Proponents of PAS argue that the 
principle of respect for autonomy should also include, in some specific cases, the right to a 
doctor’s assistance with suicide.105 Their argument is based in part upon their understanding of 
autonomy. The working definition of this thesis is that autonomy historically included liberty 
and agency. Liberty includes freedom from external interference and the ability to make a free 
decision; agency includes the capacity for intentional actions. Some PAS proponents interpret 
these notions of liberty and agency to mean that a competent and autonomous patient should 
receive assistance with suicide upon his request. While the request is not intended to oblige the 
doctor to violate his conscience, the request should still be honoured, based on the principle of
102Schneider, 209.
103“SUPPORT” showed that patients were often dissatisfied with their physicians; 
perhaps more with a physician’s apparent lack of concern or personal contact rather than with a 
violation of autonomy. The differences in values may relate to such disparate reasons as 
physician etiquette at one end of the spectrum or to medical paternalism on the other end. Still, 
patients were likely to defer to the advice of their physicians, despite registering 
dissatisfaction.
m The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, sections 2.01, 3.06; internet, available at http:// 
www.islandnet.com/~deathnet/ergo_orlaw.html; accessed 16 June 2000.
105Battin, Least Worst Death, 112-13; cf. McLean and Britton, 25. For a practical 
application cf. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, sections 3.01, 3.02. Competent patients 
who make their request “voluntarily” and act “voluntarily,” among other requirements, are 
considered suitable candidates for physician-assistance-with-suicide.
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respect for autonomy. The patient should be able to make this request and “receive” physician 
assistance with his own suicide. The latter scenario is currently allowed by case law in 
Oregon,106 however much the new law departs from historic definitions of autonomy by 
moving beyond “noninterference” toward an added positive liberty claim. PAS advocates 
would consider a refusal of a PAS request to be a paternalistic infringement upon the patient’s 
autonomy—that the doctor, hospital policy, or government, was interfering with the patient’s 
right to dispose of his own person in the manner he selected.
This challenge of paternalistic infringement introduces the other perspective in the 
discussion of autonomy, that of medical and physician paternalism. Medical paternalism is not 
new and has been perceived to have imposed limits on patient autonomy. These limits to 
autonomy, such as the overriding of a patient’s wishes concerning treatment, or the ordering of 
tests or surgery without adequate input from the patient, have contributed, at times, to the 
tension between values patients hold and those inherent within the medical profession.
One problem in the current debate surrounding patient autonomy is the claim that it 
reduces morality to the arbitrary decisions of patients.107 Factors exacerbating this perception 
may include the regulation of medical practice and imposed barriers to the acquisition of many 
medical services108 or medical crises which occur when patients cannot govern themselves due 
to temporary constraints like illness, depression, or ignorance.109 The exercise of patient
106Amy D. Sullivan, Katrina Hedberg, and David W. Fleming, “Legalized Physician- 
Assisted Suicide in Oregon—the Second Year,” New England Journal o f Medicine 342, no. 8 
(February 2000): 598-604. Oregon legalised PAS in 1997. Sixteen patients died from PAS in 
1998, and twenty-six patients died in 1999 from PAS. See also Beth Casper, “42 Use Suicide 
Law in 2003"; internet, available at http://www.dwd.org/fss/news/sj.03.10.04.asp; accessed 13 
May 2004. Casper writes that in 2003, forty-two people used the law, compared with thirty- 
eight in 2002; twenty-one in 2001; twenty-seven in 2000 and 1999; and sixteen in 1998.
107Lamb, 113. Compare Berlin, 123. Berlin terms this attitude “frustrating my wishes.” 
“The wider the area of noninterference, the wider my freedom” is the core idea behind the 
position. Hence, to limit a person’s wishes has become, for some, interference with autonomy.
108Brett and McCullough, 1347.
109Beauchamp and Childress, 121.
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autonomy includes such aspects as privacy, consent, confidentiality and choice; however, 
individual autonomy itself has never been an absolute in society. Personal rights and freedoms 
have usually been restricted, for several reasons: to minimise the possibility that a patient will 
harm himself; to minimise harm to others; and to minimise harm from others.110 The view of 
the medical profession that life is of worth, regardless of a patient’s physical circumstances,111 
has historically been founded upon a moral view that places limits on autonomy and feeds the 
debate at a foundational level. The next section of the chapter will examine this issue of 
medical paternalism.
Physician Paternalism 
The medical profession wields a persuasive claim to authority by virtue of professional 
training, technological expertise, and recognised certification. This authority may be viewed in 
several ways.
The Question of Authority 
Physician authority may be earned. Doctors are present at critical transitions in a 
patient’s existence, and they serve as intermediaries between science and private experience.112 
Sickness, by its very nature, creates conditions that promote the patient’s acceptance of his 
physician’s judgment. The doctor offers a personal relationship and authoritative counsel at 
this critical time,113 earning the patient’s trust and, thus, the right to instruct and be followed. 
Others view authority differently. Some patients relinquish their authority to their physicians,
110Cook, Patients * Choice, 228.
mGormally, 131-32.
112Starr, 4.
113Ibid.
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as has already been shown, for a variety of reasons.114 Still others see the exercising of 
authority truncated when some doctors, in an effort to leave the decision-making to their 
patients, provide no leadership at all—even though their patients perceive they cannot make 
these most weighty decisions themselves without their physicians’ guidance.115
Exercising Authority
Factors affecting physicians’ exercising of authority are numerous. First, the level of 
the patient’s competency is one of several such factors affecting the DPR and the exercise of 
physician authority. Differences in age and cognitive ability between doctors and patients also 
sometimes dictate how physicians’ instructions and recommendations are perceived by 
patients.116 Another factor is that doctors typically are motivated by good intentions, having the 
best interests of their patients in mind.117 When a patient entrusts his health into the care of a 
physician, he often voluntarily relinquishes his own autonomy in exchange for his physician’s 
authority. While perhaps not ideal, this exchange of patient autonomy (which can be an 
exercise of autonomy) for physician authority is one of the scenarios sometimes present in the 
DPR.
Another factor associated with physician authority is the setting of the hospital itself. 
Medical decisions in hospital are governed by legal and regulatory guidelines that safeguard
114Schneider, 41. Studies indicate that, while patients wish to be informed about their 
circumstances, a substantial number want neither to make their own medical decisions nor to 
participate in the decisions in a substantial way. The elderly or those with graver illnesses, for 
example, are less likely to want to make their medical decisions.
115Dame Margaret Tumer-Warwick, “Paternalism Versus Patient Autonomy,” Journal 
o f the Royal Society o f Medicine Supplement 87, no. 22 (1994): 16.
116Gary R. Anderson, “Paternalism,” in Health Care Ethics: A Guide for Decision
Makers, ed. Gary R. Andersen and Valerie A. Glesnes-Anderson (Rockville, MD: Aspen 
Publishers, 1987), 179.
117Ibid., 180.
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autonomy.118 Everything from limits placed upon visiting hours to restrictions regarding a 
patient’s diet fall under this category. Physicians, nurses, and other advocates must act as 
liaisons and gatekeepers between patients and the governance of the healthcare system.
A further factor in a physician’s exercising of authority deals with the present reality 
that his decisions affect persons other than his individual patient. Sometimes the patient’s 
wishes or desires, if granted, may impose an unfair burden upon others, particularly if those 
desires would require an inordinate percentage of the common community resources.119 
Prudence in the allocation of resources is a major consideration for all sides in the medical 
debate. Still another reason a physician may exercise authority over a patient’s desires may be 
when the patient’s choices, wishes, or actions violate a medical moral principle.120 All of these 
factors make the exercising of authority a complex issue. Physician authority, no matter how it 
may be perceived, acquired, or administered, coupled with the factors affecting its exercise, 
still requires some justification.
Historically, this justification has been rooted in the principle of physician beneficence. 
While not an exact parallel, the principle is as ancient as the Hippocratic Oath’s injunction to 
“do good,” or at least, to “do no harm.”121 The exercise of this principle of beneficence has 
contributed to some of the tensions concerning patient autonomy in the last three decades, 
especially when the principle has been used by physicians to deny PAS requests from their 
patients or their patients’ families. Nonacquiescence to patient choices, wishes, and actions has
118Ibid., 181.
119Childress, 20. The BMA stresses that in prescribing and treating patients, doctors 
must remember their duty to other patients as well.
120Ibid.
121Hippocrates, Hippocrates, vol. 2, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967. Childress, 18-19. To “do good” does not exactly correspond with to 
“do no harm,” although they are linked by PAS advocates to advocate a change in the historic 
meaning of physician beneficence. See thesis, ch. 1, 32-34.
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received close attention.122 Indeed, it is in this fact that physician authority can often interfere 
with patient autonomy, self-determination, and liberty that raises a question about physician 
paternalism, even if the justification for the physician’s action is that of beneficence. The 
concept of paternalism must first be defined before the claim may be examined as to its 
possible influence on patient autonomy.
Paternalism: Etymology and History 
Paternalism, as defined in the OED, is “the principle and practice of paternal 
administration; government as by a father; the claim or attempt to supply the needs or to 
regulate the life of a nation or a community in the same way a father does those of his 
children.”123 In comparison with the word “autonomy,” the etymology of the word 
“paternalism” is much shorter. In fact, its specific usage dates back only to the 1880s.124
The ancient Hippocratic Oath shows several similarities with the definition of 
paternalism, however, and suggests a longer history to the idea. A Hippocratic physician 
entered into a solemn agreement concerning his medical education. As a pupil, the physician- 
to-be regarded his teacher as equal to his parents.125 The pupil shared his life with his teacher, 
financially supported his teacher, and made the teacher his adopted father.126 The definition, 
“government as by a father,” was modelled upon this relationship. Further, the Hippocratic 
corpus provided the earliest example of a new model of medicine, or medical praxis, which 
was borne out of a theoretical foundation. The Hippocratic physician, then, worked within a 
philosophical structure that was practised in the physician’s moral relationships.
122Tannsjo Torbjom, Coercive Care: The Ethics o f Choice in Health and Medicine 
(London: Routledge, 1999), 5.
m OED, 2d ed., s.v. “Paternalism.”
m OED, 2d ed., dates the origin of the term at 1881.
125Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 39.
126Ibid.
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Some medical historians believe that the Pythagoreans influenced at least part of the 
Hippocratic ideal.127 This may be possible, although little else is known of the Pythagorean 
School other than the prime motive of Pythagorus was his desire to establish a society 
favouring a way of life characterised by morality.128 Edelstein’s internal examination of the 
Gath revealed the Pythagoreans’ influence upon the Hippocratic Oath’s prohibition of 
suicide,129 indicating that the Hippocratic Oath possessed a moral and beneficent tone. The 
Oath’s structure and tone was intended to regulate how physicians were to conduct their 
affairs. The Hippocratic model then, demonstrated medical values and moral commitments in 
the exercise of medical skills, to seek the good, welfare, interests, needs, and values of the one 
being aided.130 The Hippocratic Oath combined these obligations with general rules for 
physicians. It then delineated what constituted physician helpfulness: continence, secrecy, and 
self-regulation.
It may be said that a rudimentary expression of paternalism exists within the principle 
of beneficence, for the principle of beneficence refers first to a moral obligation to act for the 
benefit of others, an ideal that first emerged in the Hippocratic model.131 Paternalism contains 
the Hippocratic ideal that seeks the good, welfare, needs, interests, and values of the one being 
aided, all of which are acts motivated by a desire for the benefit of others and not their harm.132
127Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 15,60-61, 64. Henry E. Sigerist, A History o f 
Medicine: Early Greek, Hindu, and Persian Medicine, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), 231.
128W. H. S. Jones, “Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece,” no. 8, Supplements 
to the Bulletin o f the History o f Medicine, ed. Henry B. Sigerist (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1946), 1.
129Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 15.
130Nigel de S. Cameron, The New Medicine: The Revolution in Technology and Ethics 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 23.
13 Beauchamp and Childress, 260.
132Ibid. Cf. Earl E. Shelp, ed., “To Benefit and Respect Persons: A Challenge for 
Beneficence in Health Care,” Beneficence and Health Care (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing
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Although not equivalent, a physician was, at worst, to do no harm and at best, to do good for 
his patients.
The definition of paternalism includes the secondary statement, “government as by a 
father,” implying a body of knowledge or skill not yet possessed by those the father oversees, 
and the stewardship entrusted to the father to protect or defend the weaker ones in his care. The 
principle of medical beneficence, then, includes the physician’s primary responsibility to use 
his or her knowledge and skill for the patient’s medical benefit.133 It should also be added that, 
as early as Hippocrates,134 physicians were free to rely almost entirely on their own 
judgments135 about the needs of their patients, although medical consultants have been 
routinely used throughout history. It was later when patients began to question the bounds of 
authority in the DPR and suggest that their own opinion should not only be consulted, but, in 
some cases, accepted over those of the medical community. This spirit and attitude emerged in 
Enlightenment thought.
The nineteenth-century institutional churches of Europe rarely protested against the 
status quo. Instead, by their silence, they supported state policies which perpetrated such evils
Co., 1982), 200-201,204.
133Beauchamp and Childress, 272; and Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 227. Cook states that 
patients need the skill, advice, and genuine concern of their doctors. This is part of beneficent 
paternalism, but can lead to negative paternalism when heavy overtones of protection infringe 
upon the patient’s dignity, participation in the DPR, or opportunities for autonomous choice, 
for example. See Harold Y. Vanderpool, “Doctors and the Dying of Patients in American 
History,” in Physician-Assisted Suicide, ed. Robert F. Weir (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 43-47. Vanderpool presents an historical overview of the 
“dreadfulness” of hospital dying from 1952-1970 that reveals a quite different view of 
physician paternalism. Vanderpool writes of a “priority of prolonging life” and of doctors who 
“often cannot bear the thought of losing a patient” (44). Doctors, at times, sought to “control” 
what patients and families knew (45). At other times, patients, whose pain could not be 
controlled, were “euthanized” (45). These actions have been cited to foster an awareness of a 
form of negative paternalism that some patients decry.
134Beauchamp and Childress, 272. The authors cite Epidemics and the celebrated
expression, “As to disease, make a habit of two things--‘to help or at least to do no harm!”’
135Ibid.
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as slavery, child labour, and starvation. Kant advocated liberality of government (as opposed to 
the “illiberality” of tyranny), that was limited to protect life and freedom.136 His view 
recognised an individual’s freedom and capacity to determine his or her own conception of 
happiness and to pursue it so long as the pursuit was undertaken in a lawful fashion.137 It would 
be paternalistic, according to Kant’s view, if a government were to assume total responsibility 
for the happiness of its citizens by predetermining what and how that happiness was to be 
applied to the lives of its citizens.138 In Kant’s day, overt paternalism did not generally spark 
negative responses by citizens. However, post-Enlightenment changes in the meaning and 
application of autonomy to include the individual would reach a stage where conflict erupted 
between autonomy and paternalism.139 The late twentieth century witnessed the repercussions 
of this development.
Paternalism at Work
Paternalism takes varied forms, of which state paternalism and medical paternalism are 
two types that are perceived to restrict individual autonomy. Government in liberal 
democracies, according to Lindley, is premised on the idea that citizens should have the right 
to determine the course of their own lives.140 Although quite narrow in its definition, Feinberg 
explains that paternalism, as the “liberty-limiting” principle called “legal paternalism,” justifies 
state limitations to protect individuals from harming themselves “or, in its extreme version, to
136Sullivan, Introduction to Kant's Ethics, 8.
137Ibid.
138Ibid. Beauchamp and Childress, 273. Kant, according to the authors, was concerned 
with a government that “cancels freedom.”
139See ch. 3,1, for Schneider’s assessment of autonomy.
140Lindley, 9.
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guide them, whether they like it or not, toward their own good.”141 Kantor offers examples of 
“state paternalism” when he writes of compulsory vaccinations or the requirement of 
prescriptions for drugs, although neither of these examples accurately reflects the concept of 
paternalism. His point is that the government, in these cases, limits the liberty of individuals 
for their own sake or for the sake of the population at large.142
In like manner, “medical paternalism” would be exercised when a physician justifies 
patient coercion, albeit subtle coercion, or overrides a patient’s preferences to protect a patient 
from harm. This negative connotation assumes, of course, that there are contrary patient 
preferences that a physician dismisses. The physician might base such action on the principle 
of medical beneficence, but this judgment and its subsequent course of action now raise 
questions related to the current definition of autonomy. Paternalism has come to mean, in late 
twentieth-century medical terminology, the “. . .  interference with a person’s freedom of action 
or freedom of information, or the deliberate dissemination of information, when the alleged 
justification for interfering or misinforming is that it is for the good of the person who is 
interfered with or misinformed.”143 In the presence of such an array of working definitions, 
then, interpreting the term correctly involves several important aspects for consideration.
Several common ingredients of paternalism may be listed at this point. First, 
paternalism includes stewardship or oversight arising from the possession o f certain skills or 
knowledge designed expressly to help others. Next, and similar to the point above, it includes a
141Heta Hayry, The Limits o f Medical Paternalism (London: Routledge, 1991), 51. Joel 
Feinberg, as quoted in Hayry. The author also quotes Jeffrie Murphy (51). He defines 
paternalism as the “coercing of people primarily for what is believed to be their own good.” 
Richard Ameson adds that restrictions on a person’s liberty are justified exclusively by 
consideration of that person’s good or welfare and that the restrictions may be carried out 
either against his present will or against his own prior commitments (52). This, however, is a 
narrow and autonomy-devaluing interpretation.
142Jay E. Kantor, Medical Ethics for Physicians-in-Training (New York: Plenum 
Medical Book Co., 1989), 16-17.
143 Allen E. Buchanan, “Medical Paternalism,” in Paternalism, ed. Rolf Sartorious 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 62.
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desire to exercise oversight in a helpful way through supplying the needs or regulating the life 
of the patient for a specific period o f time—hence, fatherly administration to provide that which 
is lacking. Paternalism also includes, at times, interference with the free choices and decisions 
of a patient in order either to “do good or to prevent harm ” to the patient.144 Lamb writes that 
the principle of autonomy, for all of its history, is a relative latecomer to medical ethics and 
foreign to much of medical practice.145 This would explain part of the reason for current 
conflict in the DPR. The next section of the chapter examines where paternalism might be 
evident as doctors and patients relate to one another.
Where is Paternalism Evident in the Doctor-Patient Relationship?
All things being equal, the DPR is not level ground when a patient consults a doctor 
about his ailment(s). The doctor has knowledge and experience in assessing symptoms, 
rendering diagnoses, and treating illnesses. The patient, being ill and needing some assistance 
in returning to health, exercises his choice in seeking the aid of a physician. The physician, in 
turn, exercises his choice in agreeing to treat the patient. This scenario, although rather 
attenuated in the UK system, occurs each day in healthcare contexts.
A physician seeks to protect the patient who is ill and in a clinic or hospital, and the 
doctor has a plan of treatment that he believes to be the best course of action for the patient. 
The doctor also has a degree of interest and concern for the patient that motivates her to spare 
the patient pain and harm,146 and likely has the wherewithal to make decisions to provide 
direction. The physician, for example, may order an uncomfortable diagnostic procedure which 
may be necessary to determine the best way to alleviate the patient’s pain, and follow up with a
144Compare Cook, Patients * Choices, 227.
145Lamb, n.p. Cf. Beauchamp and Childress, 210. The authors write of the change in 
patients’ judgments in the last thirty years, often very different from the medical values of care
and healing. The popularity of patient autonomy rights as over against physicians’ professional 
obligations toward beneficence has created conflict.
146 Anderson, 178.
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treatment that counteracts the patient’s stated preference against the procedure. In this case, the 
physician may look beyond the patient’s anxiety to provide what she feels is best for her 
patient.
On the other hand, the physician may perform the same diagnostic procedure to 
determine whether the patient’s illness is contagious and poses a health threat to others as 
well.147 In yet more serious cases, a physician may override a patient’s preferences because the 
patient demonstrates limited capacity or impaired cognitive ability, such as the after-effects of 
a seizure or the result of a stroke. All of these physician actions have been labelled 
“paternalism” by advocates of patient autonomy, although one would be hard-pressed to find 
the negative consequences to patients in these examples implied by the definitions used by 
Buchanan and others.
A true and deeper level of negative paternalism may occur when the physician 
dismisses a patient’s request altogether without observing the mutual respect necessary in an 
effective DPR. For example, the doctor may think that his expertise or skill leads him to 
believe that the patient’s choice would be harmful, that it would not faithfully represent that 
patient’s normal course of action, or even the careful choice of a normally prudent person.148 In 
some instances a physician may disseminate only partial information or disregard a patient’s 
request for information if he feels this may be of harm to the patient.149 When physicians act in
147Battin, The Death Debate, 147-48. Battin terms “soft” paternalism as a doctor’s 
action that is justified because of a patient’s illness or because a patient is inadequately 
informed. “Hard” paternalism takes place when a doctor overrides a patient’s actions when he 
perceives the harm to his patient to be very great.
148Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts,” in The Theory and Practice 
o f Autonomy, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 124. Hard paternalism, according to Dworkin, is sometimes justified 
even if the action is fully voluntary on the part of a person.
149Buchanan, “Medical Paternalism,” 62. See Vandeipool at thesis, ch. 3, 178, 
footnote 133.
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these ways, these actions have the potential to influence negatively their relationships with 
their patients150 who often consider such actions to be “negatively paternalistic.”
The impact of paternalism upon the DPR is significant in that both physicians and 
patients have offered compelling surface arguments to justify behaviours based upon 
paternalism or autonomy. At the heart of the discussion lies physician and patient values, many 
of which have moral overtones. For example, the physician’s own feelings and beliefs can be 
powerful. In the case of a physician who does not believe it is right for him to assist a patient in 
suicide, it is not likely that he will choose to suppress his personal convictions for the sake of 
patient autonomy.151 Patient autonomy advocates do not often question kind intentions on the 
part of physicians. However, deliberate interferences with the preferences of patients are an 
open source of conflict, and Mill’s harm principle for support of physician noninterference has 
become their philosophical warrant.152 These advocates insist that unless someone other than 
the patient is in jeopardy, the patient’s request should be granted.153
These moral reflections on the parts of patients and physicians are heightened when the 
patient requests that the physician assist him with suicide. If the patient is ill and a physician 
interferes with a general treatment regimen, this action provokes less tension in the paternalism 
debate than if the patient is terminally ill and his physician interferes with his request for 
assistance with suicide. The competing views in the PAS debate are at such a level of intensity
150Of course, the potential necessarily exists, even if only with attendant family 
members, because the fact is that some patients either do not know of their physicians’ 
decisions or do not care.
151 van der Maas and Emanuel, “Factual Findings,” 166.
152Mill, “On Liberty,” 135. “. . .  the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical, or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”
153Compare Glover, 75. See also Rachels, End o f Life, 181. Rachels believes there 
should be no interference with autonomy unless a person is harming another. He also believes 
one should not interfere with a person even if it is for his own good.
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that the physician’s refusal to assist the patient with suicide then becomes a much graver aspect 
of the dialogue.
The two scenarios are different in the respect that, in the latter situation, the physician is 
requested to act contrary to an established medical principle, even though autonomy advocates 
now claim that “mercy” is an appropriate physician response to a patient’s request for 
assistance with suicide and that, sometimes, the proper response is for that physician to assist 
with that suicide. The argument claims that, should the physician comply with the request, he 
would thereby demonstrate his kind intent which is encompassed within the principle of 
physician beneficence. The physician is left tom between two arguments. If he chooses not to 
comply with the request, he is most likely deemed to be “unmerciful” or paternalistic. If he 
agrees to assist with the suicide, he chooses an action which runs contrary to the established 
norms of historic medical practice.
Summary
Opponents of PAS often cite the Hippocratic tradition in support of physician 
paternalism, even though the Hippocratic tradition weakens at the point of its deontological 
nature and lack of grounding in any theory of values.154 Conversely, strong advocates of patient 
autonomy believe individuals ought to be granted the greatest degree of autonomy possible, all 
the while acknowledging that safeguarding autonomy also means protecting both physicians 
and patients from deeper degrees of negative paternalism.155
This complexity of the arguments for and against autonomy and paternalism lead to 
questions regarding appropriate actions for both patients and physicians in the DPR. The ability 
to determine clearly where physician paternalism may be beneficial, and when it may interfere 
negatively with the patient’s autonomy, is blurred by a lack of mutual agreement in the DPR.
154Pellegrino, Humanism, 99.
155Glover, 74.
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The issues are muddied still further by the fact that a patient’s desire for medical aid may 
indeed imply a preference for paternalistic intervention in the first place. Mill believed that an 
individual best knew his own interests, but that the nature of medicine was such that the 
physician often asserted, and even co-opted, the patient’s own “best response” to the physical 
illness. Mill believed that this interference was a greater evil than any errors a person, 
physician or patient, might otherwise make.156 This dilemma of patient autonomy versus 
physician paternalism leads to a further question.
If patients are fearful of the potential present misuse of physician knowledge or 
authority in the DPR,157 then the potential future misuse of an argument from mercy bears 
implications as well. This means that a physician, who has authority to use the knowledge and 
means necessary to terminate life, might interject his values about this form of “mercy” in a 
way that is harmful to patient preferences.158 Moral concerns surface at this level of discussion 
about positive and negative paternalism that require an examination of a final PAS feature, the 
SL, which will be examined in the final section of the chapter.
Sanctity of Life 
Introduction
Having examined the historical and philosophical interrelationship between autonomy 
and the DPR within the context of the PAS and HU debate, the argument seems to coalesce at a
156See Dworkin, “Paternalism,” in “Paternalism,” ed. Rolf Sartorius (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 25; first published in The Monist 56, no. 1 (January 
1972): 65.
157Pellegrino, Humanism, 120.
158Battin, Death Debate, 145. Physician paternalism, for example, might range from 
simply helping to undo “antiquated suicide arguments” brought on by superstition or fear to 
altering circumstances in cases where, in what would otherwise seem to be an irrational and 
undesired choice for suicide, the decision for suicide becomes both rational and desired.
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crucial underlying and deeply held value; namely, the “SL.”159 The claim of this chapter is that 
the DPR is currently being influenced by a new, and perhaps different, emphasis on patient 
autonomy causing, in turn, changes in the way the notion of “SL” is being viewed by medical 
decision-makers. Both doctors and patients believe that human life carries deep significance 
and value and is to be accorded the utmost respect; nonetheless, interpretations and 
applications of this fundamental principle of respect for life often vary greatly within the 
D p r 160 One of the more simplistic reasons for differences in the interpretation and application 
of the SL principle could be attributed to the varied virtue-characteristics that both patient 
autonomy and physician paternalism presently exhibit and pursue. In an “autonomy model,” 
qualities like respect for autonomy and privacy take the forefront, while in a “paternalistic 
model,” virtues like beneficence, care, and compassion are chief.161 These differences in view 
may occur anywhere along a spectrum that includes medical tests and procedures, end-of-life 
decision-making and, in some instances, a patient’s request for physician-aid-with suicide.162 A 
person’s own view about life’s value, whether that person is the doctor or the patient can, and 
often does, influence decisions.163
159See ibid., 99. Battin acknowledges that the principle of the value of life in Western 
culture has primarily Judeo-Christian origins, and is also called the principle of SL. She also 
states that although the term “sanctity” locates the roots in “conceptions of life as God- 
created,” the term is used widely in current bioethics discussions without religious import. 
Terms like “value of life,” “respect for life,” “SL,” “inviolability of life,” and other like 
concepts are used reciprocally. This thesis will employ the term “SL” in its global sense, being 
inclusive of, but not limited to, religious import, unless so noted.
160For example, see thesis, 193-94, for discussion of patient values that may now be 
different from medical values and run counter to the established medical professional 
obligation of beneficence.
161Beauchamp and Childress, 272-73,464.
162See thesis, 182-83, for the larger moral reflection on the aspect of positive liberty 
emphases which have emerged in discussions of patient autonomy in the DPR.
163Pellegrino, Humanism, 100-101. Pellegrino writes that the physician is also a person, 
like the patient, whose values “invariably” colour his professional acts. Pellegrino would likely 
agree that values about the SL figure into these judgments.
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Of late, however, while some PAS advocates claim that respect for a person’s 
individual autonomy sometimes obliges a physician to assist a terminally ill patient with 
suicide, serious conflict has ensued inside culture and medicine over such a claim. The conflict 
could be viewed simply as one philosophical flashpoint along a battleffont between autonomy 
and physician paternalism, yet the intensity of the reaction suggests that something even deeper 
than philosophical differences has occurred. That which has triggered the conflict seems to be 
the result of the moral significance attached to the claim. The value assigned to the human 
species, especially at the end of life when illness prevails, runs deeply through the present 
discussion in culture and medicine. Yet, the claim of this section is that a lack of agreement 
within common morality concerning a value-basis for life’s “sanctity” hinders the reaching of a 
moral consensus on PAS and other forms of medical killing.
This section of the thesis, therefore, will examine issues relating to SL from the moral 
perspective that recent autonomy discussions have brought into the DPR. The discussion will 
include an examination of key features that shed light upon the debate: definitions and usage of 
the term, an historical overview of the traditional medical “SL” perspective; divergent claims 
represented by “SL” and “Quality of Life” (QL) advocates; how end-of-life treatment decisions 
have been impacted by dehumanizing cost and technological advances; and the moral 
significance of such pivotal end-of-life decisions raised by the examination of the SL value.
“Sanctity of Life”: Etymology and Usage
The “SL” principle is not a formal concept listed in dictionaries like the OED. The 
“idea” is an amalgam that has been developed from two complementary sources: revelation 
(theological) and reason (natural law and philosophy).164 SL from a Christian perspective is 
rooted in the doctrine of God as Creator and holds that humanity, having been created in God’s
164Fisher, 316. See also Singer, 84. Singer recognises both the religious and secular 
facets to SL, but approaches the principle from a secular perspective in this work.
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image, is infinitely precious to God and made for an eternal destiny.165 The core of the religious 
principle holds that one ought never intentionally to kill the innocent. God’s law/command 
explicitly forbids the taking of innocent human life.166 Human dignity also belongs intrinsically 
to human beings equally, including the notion that one cannot lose one’s inherent human 
dignity by acting in ways that are at variance with human dignity.167 Traditional secular 
versions of the principle of sanctity of human life stress the equal dignity of all citizens.168 
Broadly, human dignity or worth currently depends upon two requirements: a human being 
having “developed presently exercisable psychological abilities for understanding, choice, and 
rational communication” and a human being “actually exercising such abilities in the 
enjoyment of an acceptable quality of life.”169
Regardless of the SL position one adopts, the fusion of ideas contained within SL is 
deeply embedded in law and ethics throughout the world, is expressed in human rights’ 
documents, and is basic to common morality.170 The phrase, “SL,” originates from a number of 
streams which converge into a “values-pool.” The specific application of the word-idea
165 Westminster Dictionary o f Christian Ethics, s.v., “life, sacredness of.”
166Exod. 20:13.
167Gormally, 119. Gormally states, “. . .  one ought never to adopt any course of action 
or omission intended to terminate the life of an innocent human being.”
168Ibid.
169Ibid., 120. See also Singer, 125-26. Singer believes an “irreplaceable being” is one 
who is conscious of himself as a being existing not only at the present, but also as a being who 
existed in the past, and who will probably exist in the future.
170Explanations of SL vary along a spectrum. Fisher, 317. Fisher states that the idea has 
informed medical ethics as far back as Hippocrates. See Carrick, 134-36. Carrick states that the 
Hippocratic Oath centres our attention on “. . .  the value and respect we may or may not ascribe 
to human life.” He also states that the Oath “proclaims a bias” that favours life and the living 
and it makes no apology for it. See also Daniel Callahan, “Defending the Sanctity of Life,” 
Society 38, no. 5 (July/August 2001): 16. Callahan writes that the phrase “SL” is not a 
traditional religious concept and has “no fixed meaning.” See also Singer, 84. Singer states that 
SL is “deeply rooted in our society and is enshrined in our law.” See also thesis, ch. 2, 84, 
footnote 144.
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depends upon, among other elements, the perspectives from which the streams emerged and ~ 
the eras or contexts in which its concepts were both defined and applied.
Definitions and Usage 
Callahan believes that almost nothing is more important for human welfare than 
humans deciding how they will value themselves.171 Yet, for all of its import, there is no 
commonly held definition for the cluster of descriptors which define the value of human life. 
The OED, for example, has no definition listed for the term “SL,” although the separate 
cognates are clearly enumerated throughout history. This quest for the meaning and value of 
life is as old as Hellenism.
Historical Medical Perspectives: Sanctity of Life
Ancient Greece
The Hippocratic position on respect for human life, as has been demonstrated,172 was 
likely influenced by the Pythagorean strict belief in foregoing any action that might 
prematurely end another person’s life. Life was believed to be in the possession of God.173 The 
medical view of life has included a devotion to human interests among which one focus—the 
protection of human life—has been anciently rooted in principles within the Hippocratic 
Corpus.174 One such Hippocratic principle, “to help, or at least do no harm,”175 has served as a
171Callahan, “Defending the Sanctity of Life,” 18.
172See thesis, ch. 2,125-26, for discussion of Pythagorean influence on the Hippocratic 
proscription against killing.
173Carrick, 134-36. Yet, importantly, not even the Pythagoreans chose to endorse the
respect for human life ethic unconditionally. The Pythagoreans and Christians, for that matter,
did not hold that human bodily life had absolute value per se simply because it was human life.
They would not have endorsed such a secular principle. The value placed upon human life by
Pythagoreans and Christians was conditional, at least partly, on the higher principle that God
valued man. See also Phaedo, 62b-c where Socrates states that the gods are the keepers of men,
and that men are one of their possessions.
#
174J. K. Mason, Human Life and Medical Practice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1988), 3-4. Mason provides an overview of the move within medicine from the
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primary medical standard that guided physicians toward supporting a basic human goal—that is, 
health.176
Hippocratic medical humanism established, and still maintains, several key elements 
that stem from a belief in the SL. One of the most important of these elements is the concern 
for the patient’s well-being.177 This concern, documented as long ago as ancient Greece, 
describes physicians and physician helpers assisting the patient by promoting in the patients 
hope, courage, and trust.178 The Hippocratic physician believed that health was beneficial,179 
and he practised his craft with the intent to cure and restore the patient.180 This seeking to cure 
patients was tempered by the reality that not every disease could be healed; nevertheless, an 
overall intention to improve the quality of the patient’s life was central to his craft. The
Hippocratic position of endowing life with an absolute value to a position of preserving QL.
He states that this indicates a shift away from the historic Hippocratic position.
175Hippocrates, “Epidemics I,” in Hippocrates, vol. I, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1923), 165.
176Thomas Percival, PercivaVs Medical Ethics, ed. Chauncey D. Leake (Baltimore,
MD: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1927; reprint, Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger Publishing 
Co., 1975), 19. Leake comments that the Greeks “did not bother” about the details of ethical 
practice. The guiding principle was that the physician should help or at least “do no harm” to 
suffering humanity.
177Chauncey D. Leake, “The Humanist Tradition in the Health Professions,” 1,4. 
Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 63. Edelstein says the Oath was true in the sense that it enjoined 
the physician to be helpful. He writes that at the end of antiquity, medical practice began to 
conform to the state of affairs which the Oath had envisioned. Carrick, 89.
178Leake, 3.
179Carrick, 36. The Hippocratic School adapted to the medical needs of patients. In the 
Classical period, patients tended to be the wealthy patrons who were able to follow the regimen 
of proper exercise, climate, diet, rest, etc. prescribed by physicians. In the Hellenistic period, 
economic necessity and the political pressures of being an “active, involved middle-class 
citizen trying to earn a decent living” may have forced a change in the thinking of some. 
Citizens were likely to modify their belief in perfect health and settle for one that was more 
suited to the business of their day. In either view, the physician sought to improve the health of 
the patient.
180Ibid., 69, 83. Taking into account the differing viewpoints about the meaning of the 
statements on abortion and euthanasia (4), a Hippocratic physician placed a high value on 
human life both individually and in relationship with others (8).
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physician practised medicine within a community of like-minded physicians, all of whom, 
ideally, aimed to deliver patients back into their community relationships.181 In fact, the desire 
to restore a patient to wellness was because life itself was considered to be a “good.” The ethos 
of medicine centred on preserving life, and even though the SL principle cannot be said to have 
been binding for all physicians, it can be said that there was a generally held duty to protect 
life.182
In this way, medical humanism in the Hippocratic era generally elevated the value 
placed upon human life. Likewise, Hippocratic medical humanism helped to establish a 
synergy between the physician and patient,183 based upon the common desire for patient 
wellness which resulted in a moral bond between them. This bond was to last for centuries and 
served medicine well.184 The Hippocratic Oath, indeed, gained general acceptance in the future 
Christian eras, particularly undergirding medical opinion as it hardened against suicide and 
abortion.185
181Ibid., 69-70. Sections P2 and P7-P8 all indicate an interrelatedness between physician 
and patient as well as physician and community.
182Ibid., 167.
183Hippocrates, “Epidemics I,” 165. Hippocrates believed that the physician was servant 
of the art, and that the patient was to “co-operate” with the physician in combating his disease.
184Pellegrino, Humanism, 99. Pellegrino adds that a further reason for a change in views 
about the Oath is that its norms are no longer regarded as unchanging absolutes (97). It became 
a contention in the most recent thirty years, when patient claims became the primary focus in 
the DPR, that the Oath did not leave room for a consideration of patient values. The claim was 
that the Oath was written by physician(s) for physicians, that patient values about life at times 
run counter to those of doctors, and that the Oath itself may be no longer adequate to inform 
physician values.
185BMA, Handbook, 9.
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The Christian Era
After the Pythagorean and Hippocratic eras, the high ideals of the Oath in regard to 
SL were picked up and broadcast strongly through Christianity in the following centuries.186 
Christians made the value of “bodily life at least partly if not totally conditional on the higher 
and antecedent principle that God valued man.”187 In the early Christian era, this high view of 
human value grew. The Middle Ages, where doctors were most often priests, assured the 
continuance of this sort of religious SL view.188
As time passed, the Hippocratic Oath became the nucleus of all medical ethics in all 
epochs and in all countries in which monotheism in its purely religious or secularised form was 
the accepted creed—even the “embodiment of truth.”189 Jews, Christians, and Arabs felt the 
Oath’s impact. The “mediaeval” doctors, men of the Renaissance, scientists of the 
Enlightenment, and scholars of the nineteenth century also embraced the ideals therein.190
The Hippocratic Code called for a deep concern the physicians were to show for 
their patients. The translation from its broad principles of high standards for health caretakers, 
however, began to decline when cultural, political, and technological changes brought about 
the arrival of the Great Industrial Revolution.191 It was Thomas Percival’s (1740-1804) Code o f  
Medical Ethics that served as a bridge between two paradigms.
186Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 63-64. The Oath was a bridge between “heathendom” 
and the new belief, Christianity, that found agreement with its principles.
187Carrick, 136.
188See thesis, ch. 2,127.
189Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 64.
190Ibid.
191See thesis, 150-61, for a parallel discussion of the growth of autonomy and 
corresponding cultural changes from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment.
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The Great Industrial Revolution to the Present
Roughly, the eighteenth century was the period when modem medical ethics emerged, 
and when the middle classes were “undermining the aristocratic order, and with it the tripartite 
establishment of physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries.”192 It was not until Percival that the 
transition was made to the current medical system, when he formulated a code of medical 
ethics that was based upon the Hippocratic ideal, but was also adapted and well-suited for the 
time in which he lived.193 Part of his contribution to medical humanism was the assumption 
that the proper goal of medicine was the patient’s best medical interest, and on this basis he 
reached conclusions about the physician’s character traits.194 His Code became a guidebook for 
interpersonal relationships between physicians and patients and became the foundation for 
medical codes that followed.195 His ethics identified an unresolved tension that began to emerge 
between patient benefit and the development of medical science.196 While it may not be said 
that patients or physicians were yet fully conscious of this tension in Percival’s day, he exposed
192BMA, Handbook, 9-10.
193Percival, 1. Leake qualifies the meaning of “medical ethics” with the statement that 
Percival’s ethics referred “chiefly” to the rules of Percival’s etiquette developed in the medical 
profession. It aimed to regulate the professional contacts members of the medical profession 
had with one another. See also Pellegrino, Humanism, 119. Pellegrino states that Percival 
adapted the Oath to the spirit of eighteenth-century England.
194Beauchamp and Childress, 465. See also Percival, 20,23-24, 36-37. Percival’s work 
helped with the transition from the broad principles of Greek medical ethics to the current 
system. The eighteenth century was a period when the philosophical significance of law and 
order in nature became generally appreciated. Prior to Percival, the medical profession tried 
generally to manage its ethical problems on the basis of good taste and personal honour, but 
Percival changed the emphasis in medicine to rules of proper conduct. His work was limited in 
scope, however, in that it did not draw a clear distinction between the incidental etiquette of 
medical practice and the fundamental ethical problems of the profession.
195Beauchamp and Childress, 465. Cf. Thomas Tung and Claude H. Organ Jr., “Ethics 
in Surgery: Historical Perspectives,” Archives o f Surgery 135, no. 1 (January 2000): 1; internet, 
available at http://archsurg.ama-assn.org./issues/vl35nl/full/ssa9023.html; accessed 28 
January 2000.
196Lisbett Haakonssen, Medicine and Morals in the Enlightenment: John Gregory, 
Thomas Percival and Benjamin Rush, Wellcome Institute Series in the History of Medicine 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), 149.
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the incipient strain that would eventually become open conflict in the present-day DPR. When 
physician values and goals about life and health, ever-advancing medical technology, and 
differing patient goals intersect in a context where patient autonomy has gained preeminence, 
the potential for schism seems inevitable. Percival’s work was, in this way, a laboratory in 
which this incipient DPR conflict provided a rudimentary theoretical framework for addressing 
physician and patient concerns.
Mill, with HU, sought to provide a more empirical view of life and its value than had 
previously been established through the centuries. The ethos of Hippocratic medicine had 
centred on preserving life, and while an SL principle was not considered to be binding upon 
physicians, there was a generally physician-recognised duty to protect life.197 Christianity 
provided a SL underpinning through the centuries, especially with its prohibitions against 
killing.198 The Christian SL view was conditioned upon the higher and antecedent principle that 
God gave value to man.199 Mill, however, sought to replace such an a priori understanding of 
life with his empirical HU approach. He represents a point of departure from history in that he 
proffered a scientific approach to moral concerns, not the least of which was ethical concerns 
related to securing for individuals self-protection and self-development. His HU introduced a 
truly secular approach to moral decision-making,200 an approach that would portend conflict for 
traditional Hippocratic medical ethics. By introducing a qualitative PH dimension to HU, Mill 
also, quite unknowingly, provided a platform for future individual PH quality of life claims to 
be lobbied for in a wide range of social areas. One such area would be the DPR.
197Ibid., 191.
198Ibid.
199Ibid., 192.
200The claims of deity and/or the Church would no longer necessarily shape SL 
considerations.
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In eras to follow, medical codes were written with a mixture of professional 
obligations, ideals, and virtues, but always influenced by Hippocratic’s and Percival’s medical 
ethics. For example, the 1957 code of the American Medical Association listed the prime 
objective of the medical profession as rendering service to humanity. The physician was bound 
in the code to be upright, pure in character,201 and diligent and conscientious in caring for the 
sick. It also endorsed several Hippocratic virtues, and most significantly, the Hippocratic 
proscription against medical killing.202 Medicine still sustained the Hippocratic respect for the 
SL.203
Current Medical Situations
Physicians have, from the time of Hippocrates, both justified the use of authority and 
exercised it fully in the DPR, under the guiding principle of beneficence. Conflict emerged in 
the DPR, as the last section of the thesis described,204 at the point of beneficence or a 
physician’s nonacquiescence with his patient’s choices, wishes, and actions when those choices 
would lead to medical killing.205 Both patient autonomy and physician paternalism viewpoints 
offer reasonable surface arguments, but sharp differences exist between the positions and an 
impasse seems to remain.
Differences between physician and patient values often surface whenever a physician 
interferes with, or overrides, a patient preference, but most especially with end-of-life
201Percival, 20. Leake writes that the simple criterion of medical etiquette for physicians 
for two thousand years has been professional dignity. The criterion includes leading a pure and 
moral life, and trying to be, in the “highest sense of the word,” a philosopher. Whether most 
physicians today would agree with this statement is clearly another matter.
202See the AMA’s Code o f Medical Ethics, 1957.
203The Hippocratic values, while serving as a guide to those within the profession, were 
not, as yet, reflective of patient input.
204See thesis, ch. 3, 184-85.
205See thesis, 175, footnote 119. See also Torbjom, 5; and Pellegrino, Humanism, 98; 
and see thesis, 174-76.
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decisions. Supporters of patient autonomy have called for physicians to assist patients with 
suicide when those patients state such a preference, believing that this is sometimes the 
merciful response to a terminal illness. Although this is a different moral argument than the 
values-variations cited above, the repeated cry for sanctioned mercy-killing has become louder 
in the most recent three decades, but not solely as a result of evolving medical technologies 
that have made it possible to extend life well beyond former normal limits. The emerging 
medical wizardry has been but a precipitating cause and must not be mistaken for the crisis 
itself. The current focus over satisfying patient desires evolved over the centuries as seeds of 
autonomy were planted, nurtured, and eventually grew into a full-orbed humanism that 
demonstrates, at times, differing core values from medical paternalism.
At the heart of the issue are the varying values concerning the meaning of “life” and 
who exercises control over “life.” Traditional medical paternalism holds to a view of life, the 
“SL” position, which increasingly runs counter to the current view of patient autonomy.206 This 
latter view of autonomy, which includes the individual’s qualitative, self-calculation of PH, 
and developed through the centuries, seeks to ensure that man is given complete moral freedom 
to make decisions about his life without any external interference.
Sanctity of Life
The SL position is comprised of two parts: first, that “the value of life exceeds all other 
values” and, second, that “all lives are of equal value.”207 As such, this position is neither
206Gormally, 118.
207Peter Suber, “Against the Sanctity of Life”; internet, available at http://www.earlham. 
edu/~peters/ writing/sanctity.htm.; accessed 23 November 2003. See also “Euthanasia”; 
internet, available at http://bbc.co.uk/religion/ethics/sanctity_life/ euthasanct.shtml; accessed 
23 November 2003. The BBC online article states that human life is a basic good or a “good in 
itself rather than as a means to an end.” The article also states that “all human beings are to be 
valued, irrespective of age, sex, race, social status or their potential for achievement.”
Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, 11. Dworkin states this view in terms of abortion and also 
euthanasia. He also terms the sacredness (sanctity) of life view as life’s intrinsic value.
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originally nor solely n traditional religious concept,208 although the world’s major religions 
categorically affirm life’s sanctity. The point is that the principle, from a secular perspective, 
states that all human life has intrinsic value, and that all human life is presumed to have rights 
and interests that are worthy of protection.209 The principle is not an isolated or recent concept, 
having a history that dates back to the time of Hippocrates210 In more recent times, the essence 
of this position on life’s value has been incorporated into the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights.211
The flurry of interest surrounding the principle is due, in part, to the rise of medical 
technologies that make possible the prolongation of life itself. Doctors have the dual 
responsibility to preserve life and to ease suffering and, as Cook states, sometimes these two 
aims conflict.212 Sometimes doctors and their patients have difficult choices to make because 
SL does not mean that life must be preserved at all costs.213 Traditional moral and ethical 
formulations that sought to articulate value judgments were always difficult, but have become 
increasingly complex in light of life-preservation technologies. Names like Anthony Bland and 
Karen Quinlan have become household names and their circumstances reminders of the 
powerful technologies that can sustain life almost indefinitely. Many thinkers, both inside and 
outside of the medical community, now question the reasonableness of sustaining life at all 
costs.
208Callahan, “Defending the Sanctity of Life,” 16. See also Richard M. Gula, 
Euthanasia: Moral and Pastoral Perspectives (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994), 25. See also 
Cook, Patients’ Choice, 161.
209Gula, 25. Callahan, “Defending the Sanctity of Life,” 16.
210Callahan, “Defending the Sanctity of Life,” 16.
211Ibid. Article 2 states that “everyone has a right to life, liberty, and security of person” 
and Article 6 states that “everyone has a right to recognition everywhere as a person before the 
law.”
212Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 133.
213Ibid., 161.
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Current Changes in the Sanctitv-of-Life View
Medical tradition, until most recently, favoured the view that the patient’s treatment 
was determined primarily, perhaps above all, according to the judgment of the doctor, who 
usually called for maximum life preservation.214 This idea is longstanding, for it links back to 
the deep-seated Hippocratic principle that reflects maximum life preservation as the doctor’s 
primary “duty to do no harm” to his patient.215 The good doctor did not always seek to preserve 
life at all costs, but the good doctor did act humanely. Even the PAS advocates argue that the 
good doctor always “helped” the patient on his or her way when appropriate. The features of 
medical humanism to heal, or be o f benefit, or to do no harm to patients, have remained largely 
unchallenged throughout the centuries;216 yet, in recent years a new emphasis has been added— 
that of planned death. Death itself has always been an acknowledged medical reality; yet the 
practice of medicine, until recently, has never been fixated upon “death delivery” or bringing 
about the death of patients. The recent attempt by PAS advocates to incorporate “merciful 
killing” within medical humanism is without precedent in the codes of medical ethics. Thus, 
the addition of merciful killing to the philosophy or practice of medical humanism introduces a 
new principle that is contrary to the established medical ethos of benefiting, or preserving, life.
Do No Harm: The Principle of Nonmaleficence
Opponents of physician-aid-in-dying cite the Principle of Nonmaleficence (NM) as a 
defence against physician involvement in medical-killing. NM undergirds a physician’s 
obligation not to inflict harm intentionally to a patient.217 This principle historically has been
214Cantor, 1.
215Stuart J. Homer, Professional Opinion: Medical Ethics in England in the Eighteenth 
Century, occasional paper no. 3 (Preston, Lancashire: Centre for Professional Ethics,
University of Central Lancashire, 1997), 3.
216See 152-53, footnotes 9-13.
217Beauchamp and Childress, 189.
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associated closely with the maxim, “Above all [or first] do no harm.”218 Even though the origin 
of this saying is obscure, and is not expressly stated within the Hippocratic corpus, 
nevertheless, an obligation of beneficence and of NM is clearly expressed in the Hippocratic 
Oath219 although, in its day, not all physicians bound themselves to its precepts. The Oath 
introduced an incipient form of beneficence and NM which developed along the centuries into 
its present form. In a time when no “medical industry” existed as such, physicians were 
beginning to demonstrate an overall respect for life and its preservation-still one-sided, 
because the Oath was written by physicians for physicians. Unlike the present-day DPR, the 
patient’s perspective was not in view at this time.
In the current climate of technological and scientific-medical advances, however, the 
patient’s view has taken precedence. The historical development of the Hippocratic orientation 
toward physician duty and the SL perspective no longer provide the sole basis for medical 
decision-making. Beauchamp and Childress recognise that many present-day controversies in 
biomedical ethics involve the terminally ill, the seriously ill, and the injured, so they propose a 
framework for decision-making about “life-sustaining” procedures and assistance-in-dying that 
differs from the traditional model. At the centre of their framework is an interpretation of the 
principle of NM that sanctions, rather than “suppresses,” QL judgments.220 Assuming a stance 
that is characteristically utilitarian, Beauchamp and Childress state that utilitarians and non-
218Ibid. The actual key to understanding NM, though, relates to how “harm” is 
interpreted. Advocates for both sides of the PAS debate use the term. For example, PAS 
advocates charge that harm may be found in keeping the patient alive and continuing his 
suffering. PAS opponents argue that harm occurs when the physician helps to end the life.
219See ch. 2,130-34, for the discussion of euthanasia as it was defined and practised in 
Ancient Greece. The Hippocratic Oath says, “I will use treatment to help the sick according to 
my ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them.” In Ancient Greece, a
general “do no harm” principle arising from an intention to help patients prevailed, although 
some Pre-Christian Greek or Roman physicians participated in voluntary euthanasia.
220Beauchamp and Childress, 189-90.
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utilitarians alike hold to a principle of NM,221 and that QL assessments are often linked to 
treatment choices. Beauchamp and Childress propose a framework that would allow “patients, 
guardians, and healthcare professionals” in certain circumstances to accept or refuse treatments 
after considering the “benefits and burdens of those treatments.”222
Ordinary Versus Extraordinary Treatments
Several guidelines, one of which pertains to extraordinary (heroic) and ordinary 
treatment, have developed in “religious traditions, philosophical discourse, professional codes, 
and the law to specify requirements of NM in health care.”223 Certain distinctions between 
ordinary and extraordinary treatments have been used to justify and condemn decisions to give 
up life-sustaining treatments. The distinction has been employed to help determine whether an 
act that results in death should count as killing, especially as culpable killing.224 This difference 
has implications for a traditional SL view. In an earlier time, it was used by Roman Catholic 
theologians to deal with the problem of surgery before the development of antisepsis and 
anaesthesia. At that time it was used to help determine whether a patient’s refusal of treatment 
should be considered a suicide. Refusal of ordinary means of treatment was long considered a 
suicide, but the refusal of extraordinary means was not.225 Traditionally, the rule held that
221Ibid., 190.
222Ibid.
223Ibid., 196. The other guidelines are: withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment, artificial feeding and life-sustaining medical technologies, and intended effects and 
merely foreseen effects. Beauchamp and Childress argue that these distinctions, including the 
extraordinary and ordinary treatments above, are all untenable. They suggest that these 
traditional distinctions are outdated and are even, in some instances, morally dangerous. The 
authors recommend that these distinctions be replaced by the distinction between obligatory 
and optional means of treatment and by an account of the benefit-burden ratio. For a 
representative statement of the sixteenth-century Roman Catholic origin of the terminology, 
“ordinary” and “extraordinary treatment,” see also Wennberg, 125-27.
224Beauchamp and Childress, 200.
225Ibid. Families and physicians also were not held to be culpable if they withheld or 
withdrew extraordinary means of treatment from patients.
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ordinary treatments could not be abandoned, but that extraordinary treatments could be 
legitimately waived.226 This rule has a well-known history in medical practice, legal decisions, 
and Roman Catholic casuistry.227
The rationale undergirding this distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means is 
the idea that there is a crucial moral difference between intentionally halting ordinary 
treatment and intentionally halting extraordinary treatment.228 In the traditional view, life 
implied “benefit” and death implied “harm.”229 The distinction is cast into urgent terms when 
terminal illness is at the forefront of treatment decisions. This difficulty lies in the tension 
between the physician’s care for his patient’s ultimate well-being, his duty to “heal,” the limits 
that might be imposed on the physician in light of a “SL” ethic that absolutely prohibits the 
intentional termination of life, and his view of all human life as of infinite value and intrinsic 
worth.230 The BMA states accurately that a noticeable shift has occurred toward more decision­
making being based on “QL” assessments, particularly in the US, where the issue of patient 
autonomy and the QL of a particular patient would be adjudged either acceptable or
226Beauchamp and Childress, 200. See also Richard A. McCormick, “Quality of Life, 
The Sanctity of Life,” Hastings Center Report 8, no. 1 (February 1978): 30.
227Beauchamp and Childress, 200.
228Helga Kuhse, “Debate: Extraordinary Means and the Sanctity of Life,” Journal o f 
Medical Ethics 7, no. 2 (June 1981): 74. Beauchamp and Childress, 200-202. Medical 
professionals are not in complete agreement as to what type of treatment falls within each 
category. The terminology originated with Roman Catholic theologians who used the 
distinction to determine whether a “patient’s refusal of treatment should be classified as a 
suicide” (200). At one time, a refusal of ordinary means of treatment was considered to be a 
suicide, but the refusal of extraordinary means of treatment was not. Beauchamp and Childress 
believe such criteria that seek to distinguish between ordinaiy and extraordinary treatment is 
relevant only “if some deeper moral consideration makes them relevant” (201). The authors 
conclude that the traditional terminology of ordinary (“usual” and “customary”) and 
extraordinary (“unusual” and “uncustomary”) treatment is “morally irrelevant” (202).
229BMA, Medical Ethics Today, 154.
230Kuhse, 75.
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unacceptable.231 Afet, QL decision-making in the modem medical arena involves necessarily 
broader considerations than either a patient autonomy model or physician-beneficence model 
indicate.
Influences Upon “Quality of Life” Decision-making
QL is both discussed and used as a qualifier under the rubric of “healthcare.” However, 
the difficulty is in knowing how to measure such a gauge. One thing is clear in a pluralistic 
culture. No absolute value is placed on life itself.232 An emphasis upon QL is pervasive in the 
contemporary culture. Life, for most individuals, must be perceived as worth the living and, as 
such, must contain some measurable quantifier of “quality.” In the medical context, where 
resources are scarce and patient choice and autonomy are central, this notion of “quality- 
measurability” has received more attention and is now being directed toward the assessment of 
patients’ lives.233
The patient autonomy perspective, in an end-of-life situation involving a terminal 
illness, offers but one example of a QL option. The patient may weigh the benefits and burdens 
of life-prolonging medical treatment and determine that the quality of his future life, with its 
attendant medical or physical constraints, may not be worth the prolongation of his life. From a 
physician-beneficence perspective, when QL is so sufficiently low that a medical intervention 
produces more harm than benefit for a patient, it may become justifiable to withhold or 
withdraw treatment.234
231BMA, Medical Ethics Today, 165. These assessments of “acceptability” or 
“unacceptability” are equally true of terminally ill patients whether the state of incapacity is 
present or not.
232Cook, Patients ’ Choice, 134.
233Ibid.
234Beauchamp and Childress, 215-16.
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Still another theoretical QL option would be the medical community’s determination 
that the prognosis of a specific patient’s QL following therapy would be less than that of a 
second patient in need of the same scarce resources.235 This sort of judgment would, in this 
scenario, involve persons other than the initial patient. In reality, the decision might be made 
outside of the context of his DPR. Indeed, analysts now attempt to determine the monetary 
value of a life in order to state benefits in relationship to costs with the aim of developing 
consistency across the medical community’s practices and policies.236
End-of-Life Treatment Decisions 
Freedom to Act Versus Cost Containment
Since illness often compromises one feature of autonomy—the ability of patients to aim 
toward achieving their personal goals—medical humanism seeks to help patients toward 
physical restoration in order to help make life goals, particularly health goals, a reality. This 
primary goal of patient well-being is indeed ancient. Despite the fact that healthcare has never 
operated purely outside the considerations of economic feasibility, nonetheless, the primary 
goal of patient well-being has been compromised of late by competition from the high cost of 
delivering that beneficial healthcare.237 The growing realities of healthcare rationing and cost 
containment make changes in life-value determinations within the medical community an issue 
of deep concern for all levels within the system, from the NHS in the UK to the privatised 
healthcare market in the US.
235Suber, “Against the Sanctity of Life.”
236Beauchamp and Childress, 303-5.
237Mason, 4. Mason reasons that the differential allocation of resources, whether on 
financial or other grounds, is an indication of a shift away from the Hippocratic position.
Mason also notes a shift from a focus on the absolute value of life toward an ethos that focuses 
on QL. See also Marcia Angell, “Sounding Board: Rationing by Any Other Name,” NEJM 336, 
no. 23 (June 1997): 1668-71. Ever-rising costs make beneficial health services too expensive in 
some cases.
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Considerations of financial and resource allocations carry severe implications for SL 
issues. For example, physicians in the UK have developed standards that incorporate economic 
realities into medical judgments that affect human life. The UK physician serves as 
“gatekeeper” in several ways. For example, physicians may routinely deny potentially 
beneficial healthcare to patients by simply not making the patient aware of a possible 
treatment,238 or replying simply with a “no,” when a request is made for a particular treatment 
or, more specifically, deeming a patient too old for long-term dialysis.239
Patients in the NHS have a high respect for their doctors, in spite of the fact that 
physicians must make difficult decisions relative to cost and that the goal of physical 
restoration is, at times, postponed. Patients realise that healthcare costs must be kept under 
control.240 Even though patients in the UK do not seem to blame their physicians for rationed 
care and often long delays for treatment, a potential moral concern still arises when economics 
take precedence over humanitarian needs.
The US healthcare situation is markedly different in terms of the delivery of healthcare 
and cost containment, yet the outcome is very similar to that of the UK in terms of patient-care 
cost analysis. Since healthcare costs keep rising, the American physician as “gatekeeper” is 
seen as the guardian of society’s resources, even though more than forty million Americans do 
not presently have healthcare.241 This expectation of resource stewardship takes the physician 
out of the primary role of patient well-being advocacy and, instead, removes his platform
238William B. Schwartz and Heniy J. Aaron, “Rationing Hospital Care: Lessons from 
Britain,” New England Journal o f Medicine 3.10, no. 1 (January 1984): 54.
239Ibid., 55. A physician may make exceptions to the rules and divert more resources to 
a patient in whom he is interested. Cost-review systems by tenured physicians who are 
employed on salaiy are designed to prevent such gross abuse as cited above.
240The system of healthcare delivery in the UK is geared to provide the basics of health
care to the maximum number of people.
241Quill, Midwife Through the Dying Process, 216.
advocacy to the side of the institution or healthcare organisation.242 Through negative or 
positive incentives, the physician may be forced to conserve costs in a wide range of areas: 
testing, treatments, operations, hospitalisations, and referrals for consultation.243
If a physician is placed in the position of a “negative” gatekeeper, then she may be 
pressured to restrict the use of medical services of all kinds, but particularly those that are most 
expensive. Again, the possibility exists for moral conflict whenever considerations of cost or 
the institution come before the patient’s well-being.244 Physicians whose medical praxis is 
undergirded by SL values bear uniquely difficult burdens in light of the financial and 
technological resources that often limit the expectations of patients and their families. Patients, 
in their own right, deal with the difficulties of growing technology from a very different 
perspective.
Freedom from Interference Versus Technological Concerns
A patient’s illness interferes with his own freedom by rendering him vulnerable, often 
even compromising his ability to associate with his physician as a person with equal dignity. 
The burgeoning technological aspect of healthcare has impacted this relationship both 
positively and negatively. On the one hand, the goal of patient well-being has been sustained 
since antiquity, and continues to be the impetus for improvements in medical care. Medical
242Compare David A. Axelrod and Susan Dorr Goold, “Maintaining Trust in the 
Surgeon-Patient Relationship: Challenges for the New Millennium,” Archives o f Surgery 135, 
no. 1 (January 2000): 2; internet, available at http://archsurg.ama-assn.org/vl35nl/full/ssa9027. 
html; accessed 28 January 2000. Axelrod and Goold write of the tension between a physician’s 
financial interest and a patient’s health interest. “Surgery, therefore, often to a greater degree 
than other medical specialties, has been the target of employer and government attempts to 
limit expanding medical costs by expanding utilization review and managed care programs.”
243Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good: The 
Restoration o f Beneficence in Health Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 172.
244Compare Axelrod and Goold, 1-14. The authors state that trust is low among 
Americans for surgeons. Among other things, high salaries, managed-care company profits, as 
well as an emphasis (by surgeons) on technical procedures to the neglect of interpersonal 
contact have been suggested as part of the problem. The authors call for reflection on the moral 
underpinnings of the surgeon-patient relationship.
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technology makes it possible, now more than ever before, to extend life and postpone death, 
and added a new dimension to end-of-life care that is unprecedented in the history of medicine. 
To extend life well beyond its normal limits is, in most instances, considered to be a medical 
success; after all, the physician’s task has been to preserve life, to “do good and not harm” his 
patients.
At the same time, questions arise regarding the wisdom of applying new technological 
advances categorically. Today’s technological-medical environment spawns questions about 
the cost-success ratio. Advanced technology costs money and it, at times, yields only marginal 
success in patient health. Medical technology and the ever-burgeoning healthcare industry 
brought about new ways of thinking about healthcare in the 1970s when people began to 
compare the ever-rising cost of medical care with doubts about its long-term effectiveness. 
People questioned whether their health had improved enough to justify the increased costs and 
the development of newer and more expensive technologies. In many sectors, healthcare 
consumers determined that their health had not improved enough to warrant the cost
245increase.
Questions about cost-success ratios challenge medical humanism at the point of moral 
concern, because when health management is reduced essentially to an equation related to cost 
versus extended-life years, the sanctity aspect of that life has the potential to be diminished. In 
their autonomy, patient-consumers seek healthcare providers to supply a “good return for 
money,” like any other service industry. There is great benefit in wise financial management. 
However, a negative impact of patient autonomy exists if priority is granted to financial
245Starr, 380,408. Starr writes of the change that took place in America’s GNP as a 
result of healthcare costs. He also writes that Americans began to recognise that their health 
did not increase at the same rate as those costs. He notes that the concern with medical care 
was simply a part of a larger concern people had with institutional control (schools, 
rehabilitation of criminals, medical care, and government were all areas of concern). People 
began to criticise and accuse these services of a form of social control.
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determinations as over against the value of human life. The devaluation of life’s sanctity holds 
the potential for loss of human dignity.
Some patients are now exercising their autonomy in a new way, based upon the QL 
claim, that seeks to oblige the physician to satisfy the patient’s desires, even to the point of 
killing. This occurs when end-of-life decisions take centre stage for the patient who is also 
often unaware of the dehumanizing impact of cost and technological considerations. While not 
necessarily, or even categorically so, the QL argument often weakens when thoughtful 
consideration is given to technological considerations or medical cost ratio determinations.
In the present health environment, even a slight shift toward technological and financial 
interests in healthcare, coupled with the easing of the “do no harm” principle in the treatment 
of individuals, may seem to benefit the patient whose preference is to control costs and is 
sceptical of some uses of life-sustaining technology. In reality, the pressures facing both 
patients and their physicians in this swirling matrix of medical change call for a 
reconsideration of the moral implications of end-of-life decisions.
Summary
The previous chapter highlighted several areas of critical concern that related to 
autonomy, the discussion of which has been a primary focus of the present chapter. The claim 
of this chapter is that the DPR is currently being influenced by a new, and perhaps over­
accentuated, emphasis on patient autonomy causing, in turn, critical changes in the way the 
notions of physician paternalism and “SL” are being viewed by medical decision-makers. One 
indication of the overstress being placed on autonomy is its rise to preeminence in the DPR.
A key contributor in the development of such a rise in autonomy was the nineteenth- 
century theoretical views of John Stuart Mill’s HU. Mill based autonomy upon the individual 
alone and the GHP.246 He established clear boundaries around a person by claiming that the
246See thesis, ch. 3,162.
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person should be free from any outside inference. This intersects medicine at the point where 
doctors interfere patemalistically with the free choices and decisions of a patient in order to 
“do good or to prevent harm” to the patient.247 Differences between patients’ values and 
physicians’ values often surface whenever a physician interferes or overrides a patient 
preference, especially with end-of-life decisions. Autonomy advocates believe that respect for 
patient autonomy obliges a physician to assist a patient with suicide. The focus on satisfying 
individual desires (in this case, a patient’s desires) evolved over centuries as humanism 
developed, but this perspective has been heightened, in part, by the influence of HU. However, 
Mill, while championing the individual autonomy and rights of persons, never claimed that 
either autonomy or rights were inviolable. It is a mistaken application of Mill’s concepts to 
interpret their influence as a carte blanche for guaranteeing an individual’s security (which 
cannot ever be absolutely guaranteed) and/or PH preferences.
Furthermore, deliberate interference with the PH preferences of patients also is an open 
source of conflict in the DPR. PAS advocates cite Mill’s “harm principle” for support of 
physician noninterference which has become their philosophical warrant.248 Advocates insist 
that unless someone other than the patient is in jeopardy, then the request of the patient should 
be granted. This, however, fails to take into consideration the GHP. Mill’s autonomy principle 
was subject to the principle of utility. It is conceivable that the patient’s PH preferences might 
be overridden to satisfy the claims of the GHP. It also is conceivable that a patient’s PH 
preferences would create negative utility for either his family or another group.
Something more is required, then, than a simple PH preference in order to evaluate the 
strength of an individual patient-claim to PAS. Further, it is not entirely clear that the “harm 
principle” was ever intended to become the “trump card” of individual autonomy claims as
247See ibid., 175.
248Mill, “On Liberty,” 135.
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some would believe in the current patient-autonomy movement.249 Open discussion about the 
possibility of greater harms to the ethos of medicine, patients, physicians, and culture as a 
whole is warranted, prior to making changes in medicine related to PAS. Changes in the 
healthcare industry, the influences of HU upon medical philosophy and patient autonomy, and 
medical-technological advancements as a whole, have created a need for patients and members 
of the medical community at every level to try to reach a consensus on a set of values to be 
given priority, especially in end-of-life situations. The current cultural debate on VAE and PAS 
draws attention to such a need.250 This chapter has shown that supporters of PAS, for example, 
use the argument from mercy as a basic reason for allowing physicians to assist their patients 
with suicide. This has sparked intense debate because any act of killing, whether motivated by 
mercy or otherwise, challenges the fundamental beneficent/nonmaleficent aim of medical 
humanism and constitutes a deviation from medical practice that has been sustained for more 
than two thousand years.
The debate itself surrounding merciful acts of medical killing demonstrates that voices 
outside the medical establishment are sounding new arguments against the medical value they 
desire to see modified. To permit merciful acts of killing would represent a change in medical 
values. Some advocates of medical mercy killing support such a change as a manifestation of 
compassionate medicine. In other words, they say, PAS is sometimes a compassionate 
response to a terminal illness.251 If one examines the issue solely from its consequences, this
249Ibid., 136. Mill always regarded utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions. 
He viewed utility to be grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. 
These interests, in his view, authorised the subjection of individual spontaneity to external 
control, but only included those actions that concerned the interest of other people. It is 
conceivable, then, that PAS is one such circumstance that warrants further investigation related 
to the effect it would have on the greater utility of medicine or culture as a whole.
250The debate surrounding PAS in the UK and US is one facet of the larger cultural
debate over merciful medical killing.
251See thesis, 32.
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might seem reasonable.252 Others believe that to sanction mercy killing would be a detriment to 
the ethos of medical humanism, a view that also seems reasonable given its traditional 
endorsement of the physician’s duty to extend life.253 These conflicting values compete for the 
common-ground platform from which future medical practices regarding PAS will derive. 
Moral concerns permeate these values.
The moral dimension is important in end-of-life decision-making when a physician 
must make a judgement between costs and the patient’s life. This chapter has shown that there 
are, at times, radically different ideas about how to demonstrate respect for life and enhance the 
patient’s dignity in the health setting.254 A predominant argument for physician-assistance- 
with-patient-suicide is the argument that kindness helps to preserve the patient’s values about 
dignity when disease has robbed him or her of that state. “Dignity” is not easily defined and 
supported. The obligation of physicians to demonstrate compassion for the terminally ill by 
assisting with suicide opens another moral concern. Medicine is a moral enterprise because it 
deals with the good and welfare of others, and the introduction of merciful killing seems to 
contradict this aim of medicine.255 While some would view life’s quality as a major
252James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” in Matters o f  Life and Death:
Crises in Bio-Medical Ethics, ed. John E. Thomas (Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1978), 91. See 
also Rachels, End o f Life, 156. See also Marvin Kohl, The Morality o f  Killing: Sanctity o f Life, 
Abortion and Euthanasia (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1974), 71.
253Leon R. Kass, “Death with Dignity and the Sanctity of Life,” Commentary 89, no. 2 
(February 1990): 42-43; and Callahan, “Defending the Sanctity of Life,” 18-19. One 
intersection in the larger cultural debate over the SL is the morality of physicians assisting with 
suicide.
254Laurence J. Schneiderman, Kathy Faber-Langendon, Nancy S. Jeckev, and S. A. 
Gadow, “Nurse and Patient: The Caring Relationship,” American Journal o f Medicine 96, no. 2 
(February 1994): 31-43. See also Laurence J. Schneiderman, Kathy Faber-Langendon, and 
Nancy S. Jeckev, “Beyond Futility to an Ethic of Care,” American Journal o f Medicine 96, no.
2 (February 1994): 110-14. The authors write that caring goes beyond good intentions or 
simple kindness and includes psychological or religious and physical components. It takes into 
consideration the patient’s social context and specific goals.
255Albert R. Jonsen, “The Therapeutic Relationship: Is Moral Conduct A Necessary 
Condition?” in The Clinical Encounter: The Moral Fabric o f  the Patient-Physician 
Relationship, ed. Earl E. Shelp, Philosophy and Medicine, ed. H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. and
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determinant of its value, there are others who view life as a basic and necessary condition of all 
other good things.256 Life, overall, as a quantity or whole, is viewed as significant. Quality and 
quantity of life features are both premised upon medical humanism’s belief that life is a good. 
The moral debate surrounding PAS considers the issues of quality and quantity, especially in 
light of technological advances making life-extension possible.257
The potential overuse of medical technology to extend life is a crucial question of the 
debate, one which often overlooks the deeper moral concern. Since both medical humanism 
and patient humanism view life as an intrinsic “good,” then the conflict over the morality of 
physician killing is rooted in this deeper moral issue. The HU and PAS debate regarding how 
best to balance patient preferences and beliefs with those of medical humanism, in light of their 
moral questions, now invites a more careful examination. The weaknesses of the key features 
of the PAS arguments, as filtered through HU, point to moral considerations that remain to be 
explored. These considerations will be the subject of the final chapter.
Stuart F. Spicker, no. 14 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983), 267.
256Basil Mitchell, “The Value of Human Life,” in Medicine, Medical Ethics and the 
Value o f Life, ed. Peter Byrne, 34-46 (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), 35.
257Mason, 7.
CHAPTER 4
HEDONISTIC-UTILITARIANISM AND PHYSICIAN- 
ASSISTED SUICIDE: WEAKNESSES, MORAL 
CONCERNS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This thesis has examined whether HU provides sufficient moral ground to warrant a 
change in medical canons regarding medical killing, encompassing six features of the HU and 
PAS debate—rights, justice, medical killing, patient autonomy, medical paternalism, and SL. 
The thesis examination of the centuries-long historical and philosophical development of each 
feature has yielded a fresh vista from which to examine HU and PAS. The issue of PAS itself 
seems to have crystallised the elements into a complex philosophical confederation which has 
not yet gained full common consensus from the cultural-medical community. Nor has the 
confederation of arguments provided the clear common ground which will be necessary to 
advance legal means to change the medical canons regarding mercy killing.
The thesis has demonstrated that individual considerations like rights, justice, 
autonomy, and SL contributed important developmental steps in an ages-long evolution of the 
concept of the individual as a whole, a concept which has significant implications for the 
phenomenon of patient end-of-life decision-making. Such a discussion is morally significant 
when examining the viability of the research question about the change in medical canons 
related to medical killing, especially since these six features (rights, justice, medical killing, 
patient autonomy, physician paternalism, and SL) have been used to claim support for two 
primary PAS arguments: the arguments from beneficence (or mercy) and the principle of 
respect for patient autonomy. If, however, philosophical and moral support for these two 
foundational arguments is tenuous, then further examination of medical killing is warranted
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before changes are made in medical canons related to PAS. This judgement to suspend action 
might bear possible implications for other forms of medical killing as well.
This chapter, then, will evaluate the features above, as examined historically and 
through the philosophical framework of HU, in order to identify components of the argument 
which HU fails to address adequately in the PAS debate. The chapter also will address four 
moral concerns which surfaced as a result of the examination of HU and the six core features in 
the PAS debate. In its final pages the chapter will offer observations on the research question, 
provide an alternative way forward as a direct response and critique to Mill’s HU, and draw 
clear conclusions in the PAS discussion’s ethical considerations. The chapter discussion turns 
now to the difficulties associated with the PAS debate arguments.
Developmental and Hedonistic-Utilitarianism Problems with 
Physician-Assisted Suicide Debate Arguments
The HU philosophical system has been viewed as a support that undergirds the various 
concepts which address and inform questions that have surrounded the call to legalise PAS. For 
more than thirty years, the debate has intensified and been rendered more complex when 
advocates of either side have added and combined features to buttress the arguments that call 
for changes in medical canons regarding medical killing. This section of the paper will address 
the unresolved tensions arising from the application of the HU perspective to the six features as 
they have been used as philosophical constructs in PAS arguments.
Rights
John Stuart Mill placed a primary emphasis upon individual rights, believing that a 
right was a person’s valid claim upon society to protect the person in possession of it, either by 
the force of law, or by education, or by public opinion.1 He believed a right was grounded in
1Mill, Utilitarianism, 71.
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the GHP2 and, while his views on rights demonstrate some correlation with the historical view 
of the term, his belief that the word itself is grounded in utility reflects a point of divergence. 
This section will delineate the similarities and the differences in the meaning of the concept 
and analyse the impact the HU view of a right exerts on PAS.
As has been shown, the history of “rights” is divided generally into several 
developmental eras. From the inception of the term “right” until the present a conceptual 
complexity emerged from within a milieu with spiritual, philosophical, political, and social 
influences. Ancient Greek culture provided the nexus from which the concept took form. While 
it is certain that the term continued to undergo a long evolutionaiy development, it is equally as 
certain that the concept continues to bear some of its original meaning. For example, the notion 
of “rights” was formed from within a seedbed of ideas associated with natural law and natural 
rights. A part of this heritage included links to deity as well as institutions like the Church,
“polis,” and even the wider state. It was believed that a “right,” as stated above, would be 
experienced within relationships to others in community, but it was also believed that a right 
was self-evident.3 One could arrive at the concept of “individual rights” through human reason. 
Even while individuals did not think of themselves as individuals-with-rights as apart from the 
state at this time, nonetheless, the concept of “rights” did contain this idea of application to the 
individual in its meaning.
This inherent polarity between the term’s communal and individual features 
contributes, at times, to some difficulty in establishing a clear perspective on the meaning of a 
“right.” This polarity, when the communal and individual perspectives collide, hints at 
something deeper than a simple clash of perspectives. Though the term in its earliest forms and 
applications indicates a fledgling attempt to establish and preserve certain safeguards for the
2Ibid.
3See thesis, ch. 1, 56-58.
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individual, the possession of a “right,” even with the moral force of natural law and natural 
rights, has never fully guaranteed individual persons protection against external interference.4
A second developmental era was characterised by the secularisation of rights during the 
Renaissance and Reformation. Several key changes transpired in thinking about rights at this 
time. Natural law and rights had been associated with deity up until this point, but now it was 
conceived that natural law (hence, rights) would remain valid even if there were no God. While 
this did not mean that reference to or inclusion of deity in developmental consideration of a 
right was shunned entirely, the new emphasis did highlight one feature of the move away from 
supematurally based authority that was underway.5 Further, a fresh emphasis was placed on a 
right as the possession of an individual which was a different vantage point from Ancient 
Greece where rights were generally associated with communal attachments.
It is of significance to note that even though various aspects of a culture may undergo 
momentous change-similar to those which transpired in the Renaissance and Reformation 
eras—and influence the application of a core concept, like “rights,” this change and influence 
did not mean that fundamental features of the core concept were necessarily jettisoned. It 
remained true for this developmental epoch that the formative elements remained even though 
the inner tensions and deeper issues of how best to preserve individual rights had not been 
resolved. While the growing concept of the individual advanced along with the conceptual 
understanding of “rights,” the notion had not yet matured to a level that would grant more than 
moral force to a “right.” This development was forthcoming, but the lingering issue of how 
best to ensure the rights of the individual still dangled without direct address.
A third developmental era advanced the notion of a “right” when several key events 
shaped the perception and application of “rights.” One key event was a new belief that science 
was the way to truth and, while the Enlightenment could not be characterised as entirely anti-
4See also HU discussion to follow below.
5See thesis, ch. 1,60-63.
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God or anti-religion, it may be stated that one result of the Enlightenment was a further 
separation of the idea of rights from any foundation in deity. An important catalyst for such a 
result was the continuing emphasis placed upon the individual as the focal point for “rights.” 
Empiricism began to inform the great issues that affected human growth and advancement: 
political, legal, philosophical, spiritual, and social. While it would not be fair to state that the 
Enlightenment was characterised either by the wholesale suppression of any institutional claim 
upon an individual or the full emancipation of an individual, it may be stated that the era 
opened the way for greater emphasis to be focussed upon these two themes.
The Enlightenment was, however, an era agitated by political changes. Individual rights 
figured prominently in political discussions and, eventually, were themselves codified in key 
French and American political documents. Natural law and natural rights were coupled now 
with nascent human rights’-oriented laws.6 Yet for all of the change, the focus in rights’ 
discussions was directed toward external entities, thus leaving unexamined the inner 
etymological and moral tension between communal and individual interests. Like the previous 
era, the deeper question of how best to protect, preserve, and enhance humanity--the 
consideration of the qualitative dimension to the notion of rights—had not been fully addressed 
in the Enlightenment era either.
Perhaps the most significant era of change in the understanding and application of 
“rights” is the span of years between John Stuart Mill and the present. This era was indeed the 
time when “right,” as applied to the individual, figured most prominently. This epoch was 
characterised by two key developments. The first development occurred when John Stuart Mill 
sought, through his utilitarian writings, to establish further a foundation for human liberty and 
well-being. His efforts helped to extend the Enlightenment conceptualisations of human 
autonomy by giving the concept a moral and empirical basis. Mill based his theory upon a
6See ibid., 67-68.
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single principle--in this case, the GHP. His theory made it possible to insert a PH component 
into rights’-formulations.7
Mill sought to ground rights solely in mankind and, while he did not openly claim to be 
anti-God, he chose to relinquish a God-given, natural-rights’ basis for support of individual 
rights. From one view, Mill’s HU theory provided a philosophical vehicle for wedding 
“individual” PH preferences to human rights’ claims. HU provided an important seminal 
ingredient that became characteristic of twentieth-century human right’s applications-the 
overarching principle of a qualitative measurement for PH preferences.8 From another point of 
view, however, HU, because of its emphasis on the GHP, did not address clearly the 
longstanding internal tensions that were inherent within the concept of “rights.” Rather, HU 
compounded the tension because it became conceivable, using Mill’s calculations, for an 
individual’s claim to “rights” to be overridden by the “rights’-claim” of the many. An 
individual’s rights were not securely safeguarded under the umbrella of the GHP. This failure 
of HU theory to ensure or protect absolutely the “rights” of the individual exposes a weakness 
in PAS arguments that makes use of Mill’s HU principles on rights.
7See ibid., 96.
8See ibid., 69. See the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; internet, available at 
http://www.universalrights.net/main/declarat.htm.; accessed 27 April 2004. The Declaration 
casts its rights’ claims in qualitative terms that an individual might use to oblige a government 
or institution to provide. See also James V. Spickard, “Human Rights, Religious Conflict, and 
Globalization. Ultimate Values in a New World Order,” Journal on Multicultural Societies, 
vol. 1, no. 1 (1999); internet, available at http://www.unesco.org./most/vl lnlspi.htm; accessed 
27 April 2004. Spickard writes that the belief in innate human rights has received increasing 
circulation worldwide. It is interesting to note that Spickard believes rights are a product of the 
European Enlightenment that grew out of the West’s struggle against monarchy. He writes of 
how early on rights were an useful tool for people who desired freedom from tyranny. He then 
states that the human rights’ movement as recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, along with other United Nations documents to follow, specified a “host” of rights that 
the world’s governments were to guarantee [italics mine] to their citizens. Such rights’ 
language, in the Declaration, according to Spickard, “. . .  clearly makes society the individual’s 
servant rather than the other way around.” Spickard follows by addressing a most recent 
generation of rights’ claims that people exercise today: rights to support anything that they 
think necessary for dignity and freedom.
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The second critical development occurred in the twentieth century when the concept of 
“right” was further enhanced and applied in a different way, and a specific place where the 
modification appeared was within medicine. “Rights’” discussions turned toward establishing a 
“right” for an individual to end his own life and the obligation that “right” might impose upon 
another person, such as his physician.9 Today “patients’ rights’” claims reflect the two 
fundamental twentieth-century shifts in PAS discussions: PH preferences and a right to end 
individual life. Some patients assert their PH preferences in reaction to real and perceived 
medical intrusions within the DPR. Other patients’ PH preferences relate to real or perceived 
deficiencies in some aspect of healthcare. Today a terminally ill patient might use a “right to 
die” PAS claim, which might mean, depending on how the law interpreted the claim, that a 
doctor could be obliged to provide assistance with the suicide of the patient. Another example 
might be a simple request to provide health services based upon a right to healthcare. These 
sorts of right’s claims are based upon a perceived liberty10 or entitlement right11 that emerge 
from patient autonomy claims.12
As has been presented, however, the development of the concept of “rights” remains 
somewhat incomplete. A right by its very nature contains unresolved internal tension when 
applied to both individual claims and communal claims.13 Although there has been a 
centuries’-long swing of the pendulum toward individual “rights,” a valid need exists to 
establish and maintain balance between individual and communal expressions.
Further, when HU employs the notion of “rights,” the resulting propositions neither 
bear the moral authority to oblige another to act in behalf of the right-holder, nor do they
9See thesis, ch. 2, 71-72.
10See ibid., 71.
11 See ibid., 72.
12See ibid., 71-72.
13See ibid., 56.
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wholly preserve personhood, protecting the individual from external interference or coercion.14 
The argument of “rights” falls short of equal application when one individual’s greatest­
happiness desire would legally oblige another individual to act contrary to the second 
individual’s own best interest. While the use of the HU philosophical construct has been 
intended ultimately to help to alleviate the suffering of terminally ill patients and their families, 
its application to “rights” has led to questions concerning whether this tool is actually adequate 
to the task and whether it satisfies the claims of justice.15
Justice
Mill, in the last chapter of Utilitarianism, claims that if the principle of utility is 
satisfied, then the requirements of justice are also satisfied, since justice is built into the 
principle of utility.16 Mill’s view of justice correlates with the historical development of the 
word in several ways, but his belief that the word reflects the principle of utility departs from 
the historical view of the meaning of justice. This section will delineate the similarities and the 
differences in the meaning of the concept and will analyse the impact the HU view of justice 
exerts on PAS.
The early history of “justice” included several key components that aided with the 
development of important boundaries for the term. “Justice” was used to convey different 
conceptions about how the world was an ordered whole. In the pre-Socratic era, the nascent 
meaning of the word “justice” included a sense of balance, maintaining regularity in cosmic 
and human affairs. The word also held moral connotations, for the concept was perceived to 
have been derived from the gods. “Justice” included not only what was operative in society, 
but also what was contained inside a person, as justice was linked to happiness in Platonic
14See ibid., footnotes 84,68-69, 97-100.
15See ibid., 100-101. See also Frankena, 41. Individual rights can be overridden 
unjustly. See also 99, footnote 219.
16Mill, Utilitarianism, 80-81.
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thought.17 Central to the word were the core ideas of equality and fairness and a moral concern 
to maintain the well-being of individuals within the community.18
By the time of Plato and Aristotle the term was given a clear conceptual framework. It 
is significant to note that Plato developed a clear view of virtue that included justice, and the 
just person was one who demonstrated a balanced life, inwardly and in relation to the 
community at large. Aristotle followed by emphasising the individual and civil responsibility. 
Justice, from its inception, developed a balanced mutuality between individual responsibility to 
another or a group and the state’s responsibility to its citizens. Remaining in the concept, 
however, was an uncertainty as to whether the management (application) of the moral authority 
in the word would fall to an individual, a group, a state, or some combination of these.19
The Reformation/Enlightenment brought about a significant change in the development 
of justice. Natural law within human nature could now produce “right behaviour” in 
individuals that could result in both personal and societal justice.20 The term was influenced by 
the evolving growth in the conceptions of humanism, so much so that the inherent mutuality 
and accountability for justice shifted gradually until it was believed that a claim of justice 
could originate from an autonomous individual and oblige others morally.21 Justice and just 
behaviour, it was believed, could be apprehended by human reason unaided by any external 
source. This does not mean that thinkers of this period were not aware of the mutuality 
contained within the meaning of the term, but it does seem likely that a word like “justice,”
17See thesis, ch. 2, 88-89.
18See ibid., 89-90.
19See ibid., 90-91. In Aristotelian thought, justice implied a moral responsibility that an 
individual had toward another person or group, as well as the moral responsibility that a legal, 
constituted body had toward its subjects. There was, however, no clear delineation of how an 
infringement of justice would be corrected.
20See ibid., 92-93.
21See ibid., 94.
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with its meaning carefully associated with human concerns, was influenced by cultural changes 
in human understanding. For example, yet another focus of justice whereby a morally 
autonomous and reasoning individual could generate a justice claim appeared in the same era. 
Still other significant developments in the term were to emerge from within John Stuart Mill’s 
HU framework.
John Stuart Mill’s utilitarian theory provided another critical change in conceptions 
about justice that established the possibility for an individual to make a justice claim based 
upon PH preferences. He theorised that one person’s happiness, supposedly equal in degree, 
counted for exactly as much as another person’s happiness. Thus, in theory, the one 
individual’s qualitative PH judgment about justice, if pursued, would oblige any number of 
other individuals to act on the first person’s behalf.22 Within Mill’s system, however, the 
inherent relational balance contained within the concept of justice was newly made to depend 
upon the GHP of the individuals involved, whether a small group or a nation of citizens.23
This understanding of justice was a key difference between Mill and other philosophers 
writing about the concept. Mill believed that each person had an equal claim to happiness. 
Whereas in the previous epoch, the gravitational pull of humanism led toward a shift in focus 
toward an individual, John Stuart Mill’s HU conferred upon the individual additional authority 
when he added the possibility of that individual’s qualitative PH claim. Yet, even though 
Mill’s conceptions of justice were meant to ensure individual security for each person, any 
individual’s PH calculus could become, at times, subordinate to the GHP. A person’s equal 
claim to happiness, for example, might be limited by the “inevitable conditions of human life” 
and “the general interest.”24 Mill believed that while each person had a “right” to equality of
22See Mill, Utilitarianism, 80-82.
23Ibid., 81. See Mill’s footnote number 3 where he writes that utility means “equal 
amounts of happiness are equally desirable.”
24Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 111.
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treatment, he also believed there were instances when some “recognized social expediency” 
might require the reverse. The significance of individual limits could, in some instances, result 
in limited justice as applied to the individual.
Mill believed that human character may be influenced generally to practise the GHP; 
hence, justice would prevail through public education and opinion.25 Where this fails, however, 
laws and social arrangements are designed to place the happiness or interests of every 
individual in harmony with the whole.26 Herein lies an inherent weakness in HU: the internal 
tension between the egoistic and universal facets of utilitarian conceptualisation. An 
individual’s PH preferences cannot be guaranteed because they often defer to the GHP of the 
many when required. Someone must, of course, interpret the PH of the many. How to 
determine who this individual or group may be, and whether the GHP for all persons may 
indeed be actualised, is a tension which still remains in HU theory.
Another weakness in Mill’s theory was his belief that justice was grounded in the GHP. 
Mill’s statement of the GHP presupposes a deeper foundational principle which places his 
views about justice on even weaker theoretical ground. Mill’s formulation of the GHP rests 
upon a belief that a person should act in ways that will bring about the greatest possible 
balance of good over evil in the universe,27 which implies a basic obligation that a person “do 
good” rather than harm.28 Without this more basic obligation there could be no sense of duty to 
attempt to achieve a greater balance of good over evil in the world.29 It is conceivable, then, 
that a sincere utilitarian calculation of justice might actually be unjust whenever the end
25Ibid., 108. See Mill, Utilitarianism, 65.
26Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics, 108.
27Frankena, 45. Frankena means by “good” and “evil” nonmoral good and evil. Mill 
uses the terms happiness/pleasure and unhappiness/pain. See Mill, Utilitarianism, 16-17.
28Frankena, 45.
29Ibid.
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calculation fails to consider the deeper obligation to “do good.”30 HU, if applied as such, leaves 
open a possibility that there is a more foundational duty other than the GHP to which a person 
is obliged. This has broad implications for moral decision-making contexts, of which one 
example includes the area of medical decision-making. The following discussion serves by 
way of example to show how HU’s principles are sometimes applied to the notion of “justice” 
in the medical context.
Utilitarian principles of justice, when applied to healthcare, commonly involve 
competing exchanges between individuals and corporate needs. These exchanges have 
implications for individual patient justice. For example, prepaid health maintenance 
programmes in the US (for example, Health Maintenance Organisations [HMOs] and Preferred 
Provider Organisations [PPOs]) often establish medical plan benefits based on utilitarian 
principles.31 Such programmes usually include patient care for common “enrollee health 
needs” at a flat fee held in concert with “active management of both the delivery system” and 
“the medical care that is actually delivered to individual patients.”32 In a managed-care system 
the focus emphasis can shift from an ethic of service to one associated with a particular patient 
to a population-based ethic. Clinical decisions must include not only the patient’s welfare, but 
also the welfare of all enrollees in the health plan, society at large, any investors in the plan 
whose capital is at risk, and even the self-interests of the physician.33
30Ibid.
31Beauchamp and Childress, 335.
32Peter R. Kongstvedt, Essentials o f Managed Health Care, 2d ed. (Gaithersburg, MD: 
Aspen Publishers, 1997), 37. Whether the financing system is an HMO, PPO, or another 
model, the term used to describe each is usually a managed-care system.
33Edmund D. Pellegrino, “Managed Care: An Ethical Reflection (Managed Healthcare 
as Practiced in 1998 Not Compatible with Christian Ethics),” Christian Century (August 12, 
1998): 1; internet, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/ml058/n22_vl 15/21066277/ 
pl/article.jhtml; accessed 11 February 2004.
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Furthermore, utilitarians also often favour social programmes that protect public health 
and allocate basic healthcare equally to all citizens if the GHP is served. This allocation could 
render individual rights indefinite or tenuous (like a right to healthcare), however, if overall 
utility maximisation changes (which it often does) at any time.34 An outgrowth of maximising 
net social utility is the possible deflation of the worth and value of an individual life.35 
Utilitarian justice, when applied to healthcare system decisions, can fail to give adequate 
attention to individual value, and, therefore, be incapable of solving the dilemmas expressed by 
the individual patients for whom the system exists in the first place. Of further concern is the 
intrinsic value of human life and the inadequacy of HU to provide adequate support for the 
value of individual life.
Medical Killing
A claim that medical killing is sometimes permissible for physicians and, at times 
obligatory, raises significant moral concerns. The thesis demonstrated a long and complex 
historical development for the concept “to kill” or “to put to death.”36 The cluster of ideas 
contained within the concept of “medical killing” surrounds a central condition; namely, direct 
causation of another’s death.
Debate has ensued because medicine has historically been about helping patients 
toward wellness and life instead of causing their deaths. A central issue with medical killing, 
however, is whether a physician is warranted to use medical expertise and technology to assist 
a patient with his or her desire to end life before an illness claims it. While it is true, in some 
cases, that a doctor can maintain life indefinitely with life-extending medical technology and
34Beauchamp and Childress, 335. Even utilitarians dispute whether individual rights are 
genuine rights if they are contingent upon social arrangements that maximise net social utility.
35See Smart and Williams, 69-71, and thesis, ch. 2, 98, footnote 213. The implication of
Smart’s example is that a single life could be devalued and harmed, if needed, in order to 
maximise happiness for the many.
36OED, 2d ed., s.v. “kill.”
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can also refrain from using technology when he determines its use is futile, the focus with 
assisted suicide is somewhat different from a simple decision to use medical expertise and 
technology in a different way. There is a deeper philosophical argument at root, and this 
argument serves as a catalyst for decisions about medical killing. The philosophical argument 
in question here claims that there is sometimes no significant philosophical or medical 
distinction, with regard to either acts or omission, between “killing” and “allowing to die” in a 
terminal illness. However, this critical difference concerning a moral distinction between 
killing and allowing to die is not a new one.
Ancient Greece
Historically, social and political ideas in Ancient Greece influenced attitudes toward 
“killing” and “allowing to die.” An individual’s identity was derived from his attachment to the 
state and, as such, a weak or sickly individual was considered a burden to the body politic. 
Therefore, suicide, feticide, infanticide, and euthanasia, as a means by which the preservation 
of the state was enhanced, were not assigned the same moral disapprobation that they receive 
in Western culture today. Yet, even if an exact comparison is somewhat elusive, there were 
several moral features of ancient practices, like those of euthanasia, that were similar to 
medical discussions today.37
First, a doctor was not the direct cause of the patient’s death. In fact, such an action 
would have been considered to be prima facie homicide.38 At the very least, there seemed to 
have been some awareness of moral implications related to a distinction between “killing” and 
“allowing to die.”39 The meaning of the term “euthanasia” did not mean “active killing for
37New York State Task Force, 78. Ancient Greek euthanasia did not carry the same 
meaning then as it does in the current context, where it means to kill a person for benevolent 
motives.
38Carrick, 128.
39Ibid., 47-49.
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benevolent motives” as it does today. The concept implied, rather, a genuine human concern 
for the patient’s psychological state of mind and the moral concern exhibited by the physician 
for a patient’s plight.
Consideration was given to “allowing to die” and the meaning that would have for 
patients. A physical, if not moral, separation was made between “active killing” and “allowing 
to die.”40 The moral circumstances surrounding the actual decisions to end life are instructive. 
In fact, other than supplying the drug, a physician was generally detached from the patient and 
his decision to end life. The moral significance was attached to the patient being able to make 
a free and reasoned decision whether or not to hasten his own death. The concept said nothing 
of the morality of a doctor assisting a patient’s death. In several notable areas moral concern 
seemed to have been lacking.
Moral Mvonia
It is noteworthy that a morally reasoning individual was considered to be the primary 
determinant of whether self-killing was justified. Yet, even with behavioural (psychology) and 
physical (terminal illness) considerations, moral consideration of killing may be more complex 
than the above-stated approach might indicate. The thesis demonstrated a communal basis in 
moral formations. The attention given to self-killing and euthanasia across the centuries 
focuses most directly on the question concerning whether an individual has moral authority, 
accountability and responsibility beyond himself.41 Along with these moral-formations 
discussions, other historic expressions of the term have also been morally instructive in the 
“medical killing” examination.
40Ibid.
4,See thesis, 118-45. While it seems morally ironic that the evolution of human 
autonomy, grounded at least partly upon a human life’s intrinsic value, might be applied in this 
self-destructive fashion, some advocates suggest that it may be that some responsibilities (e.g., 
to oneself) override others.
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Moral Ambivalence: A Special Case
Some moral ambivalence existed in Ancient Greece with respect to a form of “killing” 
and “allowing to die.”42 This hesitancy was evident, for example, in the practice of infanticide. 
This form of “killing” or “allowing to die” was practised without punishment in Ancient 
Greece if, for example, a newborn child was malformed and perceived to pose a liability on the 
family or state resources. If parents did not want a child, he or she could be abandoned or sold 
into slavery. Infanticide roughly took two forms: active and passive. Active infanticide meant 
certain termination of the infant’s life, and passive infanticide meant abandoning the infant to 
experience the likelihood, but not always the certainty, of life’s termination.43 Carrick states 
that the passive approach probably lessened, in the minds of parents, the sense of moral 
responsibility for their deed.44 Active killing of an infant possibly carried more moral blame 
than, for example, passively allowing the child to die from exposure.45 This suggests, whether 
motivated by personal or state reasons, that some moral and/or psychological distinction was
42The Ancient Greek moral view about killing or allowing to die was radically different 
from the Judeo-Christian moral views upon which US and UK modem culture still, for the 
most part, at least legally, rest. See Carrick, 110-24 for an examination of various philosophical 
perspectives on infanticide and feticide, or abortion.
While not a form of medical killing per se, infanticide, for example, provides a 
platform from which to examine an early moral approach to “killing” and “allowing to die.” 
While the circumstances of the death were different, passive forms of infanticide, like 
abandonment or exposure, were not considered to be the same as “killing” or even intending a 
child to be killed. With exposure, the parents may have been interested only in ridding 
themselves of the burdens and liabilities of the infant, since it was often believed that a child 
did not become a person until she had been fed for the first time (128). Passive forms of 
killing, then, were thought to be less culpable than intentional acts of taking lives, thus 
indicating some awareness of a moral distinction between killing and allowing to die.
Singer’s view that humans who are not self-aware are not to be considered persons or to 
have a life worth living, bears some resemblance to the Ancient Greek cultural perspective that 
a child was not a person until he or she had eaten a first meal. His argument to eliminate a 
distinction between killing and allowing to die is not entirely convincing, however, because the 
moral focus in killing or allowing to die does not rest solely upon the result (minimising pain 
and maximising pleasure), but also includes the agent and his intent.
43Carrick, 108.
44Ibid.
45Ibid.
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made surrounding the act of taking a life, whether the death occurred actively or passively. The 
intent of the actor, in this case the parent, whether active (direct) or passive (indirect), was a 
key contributor in assessing blameworthiness.46 In Ancient Greece there was at least a minimal 
innate awareness that when an individual took another person’s life, or allowed that person’s 
life to be extinguished, it was a deed morally questionable and worthy of blame.47 Such moral 
concern with taking an infant’s life remained despite a cultural practice of infanticide 48
Moral fault, then, might be assigned to killing or allowing another to die in Ancient 
Greece, whether the cause of death was infanticide, euthanasia, or even murder. Even though 
some might argue that there is no real medical distinction between acts of killing or letting die, 
there seems to be some historical evidence to the contrary. When, in Ancient Greece, 
physicians might have supplied a drug to assist a patient’s suicide, thus leaving the choice of 
death to a morally reasoning individual, the supplying of the drug did not necessarily mean that 
patient autonomy alone was the only moral criterion for assessing the validity of a request for 
assistance with suicide.49 Similar observations may be made about current PAS discussions 
concerning patient autonomy.
Autonomy
Autonomous individuals demonstrate liberty when each is free from coercion and 
exercises the ability to make an independent decision. Further, an autonomous individual
46Ibid.
47Ibid., 48,108,128. In the case of murder, infanticide (in comparison with exposure) 
and involuntary euthanasia, there was some awareness of moral culpability.
48Ibid., 101,108. Plato endorsed infanticide because, in certain cases, it promoted the 
“greatest long-term benefit for the entire community” (113). Plato’s student, Aristotle, believed 
that infanticide was morally justifiable by a similar belief that overpopulation would have a 
negative impact on the well-being of the state (115).
490ther criteria for consideration of a patient’s request for suicide were possible. For 
example, a doctor might be concerned with the status of his reputation, and he also might be 
motivated by the prospect of financial gain through the sale of lethal drugs. See Carrick, 154- 
55, and thesis, 218, footnote 16.
27 6
demonstrates the capacity for intentional action that can be explained by reference to his or her 
own goals and purposes. The concept of autonomy has not changed historically in relation to 
these core features of liberty and agency.50 There are those, however, who now interpret its 
meaning to advocate practically whatever one desires.51
Autonomy developed slowly through the ages, but several key changes in its meaning 
have been discussed in the thesis. Initially, autonomy did not indicate that a person was an 
individual with an identity separate from that of the state but that a person was free within the 
context of a “polls” to interact with laws, primarily in political or military affairs. The concept 
of autonomy began to change focus, however, in the Renaissance when people began to think 
of themselves as individuals.52 Notions of autonomy were applied to the study of the human 
personality through the rediscovery of the ancient Classics. This growing individual awareness 
produced new challenges to traditional authority, for example, the Church.
The Enlightenment led to a further separation of the individual from the traditional 
sources of authority as scientific methodology became a tool by which “Enlightened Man” 
discovered truth. This methodology drove deeper the wedge between the authoritative claims 
of the Church and the state and the individuals over whom they exercised jurisdiction. 
Authority was challenged as individuals began more clearly to conceive of themselves as 
whole persons apart from attachment to such institutions. Clearly, the establishment of new 
laws designed to protect individuals served to enhance conceptions of autonomy.
John Stuart Mill’s views on autonomy set strong boundaries around an individual. Mill, 
while not anti-God or religion, did not establish man’s autonomy on “God-given” natural 
rights, but on man alone.53 Mill also centred man’s autonomy in a desire for an individual’s
50See thesis, ch. 3,164.
51Beauchamp and Childress, 70-71.
52See thesis, ch. 3,152.
53Ibid., 161-62.
277
own greatest happiness. Mill’s philosophy contains a weakness in that it cannot retain the 
ground it claims for the individual. Simply stated, Mill’s GHP requires the subordination o f  
individual happiness to the greater happiness of the many.54 It is conceivable, then, that an 
autonomous person might be required, by a literal application of the theory, to relinquish his or 
her claim to PH for the greater happiness of the many. Ironically, Mill’s HU philosophy that 
was conceived as a means for guaranteeing an individual’s autonomy also serves potentially as 
an instrument to undermine it. At this stage in the development of autonomy, an emerging 
reality became evident. The individual now stood, at least in theory, as a fully autonomous 
source of authority in decision-making.
Twentieth-century thinkers applied Mill’s theory. Individuals began to assert “rights’ 
claims” on various entities, calling for changes based solely upon the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Coupled with Mill’s GHP, an individual could now make PH claims upon other 
persons, groups, or institutions with what he/she perceived to be moral authority. The medical 
arena became a primary focus of such claims.
The thesis has demonstrated the slow progression of ideas that led to the present 
context, where autonomy advocates invoke claims of moral authority upon others which the 
advocates perceive to be inherent in the concept of autonomy. What is often left unrecognised 
is that the lengthy history of the term “autonomy” centred upon establishing safeguards around 
an individual rather than building a bridgehead for tearing down perceived opposition to 
individual autonomy claims. Further, the development of autonomy along individual lines 
often runs aground at the point of moral authority. Autonomy advocates seem to imply that an 
individual’s PH desire, although in actuality, rarely unlimited, is a sufficient source of moral 
authority to oblige action on a claimant’s behalf. Simply put, individuals now use autonomy
54It is also possible that both an individual and a community might agree that PAS, for 
example, is morally required. However, to maximise utility would require also a potentially 
undesirable result—the distribution of PAS, in such circumstances, on a wide scale. This might 
not be conducive to the greatest general balance of pleasure over pain.
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claims to impose upon others their own desires—the very thing against which the historical 
development of the notion of autonomy had attempted to safeguard. The DPR is one place 
where a patient may make an autonomy claim that he feels obliges his physician’s compliance.
Physician Paternalism
As the developmental section illustrated, the areas where conflict often emerges in the 
DPR are informed consent and end-of-life decision-making, both of which raise the question of 
identifying the ultimate source of authority. Physician paternalism has been cited as one 
hindrance to the fulfilment of a patient’s will. A patient might claim that his or her autonomy 
has been infringed and that a doctor has overstepped the bounds of authority.
The truth is that the issue of authority is complex and, at times, confusing. The doctor, 
by virtue of his or her training, technological expertise, and certification carries much 
authority.55 His level of authority may be strengthened when a patient may not wish to exercise 
her own authority in the DPR and may relinquish control to the physician. Conversely, 
confusion may arise when a doctor may assert no leadership at all, even though a patient may 
desire guidance in making a decision. All of these possibilities may be complicated further by 
the level of patient competence in perceiving and understanding her medical situation, the legal 
and regulatory guidelines that safeguard autonomy, and the potential for unfair burdens, 
financial or otherwise, placed on others because of a patient’s decisions.56
Yet, at the core of situations where authority is exercised, underlying principles exist. In 
the case of doctors, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence are significant influences 
in the exercise of authority. Physicians feel a moral obligation to “do good,” or at least, to “do 
no harm” to their patients. This, however, conflicts, at times, with a principle of respect for 
patient autonomy. Each of these positions is grounded in a set of beliefs or values about life
55Ibid., 173.
56Ibid., 174-75.
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and the potential for conflict, even moral conflict, exists whenever end-of-life choices are 
being made by both physicians and patients.
The physician principle of beneficence and the patient “principle of respect for 
autonomy” are protean concepts as the history and development of each has demonstrated. As 
such, because they are ever-shifting, they may not always be relied upon to provide consistent 
and suitable sources of moral authority. At the same time, it must be said that each principle 
illustrates a need for some source of common-ground consensus that will better serve the 
interests of both patients and physicians as they make decisions together in the DPR. This 
platform is crucial because of the direct need to clarify several issues related to the PAS debate, 
among which may be the foundational question about the ultimate value and meaning to be 
assigned to life.
Sanctity of Life
Historically, medicine has held to the view that life is good and that life is to be 
preserved.57 This view has, of late, begun to clash with contrasting life-values of some patients. 
It is true that physicians have, at times, exercised technology in a quest to extend life in such a 
way that it conflicts with a patient’s desires, but it is entirely too simplistic to state that the 
reason for conflict in the DPR is solely related to differing aims between doctors and their 
patients.
A central question related to the value of life is about what man is and why he exists, 
and whether physical illness devalues the individual any or at all. A corollary to these 
questions is one of meaning. Terminal illness often raises questions about the meaning of life 
in the face of pain and suffering. A hindrance to constructive examination of these weighty 
concerns has been the somewhat narrow view that focuses on a patient’s physical or
57Ibid., 190.
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psychological perceptions alone when making end-of-life choices associated with assisted 
suicide. Moral decisions at end-of-life invite deeper reflection.
The PAS discussion holds up for consideration divergent views of life’s 
sanctity-among which are a Christian view and a secular view. The Christian view holds that 
human life, having been created in God’s image, is infinitely precious to God and made for an 
eternal destiny. At the core of this view are the religious principles that one ought never to kill 
intentionally the innocent, that human dignity is intrinsic to all human beings equally, and that 
one must not forfeit one’s inherent dignity by acting in ways that are at variance with human 
dignity.58
Somewhat like the Christian view, the traditional secular view also stresses the equal 
dignity of all citizens. Broadly speaking, however, the secular view holds that human dignity 
and worth depend upon the following requirements: exercising freedom from external restraint; 
possessing developed, exercisable psychological abilities for understanding, choice, and 
rational communication; and exercising such abilities in the enjoyment of an acceptable QL. 
Even though the views have a core ingredient in common (for example, equal dignity), there is 
at the root of each view a significant difference in assessing life’s value. This has implications 
for end-of-life decision-making.
In the Hippocratic tradition, there was a prima facie belief that a doctor should avoid 
any action that might prematurely end another person’s life. The protection of human life was 
firmly rooted in the Hippocratic corpus. At the root of Hippocratic medicine’s SL view was a 
concern for a patient to be restored to health and return to his community relationships. 
Hippocratic medicine helped to establish a synergy between a doctor and patient based upon a 
common desire for patient wellness, a relationship which resulted in a moral bond between 
them. This common desire for patient well-being lasted through centuries and strengthened in
58Ibid., 187-88.
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the Christian era, where the value of physical life was among many emphases (e.g., 
spiritual/asceticism) which linked to the higher principle that God valued man.
The DPR changed, in the time of Percival, from the standpoint of the physician to a 
focus upon the patient’s view. Percival recognised the potential for DPR tension between a 
patient’s goals, medical technology, and a physician’s goals.59 One of the reasons for the 
current conflict in the DPR, especially as it relates to end-of-life decisions, is connected in part 
to this fully-emerging patient view of autonomy that has developed across the centuries. 
Sometimes the patient’s view is different from that of his physician.60
Patients and doctors can agree that life has intrinsic value and that human life carries 
inherent rights and interests worthy of protection. Traditional moral and ethical formulations 
have been rendered much more difficult at life’s end due, in part, to life-extending medical 
technologies. Of particular moral concern is a medical view that may, at times, seek to extend 
life at whatever cost. When technology is used as an instrument to impose life rather than as an 
aid to preserve life, this action raises moral concerns about the limits of the application of 
medical technology at the end of life.
This chapter’s evaluation of the historical and philosophical features of the PAS debate 
has revealed points of weaknesses, especially as the theory of HU has been applied by PAS 
advocates. These weaknesses have not yet been addressed satisfactorily so that a recommended 
change regarding medical killing in medical canons may be either sustained or justified. What 
has surfaced in the discussion is a number of related, if not integral, moral concerns which both 
arise from, and inform, the PAS debate. Life’s value is found in more than physical, 
materialistic, or psychological data. It may be suggested, therefore, that the moral concerns 
which remain unaddressed will have significant implications for further discussions concerning 
the legalisation of medical killing.
59Ibid., 192-93.
60Ibid., 194.
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Four Moral Concerns
Whereas the ends of medicine have been to care for and to restore the health of sick 
individuals and relieve their suffering, the ethical dimension in the medical profession 
historically has not so much focussed upon ethical ideals, either solely or primarily, as upon 
their application to people.61 The practice of medicine, humanly and technically, involves the 
application of actions motivated by ethical principles by human beings (physicians) to human 
beings (patients) in relationship. Of significant import to the PAS debate is this ethical 
dimension of medicine that relates both ideally and practically.62 It is the ethical dimension of 
the discussion that will be the focus of this section of the chapter.
Several key moral concerns surfaced as the PAS debate features were evaluated. 
Among these concerns are three which derive from the DPR and must be addressed, since the 
DPR is the laboratory where the current application of ethical ideals and practice coalesce.63 
These three concerns are: (1) the historic departure fromphysician-protection-of-life to 
physician-assistance-with-death;64 (2) a question about whether assistance with suicide is 
indeed moral at all;65 and (3) the potential for fostering distrust in the medical community.66 A
61Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Ends o f Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 14.
62Earl R. Babbie, Science and Morality in Medicine: A Survey o f Medical Educators 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 12. Babbie writes that interpersonal 
relationships are important in the DPR, because the character of the relationships between 
doctors and their patients ultimately either supports or threatens the basic beliefs (moral) held 
in general society. On the other hand, physicians like Lasagna argue that medicine is not a 
moral enterprise at all. See Jonsen, 268.
63Babbie, 12.
64See thesis, ch. 4,222-27.
65Ibid., 223-24.
66Ibid., 258-59, footnotes 164 and 165.
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fourth moral concern, the threat of “greater killing,” is a “slippery slope” argument which PAS 
opponents fear may become a reality should medical canons be changed.67
The twentieth century brought wartime experiences that contributed to a certain loss of 
innocence and idealism. In the same period, scientific progress created new technologies in 
medicine that raised new moral questions about human decision-making. The BMA, in writing 
about the modem moral dilemmas in medicine, states that the past offers no solutions to the 
new and evermore complex problems in medicine.68 Contemporary medical ethics seems to be 
unwilling, at present, to draw upon the past for help. After all, it is tme that the pluralistic 
Western culture, with its liberal political philosophy, makes it difficult to appeal to any widely 
held religious or philosophical system as a basis for medical decision-making.69 Whether the 
BMA assertion is tme or not may be argued. In fact, this section will offer some discussion, 
drawn from the past, which will contribute to clearer thinking about these complex moral 
dilemmas.
First Moral Concern: The Historical Departure from Physicians 
Protecting Life to Physicians Assisting Death
The Scone of the Argument in Support of 
Allowing Physicians to Kill
Supporters of PAS argue that terminally ill patients should receive assistance with 
suicide based on the claim of mercy or compassion.70 Proponents are careful, however, to list 
qualifications for the use of PAS: the patient is to be experiencing irreversible suffering, he is
67Ibid., 262.
68BMA, Handbook, 10.
69Emanuel, Ends o f Human Life, 36-37.
70Battin, Least Worst Death. A leading example is Battin who bolsters from mercy her 
guarded argument for assisted death.
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incurably ill, and he must make repeated requests for assistance with suicide.71 Advocates like 
Quill state that it is difficult to prosecute legally physicians who assist with suicide motivated 
by compassion,72 In fact, the act of assistance is often considered to be morally sound if the 
motive for acting is pure, which implies compassion.73 A companion form of assisted death, 
VAE, also claims validity in the mercy argument because the compassionate physician who 
helps the patient end his life enables the patient to escape from “useless suffering.”74
The thesis has demonstrated that a primary fulcrum in the PAS debate is the 
autonomous patient requesting assistance with death. Physicians, it is asserted, are obliged to 
assist patients with their requests, based upon mercy, as an extension of the principle of 
beneficence. It might seem odd, in light of its etymological root, to link “beneficence” with 
“killing,” since the word beneficence means “doing good” or “active kindness,”75 although it 
must be acknowledged that in order to ease suffering, beneficence is related to both aspects. 
The meaning of beneficence in medical ethics now, however, includes the notion of a “duty” to 
help others further their important and legitimate interests both when it is possible and with 
minimal risk to the physician.76 Beauchamp and Childress also include the idea of moral 
obligation in the notion that a physician is to act for the benefit of others and to help them
71Timothy Quill, “Physician Assisted Suicide Is Moral,” in Physician-Assisted Suicide, 
ed. Daniel A. Leone (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1998), 17.
72Ibid.
73Timothy Quill, “Physician Assisted Suicide,” 16-17. Quill says that if the act of 
assistance is initiated by the physician, or motivated by greed, then the decision to assist in 
suicide is no longer morally sound.
74A. B. Downing, “Euthanasia: The Human Context,” in Euthanasia and the Right to
Death: The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia, ed. A. B. Downing (London: Peter Owen, 1969) , 
23. Of course, this argument begs the question concerning when one’s suffering is determined 
to be “useless.”
lsOED, 2d ed., s.v. “beneficence.”
76Shelp, 201. Shelp quotes Beauchamp and Childress, 201, 260.
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further their legitimate interests.77 PAS supporters reason that it is beneficent, and in the 
legitimate interest of the patient, to eliminate the patient’s pain. This idea parallels Mill’s 
initial view of beneficence.78 True utility is achieved when happiness is experienced through 
maximising pleasure and minimising pain. Mill believed this could be achieved through proper 
education in utility so that human beings would be motivated by an inner impulse that leads 
them to promote the general good.79 In this case, the elimination of the patient’s pain and 
suffering through death both helps the patient and decreases the level of pain and suffering of 
society depending, of course, at what point the calculation is made.
Secondary support for this beneficence-claim for PAS comes from other areas as well. 
For example, statistics seem to indicate that doctors’ attitudes toward death are changing, so 
that there is a “drastic” decrease of belief in an afterlife.80 Another area of support comes from 
a change in age-old perceptions among some doctors that the death of a patient is a mark of 
failure or ultimate defeat; hence, the substitution of the idea that beneficence actually may aid 
the patient more by easing his suffering.81 Still another area of support comes with a change in 
the ultimate good that may result when a patient chooses his death. If a patient chooses to 
terminate his own life at a specific point, for example, then the patient is not under the ultimate 
control of death. Advocates of PAS like Quill list as a reason to help patients with suicide the 
desire to help patients maintain their dignity and control over life, on their own terms, until
77Beauchamp and Childress, 260.
78Shelp, 202. Compare Mill, “Utilitarianism,” 268-69.
79Mill, “Utilitarianism,” 268-69.
80George Annas, “Rights of the Terminally 111 Patient,” in Matters o f Life and Death: 
Crises in Bio-Medical Ethics, ed. John E. Thomas (Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1978), 106.
81Quill, Midwife Through the Dying Process, 1; and Annas, “Rights of the Terminally 
111 Patient,” 106.
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death comes.82 Advocates of PAS, then, use a variety of arguments to support a change in 
medical canons regarding killing.
The Scone of Arguments Against Allowing Physicians to Kill 
General: Medicine’s Healing Ethos
There are several counter arguments offered by those who do not support PAS, or who 
do not agree with the use of the principle of mercy and beneficence in this manner. Pellegrino 
argues that when physicians kill patients, even as a compassionate act, it fundamentally distorts 
the healing relationship.83 He believes that physician-assisted death is a “serious violation” of 
the moral nature and purposes of medicine which, historically, promoted the preservation and 
healing of life.84 Until recently, this generally recognised healing framework supplied a widely- 
accepted moral standard for medical decision-making.85 Perhaps originating in the Hippocratic- 
Pythagorean School and amended many times across the centuries, nonetheless it existed and 
remained at the heart of the DPR. Even though the standards within various physicians’ codes 
were often violated, this basic core principle remained constant—that medicine supports and
82Quill, “Death and Dignity,” 693.
83Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 95-102. Pellegrino, Humanism', Edmund 
D. Pellegrino, “The Place of Intention in the Moral Assessment of Assisted Suicide and 
Active Euthanasia,” in Intending Death: The Ethics o f Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 
ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 163-83;
Pellegrino and Thomasma, Philosophical Basis o f Medical Practice', Pellegrino, For the 
Patient’s Good; and Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical Practice. Pellegrino 
offers a contrasting view of beneficence to that presented by Mill and HU.
84Ibid., 98.
85BBC News, “Helping the Terminally 111 to Die”; internet, available at http://newsvote. 
bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pageto.../news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3549673.stn; accessed 21 March 2004. 
The article notes that a reason why physicians are against euthanasia and assisted suicide is the 
belief that it would undermine the basic ethos of a caring profession, and it would lead to a 
deterioration in the DPR.
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protects human life. Medicine is historically a healing relationship that has as its long-term 
goal the restoration and cultivation of health.86
Specific: Historical Emphasis on Humane Treatment
The BMA notes that society, in view of the medical profession’s special expertise and 
the patient’s vulnerability, expects high standards from medical professionals. High standards 
apply not only in relation to scientific education and clinical skill, but also to professional and 
humane conduct.87 This has been the case, for the most part, throughout history although, in 
some instances, the expectations for quality healthcare were as abysmal as the services 
rendered, and in others the penalties for failure to meet standards were quite demanding. In 
ancient Babylon, for example, Hammurabi’s Code o f Laws (1790 B.C.) regulated the fees of 
physicians proportionate to the status of their patients. If the surgery proved fatal to the patient, 
the physician’s hands were cut away. There was a value scale to human life, however, and if 
the patient were but a slave his replacement would suffice.88 Hammurabi’s external oversight 
through law served to regulate the practice of medicine somewhat, and provided a more 
humane care for patients as it called for the protection of human life. Professional self­
regulation, from another perspective, may be traced back at least to the Hippocratic Oath 
(fourth century B.C.).89 In a day when there were no medical schools, no examinations, and no 
formal procedures for certification and licensure,90 the Oath reflected a system of medical
86Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 98. When the goal of restoration to health is 
impossible, medicine has still sought to support and protect human life. How this is to happen 
is a matter of varied debate.
87BMA, Handbook, 9.
88Ibid.
89Ibid.
90Amundsen and Femgren, 18.
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principles in a context where obligations to abide by any standard were rare.91 The overall 
Hippocratic Corpus provided the earliest example of “new medicine,” one that developed a 
theoretical basis for medical practice.92 The fifth century B.C. offered medical craftsmen 
philosophical constructs that helped them to examine the nature of man.93
In mediaeval Christian Europe, the attitude of pre-Christian medical humanism still 
provided general guidelines for the conduct of physicians.94 Alongside these guidelines the 
equally ancient traditions of medical etiquette, manners, and deportment flourished, thus aiding 
the physician in building the confidence of his patient.95 Modem medical ethics, but with the 
same key cultural variations, emerged toward the end of the eighteenth century in a time of 
great social change.
Thomas Percival laid the foundation for modem medical ethics when, as an outgrowth 
of his initial desire to solve a controversy over medical behaviour between hospital personnel, 
he wrote a guidebook of professional conduct.96 With this guide the bridge between ancient and 
modem medical ethics was crossed. Each successive generation has amended and reapplied 
codes of ethics based, in part, upon Percival’s work. Each subsequent medical code also 
contained at least one statement concerning the preservation of human life.97 This idea of 
preserving life faced a new challenge to its meaning and application in the modem period when
91Edelstein, Hippocratic Oath, 59.
92Amundsen and Femgren, 11.
93Ibid, 11.
94BMA, Handbook, 9.
95Ibid.
96Ibid., 9-10.
91 Code o f Ethics o f the American Medical Association 1847,1957, and 1980. Cf. the 
International Code o f Medical Ethics o f the World Medical Association 1949, amended 1968, 
and 1983. Compare “Appendix ID: World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki,” Law, 
Medicine & Health Care, 19, nos. 3-4 (Fall-Winter 1991): 264-65. The World Medical 
Association Declaration o f Helsinki 1964 was amended in 1975,1983, and 1989.
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the argument of extending beneficence became the ground from which to argue some forms of 
physician-killing.98 These challenges to the moral standards of the previous centuries is worthy 
of careful note.
Specific: An Alternative Ethic of Care
The standards of ethical conduct that govern the DPR have changed drastically in the 
last generation with “the center of gravity” of clinical decision-making shifting “almost 
completely from the physician to the patient.”99 Pellegrino believes that the principle of 
autonomy gained force in Western culture bn the “inchoate stirrings of social change” that had
98The thesis addresses the specific challenges of PAS, but abortion is another related, 
but extremely complex, facet of the larger medical question regarding the preservation of life.
In one respect, abortion resembles a portion of the thesis argument; namely, the involvement of 
a physician in an act of harm to an innocent life in order to extend beneficence to another life, 
or to the life of the innocent foetus itself. Further, both abortion and PAS discussions involve 
autonomy claims—which claims have been integral parts of the thesis focus. The abortion 
discussion, however, differs from the present PAS dialogue in several ways. First, an unborn 
child, unlike a terminally ill patient, is unable to make an autonomous choice to end his life, 
notwithstanding a claim of “vicarious consent.” See Charles E. Curran, Issues in Sexual and 
Medical Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 79, 85. Curran’s abortion 
autonomy argument differs somewhat from a PAS autonomy argument. The scope of PAS, by 
design, requires a competent patient to make repeated requests to die and does not by design 
include “vicarious” or proxy consent. The aim of PAS is to allow a terminally ill patient to 
make the decision whether or not to commit suicide. Further, unlike a terminally ill patient who 
can decline unwanted medical treatment, an unborn child is not able to decline such treatment. 
Second, since an unborn child cannot express his desire about whether to continue living, a 
moral question concerning the rights and responsibilities medicine might have toward that 
unborn child must be raised. Differences in the definition of what constitutes human life are 
deeply divisive at this point, since some abortion advocates argue that an embryo is not yet a 
human life, and thus assume that any consideration of the choice of life or death from his 
perspective is a moot point. See Singer, Practical Ethics, 86-87. By way of contrast, in the case 
of PAS, even if a patient is unable to express a choice regarding living or dying, the 
assumption is not that the patient wants life to be ended.
Dworkin recognises the deeper preservation-of-life question and seeks to address it 
from within the moral complexity that surrounds a doctor’s involvement with abortion. He 
reasons that very few people would consider it morally justifiable for a third party, even a 
doctor, “to kill one innocent person to save another.” Dworkin seeks to direct the focus away 
from the act of killing and toward clarifying life’s sanctity and its meaning. See Dworkin,
Life’s Dominion, 32. Yet, unlike Dworkin, this thesis additionally directs specific attention to 
the moral nature of a physician’s action with regard to killing, most specifically as it relates to 
PAS.
"Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical Practice, 54.
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challenged deeply the traditional Hippocratic model of the physician-patient relationship. 
Coupled with social change was the “formal analysis” of Beauchamp and Childress’s 
Principles o f Bioethics (1978 edition), which included as one of its four principles the principle 
of autonomy. The principle of autonomy has experienced worldwide appeal both inside and 
outside of medicine. Pellegrino and Thomasma believe that the principle seeks to balance the 
“enormous power of expert knowledge” that is so pervasive in industrialised, technologically- 
oriented societies. Autonomy, according to Pellegrino and Thomasma, has particular appeal in 
medical relationships and it counters the historical dominance of either benign authoritarianism 
or paternalism in the traditional ethics of medicine.
The image of the physician has changed in this time frame as well from a figure 
carrying “technical and moral authority” to an image of “protector, facilitator, and advocate for 
the self-determination of the patient.”100 A complex array of social, political, philosophical, 
religious, and medical forces has been credited with influencing the changes in the DPR. The 
emphasis upon, and influence exerted within, the DPR by patient autonomy has fostered the 
emergence of several models of the physician-patient relationship.101 At first glance, such 
models seem to protect the patient’s right to self-determination, but any autonomy-based view 
is actually “illusory,” and bears implications for the DPR.102 This type of model becomes 
especially crucial when the patient who holds this view is faced with a terminal illness and is 
making end-of-life decisions.
An autonomy-based model, where a patient establishes a contract with a physician, 
truly undermines physician trust and it fails to provide a realistic understanding that a patient is 
“vulnerable,” “lacks the power to heal herself,” is likely in “pain, anxious, frightened and
100Ibid., 56.
101Ibid. The authors list autonomy-driven models like a consumer model and a 
negotiated contract model. They well note that these models may not engender personal 
commitment or trust on the part of either physician or patient.
102Ibid.
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perhaps distressed.”103 The patient, no matter the view of autonomy, is actually often not equal 
in bargaining power with a physician.
The reality is that autonomy-inspired models are not able to offer the protection of a 
patient’s self-determination, and to a considerable degree are “illusory” and “even dangerous” 
to patients and doctors.104 Pellegrino and Thomasma warn that absolutisation of autonomy- 
based models is morally perilous.105 Wamock is cautiously supportive of patient autonomy 
when patients face “overinterventionist” or “overdogmatic” doctors, but she has expressed 
concern, as well, that autonomy may be given too much prominence.106 She warns that there 
are “numerous difficulties in ensuring that a patient has really been brought to understand the 
alternatives on offer,”107 and adds that there are many situations, “especially when someone is 
asked to decide on treatment or the withdrawal of treatment not for himself but for his child or 
parent,” where the burden of making such a decision is almost intolerable.108 In Wamock’s 
view, it would be “disastrous to be so enthusiastic for the principle of autonomy that 
paternalism was quite abandoned.”109 She advocates a balanced model that offers proper 
support to patients.
The thesis has demonstrated that there is no way to circumvent a physician’s character, 
or values, or influence in the current DPR setting,110 thus inviting an alternative approach to the
103Ibid., 56-57.
104Ibid., 56.
105Ibid., 57.
106Maiy Wamock, “Views and Reviews: ‘Principles of Health Care Ethics,”’ BMJ 308 
(9 April, 1994): 988-89.
107Ibid.
108Ibid.
109Ibid.
110Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical Practice, 57. Pellegrino and 
Thomasma write: “the physician’s virtues are habitual dispositions to act in such a way that the 
ends of medicine are enhanced and enriched. See comments at footnote 100.
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current medical culture of end-of-life decision-making as supported by HU. Pellegrino and 
Thomasma provide an alternative “healing relationship” approach to the current “physician- 
aid-in dying” model.111 Their “end-oriented beneficence modeV’ is based upon the specific 
historic ends112 of medicine. These ends of medicine are strengthened by the application of 
foundational principles.113 Attendant to these core principles are the three subsidiary principles 
of truth telling, promise keeping, and confidentiality that can be derived from the ends of 
medicine.114 While these principle cognates and their application in the DPR comprise a 
physician’s role in the healing relationship, it also is important to recognise the duties 
incumbent upon a patient.
Patients share with a physician the obligation to “act according to principles and in 
fulfilment of duties that will attain and not obstruct these ends.”115 The patient is obliged to 
provide honestly to the physician the data he or she needs, comply with the agreed- upon 
treatment regimen, “disclose conflicting advice or doubts about the advice given, consider the 
needs of the physician as a human being, and respect the physician’s autonomy and moral 
values.”116 Indeed, misapplied autonomy-based models can actually erode the very value—self- 
determination—that such models seek to protect and even create a climate of distrust in the 
DPR.117
inIbid., 170-71, and 193-94.
112Ibid., 193. The authors use the term “ends” in the classic teleological sense. They 
believe that these “ends” are health, cure, the care of illness, and a right and good healing 
decision.
113Ibid., 194. According to the authors, the three ends of medicine are supported by the 
principles of beneficence/nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice.
114Ibid.
115Ibid.
I16Ibid.
117Ibid., 57. The authors state that no evidence exists that a relationship based on 
mistrust is any more protective of patient autonomy than one based on trust—on a covenant 
rather than a contract, for example.
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A more robust physician-patient model, such as an end-oriented beneficence model, 
recognises that the current moral complexities call for a clearer assessment of the nature 
and meaning of beneficence—what is meant by acting in a patient’s best interest-and 
how this relates best to end-of-life concerns such as medical killing.
Discussions of “Beneficence,” “Nonmaleficence,” and “Killing”
The debate concerning PAS has been confused somewhat by a lack of clarity with the 
terminology used by both sides. By definition, “beneficence” has not, until recently, carried the 
idea of promoting an act of harm. PAS exceeds the current stated rules of the principle of 
beneficence in medical ethics.118 To allow for killing under the present umbrella of beneficence 
then, would require an expanded definition, as well as a broader application of HU theory.
Utilitarian theory stresses beneficence as a central concept, according to Beauchamp 
and Childress, because it is conceived as an aspect of human nature that spurs one to act in the 
interest of others.119 Mill would qualify this somewhat generous definition by stating that the 
sacrifice made for others would be wasted if beneficence does not tend to increase the sum 
total of happiness. Mill would stress that the happiness pursued must contribute to the general 
good as Utilitarians deem it—the greatest happiness of the greatest number.120
Utilitarianism also redefines the historic term, “beneficence,” to buttress its 
philosophical construct, allowing the term to be shaded by an evolving theory. As 
“beneficence” has been applied to the act of killing, it has blurred the historic meaning of the 
word to cloud the difference between the care given to ensure that a patient experiences a 
“good” death, and a physician’s active assistance with a patient’s death. The term 
“beneficence” also relates to the community-at-large, because family members, friends, and
118Beauchamp and Childress, 262.
119Ibid, 260.
120Mill, “Utilitarianism,” 268-69.
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society are often perceived to have gained as the patient received assistance with death; an 
opportunity for each individual to have explored and confronted the inner self.121 The historic 
idea of beneficence as it related to caregiving was straightforwardly positive, including few, if 
any, alternative definition nuances. Its parallel term, like the opposite side of the same coin, is 
the notion of “nonmaleficence.” However, just like the notion of beneficence, which is 
evolving in meaning and application, the meaning of its counterpart is changing as well.
While in the attention given to the principle of beneficence the matter of maleficence is 
often overlooked, other spokespersons, like Frankena, include the ingredient of wowmaleficence 
as a primary consideration.122 He ranks four aspects of beneficence, the first of which is 
nonmaleficence: that one ought not to inflict evil or harm. Next in his list are three obligations 
of beneficence: that one should prevent evil or harm to another; and should remove evil or 
sources of harm to another; and finally, that one should “do or promote good.”123 For Frankena, 
nonmaleficent action ranks ahead of beneficent action. Before one may “do good,” one must 
have the intention to “avoid doing evil or harm.” Frankena sees beneficence and 
nonmaleficence as joined in a single principle.
The authors Beauchamp and Childress also speak to this issue and, while they do not 
propose a normative ranking or hierarchical structure to the principle, they do favour utilitarian 
calculations to balance benefits, risks, and results of actions. Using their application of the 
principle of utility,124 obligations of beneficence may, at times, override obligations of
121Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 97.
122Judith Wilson Ross, Sister Corrine Bayley, Vicki Michel, and Deborah Pug, 
Handbook for Hospital Ethics Committees (Chicago: American Hospital Publishing, 1986), 12- 
13. Compare also Beauchamp and Childress, 190.
123Beauchamp and Childress, 190-92.
124Ibid, 260-62.
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nonmaleficence, but they suggest no a priori rule that favours avoiding harm over providing 
benefit.125
Neither of these above approaches, however, clarifies moral end-of-life decision­
making. Not all moral matters may be addressed through utilitarian calculations of benefits and 
harms. Quill himself expressed an “uneasy feeling” about the crossing of spiritual, legal, 
professional, and personal boundaries after writing his patient’s prescription.126 The principles 
of beneficence and nonmaleficence invite more careful moral scrutiny. While beneficence and 
nonmaleficence may be sometimes linked to each other in concept, there is, however, a distinct 
difference between these two terms and the historic concept of “killing.”
Historically, the term “killing” has meant the direct causation of another’s death. 
Advocates of PAS use the word in a “technical” or strictly “biological” sense,127 in contrast 
with the traditional interpretation which implies personal agency as part of its meaning.128 
Rachels defines “intentional” killing as “what one is trying to accomplish by an action,” not in 
the sense of “knowing exactly what someone did” (for example, Cain killed intentionally his 
brother Abel in the Bible).129 Rachels presents a utilitarian viewpoint because, according to his 
view, actions are neither right nor wrong in and of themselves. If the goal is to minimise pain 
and maximise pleasure, then the action is deemed to be right.130 “Killing” for the utilitarian, 
then, may include the medical purpose to alleviate the extreme pain of a patient and thereby, 
because of its result, be considered to be a “right” action.
125Ibid., 191.
126Quill, “Death and Dignity,” 693.
127Quill, “Physician-Assisted Suicide,” 16. Oddly, Quill states that “killing” patients is 
technically correct, but that it incorrectly suggests a physician-driven act.
m OED, 2d ed., s.v. “kill.” Rachels fails to consider the additional fact that Cain killed 
in anger.
129Rachels, End o f Life, 15.
l30Ibid., 154-55.
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Opponents of PAS use the term in its traditional sense and assign moral responsibility 
to the one who kills, although they propose variations in the degree to which culpability is 
assigned. According to spokesmen like Callahan and Pellegrino, the legalisation of PAS would 
be hazardous to the medical profession because this position departs from that which 
physicians have taken throughout the history of the profession.131 Callahan, for example, in 
summing up the distinction between killing and “allowing to die,” and calling attention to the 
difference between causality and culpability, does not assign blame to the physician who stops 
treatment in the case of a lethal disease. For Callahan, the physician is not the “killer.” The 
disease is the cause of death. Therefore, there is no culpability in allowing a patient to die of 
the natural results of his illness.132 Callahan does, however, point to an underlying morality 
when he alludes to hazards associated with PAS other than physical or legal. The danger is tied 
to the harm that would follow if the line between killing and letting die were erased.
Previously, biological factors were agents in the death of a terminally ill patient, but the 
present PAS scheme suggests that the doctor should replace the natural cause of death as an 
intentional agent, working in conjunction with the patient and/or his family.133 Callahan 
reasons that to permit doctors to kill patients, based on the belief that there is no difference 
between “killing” and “letting a patient die,” interjects moral confusion into the argument. This 
confusion, he argues, lies between the direct physical cause of death or its causality and the 
culpability for the death. Historically, the cause of a terminally ill patient’s death was the 
natural consequence of disease, and there was no culpability assigned to such a death since it 
was a natural result of natural biological processes. PAS advocates claim, however, that a death 
by natural causes or a death by suicide results in the same namely, the cessation of a
131Daniel Callahan, “Self-Extinction: The Morality of the Helping Hand,” in Physician- 
Assisted Suicide, ed. Robert F. Weir (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 69-70. 
See also Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 98.
132Callahan, “Self-Extinction,” 78-79.
133Ibid., 78.
297
patient’s life, so there is no difference in moral significance. PAS opponents, however, 
recognise that a physician’s assistance includes intentionality concerning the death of the 
patient and, perhaps, a hastening of the final event. The implication for these thinkers is one of 
moral culpability, whether that assignation of culpability comes from ecclesiastical, societal, or 
legal sources.134
The legalisation of PAS would alter what Ladd calls the “internal morality of 
medicine.”135 According to Ladd’s definition, a physician should “refrain from doing anything 
to or for a patient that does not have a clear medical purpose,” for without this medical 
purpose, a patient’s death would be regarded as “killing.”136 Ladd associates the term “killing” 
with a body of norms or ethical constraints and requirements that govern the physician-patient 
relationship.137 Ladd reasons that there is a moral difference in medicine and, perhaps, even 
philosophy138 between the terms “letting die” (refraining from futile treatment) and “killing” 
(action that has no clear biological “healing” medical purpose). The actor (or physician) in the 
act of assisting with suicide will be affected morally by the death of the patient. As has been 
shown in chapter 2, much has been written about the “distinction without a difference,” in 
support of the underlying mercy argument that, sometimes, the most merciful response to 
terminal illness and suffering is a “kindness” (beneficence) that can kill. For Ladd and others,
134Ibid.
135John Ladd, “The Internal Morality of Medicine: An Essential Dimension of the 
Patient-Physician Relationship,” in The Clinical Encounter: The Moral Fabric o f the Patient- 
Physician Relationship, ed. Earl E. Shelp, Philosophy and Medicine (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 
Publishing Co., 1983), 210. Cf. Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 98. Pellegrino defines the 
“internal morality of medicine” as “. . .  the moral obligations that devolve upon physicians by 
virtue of the nature of medical activity.” Overall, Pellegrino stresses that medicine is 
fundamentally a healing relationship.
136Ladd, 210. This use of the term does not imply wholesale acceptance of its definition.
137Ibid., 209.
138Ibid, 209-10.
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there must be an alternative to physician killing to avoid the moral dilemma inherent in the 
intent, action, and consequences such a practice brings into the medical context.139
Summary
The debate surrounding physician involvement in PAS hinges upon many factors. 
Traditionally, the DPR has been one of stability through the centuries by the consistent 
exercise of the principle of beneficence by physicians toward patients. Tension in the current 
PAS debate surrounding the principle of beneficence appears to be centred at the point of the 
difference of opinion concerning life’s value which becomes apparent, for example, when one 
examines the application of terms like “killing” versus “allowing to die.” The reigning 
confusion in terminology, which both sides use, and the considerations of culpability and the 
effects of patient death upon those who help make that death possible, have yet to be properly 
clarified. These ongoing tensions between competing ethical views have slowed, if not made 
impossible heretofore, the process of reaching consensus in the matter.
Second Moral Concern: A Question About Whether 
Assistance with Suicide Is Indeed Moral
Moral concerns surrounding doctors who assist patients with suicide may not be settled 
simply by referring to an ontological framework. A valid question in medical morality is 
whether there is some “justifiable philosophical foundation” for a set of binding obligations on 
all those who profess to heal.140 It follows that, if there were, a question concerning whether a 
binding moral obligation would be perceived to attach to the legal acceptance of PAS. With
139Ibid., 209. Compare Ronald E. Cranford’s, “The Physician’s Role in Killing and the 
Intentional Withdrawal of Treatment,” in Intending Death: The Ethics o f Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996), 161. Of 
course, Quill reasons that PAS should be legalised for this reason, falling back on the argument 
for autonomy as support for this position; see Quill, Midwife Through the Dying Process, 1.
140Pellegrino and Thomasma, Philosophical Basis o f Medical Practice, 192. The AMA, 
BMA, and the GMC have clearly stated sets of obligations regulating treatment of patients. To 
what extent these are moral is another point.
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these queries in mind, the focus of this section is the DPR and whether a binding set of moral 
obligations either remains or exists to cover this relationship and what may be said about the 
morality of the act of assisting patients with suicide.
The Morality of Practising Medicine
In the present pluralistic medical environment, Pelligrino and Thomasma report, fewer 
physicians accept a religious foundation for professional ethics. Fewer still claim to be true to 
all of the injunctions of the Hippocratic Oath, especially with specific reference to the matter of 
euthanasia.141 Even codes of professional ethics mention moral positions less frequently.142 
This absence of overt reference, however, does not necessarily argue that current medical 
practice is either devoid of a moral base or must abandon such a tenet, even though some might 
argue otherwise.143 In fact, the reality that the practice of medicine has to do with “good ends” 
and the well-being of others qualifies it as moral in nature.144 Since the DPR involves human 
beings in relationship, the DPR will reflect the general level of morality associated with each 
of the entities in the DPR.145
As has been demonstrated, the nature of medicine as a healing craft has historically 
imposed on the physician certain moral obligations such as the avoidance of treatment thought 
to be futile, burdensome, or not in the patient’s best interests.146 The fact that physicians
I41Ibid.
142Ibid., 193.
143Jonsen, 268. At least one physician, Louis Lasagna does not believe medicine is a 
moral enterprise, but he does believe there are many occasions where a physician can act 
immorally.
144Ibid., 267.
145Babbie, 12.
146Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 96. All of these obligations are, of course, 
highly debatable, but serve as examples of the ways in which physicians have historically 
perceived themselves to be responsible for patient welfare.
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throughout history have found it profitable to craft codes and oaths to serve as guiding 
standards for the ethical practice of medicine serves to indicate, among other things, that an 
ethical thread runs through medical practice.147 Emanuel notes rightly that the codes of 
medicine were often broken by individuals whose “moral perceptions may have been 
defective.”148 An interest in “morality” or “behaving morally” has historically existed in 
medical practice.
Terminology
The term “moral” means “pertaining to character or disposition, considered as good or 
bad.”149 The term also means “pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good 
and evil, in relation to the actions, volitions, or character of responsible beings.”150 “Morality” 
is “moral qualities or endowments” and “the doctrine or system concerned with conduct and 
duty.”151 A certain degree of ethical continuity existed from the time of Hippocrates until the 
middle of the last century.152 Science, technology, and social change began, at that time, to 
produce rapid changes in healthcare and the biological sciences, some of which, in turn, 
seemed to produce challenges to the longstanding moral obligations between physicians and 
patients.153 In contemporary biomedical ethics, specifically with regard to the PAS debate,
147Emanuel, 13. Other reasons for writing moral codes may exist, such as the 
delineation of benefits to patients or the evolution of medical canons.
148Ibid., 12-13. Cf. Pellegrino and Thomasma, Philosophical Basis o f  Medical Practice,
192-93.
m OED, 2d ed, s.v., “moral.”
150Ibid.
l5lOED, 2d ed., s.v., “morality.” See also Cambridge International Dictionary o f  
English (1995), s.v., “morality.” Morality is defined as a “personal or social set of standards for 
good or bad behaviour and character, or the quality of being right, honest or acceptable.”
152Beauchamp and Childress, 3.
153Ibid. An example of scientific advancement, as applied to medicine, for example, is 
the sustaining of a terminally ill patient’s life through technology.
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finding a stable medical/communal consensus about right and wrong conduct has proved to be 
somewhat elusive.
The Prevailing Climate
Beauchamp and Childress, while not expressly utilitarian, offer a “common morality” 
framework for thinking about moral issues related to PAS.154 These authors do not draw a 
moral distinction between “killing” and “allowing to die.” For them, the labelling of an act as 
“killing” or “allowing to die” does not solely determine if one form of action is better or worse, 
or one more or less justified than another. In actuality, neither “killing” nor “allowing to die,” 
according to the authors, is wrongful per se. For example, a brutal murder (killing) is 
considered worse than foregoing treatment for a person who is in a persistent vegetative state 
(letting die). On the other hand, however, letting someone die who might have otherwise been 
saved (letting die) could be worse than some specific instance of a physician killing his patient 
in response to that patient’s own request (assisted killing).155
While both the murder and the allowing of the patient to die of neglect as described 
above may be prima facie wrongful deaths, perhaps all of the deaths could be justified in some 
way according to this system. The point is that, for Beauchamp and Childress, the doctor’s 
motive, the patient’s request, and the consequences of the act together will place the act of 
death on the “moral map” and allow its judgement to be assessed.156 The following case study 
further explains the rationale.
154Ibid., 260-61.
155Ibid., 225.
156Ibid.
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Case Study
The actor’s involvement, the patient’s request, and the consequences of the act are 
evident in the DPR situation which included Dr. Timothy Quill and his forty-five-year-old 
leukaemia patient. She had been his patient for many years and several members of her family 
had, as a group, come with her to the decision, through the counsel of Dr. Quill, that it was 
time for her to commit suicide. The patient was competent, and all reasonable alternatives for 
the relief of her suffering had been discussed and rejected. Dr. Quill prescribed the barbiturates 
she both desired and took,157 committing suicide with his assistance. Beauchamp and Childress 
list nine reasons why they considered Quill’s case one of “justified assisted suicide.”158 The 
story is now well-known, and while his involvement was labelled by some observers as 
“unsettling” and “unjustified,” his actions have been met with guarded approval.159
An application of classical HU reasoning would produce the same verdict concerning 
Dr. Quill’s situation. An action is morally right, according to HU, if the action either increases 
happiness in the world or decreases the amount of misery. The “killing” of a hopelessly ill 
patient at her own request, like Quill’s action, would decrease the amount of suffering in the 
world and, thereby, render the action “morally right.”160 The point of this section is that, even 
though an interest in “morality” or “behaving morally” has prevailed in medical practice 
through the centuries, the current public and medical climate seems to be shifting from 
traditional understandings of “killing” or assisting with death, to more complex justifications 
of the act, based upon ultimate benefit calculations.
157Ibid., 239-40.
158Ibid., 240.
159Ibid.
160Rachels, End o f Life, 154-55.
303
“Consequentialist” Decision-Making
The use of consequential reasoning, when analysed morally, takes on a somewhat 
different perspective. In the scenario above, the patient “ought not to have to continue 
suffering,” and the moral doctor is one who “ought to do whatever is necessary” to bring about 
an end to her suffering. The consequentialist decision is reached by balancing the benefits and 
burdens to determine their acceptability. Since the result was sufficiently good (the 
consequence was the end of suffering), the action (assisted killing) was justified. To state 
Quill’s action in moral terms, he aimed at death, or killing, to relieve his patient’s suffering. In 
order to soften the notion of “killing,” one might lessen the impact by emphasising the merciful 
motives.
In other words, the good results became sufficiently weighty to make the end result, or 
killing, justified. The end simply justified the means. The consequentialist line of reasoning 
carries the potential for moral harm; for example, primary dependence upon mechanical or 
utilitarian calculations to determine a patient’s final decisions, which may in turn affect 
negatively a patient’s dignity. One must be careful to give attention to both dignity and 
autonomy in these matters, both when the patients can, and when patients no longer have the 
capacity, to reason clearly.
Balancing Human Dignity and Autonomy
Beauchamp and Childress argue that the loss of cognitive capacity and suffering can so 
“ravage and dehumanize” patients that death “is in their best interests.”161 In contrast, by 
limiting the search for meaning in life to the mechanical, which is a utilitarian calculation, one 
may miss many other, even moral, facets of life that give life meaning—such as illness itself. 
Medicine applied to human activity is moral, in part, because of the nature of illness. 
Depending upon the severity of their ailing conditions, people are often vulnerable, weak, and
161Beauchamp and Childress, 240.
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in need of the special skills the physician possesses, including human contact and 
reassurance.162 Because of the mechanisation of life and death through medical technology and 
loss of personal contact with familiar surroundings, hospitalised patients often perceive a loss 
of dignity, what has been called “technological neglect.”163
The manner in which Kevorkian’s PAS deaths occurred seemed to place the emphasis 
on the biological aspects of the patient’s life to the neglect of the social, with their families 
absent. Although PAS rests centrally upon the principle of autonomy, the question arose as to 
whether Kevorkian’s patients were truly exercising autonomy or freedom from interference, 
especially in light of Kevorkian’s ancillary emphasis upon publicity and the circumstances 
surrounding patient selection. For example, Dr. Jack Kevorkian’s van, suicide machine, media 
glare, and limited knowledge of his patients were cited as contributing to the loss of those 
patients’ dignity. Dr. Kevorkian did not seem to balance the autonomy of his patients with a 
preservation of their dignity.
The issues of autonomy and dignity are not limited to patients, however. Dr. Quill 
might also have questions about his own autonomy in the situation in which he found himself. 
He may himself have been a victim of his own patient’s insistence on committing suicide. His 
unease with the boundaries being violated suggests that he, too, felt his circle of autonomy 
somewhat breached, although it would be speculative to infer from the report cited any 
suggestion that there was some sort of psychological transference and countertransference 
between himself and his patient. PAS advocates present stringent guidelines to safeguard the 
practice of preserving autonomy and dignity for the patient. However, these guidelines should 
also be carefully considered and equally applied to each party in the DPR. The promise to
162Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical Practice, 35-36.
163Compare Beauchamp and Childress, 237-38. The source is used as one of many that 
gives details about the death of Janet Adkins. The authors state that Kevorkian’s action is a 
case of unjustified killing.
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preserve autonomy and dignity for both patients and physicians has not yet been adequately 
addressed by the PAS arguments.
Summary
Based upon their varied sources, the binding set o f moral obligations, which once 
served medicine historically, seem to be of less consequence in the current milieu, particularly 
when HU calculations are used both to quantify and qualify end-of-life decision-making. 
Guidelines that establish moral judgements about physician and patient behaviour have yet to 
gain a consensus; however, balancing autonomy and dignity considerations are critical for both 
parties in the DPR. The possibility that physician and patient trust in medicine will erode rises 
from within a context where primary focus is placed upon GHP calculations. Such calculations 
run the risk of eclipsing autonomy and dignity considerations in the DPR.. For example, one of 
the crucial ingredients in any discussion regarding the value and equal treatment of human 
beings is the climate of trust from which all parties derive equal hearing. This leads to the third 
moral concern—regarding trust in the medical context.
Third Moral Concern: The Potential for Codifying 
Distrust in the Medical Community
Background and Terminology
The OED defines trust as “confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a 
person or thing, or the truth of a statement,” or the word can mean “the quality of being 
trustworthy; fidelity; reliability; loyalty; and trustiness.”164 Beauchamp and Childress define 
trust as the confidence that another will act with the right motives in accord with moral 
norms.165 “Trust is a confident belief in and reliance upon the ability and moral character of
m OED, 2d ed., s.v. “trust.”
165Beauchamp and Childress, 469. They also say that this is the most important 
ingredient in making the choice of one physician rather than another. This position, to act with 
right motives in accord with moral norms seems odd, however, in light of the authors’ 
emphasis upon consequentialism.
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another person.”166 Trustworthiness, as Beauchamp and Childress have declared, is a prominent 
virtue in healthcare in general and in the DPR specifically.167 Three separate examples 
illustrate, at differing levels, the importance of physician trustworthiness.
The case study involving Dr. Quill raises the moral concern of truth-telling. Quill 
admitted, after the fact, to withholding the truth about the patient’s cause of death. When he 
chose not to tell the truth, and the truth itself became known, the wider community of 
observers reacted to Dr. Quill’s action, which opened up the medical community to speculation 
and the potential reinforcement of general mistrust.168 Dr. Quill’s lack of truth-telling, when the 
loss of his professional status seemed to be placed in jeopardy, raises a larger moral question 
concerning what other unforseen stresses to a doctor’s professional status might lead to similar 
behaviour and contribute to a broader loss of trust in doctors.
Another example may be found in Dr. Kevorkian’s behaviour, which has also been 
called into question by the medical community, in part, because of the overall atmosphere of 
distrust it created within the medical and wider communities.169 Dr. Kevorkian operated outside 
recognised medical and legal boundaries that had been established precisely to foster a climate 
of trust between patients and their doctors.
Still another eminent British physician, Dr. Michael Irwin, admitted to helping at least 
fifty people to die, one of whom was not a patient of the doctor, but who was supplied with a
166Ibid.
167Ibid. The specific definition of trust is neutral in the PAS debate in that both sides use 
the definition to buttress their positions. For example, PAS advocates might include physicians 
working to be merciful and to end the suffering of their patients as having the “right motives.”
168Quill, “Death and Dignity,” 694.
169Beauchamp and Childress, 238. Kevorkian’s “. . .  abuse, lack of social control, 
physicians acting without accountability, and unverifiable circumstances of a patient’s death 
. . . ” raised all the fears present in arguments about killing in medicine. Kevorkian’s behaviour 
was veiled somewhat by the privacy that envelopes the DPR.
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plastic bag to help with asphyxiation.170 The latter doctor knew that assisting with suicide was, 
and still is, a crime in England. This volitional act in an illegal manner did not deserve trust. 
The presence of trust, or the lack thereof, was at least a question in each of these cases. The 
meaning of the word implies a moral basis, but the actual practice of tracing “trust” in medical 
history, as observed in codes of ethics, warrants some observations.
Historical Weight
The Hippocratic corpus advises bluntly the physician to conceal most things from the 
patient. The Hippocratic physician was not to reveal the patients’ present or future condition.171 
Percival’s code, which served as the model for the first AMA code in 1847, allowed for 
“beneficent deception” for patients with gloomy prognostications.172 The Declaration of 
Geneva does not mention veracity at all except that the physician himself “promises solemnly” 
to adhere to its tenets.173 In fact, the AMA codes do not mention honesty or truthfulness at all 
until 1980. In that latest code, the physician pledges to deal honestly with his patients and 
colleagues.174
170Mark Austin, “Doctor Admits Killing 50 People,” in The Sunday Times no. 9, 021 
(20 July 1997), n.p. While these are cases which have the potential to impact negatively the 
DPR, it must be said that PAS advocates do not agree, citing that the willingness for a 
physician to assist in PAS increases trust/confidence in the DPR.
171Tom L. Beauchamp, “Medical Ethics in the Age of Technology,” in Traditional 
Moral Values in the Age o f Technology, ed. W. Lawson Taitte (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1987), 63.
172Ibid, 65.
m The World Medical Association Declaration o f Geneva (1948) Physician’s Oath; 
internet, available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/geneva/; accessed 6 June 2002.
174Beauchamp and Childress, 395. Cf. American Medical Association, Principles o f 
Medical Ethics, Article n, 1980.
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The Importance of Trust
Since the various codes of ethics do not render explicit the matter of trust, it might 
appear that there is little reason to question the potential for its erosion and how that loss might 
impact ethical considerations in medicine. Codes continue to be oaths or pledges taken by the 
physician and, while most often undergirded by his own sense of truth-telling and honour, 
medical codes seek to safeguard the ethical or moral actions of the physicians when they 
pledge to act in accordance with established norms of the profession. Trust is vital in normal 
human relationships and is particularly important in times when patients experience states of 
special dependence upon medical professionals in the DPR.
These states of special dependence may include “illness, old age, infancy, times where 
the patient is in need of healing, justice, spiritual help, or learning.”175 The doctor elicits patient 
information, then structures and orders it in relation to a scientific theory of disease. He then 
must gather the information as accurately as possible and apply the logic that comes from the 
contemporary science of diagnostics together with appropriateness and sensitivity to the 
patient’s needs. All of this requires an honest relationship between doctors and patients, both of 
whom disclose information and have the patients’ best interests in mind.176
Beauchamp and Childress see adherence to the principle of veracity as vital for a 
successful physician-patient relationship.177 They base this belief upon respect for others, the 
patient’s right to know the truth, which involves the obligation of fidelity and promise- keeping 
by both physicians and patients, and the fact that trust is necessary for fruitful cooperation and
175Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical Practice, 25. A physician can shape a 
decision by the way he presents factual data. He may interject his own values or prejudices 
about life, politics, or religion into the dialogue either openly or covertly (75).
176Jonsen, “Therapeutic Relationship,” 278.
177Beauchamp and Childress, 396.
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interaction in relationships. 178A patient’s only real alternative is that of distrust, and that is 
rarely an helpful option.
Contributors to Distrust
Patient perspective. Varying levels of distrust manifest themselves in the current DPR. 
The most impersonal are at the institutional level. Patients, particularly in America, distrust 
large, impersonal, and bureaucratic medical institutions, fearing the commercialisation of 
medical care through advertising and entrepreneurialism and the potential loss of intimate 
contact in the DPR with their physicians.179 Patients in America are also most likely to express 
distrust at the financial level, having grown weary of “pay-before-we-treat” policies, cost- 
control strategies, overall high charges for healthcare, as well as the conflicts of interest 
apparent between physician referrals and the practice of physician-investment/ownership of 
treatment centres.180 Patients have grown distrustful on a popular or individual level as well. 
Growing cynicism among medical consumers, who observe some doctor’s preferences for nine 
to five jobs, lengthy time off, and the retreat by doctors to “specialty” practice from general 
practice,181 when exacerbated by greed, often degenerates into filed suits of malpractice.
Physician Perspective. Physicians may also express concern about a medical-financial 
climate that is disruptive to trust. Part of the blame can be placed on cost increases due to rapid
178Ibid.
179Ibid., 470. Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical Practice, 71. Axelrod and 
Goold, 2. The authors write of the distrust created when patients are “forced” to see a certain 
physician due to cost control strategies.
180Beauchamp and Childress, 470. Edward Shorter, Doctors and Their Patients: A 
Social History, reprint edition (London: Transaction Publishers, 1991), 229. Axelrod and 
Goold, 2.
181Beauchamp and Childress, 470. Pellegrino and Thomasma, Virtues in Medical 
Practice, 71. Axelrod, and Goold, 2. The authors write of the distrust created when surgeons 
become employees of the integrated health system or managed care firm. They no longer 
“work for the patient” alone, but work primarily for their institution or system. See also 
Shorter, 229, for the amelioration of the traditional practice of patients to view their physicians 
as “priests,” and “medicine as a series of secret holy rites.”
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expansion of an aging population in both the US and the UK, together with the rising cost of 
technology. Surgery has been targeted by employers and government as a place to limit 
expanding costs. Tensions are created between physicians’ financial interests and the interests, 
financial or otherwise, of their patients.182 Surgeons, as an example, believe this conflict can 
undermine trust in a physician’s decisions and represents a serious threat to the physician- 
patient relationship.183
Physicians distrust the present medical climate in another way. They recognise that a 
struggle exists between the paternalism of the traditional Hippocratic corpus and the new 
practical codes of ethics perceived necessary to make increasingly difficult real-life decisions, 
especially in relation to the ethical usage of advanced medical technology. On the one hand, a 
physician may be encouraged to emphasise beneficence and nonmaleficence (the Hippocratic 
tradition), and on the other hand, the same physician may feel pressured toward PAS decisions, 
based upon HU calculations, from groups citing autonomy and justice claims.184 Physicians 
seek clear ethical guidelines upon which to base decisions.
An example of this dilemma may be the patient with severe leg ischemia and gangrene 
who refuses an amputation. His physician understands the need to respect the patient’s 
autonomy and must decide whether to allow the patient to refuse the required lifesaving 
medical procedure. This respect for the right of patients to make their own healthcare decisions 
departs somewhat from the Hippocratic corpus, although this departure must not be taken to 
imply that Hippocrates would have insisted upon an amputation against the patient’s wishes. 
Nevertheless, when patients wish to be left alone to allow the natural consequences of their 
life-threatening diseases to end their lives, physicians sometimes wrestle with both the
182Axelrod and Goold, 2.
183Ibid.
184Axelrod and Goold refer to beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice as 
presented in Beauchamp and Childress.
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principle of beneficence and their own desires to do what is best or to act in such ways that 
clarify the best options for their patients.
Specific Application of Trust to Physician-Assisted Suicide
The abovementioned factors contribute to the perception, if not reality, of distrust in 
normal medical decision-making, and even more so in the difficult end-of-life decision­
making. Understandably, a lie told in the process of encouraging a patient to seek treatment at 
a centre where a physician has a financial interest is morally questionable. The subtle influence 
by a physician to pursue PAS, however, may have further moral implications. There are several 
reasons for serious consideration of the negative moral effects PAS could have on trust. First, 
there is the issue of patient trust in the physician’s devotion to the patient’s interests.185 PAS 
opens a whole new range of potential doubts about physician-devotion in the minds of patients. 
Second, distrust could be created if physicians cross the lines drawn in the use of PAS.186 When 
doctors act with the right motives according to moral norms, trust is more easily built in the 
DPR.187 Third, distrust could be created in medicine as a whole when physicians join the state, 
government, or other confederacies, such as managed healthcare plans, as holders of the power
185Leon R. Kass, “Physician-Assisted Suicide Should Not Be Legalized,” in Physician- 
Assisted Suicide, ed. Daniel A. Leone (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1998); 79. See also 
Arnold S. Reiman, “The Impact of Market Forces on the Physician-Patient Relationship,” 
Journal o f the Royal Society o f Medicine Supplement 87, no. 22 (1994): 22. The medical 
profession, Reiman claims, is different because the doctor, who is the provider of services, 
must be trusted to protect the consumers’ (the patients’) interests by acting as advocate and 
counsellor.
186This touches upon the matter of slippery slopes to be discussed in the next section. 
See also Kass, 79. Kass believes that PAS would not stay confined to the terminally ill and 
mentally competent patient who freely and knowingly chooses PAS. He cites the example of 
Dutch doctors, forty percent of whom have performed involuntary euthanasia. It must be noted, 
however, that PAS detractors claim the threat of distrust as well.
187Beauchamp and Childress, 469. See also Tony Sheldon, “Reprimand for Dutch 
Doctor Who Assisted Suicide,” British Medical Journal 310, no. 6984 (April 8,1995): 894-95. 
A medical disciplinary board in Amsterdam reprimanded Dr. Chabot for helping a depressed, 
but physically healthy, fifty-year-old woman to commit suicide. The Board concluded that the 
doctor’s actions “undermined trust” in the medical profession. The action of the Board implies 
a moral standard that had been breached.
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to exercise lethal force.188 Medicine, whether it engages at the corporation or DPR level, wields 
great power—the power to cure and the power to kill. PAS raises questions about the 
trustworthiness and ethics of the medical profession at the point of the exercise of this medical
1 OQpower.
Summary
While it is not unusual for patients and physicians to harbour distrust for financial 
reasons, each from their own perspectives and for their own reasons, there is a possibility that a 
deeper moral concern involving trust is overlooked. The DPR is a relationship where both 
patient and doctor expect the other to act with right motives and to be a person of moral 
character. When patients and their doctors face end-of-life decisions, then the issue of trust is 
heightened because of the special state of dependency that enfolds a patient. The potential for 
greater and broader damage to trust is present with PAS because any compromise bears 
implications that extend beyond the death of a patient to lessen an atmosphere of trust in the 
wider community. One of those implications of a lessening of trust may raise questions about 
“greater killing.”
Fourth Moral Concern: The Threat of Greater Killing 
Delineations of the Slippery Slone Argument
The slippery slope threat of greater killing presents a final moral concern to be 
discussed in this section. PAS opponents claim, for example, that if PAS is initially allowed 
only for those who are in the end-stage of terminal illness, then one day PAS will be allowed 
for those who are not in the end-stage of terminal illness.190 This form of the slippery-slope
188Kass, 78-80.
189Ibid., 78-79.
190Beauchamp and Childress, 240. Although Beauchamp and Childress are not 
opponents of PAS, they have provided a complete list of nine conditions considered sufficient 
for justified assisted suicide.
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argument is named the Psychological-Social version (PSV). The concern is that once the 
restraint against killing is removed for the terminally ill, then various psychological and social 
forces would likely make it harder to keep distinctions between the degrees of severity among 
patient illnesses.191
When PSV is applied to PAS, an act of assisting with the killing of a person at his own 
request invites social changes similar to those feared when the question of the legalisation of 
VAE was discussed.192 For example, it could lead to the subtle influence to kill those whose 
health problems and costs require larger proportions of the public’s financial resources. In the 
US where more than forty million people are uninsured,193 this presents a moral concern for the 
subtle coercion of a social policy that suggests that the incurably ill are social, economic, and 
emotional burdens.194 Pellegrino also notes that as killing becomes bureaucratised and 
standardised, it remains impossible to contain VAE within specified boundaries.195 The same 
would hold true with PAS, he says, because even if PAS is carefully monitored, laws cannot 
prevent abuses. Slippery-slope arguments often fall into such familiar traces that hearers 
sometimes dismiss them without due consideration.
Litmus Test: Qualifiers of the Argument
Battin lists four errors common to slippery-slope reasoning.196 The first is a failure to 
identify clearly the feared outcome or lowest point of the slide. In the current PAS debate, one
191The matter of the slippery slope of social consequences has been addressed for the 
last decade. Compare Brody, 1385. A counter perspective is presented by Pellegrino, “Doctors 
Must Not Kill,” 99-100.
192Beauchamp and Childress, 230. See also Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,”
99-100.
193Quill, Midwife Through the Dying Process, 216.
194Pellegrino, “Doctors Must Not Kill,” 100.
195Ibid.
196Battin, Least Worst Death, 22-23.
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fear behind the legalisation of PAS is that there will be an absolute impossibility, in a 
democratic culture based on rights, to maintain the boundaries of PAS at the level of the 
terminally ill. The experience of the Dutch with VAE illustrates the point. There has been a 
slow, but steady, progression with VAE beyond the terminally ill to include the chronically ill 
and depressed.197
The second error in the argument is a failure to identify the causal force that is 
presumed to fuel the slide from the current situation to the predicted bad outcome. To answer 
this critique, the causal force in America is feared to be economic in some shape or form. 
Insurers are already offering lump-sum payments, or payments on policies at a lesser amount, 
to the terminally ill.198 Some predictors suggest that economic factors will one day merge with 
PAS to create advance payments, prior to death at a reduced amount, on life insurance policies 
for those who choose this form of death.199 This practice, would surely encourage the death of 
individuals for monetary gain since, under the present system, this motive is already a reality.
The third argument error is a failure to identify the negative reality of the outcome. PAS 
is one step toward the medicalisation of death. Jack Kevorkian coined a technical term,
197Alan D. Ogilvie and S. G. Potts, “Assisted Suicide for Depression: The Slippery 
Slope in Action? Learning from the Dutch Experience,” British Medical Journal 309, no. 6953 
(1994): 493. The authors cite the case of Dr. Chabot who assisted a depressed woman with her 
suicide. See Diane Raymond, “Fatal Practices: A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted 
Suicide and Euthanasia, Hypatia 14, no. 2; internet, available at http://www/iupjoumals.org/ 
hypatia/hyp 14-2.html; accessed 21 March 2004. Raymond discusses from a feminist vantage 
point, her belief that euthanasia is generally treated in moral isolation, but that, in reality, it 
may be seen as being linked to a number of complex issues in medical ethics. She states that it 
has implications for power inequality, resource allocation, social priorities, and QL.
198Compare “Quality Care for the Dying: Glossary”; internet, available at http://www. 
cs.virginia.edu/~jones/tmp352/projects98/ group7/gloss.htm; accessed 21 March 2004. The 
term used is “viatical settlement.” A viatical settlement refers to a business where a private 
company pays a patient a portion of her life insurance while she is still living instead of the 
whole payment when she dies.
199Compare Alexander Morgan Capron, “Sledding In Oregon,” Hastings Center Report 
25, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 34. Capron notes that presently the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act protects wills and insurance policies from being affected by a person’s taking his 
or her own life.
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thanatiatrics, to describe death through human action that is “benevolent and altruistic in 
purpose.”200 His plans were many and varied and perhaps not altogether coherent. For example, 
his plan made room for patients to “opt for death.” Kevorkian’s plan also called for physician 
involvement in death that would extend beyond the mere termination of life to “permit 
exploitation of the enormous potential benefit that could accrue from the acquisition of organs 
for transplantation and the performance of daring and otherwise impossible human experiments 
under irreversible general anaesthesia.”201
Kevorkian’s critics compared his ideas with the medical aberrations of Nazi Germany. 
The Nazi analogy stirs up much controversy when used as an example of the bottom of the 
slope. It does not serve to prove the point, say critics of its use, because the rationale of the 
Nazi programme was a racist ideology, not respect for autonomy.202 Kevorkian himself 
criticises those who make the comparison of Nazi atrocities with his plan, for his would allow 
for “proper consent and controlled anaesthesia.”203 Kevorkian based his case, in part, upon the 
principle of autonomy.
Advocates of PAS and VAE also make claims which stand strongly upon the principle 
of autonomy. PAS advocates would question, for example, how a patient could actually 
commit suicide without the doctor’s help unless a patient was competent in the first place. This 
stance causes some opponents of PAS to call for caution. Current anti-PAS spokespersons 
draw comparisons between the “racist ideology” of Nazi, Germany, and current proposals
200Jack Kevorkian, “The Last Fearsome Taboo: Medical Aspects of Planned Death,” 
Medicine and Law 7, no. 1 (1988): 3.
201Ibid, 1.
202Beauchamp and Childress, 232. The authors also condemn the possible action taken
by a gynaecology resident in the now famous “It’s Over Debbie” article in the Journal o f the 
American Medical Association (1988).
203Ibid, 4.
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which classify the ill or infirm or poor or demented as somehow “sub-human”— those who live 
lives that are “not worth living.”204
A fourth error is a failure to take account of the current state of affairs and “the 
predicted negative outcome.” The present medical environment, with its moral ambiguity that 
exercises utility (weighing benefits against burdens) in making moral decisions, creates the 
possibility for future abuses to occur. The relationship this has with the future negative 
outcome is personified again in the actions of Jack Kevorkian.
While Kevorkian may be considered to be an extreme case, the 1990s proved that even 
he could successfully sidestep the law and engage in the practice of PAS in the state of 
Michigan. His actions were not legally prevented and, while his actions brought moral 
condemnation from the medical community at large, he continued to practise PAS.205 Only 
when he crossed the boundary lines of VAE, with videotaped proof of his direct involvement, 
was he successfully prosecuted. It is of specific note, however, that the censure he incurred for 
PAS was for the reckless manner in which he conducted the procedures, not for actually 
assisting people in their deaths.206
The Dutch experience with euthanasia provides another example of compromised 
boundaries and a possible slide toward a future negative outcome. Euthanasia has not been 
limited to competent terminally ill adults who are enduring physical suffering. The regulation
204Singer, 95-99,101. Singer’s social policy, which assigns worth to those who meet his 
narrow definition of “life,” rings closely true to the war crimes of a previous era. While 
Singer’s views may not be classified as “racist,” he does draw a distinction between “social 
classes.”
205Dr. Quill was prosecuted but not convicted for his role in the death of his patient. See
also Ronald E. Cranford’s discussion for the potential for abuse in “The Physician’s Role in 
Killing and the Intentional Withdrawal of Treatment,” 160-61.
206Beauchamp and Childress, 238.
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of the practice has not prevented involuntary euthanasia207 or the expansion of euthanasia to 
include severely disabled neonates and elderly persons suffering from dementia.208
These categories of thinking about “slippery slope” arguments also are helpful for 
reflecting upon both the present and the future with regard to HU’s applications of the features 
of the PAS debate. Opponents of PAS propose the slippery-slope argument in order to project 
what might happen if PAS were legalised. Instead of dismissing their concerns out of hand, an 
examination of the argument’s components is crucial. If these concerns prove to be valid, then 
the case for PAS needs to be reassessed.
Conclusions
In a morally ambiguous medical climate where procedural irregularities raise more 
concerns than merely the considerations of planned death, the potential for further negative 
moral outcomes may indeed be a reality. A primary moral problem is that legalising PAS may 
set a foot in the direction of “negative” solutions toward dealing with mitigating miseries rather 
than stepping toward positive goods to promote.209
Thesis Conclusions
The research question inquired whether HU provides sufficient moral ground to warrant 
a change in medical canons regarding medical killing. Mill’s philosophy, as noted, has long 
been considered a useful philosophical framework for social policy that aims to improve the
207Kass, 79.
208Charles E. Rice, “Abortion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New Culture of 
Life,” Notre Dame Journal o f Law, Ethics & Public Policy 12 (1998): 514.
209Timothy Quill’s assistance with suicide raised some questions in the medical 
community, but even he received general praise for his compassionate response to the patient’s 
need and his suggested plan for assisting with future suicides. Moral light should be shed on 
the matter of the hopelessness, or even meaninglessness, patients are expressing in the current 
medical environment—a hopelessness that leads them to choose PAS as an alternative to life. 
The topic of meaninglessness, while perhaps necessary to the PAS discussions, is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
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conditions of human life by the exercise of rational principles,210 but it was not known what 
impact the theory might exert in the medical debate concerning PAS. The thesis examined the 
two core principles of HU: hedonism and consequentialism. Hedonism states that the only 
thing that is good in itself is pleasure, and the only thing bad in itself is pain. Decision-makers 
in the DPR, when applying HU, would be obliged to pursue pleasure/happiness as the supreme 
good. The second principle of HU is consequentialism. The consequentialist principle 
determines the rightness or wrongness of an action by the goodness or badness of the results 
that follow from the action.
In the case of PAS, a typical utilitarian calculation would evaluate whether an action, 
for example, a physician’s assistance with a patient’s suicide, was right or wrong based upon 
whether the action produced good results—in this case a greater balance of pleasure/happiness 
over pain/unhappiness. Right action in this case would be adjudged solely on the ground that 
the consequences of the physician’s action were better than any and all other consequences 
produced for the general well-being of all who were affected by the actions of the physician. 
Such a scenario creates immediate tensions within the DPR, not the least of which are related 
to the singular theory of value espoused by Mill, the tension also relates to Mill’s theory of 
action.
Mill’s HU: Certainty of Conflict
Mill’s ethical theory, as conceived, runs immediately counter to established medical 
canons which have been historically based upon a deontological ethical model that emphasises 
moral action related primarily to duly, rather than to ends or consequences. The application of 
Mill’s theory, in whole, or in part, to medical-ethical decision-making ensures certain conflict 
with the historical medical principles that are ingrained deeply within medicine. 
Notwithstanding the disregard Mill held for intuitive ethical theories, and the conflict this
210See thesis, intro., 2.
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creates within medicine, his theory requires the adherent to hold to an exclusive theory of value 
(PH) and to maximise this value for the many (GHP). While this may have some useful 
application to governmental health policy on a macro level, it cannot secure the rights and 
provide adequately for the claims of justice on a micro level—the traditional DPR, for the DPR 
represents more than a medical-technological-financial encounter between a physician and a 
patient. The DPR represents a moral healing relationship and the moral nature of this encounter 
is never more important than when a patient and his or her family faces end-of-life decisions 
brought on by a terminal illness.
One of the primary canons of medicine is that “life is a good” and this canon is 
grounded deeply in “other-than-biological” or mechanical moral realities and urgencies. This is 
an ancient philosophical and medical perspective. The Ancient Greek philosophers themselves 
sought to examine the world through the lense of independent rational thought, and a 
characteristic of their age was to grapple with the “why” of life and death.211 They sought to 
discover the connections or “stuff’ of man’s inseparable link between himself and the world 
(cosmology) and man’s moral relationship with others in the same world (moral community). 
Through varying approaches to the discovery of what comprised the “good life” these 
philosophers demonstrated the near impossibility of reaching a consensus about that which 
comprised the supreme good and the best moral path to take in order to attain that good. Mill, 
however, claimed to have determined the supreme good and the pathway to attain it. It is not 
simply the fact that Mill’s cosmology is mechanical that is a hindrance to HU’s effective 
application to medical-wora/ concerns, it also is the fact that Mill seeks to decipher moral 
complexities cosmologically and empirically with the aid o f a highly-debatable moral calculus 
that makes HU’s application to medical-moral concerns untenable.212
211See ibid., ch. 1, 33.
212See Mill, ch. 1, 6, 8.
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From within this seedbed of philosophical questioning and speculation, Epicurus, who 
was later followed by John Stuart Mill, equated decisively happiness with pleasure. Pleasure 
alone constituted happiness. Mill’s HU added variation to the PH theme by reasoning that 
“ultimate good” was the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Mill patterned his theory 
after Epicurus who, as an “atomist,” believed that a material worldview gave rise to moral 
responsibility.213 Nothing had been created out o f  the nonexistent, and nothing was destroyed 
into the nonexistent. Epicurus and Mill both held that the world was the result of inevitable 
natural processes, but no part of the world, inorganic or organic, was the result of any 
purpose.214 For them, man was required to fashion his own moral existence in order to find 
meaning and purpose.
Mill’s insistence that PH and “happiness alone is the only thing desirable”215 is a 
dubious claim because people simply do not desire certain things because of the pleasure such 
things give to them.216 To reduce moral valuation in the DPR to the level of a hedonic calculus 
(quantifying/qualifying PH) is not feasible and cannot ensure accuracy in moral decision­
making for either doctors or patients. Mill’s further insistence upon a mechanical view of 
organic, human, existence conflicts with the medical value-the sacredness of life. While such a 
view may provide various empirical advantages, for example, in medical research and the 
development of medical technologies, it conflicts with the medical principles of patient 
autonomy, rights, and justice—all of which support strongly the sanctity of life value.
Mill constructed his theory within a post-Enlightenment climate, a “scientific age” that 
held that matter was indeed connected to an ordered universe existing according to natural law
213See ibid., ch. 1,42, footnote 76; and ibid., 44,47.
214See ibid., ch. 1,43-44, footnote 86.
215See ibid., ch. 1,11.
216See Aristotle, 317-18, who noted that people do not desire “knowledge” or “virtue” 
„simply for the pleasure they bring.
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(as he understood natural law), and that man must evaluate his role in light of physical 
properties that could be weighed and measured. In this new age, man would ascribe the norm 
in a world which was viewed as fundamentally purposeless and even hostile. Like Epicurus 
before him, Mill did not believe the world could have been created by the gods, so man was 
left to carve out an existence from within this, at times, hostile environment. The “scientific 
age” gave Mill an empirical basis for his utilitarian calculations. Man was left alone to hold 
centre place in moral decision-making. HU was for Mill, therefore, the bridge or empirical 
framework for individual moral decision-making, just as Hedonism had been to Epicurus 
before him.
Mill’s Moral Decision-making Model Applied to Physician-Assisted Suicide
The GHP calls simply for calculations that increase happiness and reduce pain for the 
many. Accordingly, an action to end a life should be judged as either right or wrong based 
upon whether it increases happiness or reduces misery for the many. PAS could be adjudged 
morally acceptable from such a perspective. It could be reasoned that the death of a person who 
is less than happy would be well-received, unless that person’s death produced new 
unhappiness for surviving individuals. Utilitarians are fully aware that such calculations carry 
the potential for negative results for a patient, but in a case where the balance of benefits over 
injury would accumulate to others from the suicide of a patient, then it appears that a suicide 
ought to be encouraged.217
Mill argued strongly for an individual’s moral right to make his or her own decisions 
without interference, except when others might be harmed by the exercise of a person’s 
autonomy.218 According to PAS advocates, this would mean that a person who desires PAS
217See ch. 1, 67; see also 67, footnote 190.
218See ibid., ch. 2,68, footnote 84.
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should be free from external (governmental, ecclesiastical, or medical) interference219 and able 
to direct the course of his or her life and death. Mill believed strongly that the principle of 
utility lay at the root of all morality.220 He desired to translate the ideal of moral rights into 
positive rights backed by law.
In the case of PAS, there are those adherents who would use such a tenet of HU to 
support a claim to legalise PAS. PAS advocates purport suicide to be a liberty right in their 
interpretation of the philosophical tradition of Mill;221 that is, a right to non-interference. Mill 
did believe that “justice” (fairness and equality) was included in HU and that it was something 
that an individual could claim as his or her moral right.222 He recognised the essential social 
nature of morality and that society has as its moral end the moral good of its members. 
However, he also believed that the self-conscious goal of the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number was at the centre of justice.223 He believed that each person’s happiness (well-being) 
would be preserved if each person’s happiness was equal in degree and was valued exactly as 
much as another person’s happiness.224 Mill’s construct made it possible for a person to link 
together individual autonomy, rights’ claims, and justice in a confederacy of sorts that would 
wield moral influence. PAS advocates today have reached back to Mill to find support for 
various aspects of PAS claims.225
219See ibid., thesis, ch. 1, 68-70, 71-73, footnote 195.
220See thesis, 132.
221See ibid., 109.
222See ibid., 132.
223Ibid, 133.
224Ibid., 133.
225See ibid., 109.
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Supporting Physician-Assisted Suicide Claims:
Mill’s Model as a Moral Bridge
Such advocates of PAS use Mill to help establish a link from Enlightenment thinking 
on autonomy (noninterference from outside authority) to a modem form of autonomy (positive 
freedom with inherent morally binding obligations that may be used to compel others to act on 
one’s behalf). Proponents, in the case of PAS, can cite claims of fairness, based upon their 
individual preferences about happiness and use a moral argument to do so.226 Mill’s HU 
advances a view of humanism that can be forged into a claim that mercy and autonomy oblige 
a physician to assist a patient with his or her request for suicide.
As stated in the thesis, Mill’s view may then be critical to the progression, helping to 
build a philosophical bridge that links historical discussion of suicide with current claims for 
physician-assisted killing.227 Advocates of PAS use Mill’s GHP to claim that, since personal 
happiness is of supreme importance and future happiness might be threatened by suffering, 
then certain persons in specific medical situations may claim the right to bring their own 
suffering to an end. According to the argument, a physician would be morally obliged to aid 
such a suffering individual in the desire to end his life, because justice demands equal 
happiness for all and the alleviation of suffering would maximise happiness. A death, 
according to utilitarian calculation would be good if it raised the level of happiness. In 
utilitarian calculation the end (GHP) is the primary determiner in the action. Even though 
Mill’s model has been used as support for PAS claims, this does not mean that it is without 
weaknesses.
Evaluating Mill’s Model
A close examination of Mill’s model for moral decision-making reveals weaknesses 
related to individual rights. An individual’s self-governing PH preferences could be overridden
226See ibid., 133.
227See ibid., 171.
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because he or she might be required to yield individual preferences for the greatest happiness 
of the many. It is conceivable that a person’s rights might be overridden to satisfy the GHP. It 
is not certain, however, that Mill conceived of the application of individual rights in the way 
that some people are advocating rights today. Mill’s GHP is evidence that, while he advocated 
strong autonomy claims to noninterference, he could not embrace positive rights’ claims that 
might produce negative utility for the many. His theory does not make adequate provision for 
competing PH claims. His theory, then, may require external moral arbitration to settle some 
difficult issues related to conflicting PH preferences between an individual and those of either 
a particular group, or society as a whole.
Mill’s view o f justice stands to undermine individual autonomy claims as well, 
especially when the greater happiness gains of some would compensate for the lesser happiness 
losses of others. It is questionable how it can be considered justifiable to violate the liberty of 
the few in order to provide for the greater good of the many. Even though Mill believed each 
person had a right to equality of treatment, he also believed there were instances when some 
“recogni[z]ed social expediency” required the reverse. Mill believed that human character 
could be influenced to practise the GHP, hence justice would prevail.228
Mill’s theory, however, has an inherent tension in the hedonistic side of his theory.
Here again, his view of justice may require external arbitration to balance the justice claims of 
the individual with those of a group or society. Someone must interpret the PH of the many, 
but Mill does not designate who this person might be and if he (or they) might be trusted to 
articulate and apply the GHP for all persons. Those employing Mill state that the one qualified 
in the present medical environment to make a decision about PAS, and end-of-life decision­
making, is the individual herself.
228See Tom L. Beauchamp, Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1982), 108.
325
Further, Mill’s formulation of justice required that a person should act in ways that 
would bring about the greatest possible balance of good over evil in the universe, presupposing 
an underlying basic obligation to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. Mill also postulated 
that the GHP was the basis for moral decision-making. Mill’s model for moral decision­
making is flawed in some cases when applied to individual autonomy (patient and physician 
alike) in the DPR. It is not entirely certain that Mill conceived of, or would have agreed to his 
model of autonomy to be used as a means of moral obligation upon medicine to assist with a 
patient’s suicide. His theory assumes that whatever the good and bad are, they can be measured 
and balanced against each other in some quantitative and qualitative way. There are 
challenging difficulties associated with measuring and balancing goods and evils in such a 
quantitative way, but especially so when the qualitative dimension is added to the computation. 
For example, in order to respect each patient’s and physician’s PH desires would require 
seemingly impossible calculations for timing, actions, and results.
Further, a patient and a patient’s family might agree that a decision to receive assistance 
with suicide maximises the good (for example, a patient’s QL view) on their part and 
demonstrates respect for a patient’s autonomy. A physician, being equally autonomous, might 
disagree and, based upon the GHP, give equally valid reasons (for example, medicine’s SL 
view) for denying the requested assistance. The principle of utility requires justice at this point, 
but it is conceivable that a physician’s denial of the patient’s PAS claim, for example, could be 
less “beneficent” but more “just” overall depending, of course, upon the definitions used by the 
persons involved.229 The reality is that physicians do not always infringe upon a patient’s 
autonomy when patient claims are denied.
Tensions clearly lie between the expressions of autonomy and utility. On the one hand, 
it might seem to be the greatest good to grant a patient’s autonomy claim and allow PAS. On 
the other hand, with a different set of circumstances, it might seem to be equally unjust to do
229See Frankena, Ethics, 45-49.
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so. The criterion of justice might be said to overrule utility in such cases. Mill’s concept of 
justice would require both patient and physician to count the effects of each action on everyone 
involved and to weigh equal effects equally in the computation of scores for each action, no 
matter who is concerned. In such cases, conceivably, the scores of both patient and doctor 
could come out even. If so, then the greatest happiness of the many must tip the balance to 
override the happiness of either the doctor or the patient. In either case, the doctor or the 
patient would have his individual autonomy overridden.
Application: A Way Forward
The thesis provides a comprehensive examination from an historical, medical-ethical, 
and philosophical perspective of the centuries-long development of key features related to the 
development of individual humanism. The key features give shape to human life and help to 
define the nature of human existence in community. One of the most probing realities of 
human existence that has perplexed and, at times vexed, mankind is the fact of death. From the 
earliest recorded times of nascent philosophical-theological investigation and speculation, life 
and death has been near the forefront of man’s exploration of the cosmos and his place within 
the universe.
The medical world, a microcosm within the larger circle of the human life and death 
struggle, has evolved through the centuries as those within the medical community have 
laboured to provide help, healing, and hope to those who experience pain, sickness, suffering 
and, indeed, death. Both medicine and mankind, as a result of this life and death struggle, have 
become deeply intertwined in a moral relationship because both medicine and mankind have 
determined that life is a basic good well worth protecting and preserving.
The thesis has examined the philosophical model of hedonistic-utilitarianism for its 
impact upon a core value, the sanctity of life, from within one aspect of the medical microcosm 
(the DPR) and one event (PAS). In one sense, the long exploration of the complex issues of life
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and death are resurfacing afresh from within this complex end-of-life medical-ethical matrix. 
From Hippocratic medicine forward to Percival, and forward once again to the present, with 
philosopher-physicians like Pellegrino a longstanding ethic of care exists that seeks to preserve 
and protect the basic value, life’s sanctity, within the framework of the historic medical 
dyad—the DPR. If anything, the circumstances in the DPR are not simply concerned with the 
medical-technological facts about illness, pain, and suffering.
The thesis has demonstrated that John Stuart Mill is fundamental to the establishment 
of HU and that HU provides critical philosophical support to PAS. Mill, therefore, becomes a 
central influence upon PAS and the foundation upon which current PAS advocates debate. The 
thesis has also demonstrated that Mill’s HU offers insufficient warrant to change medical 
canons regarding physician-assistance with suicide. Moreover, HU presents key moral and 
ethical challenges to the traditional medical-ethical and moral relationship between doctors and 
patients and produces unique challenges to the basic SL value. The thesis demonstrates that 
HU, as a theory of social reform, places undue stress upon the DPR and fails to provide a 
comprehensive, compelling argument for changes in the DPR that would enhance patient well­
being, which is a primary goal of medicine. Furthermore, HU fails to provide protections for 
autonomy, rights, and justice, and it recasts the nature of beneficence in terms that are not well- 
suited, if not actually harmful, to medicine. Something more is needed to protect the autonomy 
and rights of patients and their physicians as well as to provide for the claims of justice in the 
face of an ever-burgeoning complex medical-technological-financial cosmos.
Among possible alternatives to HU, the thesis suggests that natural law theory, with its 
longstanding philosophical foundation, may be a parallel track for discussions about the central 
significance of SL. Recognising the pluralistic nature of Western Culture, with its current 
secular basis, the thesis suggests a foundational approach from a non-religious perspective. The 
thesis calls for the need of a medical model, like an end-oriented beneficence model,230 that
230See thesis, 292.
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offers an alternative approach to the quality of life, autonomy-based models that are prevalent 
today. A holistic, healing approach like the “end-oriented beneficence model” presents a 
realistic view of the current need within the DPR for greater emphasis on patient self- 
determination that does not overwhelm and erode the centuries’-long development and 
confidence placed in caring medicine as a help toward healing and wholeness. This particular 
approach emphasises an ethic of care that is consistent with established medical canons and 
preserves SL. The model also provides a holistic approach to the moral relationship between 
the doctor and the patient. HU requires the focus to be placed upon results, whereas an end- 
oriented beneficent model focuses on both motives and ends in the DPR.231
Summary
This study has answered the research question by clarifying certain features of the PAS 
debate and demonstrating weaknesses inherent in HU that impact negatively on medical 
practice, particularly in the DPR. Mill’s theory for social policy may have made some sense 
when it was first applied to provide support against the institution of medicine’s infringement 
upon individual autonomy, but it provides questionable assistance in current end-of-life 
medical decisions for the DPR. Even though Mill’s theory has inherent weaknesses related to 
personal autonomy claims, still Mill’s advocates apply elements of HU as support for the much 
more complex PAS claims.
Since the arguments of HU and PAS are untenable in supporting a change in medical 
canons regarding killing, it is neither medically necessary nor morally advisable until 
consensus may be reached on the value of life, and certainly not until the core PAS features of
23IThe latter model also does not require PH as a first principle, but it does not discount 
its value in certain limited circumstances. PH, the desire to create a greater balance of pleasure 
over pain, is in one sense a useful aim within medicine, but its usefulness remains questionable 
as an overall theory of value, especially when coupled with a consequentialist theory of action. 
For example, to help a person to become restored to health, family, and community, while 
reducing and/or eliminating illness and pain and suffering is well within the goals of medicine. 
To establish PH as the greatest good is not a goal of medicine.
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rights, justice, medical killing, autonomy, and paternalism are resolved to a better degree of 
satisfaction. The thesis concludes with the same question which began its discussion 
concerning the philosophical quest for meaning of life in the face of harsh realities like the 
current culture of death. The thesis proposes that a further investigation of PAS claims is 
mandatory, as is an examination of the ethical issues that surround end-of-life decision­
making, before new medical canons are used as a legal warrant for the taking of another human 
life.
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